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Abstract 
 
Description Logics (DLs) are now the most commonly used ontology languages, in part 
because of the development of the Web Ontology Language (OWL) standards.  Yet it is 
accepted that DLs are difficult to comprehend and work with, particularly for ontology users 
who are not computer scientists.  The Manchester OWL Syntax (MOS) was developed to 
make DLs more accessible, by using English keywords in place of logic symbols or formal 
language.  Nevertheless, DLs continue to present difficulties, even when represented in 
MOS.  There has been some investigation of what features cause difficulties, specifically in 
the context of understanding how an entailment (i.e. an inference) follows from a 
justification (i.e. a minimal subset of the ontology that is sufficient for the entailment to 
hold), as is required when debugging an ontology.  However, there has been little attempt to 
relate these difficulties to how people naturally reason and use language. 
This dissertation draws on theories of reasoning from cognitive psychology, and also insights 
from the philosophy of language, to understand the difficulties experienced with DLs and to 
make suggestions to mitigate those difficulties.  The language features investigated were 
those known to be commonly used, both on the basis of analyses reported in the literature 
and after a survey of ontology users.  Two experimental studies investigated participants’ 
ability to reason with DL statements.  These studies demonstrate that insights from 
psychology and the philosophy of language can be used both to understand the difficulties 
experienced and to make proposals to mitigate those difficulties.  The studies suggest that 
people reason using both the manipulation of syntax and the representation of semantics with 
mental models; both approaches can lead to errors.  Particular difficulties were associated 
with: functional object properties; negated conjunction; the interaction of negation and the 
existential or universal restrictions; and nested restrictions.  Proposals to mitigate these 
difficulties include the adoption of new language keywords; tool enhancement, e.g. to 
provide syntactically alternative expressions; and the introduction during training both of De 
Morgan’s Laws for conjunction and disjunction, and their analogues for existential and 
universal restrictions.  A third study then investigated the effectiveness of the proposed new 
keywords; finding that these keywords could mitigate some of the difficulties experienced. 
Apart from the immediate applicability of these results to DLs, the approach taken in this 
dissertation could be extended widely to computer languages, including languages for 
interacting with databases and with Linked Data.  Additionally, based on the experience of 
the three studies, the dissertation makes some methodological recommendations which are 
relevant to a range of human-computer interaction studies. 
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1. Introduction – Description Logics and human reasoning 
The fundamental problem of ontology is managing the complexity - and doing so in a 
way that people can understand. 
John Sowa1 
1.1 Research questions 
The goal of this work is to understand the difficulties people experience using Description 
Logics (DLs2) to create and edit ontologies, and from that understanding, to seek to mitigate 
those difficulties.  In particular, the work draws on insights from theories of reasoning 
developed by cognitive psychologists, and also from the philosophy of language. 
DLs are discussed in detail in Chapter 2.  In brief, they are modelling languages based on 
First Order Logic (FOL).  Over the past few decades their decidability and computational 
properties have been extensively studied.  Baader et al. (2003) provide a comprehensive 
overview of the theory of DLs, as well as describing applications in areas such as software 
engineering, medical informatics, digital libraries, natural language processing, and 
databases.  A Web Ontology Language, OWL, which is based on DLs has been standardised 
by the W3C (2001) and is used in a number of application domains for creating ontologies.  
In fact, OWL exists as a number of profiles, the properties of which are well understood 
(Motik et al., 2012). 
However, the usability of these languages, in particular their comprehensibility, has been 
much less studied.  There have been some notable exceptions.  For example, Rector et al. 
(2004) discuss the problems that people have working with DLs, based on their experiences 
of teaching OWL.   
Other researchers have investigated how to create comprehensible explanations of why an 
ontology gives rise to a particular inference (Nguyen et al. 2012, 2013).  Typically the 
ontology developer will be using a tool such as Protégé3 and will, from time to time, run a 
reasoner.  The reasoner may create an inference, or entailment, which the ontology developer 
does not expect and which may indicate an error in the ontology design.  At the same time 
the reasoner may provide a justification for this entailment, defined by Horridge et al. (2011, 
p. 241) as “a minimal subset of an ontology that is sufficient for an entailment to hold”.  
Horridge et al. (2011) present an intuitive model for determining the cognitive complexity 
of a particular justification, with a view to enabling a reasoner to choose an optimum 
justification4.  Horridge et al. (2011) compared the predictions of the model with the relative 
difficulty experienced by people in understanding a set of entailments, concluding that the 
model “fared reasonably well”.  Nguyen et al. (2012) were interested in automating the 
                                                 
1 In a post on ontolog-forum, 30th November 2013, see: 
http://ontolog.cim3.net/forum/ontolog-forum/2013-11/msg00117.html#nid09  
2 A glossary of acronyms is provided at the end of the dissertation, after the References and 
immediately before the Appendices. 
3 http://protege.stanford.edu/ 
4 The model comprised twelve factors, with varying weights.  For example, the number of 
different axiom types in the justification and the entailment together is weighted 100, i.e. the 
number of axiom types is multiplied by 100.  As another example, each axiom type in the 
entailment which is not in the justification causes 50 to be added to the overall score.  These 
two scores can be calculated from a syntactic analysis.  Other factors depended on the 
semantics and required entailment checking.  
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production of a proof tree, in English, to show why a particular entailment is a consequence 
of the ontology.  Such a proof tree consists of a sequence of deduction rules and the problem 
is to determine, from a number of possible proof trees, the one which is the most 
comprehensible.  To do this requires understanding the comprehensibility of each deduction 
rule.  Nguyen et al. (2012) investigated the comprehensibility of fifty-one typical deduction 
rules. 
There has been other work not directly looking at comprehensibility but investigating 
common ontology faults, some of which may originate from problems of comprehension.  
For example,  Kalyanpur et al. (2006) have analysed problems in existing ontologies and 
identified a number of underlying user errors.  Poveda-Villalon et al. (2012) have compiled 
a catalogue of potential ontology design faults, a number of which are classified as arising 
from problems of ‘human understanding’.   
This previous work has catalogued the kinds of errors people make and highlights the need 
to understand why those errors occur and to mitigate them.  However, none of this work has 
made use of findings from cognitive psychology.  Other areas of computing, in particular 
relating to the human-computer interface, have drawn on and contributed to cognitive 
psychology, going back to pioneering work in the last century (Card, Moran, & Newell, 
1983).  Theoretical models have been used to create an understanding of human 
performance.  An example is the use of the ‘Goals, Operators, Methods, Selection’ (GOMS) 
model to understand text editing performance (Card et al., 1983, chapter 5).  Card et al. 
(1983) were concerned with physical issues such as screen and keyboard layout.  The work 
of Yamauchi (2007) is more related to the inferencing studied in this dissertation.  He 
investigated the extent to which people make predictions about individuals based on class 
tags and property tags; finding that the former are more important for prediction than the 
latter.  However work to understand the difficulties of DLs, and of OWL in particular, has 
been limited to the anecdotal (Rector et al., 2004) and to controlled experiments to identify 
which constructs give difficulty (Horridge et al., 2011; Nguyen et al., 2012).  This work does 
not explain why those constructs give difficulty.  Without that understanding it is not 
possible to generalize beyond the particular constructs studied.  Yet there has been 
considerable research on human reasoning which offers the possibility of providing 
generalizable explanations of human performance in dealing with these DL constructs.  The 
goal of this work is to find those generalizable explanations and use them to motivate 
solutions to overcome the difficulties. 
Thus, the research questions investigated in the current work are: 
(1) In what way can the difficulties experienced in using Description Logics be 
understood in terms of underlying theories, e.g., theories of reasoning, already developed 
within the cognitive psychology community? 
(2) In what way could such theories contribute to improving the usability of Description 
Logics? 
More specifically, the work investigates: 
(1A) What theories are available, and what are their relevant strengths in the context of 
DLs? 
(1B) How can these theories explain how people understand DL statements? 
How do these theories motivate: 
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(2A) notational extensions; 
(2B) tool enhancements; 
(2C) enhancements to training? 
1.2 Structure of the dissertation 
Chapter 2 discusses DLs, their role in describing ontologies, and some of the approaches and 
tools used.  Chapter 3 then gives an overview of the various theories of reasoning developed 
by psychologists, in particular the three used in the work reported here, i.e. theories based 
on the use of rules, mental models, and relational complexity.  This chapter also briefly 
discusses the concept of the implicature, taken from the philosophy of language.  Chapter 4 
then describes the methodology adopted for the current work, and the reasons for such a 
methodology. 
Chapter 5 describes a survey into the use of ontologies.  This survey served to confirm the 
importance of DLs, identified the most commonly used DL constructs and also identified 
some of the problems people experience in using DLs. 
The next three chapters describe three laboratory studies.  Chapter 6 describes a study 
specifically designed to investigate difficulties with frequently used DL constructs in the 
context of common ontology patterns.  This chapter starts to answer research question (1) 
above.  Chapter 7 continues to answer research question (1), by describing a study which 
further investigated the difficulties identified in the first study, as well as looking at some 
additional DL constructs.  The work reported in Chapters 6 and 7 led to some proposed 
modifications to the syntax, in response to research question (2A).  The effect of these 
modifications was investigated in the final study, described in Chapter 8. 
Chapter 9 reviews the underlying themes, both theoretical and methodological which have 
run through the dissertation.  Chapter 10 draws some conclusions, reviewing progress 
against the research questions, including a discussion of (2B) and (2C).  Finally, Chapter 10 
also outlines some areas for future work. 
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2. Ontologies and Description Logics 
 
… since Aristotle, it [logic] has been unable to advance a step and, thus, to all 
appearance has reached its completion. 
Immanuel Kant, ‘Critique of Pure Reason’, Preface to second edition, 1787 
This chapter provides an overview of ontologies and Description Logics (DLs).  The purpose 
of the chapter is to provide the background required for later chapters, and presentation is 
skewed towards aspects relevant to those chapters.  Section 2.1 provides a general discussion 
of ontologies.  Section 2.2 then gives an overview of DLs and section 2.3 discusses the OWL 
family of DLs.  Section 2.4 discusses some of the known difficulties with using OWL.  
Section 2.5 talks about ontology development, describing the mainstream tools as well as 
some more experimental approaches.  This section is left until after the discussion of DLs, 
since most ontology development today makes use of DLs.  Finally, section 2.6 reviews the 
main themes of the chapter and makes some conclusions.  
2.1. Ontologies 
The classic definition of an ontology, given by Gruber (1993) is “an explicit specification of 
a conceptualization”.  This has the virtue of precision but the defect of abstraction.  Its 
precision defines exactly what is and is not an ontology.  However, its abstraction gives no 
insight into what an ontology looks like or how it is created.  For the purposes of this 
dissertation a more concrete description of an ontology will be given.   
Ontologies are used to describe knowledge5.  More specifically, ontologies contain the three 
basic elements of any knowledge representation system: sets, members of sets, and relations 
between those set members.  In the context of an ontology, the sets are normally referred to 
as classes, the members of the sets as instances or individuals, and the relations as 
properties.  Note that properties are defined as potentially existing between the instances of 
two classes, such that one class provides the subject and the other the object, e.g. John plays 
tennis, where John is the subject and tennis the object of the property plays.  Here John 
might be an instance of a class Person and tennis an instance of a class Game.  The two 
classes providing the subject and object can, of course, be identical.  In fact, in the context 
of OWL, these kind of properties are more fully referred to as object properties; another 
type of property, the datatype property, will be introduced in subsection 2.3.3.  In this 
dissertation, wherever the term property is used unqualified, it is assumed to mean object 
property.  In principle, relations could be defined between classes, e.g. 
has_more_members_than6.  However, apart from the predefined subsumption relation, this 
is not generally done and this possibility will not be considered in this dissertation.  The 
reason is that this takes us outside of First Order Logic (FOL) and introduces problems of 
decidability, see the discussion below.   
Some writers reserve the term ontology for the classes, the properties, and the axioms 
relating classes and properties, e.g. the subsumption relations and domain and range 
statements.  The term knowledgebase is then used for the instances and the instantiation of 
properties between instances.  However, this distinction is not always observed. 
                                                 
5 Antoniou and van Harmelen (2004) state this precisely and succinctly: “an ontology describes formally a 
domain of discourse”.   
6 When property names comprise more than one word, they will be written with underscores. 
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An overview of knowledge representation, including a discussion of ontologies, is given in 
Sowa (2000). 
2.2. Description Logics 
2.2.1. An overview of Description Logics 
This subsection provides a brief overview of DLs.  For a more detailed introduction, see 
Krötzsch et al. (2012a).  DLs are formal modelling languages used to create ontologies.  
Because they are formal they enable automated reasoning; in this respect they differ from, 
say, the Unified Modeling Language (UML).  They comprise the three kinds of entities 
described above: individuals, classes and properties.  DLs possess three defining 
characteristics: 
1. They are based on First Order Logic (FOL)7.  In practice, most DLs are based on 
decidable fragments of FOL. 
2. They employ the Open World Assumption (OWA). 
3. They make use of operators which are analogous to the operators of FOL, but which 
have a different interpretation because they are concerned with classes not propositions.  
In the place of conjunction, disjunction and negation, they have intersection, union and 
complement.  In the place of the existential and universal quantifiers, they have 
existential and universal restrictions, which are used to define classes. 
Each of these will be considered in turn. 
Full FOL is undecidable.  For example, in full FOL, no algorithm to determine whether one 
class is a subclass of another can be guaranteed to terminate.  However, various judicious 
choices of subsets of FOL enable such guaranteed-to-terminate algorithms to be constructed. 
The OWA means that the absence of a fact from the knowledgebase does not mean that the 
fact is false.  This differs from the typical database application, where the absence of John 
Smith from a company employee database would imply that John Smith is not an employee.  
With a DL knowledgebase, if John Smith is not stated to be a company employee, all that 
one could infer is that the knowledgebase does not know whether he is an employee.  To 
exclude the possibility of his being an employee, the knowledgebase would need to include 
the explicit fact that he is not an employee, or else contain sufficient other facts to enable the 
deduction that he is not an employee.  Another consequence of the OWA is that one cannot 
assume, without other evidence, that two different names refer to different entities.  For 
example, John and Smith may refer to the same individual.  To infer that the names represent 
different individuals there either needs to be an explicit statement to that effect, or it needs 
to be possible to deduce that they are different from the statements in the knowledgebase.  
The OWA fits well with Web applications which need to work with incomplete data, in 
contrast to a corporate database which might be assumed to be complete. 
The third point above is more subtle, but differentiates the use of logic and logic symbols in 
DLs from their normal use in mathematical logic.  As an example, consider the use of the 
existential restriction.  In the so-called German DL syntax, standard logical symbols are 
used, including ∃ for existential restriction and ⊤ for Everything, i.e. the domain of 
discourse.  Assuming that P is a property, it is possible to write: 
                                                 
7 “Description Logics (DLs) are a family of knowledge representation languages … equipped with a logic-
based semantics which, up to some differences in notation, is actually the same semantics as that of classical 
first-order logic” (Baader et al. 2017). 
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∃ P.⊤ 
This defines an anonymous class containing all the individuals which are the subject of a 
property P, i.e. all the individuals a for which an individual b exists such that a P b.  Thus, 
the symbol normally used for existential quantifier (∃) is being used to represent existential 
restriction.  The symbol is here not explicitly stating the existence of an individual, it is being  
used to define a class.  It might be construed as implicitly stating that, for each a in the 
anonymous class, then there exists b such that a P b.  However, the existence of any such 
individual b is not guaranteed.  It might be that the anonymous class defined above is empty, 
i.e. that there is no instance of the property P in the knowledgebase, and hence no individuals 
a and b acting as subject and object of the object property, P. 
DL syntaxes created by logicians, like the German DL syntax, are generally not regarded as 
ideal for domain experts who are non-logicians, e.g. see Horridge et al. (2006).  However, it 
is also likely that the use of a restriction to define classes, rather than a quantifier to make 
statements about individuals in classes, may present difficulties even to those familiar with 
logical notation.   
The same difficulty applies to the use of the universal restriction.  However, here there is an 
extra difficulty which creates problems in writing and interpreting DL statements.  Consider 
the following statement: 
∀ P. X 
Here P is again a property, and X is assumed to have been declared to be a class.  This 
statement defines the anonymous class containing all those individuals a such that 
either: 
• whenever a is the subject of an instance of P, the object is in the class X; or 
• a is never the subject of an instance of P. 
The first option is equivalent to stating that, for all b such that a P b and a is in the 
anonymous class defined above, it is the case that b is in X.  The use of for all in the last 
sentence corresponds to the common usage of the phrase.  The second option occurs 
because, in mathematical logic, any statement will be valid for the members of the 
empty set.  The existence of the possibility exemplified by the second bullet point above 
is sometimes referred to as the ‘trivial satisfaction of the universal restriction’, e.g. see 
Rector et al. (2004).  As a consequence, in DLs, if no b exists such that a P b, then a will 
also be in the anonymous class. 
To the non-logician this can be confusing, and the second option above is often 
overlooked.  In everyday language, the phrase for all x has the implicature that x exists.  
That is to say, it does not logically imply that x exists, but conveys an assumption of 
existence.  The word implicature, coined by Grice (1975) is used rather than 
implication, since the latter has a variety of meanings.  An overview of implicatures in 
general, along with a detailed discussion of one particular sort, is given by Carston 
(1998). 
In fact, in Aristotle’s study of syllogisms all implied existence, see Khemlani and 
Johnson-Laird (2012) who cite Strawson (1952).  The introduction of the more general 
sense of the universal quantifier, which leads to the second option above, was 
introduced into the mathematical treatment of logic developed in the late nineteenth 
century. 
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In this context it is worth noting the role of the domain and range statements which are 
implemented in some DLs.  These statements are not provided for error checking in 
the manner of, for example, typed variables in some programming languages.  They are 
simply additional axioms which can be used to make inferences.  Thus, if the domain of 
a property, P, is given to be class X then the statement a P b enables the inference that 
the individual a is a member of X.  Similarly if the range of P is given as Y, then a P b 
enables the inference that b is in Y. 
In fact, domain and range statements are not necessary as they can be replaced with 
existential and universal quantification respectively.  The statement that P has domain 
X is equivalent to the statement that all individuals which are the subject of an instance 
of P are in X, i.e.: 
∃ P.⊤ ⊆ X 
The statement that P has range Y is equivalent to the statement that all individuals which 
serve as objects of instances of P are in Y.  This is equivalent to stating that every individual 
is either the subject of an instance of P such that the object is in Y, or else is not the subject 
of an instance of P, i.e.: 
∀ P. Y ≡ ⊤ 
DLs also typically include the Boolean concept constructors intersection, union and 
complement.  As noted by Krötzsch et al. (2012a), these are also knowns as conjunction, 
disjunction and negation, because of their relationship to conjunction, disjunction and 
negation in logic.  Throughout this dissertation, both terminologies will be used 
interchangeably.  However, this question of terminology will be returned to later.  In the 
German DL notation intersection, union and complement are represented by ⊓, ⊔ and ¬ 
respectively. 
2.2.2. The Web Ontology Language (OWL) 
DLs were developed during the last few decades of the 20th century, see Nardi and Brachman 
(2003) for background and history.  Much early research went into investigating which 
subsets of FOL are decidable.  Considerable research was also dedicated to investigating the 
computational tractability of these subsets, i.e. the space and time requirements of algorithms 
to determine subsumption and class membership. 
By the beginning of the 21st century, the success of the World Wide Web (WWW) led to 
calls to make the Web ‘semantic’.  The intention was to go beyond a web of information 
purely for direct human consumption to a web of data which enabled automatic reasoning 
across various data sources (Berners-Lee et al. 2001).  The decision was taken to base an 
enhanced, semantic Web on DLs.  An alternative knowledge representation formalism 
considered was frame logic (F-Logic).  F-Logic is an object-oriented database logic (Kifer 
& Lausen, 1989).  It uses the Closed World Assumption (CWA); if something cannot be 
shown to be true, then it is assumed to be false.  As already observed, one of the reasons for 
adopting DLs for the Semantic Web was that the latter’s OWA was believed to be more 
suited to the open environment of the Web where not all facts on a given topic are available. 
HyperText Markup Language (HTML) was the original markup language for the WWW, 
and this language was purely aimed at the presentational level.  The requirement for a 
semantic web necessitated a language with which ontologies could be constructed.  The 
Resource Description Framework (RDF) was developed to provide a very basic 
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functionality, enabling the creation of subject, predicate, object triples.  Since any given 
entity can be involved in any number of such triples, the resultant structure is a graph, which 
is usually serialized in XML.  The RDF schema language (RDFS) extended RDF, e.g. with 
the introduction of the concepts of subclass and subproperty.  Antoniou and van Harmelen 
(2004), and Allemang and Hendler  (2011) provide information on these developments.   
There was a perceived need to go beyond RDFS and create a DL for use on the WWW. 
DAML+OIL was an early attempt at such a language, see Horrocks (2002)8.  This developed 
into the Web Ontology Language (OWL), created and standardised by the World Wide Web 
Consortium (W3C).  OWL is a set of standardised DL profiles.  Originally there were three 
species of OWL: OWL Full, OWL DL and OWL Lite, see Antoniou and van Harmelen 
(2004).  OWL Full is not decidable.  OWL DL is a subset of OWL Full chosen to be 
decidable, whilst OWL Lite is a subset of OWL DL chosen to improve computational 
tractability. 
A second generation of OWL contained three profiles: 
• OWL 2 QL; designed for database-like applications with a simple schema and large 
amounts of data. 
• OWL 2 EL; designed for applications with a large number of classes, as are found in 
the life sciences. 
• OWL 2 RL; designed for applications which employ rules, e.g. business rules. 
These profiles differ in the particular constructs used and in the precise manner in which 
they can be used.  Allemang and Hendler (2011) and Horridge et al. (2012) provide more 
detail on these.  Motik et al. (2012)  provide an overview, with links to various W3C 
documents.  OWL is one of the technologies supporting the semantic web9.  Specifically, 
OWL builds on RDF and XML.  Thus an OWL ontology can be expressed as an RDF graph 
and serialized as XML.  For a detailed description of the relation between OWL and DLs, 
see Baader et al. (2017, Chapter 8). 
OWL exists within an ecosystem of tools, frequently employing XML as an exchange 
format.  One of the most commonly used tools is Protégé10, a free open-source ontology 
editor developed at Stanford University.  Protégé makes use of a graphical user interface 
with panes to provide a class, individual and property-oriented view.  The software has a 
long history; its early development is recorded by Gennari et al. (2003). It was originally 
developed for biomedical applications and used a frame-based, rather than DL paradigm.  
The frame-based approach originated with Minsky (1974) and is loosely related to the 
object-oriented approach in programming.  One particular feature not shared with DLs is 
that frame-based systems allow for defaults and the creation of exceptions.  However, the 
widespread adoption of DLs has meant that current versions of Protégé are entirely DL-
based.  The software incorporates a reasoner to compute class subsumption and membership 
relations.  A wide variety of plugins are available, e.g. for ontology visualization11.  A guide 
to using Protégé 4 is provided by Horridge (2011).  The current version is Protégé 5.  There 
                                                 
8 DAML+OIL was the result of a merger between DAML-ONT, developed by the US DARPA programme, 
and OIL, developed chiefly in Europe.  DAML is an acronym for DARPA Agent Markup Language; OIL is 
an acronym for Ontology Inference Layer. 
9 https://www.w3.org/standards/semanticweb/ 
10 http://protege.stanford.edu/ 
11 For the Protégé plugin library, see http://protegewiki.stanford.edu/wiki/Protege_Plugin_Library 
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is also a web-based version of Protégé created particularly for collaborative ontology 
development. 
2.2.3. OWL syntaxes 
OWL is not associated with one prescribed syntax or notation.  Rather, various syntaxes 
have been adopted.  As already noted, DLs were conceived by logicians and they used the 
standard mathematical symbols for the existential quantifier (∃) and universal quantifier (∀) 
along with the standard set-theoretic symbols for union (⊔), intersection (⊓), the formation 
of a complement (¬) and the subset relationship (⊒).  These symbols were originally used 
by Protégé. 
At an early stage an abstract syntax was constructed, to enable OWL ontologies to be more 
easily shared between people, see Patel-Schneider et al. (2004).  A functional syntax was 
used which contained keywords such as unionOf, intersectionOf, complementOf.  The 
existential and universal restrictions were achieved by the use of the keywords restriction 
and SomeValuesFrom or AllValuesFrom.  As an example, the expression ∃ P.⊤ would be 
written: 
restriction(P someValuesFrom(owl:Thing)) 
P would normally be replaced by a mnemonic property name, including a namespace prefix. 
Somewhat later a related functional-style syntax was developed for the second generation of 
OWL (OWL 2), see Motik et al. (2012).  Like the abstract syntax this used some and all, in 
compound words, to represent the existential and universal restrictions.  In this the authors 
of these syntaxes were following the use of these words in a common English rendering of 
the Aristotelian syllogisms12.  The functional-style syntax also used union, intersection and 
complement in compound words, e.g. ObjectUnionOf. 
The abstract and functional syntaxes may have been more readable to the non-logician than 
the mathematical notation, although this does not appear to have been tested.  However, this 
was at the expense of verbosity.  The Manchester OWL Syntax (MOS) was created to 
combine readability and succinctness, see Horridge et al. (2006) for the original description 
of MOS, and Horridge and Patel-Schneider (2008) for some additional features.  The former 
authors used capital letters for the keywords.  However, the latter adopted lowercase and this 
convention is the one currently used.  The current status of the syntax is described by 
Horridge and Patel-Schneider (2012).  MOS is now used in the Protégé tool. 
MOS uses the keywords or, and and not for union, intersection and complement.  This is a 
departure from the previous syntaxes.  Note that these are not set-theoretic terms; apart from 
their usage in everyday language they are used in logic, e.g. FOL and Boolean algebra.  They 
are, however, being used in MOS as operators on classes, i.e. as replacements for the set-
theoretic terms.  They were presumably adopted because they were regarded as more 
familiar than the set-theoretic terms.  However, there may be some ambiguity about the 
words or and and.  This point will be returned to in chapters 3 and 9. 
MOS uses the keywords some and only for the existential and universal restrictions.  For 
some the authors were following the convention in the previous syntaxes.  As already noted 
this has a history going back to Aristotle.  The use of only is, however, another departure 
                                                 
12 In Aristotle all syllogisms are expressed using premises and conclusions of the form: All A are B; No A are 
B; Some A are B; Some A are not B. 
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from previous practice.  Note that the Aristotelian premise all X are Y can be rewritten only 
Y are X. 
MOS also uses an infix notation.  As regards the set-theoretic operators or and and this was 
a return to the convention used in the German DL notation.  For the restrictions, the German 
DL syntax used a prefix notation, e.g. as in ∃ P.⊤.  The abstract syntax uses a combination 
of prefix and infix.  Consider the example given previously: 
restriction(P someValuesFrom(owl:Thing)) 
This is prefix as regards the keyword restriction but infix as regards someValuesFrom.  
However, MOS drops the use of restriction and this results in an entirely infix notation: 
P some Thing 
The replacement of all with only may have been to avoid an ambiguity arising from the use 
of the shortened keyword.  In the abstract syntax P allValuesFrom X makes it relatively clear 
that all the entities selected as an object of the property P (for subjects in this anonymous 
class) will be chosen from the class X.  However, P all X might give the false impression 
that all members of X are to be used as objects of P.  P only X is arguably less ambiguous. 
The relative advantages of the various possible alternative keywords does not seem to have 
been evaluated in any systematic way.  Nor has the advantages and disadvantages of prefix 
and infix notation been studied.  Chapter 8 considers the effect of some alternative keywords 
and also compares human performance with prefix and infix notation in some particular 
situations. 
2.2.4 DLs, OWL and MOS 
To finish this section, it is useful to recap the distinction between DLs, OWL and MOS: 
• DLs are knowledge representation languages based on FOL.  In practice, they are 
frequently based on decidable subsets of FOL. 
• OWL is a set of standardized DLs, i.e. a subset of all possible DLs.  With the 
exception of OWL Full, they are chosen to be decidable.  OWL Lite and the three 
species of OWL 2 are also chosen for their computational tractability. 
• MOS is a particular syntax frequently used for the OWL species. 
Chapters 6 to 8 investigate difficulties with DLs.  These investigations concentrate on 
language constructs occurring in several of the OWL species, and make use of MOS.  Thus, 
this work is concerned with difficulties arising from the specific syntax and also with 
difficulties arising from the underlying DL constructs.  In the latter case, the difficulties may 
be mitigated or exacerbated by the choice of syntax. 
2.3. Key features of OWL 
This section describes the key features of DLs, as implemented in the various species of 
OWL.  Not all the features here are included in all the species of OWL.  The treatment here 
is skewed towards those features which are relevant to the work described in this dissertation.  
Throughout the remainder of the dissertation the syntax used for OWL statements is a 
slightly modified version of MOS.  Specifically, the syntax follows that in Horridge and 
Patel–Schneider (2012) with the exceptions that: 
• The colon which follows certain keywords is omitted. 
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• The keyword Types was replaced by its singular form, Type13.  In studies 2 and 3, the 
keyword Characteristics was replaced by Characteristic14. 
• As already noted above, the study reported in Chapter 8 experiments with certain 
variations in keywords and syntax. 
2.3.1. Classes 
The set-theoretic operators union, intersection and complement, plus the relationship 
subclass have already been described.  OWL also permits classes to be defined as equivalent 
or as disjoint.  Additionally, a class can be described as a disjoint union of a number of other 
classes. 
The use of the existential and universal restrictions to define classes has already been 
described.  As already noted, these are generically referred to as property restrictions.  They 
are frequently used with the subclass and equivalence relations, e.g.: 
X SubClassOf has_child some MALE15 
X EquivalentTo has_child some MALE 
The first of these statements specifies that all members of X have one or more sons, and says 
nothing about whether or not they have daughters.  The second statement defines X to be the 
class of individuals who have one or more sons, again irrespective of whether they have 
daughters. 
Note also the analogous statements using only: 
X SubClassOf has_child only MALE 
X EquivalentTo has_child only MALE 
The first of these specifies that all members of X have only sons, or no children at all.  The 
second that X is exactly the set of individuals who have either only sons or no children at all. 
Another category of property restriction is based on cardinality, specifically maximum, 
minimum and exact cardinality.  As an example, using MOS, we could write: 
has_child exactly 4 
This defines a class of individuals with exactly 4 children.  Using min or max we could 
define class of individuals with a minimum or maximum of 4 children respectively. 
Similarly, we could write: 
has_child exactly 4 MALE 
to define the class of individuals with exactly 4 sons.  Note that this places no restriction on 
the number of daughters.  Individuals in this class might have no daughters or very many. 
                                                 
13 This was done for simplicity in the questions used for the studies, since in these questions the Type and 
keyword was only followed by one entity. 
14 In study 1 some object properties were declared to have more than one characteristic, hence the keyword 
Characteristics was used.  In studies 2 and 3 this was not the case, and the keyword Characteristic was used. 
15 Throughout, class names are written with capital letters, or combinations of capitals, numbers and 
underscores.  Property and individual names are written with lowercase letters. 
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2.3.2. Individuals / instances 
Individuals can be defined as being members of a class, e.g. to define a as a member of class 
X: 
a Type X 
Two names can be defined to refer to different individuals: 
a DifferentFrom b 
This is important because the OWA does not permit us to assume that different names 
represent different individuals. 
Alternatively, we can specify that two different names do refer to the same individual: 
a SameAs b 
2.3.3. Properties 
Properties can be defined to have certain characteristics, based on the characteristics of 
relations studied by logicians.  In the following R represents an arbitrary relation; a and b 
represent arbitrary individuals.  Many of the examples are taken from Hitzler et al. (2012): 
symmetric, i.e. a R b implies that b R a.  Example: has_spouse. 
asymmetric, i.e. a R b implies that it is not the case that b R a.  Example: has_child. 
Note that asymmetric is stronger than not symmetric.  All asymmetric properties are 
not symmetric; however there are properties which are both not symmetric and not 
asymmetric, e.g. has_brother.  Similarly, symmetric is stronger than not asymmetric. 
reflexive, i.e. a R a for all a.  Example: has_same_age 
irreflexive, i.e. it is never the case that a R a.  Example: parent_of 
functional, i.e. a R b and a R c implies that b and c represent the same instance, 
or alternatively for any given property and any given subject for that property, 
there can only be one corresponding object.  An example is 
has_national_insurance_number.  As suggested by this example, functional 
properties are often used to indicate unique identifiers, analogously to a unique 
key in a database.   
inverse functional, i.e. a R b and c R b implies that a and c represent the same 
instance, or alternatively for any given property and any given object for that 
property, there can only be one corresponding subject.  Example: is_father_of.   
transitive, i.e. a R b and b R c implies a R c.  Example: has_ancestor 
In this dissertation, property characteristics are defined using the Characteristic keyword, 
e.g.: 
has_father Characteristic asymmetric 
It is possible to state that one property is the inverse of another, e.g.: 
is_father_of InverseOf has_father 
It is also possible to state that one property is a subproperty of another, e.g.: 
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has_child SubPropertyOf has_descendant 
Note that, in general subproperties do not inherit characteristics from their superproperties. 
For example, the symmetric, reflexive and transitive characteristics are not necessarily 
inherited.  Indeed, the concept of inheritance is inappropriate in this context.  That said, it is 
the case that there are certain characteristics which, if possessed by a property, will also be 
possessed by any subpropropety. An example is functionality, since if a subproperty has two 
different object entities for the same subject, then so will its superproperty.  Hence if a 
superproperty is functional, its subproperty must also be functional.  Thus, each 
characteristic must be considered separately and this needs to be stressed when teaching 
DLs.  For reference, Table 2-1 lists the OWL property characteristics, indicating whether the 
characteristic is transmitted to subproperties, and sketching a proof or providing a 
counterexample as appropriate16. 
The property characteristics in OWL are only a subset of the possible relational 
characteristics which can be studied logically.  For example, OWL does not possess an 
intransitive characteristic.  Such a characteristic would mean that, for an intransitive property 
R, a R b and b R c implies that it is not the case that a R c.  Halpin and Curland (2011) discuss 
a wider range of property characteristics available in Object Role Modelling17, commenting 
on which of these characteristics are available in OWL.  They note that some characteristics, 
or combinations of characteristics imply other characteristics.  As an example, they show 
that a symmetric and transitive property will also be reflexive.  In addition, some 
combinations of characteristics are not possible, e.g. a property cannot be both reflexive and 
irreflexive18. 
  
                                                 
16 Characteristics can be grouped into non-inheritable and inheritable characteristics: 
 
(i) Non-inheritable characteristics 
These are characteristics which imply the truth of additional property statements.  E.g., if S and T are symmetric 
and transitive properties respectively: 
a S b ⇒ b S a 
a T b; b T c ⇒ a T c 
These characteristics are not inherited because there is no guarantee that the inference will be valid when the 
superproperty is replaced with a subproperty.   
 
(ii) Inheritable characteristics 
These are characteristics which imply the falsehood of additional property statements.  E.g., if A and F are 
asymmetric and functional properties respectively: 
a A b ⇒ ¬ b A a 
a F b; ¬ (b = c) ⇒ ¬ a F c 
These characteristics are inherited because the inference remains valid when a superproperty is replaced with 
a subproperty; were the inference with the subproperty not valid, then the original inference with the 
superproperty could not be valid. 
 
Note that the reflexive and irreflexive characteristics are particular cases of (i) and (ii) respectively, where the 
set of statements on the left-hand side of the inference is the empty set.  If R and I are reflexive and irreflexive 
properties respectively, then a R a is always true and a I a is never true.  Using ∅ to represent the empty set, it 
is possible to write: 
∅ ⇒ a R a 
∅ ⇒ ¬ a I a 
17 http://www.orm.net/  
18 Strictly speaking, an exception to this is the bottom property.  Baader et al. (2017) define the bottom property 
as “a property whose extension is empty in every interpretation”.  Thus it is the property for which there are 
no property assertions, i.e. the set of property assertions is the empty set.  Any statement is, therefore vacuously 
true of the elements of this set, and hence the bottom property can be said to possess any characteristic. 
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Table 2-1 OWL property characteristics, indicating whether a characteristic is transmitted 
to subproperties.   
characteristic of 
P 
transmitted to 
subproperty S 
proof or counterexample 
transitive No property descendant_of, subproperty child_of 
functional Yes a S b ⇒ a P b and a S c ⇒ a P c.  So a S b; a S c 
⇒ a P b; a P c ⇒ b ≡ c (by functionality of P).  
Hence S is also functional. 
inverse functional Yes a S b ⇒ a P b and c S b ⇒ c P b.  So a S b; c S b 
⇒ a P b; c P b ⇒ a ≡ c (by inverse functionality 
of P).  Hence S is also inverse functional. 
symmetric No property sibling, subproperty sister 
asymmetric Yes Given a S b assume b S a.  Then: 
a S b ⇒ a P b and b S a ⇒ b P a 
However, we cannot have both a P b and b P a, by 
asymmetry of P.  Hence we cannot have b S a, i.e. 
a S b ⇒ ¬ b S a 
reflexive No property greater_than_or_equal_to 
subproperty greater_than 
irreflexive Yes a S a ⇒ a P a, which contradicts the irreflexivity 
of P.  Hence ¬ a S a, i.e. S is irreflexive. 
N.B. in the proofs, P is the superproperty, assumed to possess the particular property 
characteristic; S is a subproperty of P 
Strictly speaking, much of the foregoing discussion is related to object properties, i.e. 
relations between instances.  Besides classes, instances and properties, OWL also contains 
literals.  As a result, besides object properties there are also datatype properties, i.e. 
describing relations between an instance and a literal, e.g. John has_age 30.  Datatype 
properties can also have subproperties, which are also datatype properties.  However, it is 
not possible to define the inverse of a datatype property, and with the exception of functional, 
the characteristics above relate only to object properties.   
2.4. Difficulties with DLs 
Chapter 1 noted that there has been a small number of papers reporting on user difficulties 
with DLs.  Rector et al. (2004), based on their experience of teaching OWL DL, found four 
logical issues which users find particularly difficult.  Expressed in MOS, these are: 
1. A tendency to assume that only implies some. 
2. Confusion between and and or. 
3. A combination of (1) and (2), where the use of and between disjoint classes creates 
Nothing (⊥), which leads to the trivial satisfaction of a universal restriction. 
4. Confusion between P some (not X) and not (P some  X). 
To illustrate (3), referring to the pizza ontology (see Horridge et al. (2011)) which was used 
by Rector et al. for training, students may write has_topping only (Meat and Fish) when they 
mean has_topping only (Meat or Fish).  The former is a valid class definition, but can only 
be satisfied by pizzas with no topping, since Meat and Fish is the empty class, i.e. the class 
Meat and the class Fish are disjoint.  The authors also proposed a set of paraphrases for the 
main OWL constructs, suggesting that these be used in the comments on the ontology to 
help confirm that the constructs are achieving what is desired. 
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Kalyanpur et al. (2006) have added four additional issues to this list, based on their analysis 
of  unsatisfiable classes found in ontologies.  Expressed in MOS, these are: 
1. Writing EquivalentTo when SubClassOf is meant.  They regard this as “the most 
common reason for unsatisfiability [of a concept]”. 
2. Writing A SubClassOf B and A SubClassOf C when what is intended is A SubClassOf (B 
or C). 
3. Writing P Domain A and P Range B instead of A SubClassOf P only B. 
4. Writing P Domain A and P Domain B instead of P Domain (A or B). 
Note that (2) and (4) are variants on the confusion between and and or identified by Rector 
et al. (2004). 
As noted in section 1.1, Horridge et al. (2011) were interested in the relative 
comprehensibility of different justifications for a particular entailment.  They proposed an 
intuitive cognitive complexity model to compute the complexity of any particular 
entailment, based on the DL constructs used in the justification.  They tested the model by 
providing study participants with six justifications and in each case asking the participants 
to confirm whether or not a putative entailment could be inferred.  The model categorised 
the justifications into three easy and three hard and found that this categorisation was 
consistent with participants’ experience for four of the six justifications. 
Nguyen et al. (2012) were interested in the relative comprehensibility of deduction rules.  
They presented participants with 51 deduction rules with valid inferences, plus some with 
non-valid inferences.  Participants were asked to confirm the validity, with success rates for 
the 51 valid rules ranging from 1 to 0.04.  These success rates, which they termed facility 
indexes, could then potentially be used by an algorithm to optimise the comprehensibility of 
a deduction chain. 
2.5. Ontology development 
2.5.1. General purpose ontology development tools 
Mention has already been made of the GUI-based tool, Protégé, which was one of the earliest 
ontology editors.  Protégé continues to be developed and is one of the most widely used.  
TopQuadrant19 (2014) provide a commercial ontology editor, TopBraid Composer, similar 
in philosophy to Protégé.  There are now a very wide range of plug-ins available for 
Protégé20, including reasoners.  The current version of Protégé is downloaded with the 
Hermit reasoner (Glimm et al. 2014), one of a number of highly optimised reasoners.  Some 
reasoners are optimised for particular species of OWL.  For example ELK, also available for 
Protégé, is optimised for OWL 2 EL (Kazakov et al. 2012).   
A considerable number of ontology visualization tools have also been developed, some as 
plug-ins for Protégé.    Visualizers are frequently designed primarily to navigate all or part 
of an ontology.  An early one was Jambalaya (Storey et al., 2001) which adopted techniques 
previously used in software visualization.  Another application of visualization is to compare 
ontologies, e.g. OWLDiff, see Křemen et al. (2011).  Both these visualizers are available as 
Protégé plug-ins.  An early review of ontology visualization tools was provided by Katifori 
et al. (2007). Ramakrishnan and Vijayan (2014) provide a more recent review. 
                                                 
19 http://www.topquadrant.com 
20 For Protégé plug-ins, see http://protegewiki.stanford.edu/wiki/Protege_Plugin_Library 
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Some visualization tools show only the subsumption hierarchy.  The classic problem here is 
enabling users to focus in on a part of the ontology whilst seeing that part in the context of 
the whole ontology.  Katifori et al. recommend different visualizers for different size ranges.  
Some do show object properties as well as the subsumption hierarchy.  OWLPropViz21 was 
designed specifically to show the object properties; the user can select which properties are 
to be shown, and also whether to show subsumption, disjointedness and class equivalence.  
However, where object properties are shown there is very rarely any support for human 
reasoning about those properties.  Systems which do support such reasoning are described 
in subsection 2.5.5. 
Apart from problem of actually displaying large ontologies, the layout of such ontologies 
creates computational problems.  A recent visualizer, NavigOWL (Hussain et al., 2014), is 
based on the observation that when an ontology is represented as a graph, a small proportion 
of the nodes are power nodes, i.e. highly connected to other nodes.  Taking account of this 
fact enables the design of a more efficient layout algorithm than would be possible if all 
nodes were treated equally.   
2.5.2. Textual approaches 
GUI tools, such as Protégé, are widely popular; however Lord (2015) has noted that they are 
not ideal for large ontologies, or ontologies with a great deal of repetition.  Such ontologies 
were part of the motivation for developing textual approaches to creating OWL ontologies, 
based on particular programming languages.  Ogbuji (2008) developed InfixOWL building 
on Python and using an infix syntax based on MOS.  For example the InfixOWL some and 
only operators are associated with methods that construct the existential and universal 
restrictions.  Nickles (2014) has taken a functional-logic programming approach based on 
Javascript and JSON.   
Matassoni et al. (2014) developed a language based on the LaTeX22 syntax.  They surveyed 
ten knowledge engineers to obtain their views on the intuitiveness and conciseness of their 
syntax, compared with five other OWL syntaxes, including MOS.  To do this they presented 
the engineers with ten samples of OWL usage, each one represented in each of the six 
syntaxes.  The LaTeX-like syntax and MOS were very similarly regarded for intuitiveness, 
and clearly ahead of the next best, which was the functional syntax.  The LaTeX-like syntax 
was the clear favourite for conciseness, well ahead of functional syntax and then MOS.  The 
other three syntaxes used, Turtle, OWL/XML and RDF/XML, were very poorly regarded 
for both intuitiveness and conciseness. 
Lord (2015; 2013) has taken a related approach in developing Tawny OWL.  Tawny OWL 
makes use of Clojure, a dialect of Lisp built on a java virtual machine, thereby providing 
easy access to the OWL API.  It uses the MOS keywords but a prefix notation taken from 
Lisp.  Functions are variadic, e.g. or X Y Z indicates the disjunction of X, Y and Z.  
Abstraction, e.g. the definition of patterns, is enabled via Lisp functions and macros.  There 
are also some in-built patterns, e.g. value partition23.  Apart from supporting repetition, the 
programming approach enables the use of environments and tools for software development 
rather than developing tools specifically for ontology development.  The use of macros and 
functions means that the programmer’s intention is more evident from the source.  Relatively 
                                                 
21 http://protegewiki.stanford.edu/wiki/OWLPropViz 
22 https://www.latex-project.org/ 
23 For a discussion of value partitions, see Rector (2005). 
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compact source code, with well chosen macro or function names, is more readable than 
longer source code with repetitive sections. 
2.5.3. Controlled Natural Languages 
The textual systems described in the previous subsection were based on formally defined 
computer languages.  An alternative approach is to use a controlled natural language (CNL), 
i.e. one based on a natural language.  CNLs have a long history; they were used for 
communication, e.g. between non-native speakers of English, prior to their use in computing.  
They have also been used as simplified languages to facilitate translation.  Kuhn (2014) 
provides a survey and traces their development back to the 1930s.  The essence of a CNL is 
that it is an approximate subset of a natural language designed to simplify the language.  The 
adjective approximate is necessary because, as Kuhn (2014) points out, there may be “small 
deviations from natural grammar or semantics”.  Kuhn provides a classification of language 
based on four dimensions, represented by the acronym PENS, for precision, expressiveness, 
naturalness and simplicity.  The last of these refers to the effort required to describe the 
language.  Each dimension is divided into five categories.  English lacks precision, is very 
expressive and natural, and very complex to describe.  This is categorised as P1E5N5S1.  
Propositional Logic (PL), on the other hand, is very precise, neither expressive nor natural, 
but simple to describe.  It is categorised as P5E1N1S5.  Thus English and PL are at 
diametrically opposite corners of the four dimensional space used to describe language.  
MOS is categorised as P5E2N2S4, i.e. high in precision and simplicity but low in 
expressiveness and naturalness.  Kuhn (2014) adopts the convention that to be classified as 
a CNL, a language must have a naturalness of three or greater.  By this convention, MOS is 
not a CNL.  Kuhn also notes that CNLs can be defined in a proscriptive or prescriptive 
fashion, or a combination of the two.  In the proscriptive case the language definition 
specifies what is not allowed; in the prescriptive case what is allowed.  More generally, we 
might regard CNLs as being derived from a natural language by the removal of those 
constructs which create ambiguity.  On the other hand, MOS was created from logical 
notation by removing those symbols which were felt to be off-putting to some users, e.g. the 
existential and universal quantifier symbols, and replacing them with words from the English 
language. 
Within the domain of computing, CNLs have been used for software specification, and more 
recently for ontology generation.  Examples of such languages are ACE, Rabbit and Sydney 
OWL Syntax (SOS).  ACE has been designed to translate natural language into first order 
logic, originally for software specification (Kaljurand, 2007; Kuhn, 2014),.  Fuchs et al. 
(2006) describe its use for knowledge representation.  Rabbit was designed specifically to 
translate into OWL, see Hart et al. (2007) for an introduction to the language.  SOS, the 
design of which is discussed in Cregan et al. (2007) had a similar goal to Rabbit. 
A comparison of the three languages is given by Schwitter et al. (2008).  They highlight a 
design decision which differentiates ACE and SOS from Rabbit.  With ACE and SOS, when 
stating the characteristics of an object property, dummy names are used.  Thus, using the 
example from Schwitter et al. (2008), to define larger than as asymmetric, one writes in 
ACE: if something X is larger than something Y then Y is not larger than X.  Similarly, in 
SOS one writes: if X is larger than Y then Y is not larger than X.  However, in Rabbit the 
ontology author is expected to have an understanding of the terminology associated with 
object properties and to write: the relationship “is larger than” is asymmetric.  This is an 
aspect of a general design decision about how much one wishes to protect the author from 
the technical language of DLs. 
23 
 
A number of researchers have investigated the use of CNLs for ontology creation.  
Engelbrecht et al. (2010) investigated the ease with which domain experts could use the 
Rabbit language.  Apart from suggesting some changes to Rabbit syntax, this highlighted 
the need for an authoring tool.   
Indeed, a Protégé plug-in for Rabbit (ROO) has been produced, see Denaux et al. (2010), 
although not used in the Engelbrecht et al. study.  Another Protégé plug-in, ACEView 
(Kaljurand, 2008), has been developed for writing ACE statements.  As well as generating 
OWL, ACEView can generate SWRL (Horrocks et al., 2004) and DL-Query24  statements, 
thereby offering a unified interface to the three languages.  
Dimitrova et al. (2008) compared ROO with ACEView.  They found a number of errors 
which occurred with both tools and which may be a feature of ontologies created from CNLs: 
• Some classes had a number of immediate superclasses; they regarded this as an error 
although in some cases it might be the correct approach.   
• What should have been classes were recorded as instances.   
• Redundant axioms were entered, i.e. axioms which repeated knowledge already present 
in the knowledgebase. 
Kuhn (2013) has compared the understandability of ACE with a simplified form of MOS 
which he named ‘Manchester-like language’ (MLL).  This was done by showing participants 
a diagrammatic representation of a small ontology and ten statements in either ACE or MLL.  
The participants were required to indicate whether each statement was true or false, based 
on the diagram.  Each participant did the test twice, once with ACE and once with MLL, 
with a different diagrammatic ontology in each case.  Overall, performance was significantly 
better with ACE than with MLL.  The design of the experiment enabled comparison of 
equivalent statements in ACE and MLL.  There was a particularly large difference between 
ACE and MLL in a question where an existential restriction was used with a complemented 
class (“John buys something that is not a present” versus “John HasType buys some (not 
present)”.  All of the 16 participants who were shown this statement in ACE responded 
correctly, whilst only 8 out of 16 responded correctly when shown the statement in MLL.  
This may relate to the confusion noted by Rector et al. (2004) between P some (not X) and 
not (P some  X), see section 2.4 above.   
Another marked difference was between the expression of object property equivalence in 
ACE (“If X loves Y then X helps Y.  If X helps Y then X loves Y”) and in MLL (“loves 
EquivalentTo helps”).  The former elicited 14 out of 16 correct responses, the latter 8 out of 
14.  This difference might disappear or at least be reduced once people had more experience 
with MLL and were used to the EquivalentTo statement.  Indeed, Kuhn comments on the 
need to understand the learning curve for both types of languages. 
Kuhn’s work suggests that a well-designed CNL can be more understandable than MOS, 
which is generally regarded as the most readable of the standard DL syntaxes.  However, 
Kuhn was not concerned with the ability to reason using DL statements.  
Smart (2008), in a detailed survey of CNLs for the ‘Semantic Web’ presents an interesting 
argument and counter-argument.  He is one of the few in this area who refers to the cognitive 
psychology and linguistic literature.  He starts by arguing that reasoning is not something 
which people naturally do well, citing some of the same kinds of studies as will be discussed 
                                                 
24 http://protegewiki.stanford.edu/wiki/DLQueryTab 
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in chapter 3 of this dissertation.  He then presents the view that CNLs should support people 
in reasoning better than more formal syntaxes since they are close to natural languages which 
presumably have been optimised through evolutionary pressure.  Finally, he makes the 
antithetical point that the apparent ease of interaction which is observed with natural 
language may not equate to ease of understanding.  He observes that the psychological 
studies which have highlighted our difficulty with reasoning have used “sentential 
structures”, i.e. natural language.   
Perhaps natural language has been optimised by evolution.  However, it is extremely unlikely 
that it has been optimised for understanding and reasoning about complex logical scenarios.   
The debate about the use of natural language in semantic technologies echoes an earlier one 
about natural language in database systems.  Shneiderman (1978), in a paper arguing for a 
greater consideration of human factors in database research, reports an experiment 
comparing the use of natural language with a formal database query language.  In a within-
participants study he provided participants with a scenario and asked them to formulate 
queries in both English and the formal query language.  There was no significant difference 
between the number of valid queries constructed in the two languages.  However, 
participants created significantly more invalid queries in English than in the formal language.  
Shneiderman (1978) specifically avoids an outright condemnation of natural language in 
database applications but concludes that, amongst other things, querying in a natural 
language requires a knowledge of the structure of the data, since there is no formal language 
to guide users.  This is supported by the fact that, in the experiment, there was a significant 
order effect; participants who were asked to use first the formal language, and then English, 
created fewer invalid queries than participants who were asked to use English first. 
The largely proscriptive approach of CNLs and the prescriptive approach of MOS may be 
relevant for different sets of users.  Hendler (2015) talks about ‘big O’ ontologies and ‘small 
O’ ontologies.  The former find their application in specialized fields such as biological 
research.  The latter are found at Web scale constituting the LOD cloud.  He suggests that 
for the Web scale applications users can tolerate that not every answer is correct, just as they 
can tolerate incorrect responses to Google searches.  It may be that CNLs are of more use 
for non-specialist users working with these Web scale applications, e.g. semantic wikis, 
where a degree of error can be tolerated.  MOS is likely to be more relevant for specialist 
users, e.g. in bioinformatics, who are prepared to learn some of the jargon of DLs. 
2.5.4. Ontology patterns and pattern tools 
A fundamental feature of ontology development is the ability to import and reuse existing 
ontologies.  However, another means of supporting reuse is with ontology patterns.  
Ontology patterns exist at a number of levels of design; a categorisation framework is 
provided in Gangemi and Presutti (2009).  Falbo et al. (2013) review the categorisation and 
relate it to the phases of ontology development.  The OntologyDesignPatterns.org25 portal 
lists a number of patterns, using this categorisation.  Since the work reported in this 
dissertation is concerned with a relatively detailed level of design, only two pattern types 
will be considered: logical ontology patterns and content ontology patterns26.  Logical 
patterns are independent of content.  An example is a pattern to create an n-ary relation using 
                                                 
25 http://ontologdesignpatterns.org 
26 Other pattern types, not considered here include architectural ontology patterns, which are concerned with 
the overall shape of an ontology, and reengineering ontology patterns, which are rules to transform one 
ontology to another. 
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as building blocks ternary relations available in OWL27.  The category of logical patterns 
also includes logical macros; a simple example is exclusive or, see Horridge et al. (2006).  
Content patterns relate to a specific topic.  OntologyDesignPatterns.org lists content patterns 
ranging from the relatively generic, e.g. a pattern to represent time intervals, to the industry 
specific, e.g. a pattern to represent catch records from the fishing industry.  Logical patterns 
do not contain predefined individuals, classes or properties, except for generic ones such as 
Thing (⊤).  They may contain rules to generate entities from the entities in the ontology, 
as is the case for the n-ary relation pattern.  Content patterns, on the other hand, 
contain predefined entities, e.g. the time interval pattern contains the class Time 
Interval.  Content patterns are, in fact, small ontologies. 
There is a significant literature on ontology patterns, of which only a small part can be 
mentioned.  The papers described here include some of the most important usability 
studies and tool developments as well as describing different approaches to pattern 
generation and use.  Blomqvist et al. (2009) studied the use of content patterns by 
giving experiment participants a modelling task without access to content patterns and 
an analogous task with access to patterns.  They concluded that patters were perceived 
as useful by developers and that they led to increased ontology quality.  Three 
particular modelling ‘mistakes’ were identified when patterns were not available: 
failure to distinguish “between persons and their roles”; a similar failure to distinguish 
“between information and its physical realization”; and incorrect modelling of n-ary 
relations.  With the use of patterns neither of the first two mistakes were observed and 
there were fewer incidences of the third.  Blomqvist et al. (2010) describe user 
experiences with tool support designed specifically for patterns.  Horridge et al. (2012) 
analyse patterns from the OntologyDesignPatterns.org library for their ‘language 
expressivity’, e.g. to determine within which species of OWL 2 they fit.  Another 
research area is that of finding patterns, e.g. from a patterns library, and then 
integrating them into the ontology; Hammar (2014) discusses these issues. 
Language and tools have been created to support pattern generation and use.  Iannone 
et al. (2009) describe the Ontology Pre-Processor Language (OPPL).  OPPL patterns 
specify axioms to be added or removed from an ontology.  They also include variables, 
defined to be particular ontology entity types, which the developer associates with 
entity names whenever the pattern is to be instantiated.  Aranguren et al. (2011) 
provide a user manual for the language.  An OPPL plugin has been created for Protégé28. 
Tawny OWL, discussed above, incorporates closure and covering patterns, see Lord, 
(2013) and (2015).  For example, some-only enables closure.  Using Tawny OWL 
notation: 
P some-only X Y Z 
indicates the class of individuals which are related as subject of property P to 
individuals from each of the classes X, Y and Z, and individuals from no other classes.   
Tawny OWL also enables the definition of additional patterns by the developer through 
use of the Lisp facility for defining macros.  As already noted, Tawny OWL is intended 
                                                 
27 See http://ontologydesignpatterns.org/wiki/Submissions:N-Ary_Relation_Pattern_%28OWL_2%29 and 
also Hoekstra (2009). 
28 See http://sourceforge.net/projects/oppl2/files/ for plugins for Protégé 4.0 and 4.1. 
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to support repetitive structures in ontologies, and is motivated by applications in 
biology where repetition is common. 
Jupp et al. (2012) argue that there is a distinction between developing an ontology and 
populating it with instances.  The former requires people with strong ontology skills, the 
latter may be done by domain experts with less training in ontologies.  The two groups also 
require different tools.  The ontology developers will typically use tools such as Protégé 
which are not appropriate for the domain experts.  Moreover, in domains such as the life 
sciences ontology population is often highly repetitive, based on patterns.  Jupp et al.’s 
solution to this was to design the Populous tool29.  Populous provides the domain expert with 
a form, with a particular template appropriate to the repetitive structure.  OPPL patterns (see 
above) are created by the ontologist to generate OWL from the tabular data.  
2.5.5. Diagrammatic representation of ontologies 
The visualization tools discussed in section 2.5.1 chiefly concentrate on subsumption 
relations between classes and the membership relation between individuals and classes.  
Some show properties, but not in a way which supports human reasoning about these 
properties. 
It is, however, possible to reason diagrammatically, i.e. using rules for manipulating 
diagrams analogously to the way in which we reason with rules to manipulate text in an 
algebra.  Dau and Eklund (2008) demonstrate the soundness and completeness of a 
diagrammatic reasoning system based on existential graphs (Peirce & Sowa, 2000) and 
applicable to the small DL called 30.  The operations in their calculus include adding 
and deleting branches to and from a tree structure.  They also provide a survey of the use of 
diagrams in logic. 
Some researchers are now developing diagrammatic approaches to formally representing DL 
ontologies, thereby aiding users in reasoning about those ontologies.  Chapman et al. (2011) 
describe a formalism they call concept diagrams and provide a formal semantics.  They 
derive sound inference rules, based in part on pattern matching, with which to reason about 
these diagrams. They argue also that these inference rules are intuitive, a consequence of 
“the syntactic properties of the diagrams reflecting the semantics”.  Shams et al. (2017) have 
developed a set of inference rules “for reasoning about inconsistencies and incoherence in 
ontologies”.31  Stapleton et al. (2013) illustrate how to represent common DL axioms using 
concept diagrams.   A case study, using the Semantic Sensor Network32 ontology, is 
described by Howse et al. (2011), concluding with requirements for tool support.  They 
identify the need to be able to translate from symbolically specified ontologies to diagrams 
and for sketch recognition to translate from diagrams to symbolic form.  Stapleton et al. 
(2014) provide another case study based on a cemetery ontology.  They highlight the need 
for the development of effective layout algorithms.  One aspect of this is ensuring that where 
                                                 
29 Available from http://e-lico.eu/populous.html 
30 The computational complexity of DLs is conventionally described using letters written in a cursive script, as 
shown.   represents a basic DL with negation of concept names on the right-hand side of axioms, 
intersection, universal restriction and limited existential quantification.   indicates the ability to negate 
concepts made up of other concepts (complex concept negation).  A brief overview of this notation is given in 
Horridge et al. (2012). 
31 An iconsistent ontology “cannot have any model and, so entails anything”; an incoherent ontology “entails 
an unsatisfiable (i.e. empty) class or property” (Shams, et al., 2017). 
32 See Compton et al. (2012) for a description of the Semantic Sensor Network ontology. 
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multiple diagrams have common parts, these look identical in each diagram.  Another aspect 
is the development of algorithms which enable the incremental updating of diagrams when 
an ontology is edited.  The longer-term goal is to enable the diagrammatic editing of these 
diagrams, so that diagrammatic editing and a more conventional approach could be used 
complementarily. 
A visual language for DL has also been developed by do Amaral (2013); he describes a study 
to compare understanding of this language with MOS33.  Participants were asked a number 
of questions to test their understanding of ontologies described using the two approaches.  
The participants did better with the visual language than with the MOS.  There appear to be 
a number of reasons for this.  In one question, the difficulty may have arisen in part from a 
non-standard use of MOS.  In another question involving only, the problem seems to be the 
familiar one of assuming that the universal restriction implies existence, i.e. ignoring the 
trivial satisfaction of the universal restriction.  The visual language avoided this difficulty.  
Although not entirely without ambiguity, generally the visual language appeared to avoid 
some of the ambiguities and misinterpretations present in MOS. 
2.6. Discussion 
This chapter has explained the use of ontologies in formal modelling, and in particular DLs 
which are the most frequently used languages for creating ontologies.  The prevalence of 
DLs is in part because the OWL family of DLs has been standardised by the W3C.  It was 
explained that the formal notation used initially for DLs was thought to be a problem for 
non-logicians, and this has led to a variety of other syntaxes.  MOS is now commonly used 
and has been incorporated into the Protégé tool.  None of the commonly used syntaxes 
appears to have been rigorously tested, nor does their design seem to have been influenced 
by any considerations from cognitive psychology or linguistics.  Yet studies have been 
described which identify difficulties experienced with these notations.  The studies reported 
later in this dissertation will further illustrate some of these difficulties. 
MOS uses keywords from English.  Its constrained structure and limited vocabulary mean 
that it would not normally be regarded as a CNL.  A number of CNLs have been designed 
for translation into DLs.  Some of these have been subjected to user testing.  However, CNLs 
can be verbose and ambiguous.  Kuhn (2013) admits that they can be difficult to write, 
although tools such as ROO (Denaux et al., 2010) and ACEView (Kaljurand, 2008), can 
help with this.  They can also be verbose and ambiguous.  At least one study has compared 
a CNL with MOS for understandability (Kuhn, 2013); this work suggest that MOS could be 
improved upon.  More fundamentally, none of the studies have compared how easily people 
can reason when confronted with statements in the various DL languages.  Yet this is a key 
requirement, for example during debugging when attempting to understand how a particular 
entailment follows from a justification.  Indeed, some of the problems people have in 
reasoning about DL statements may transcend issues of syntax; for example the trivial 
satisfaction of the universal restriction discussed in subsection 2.2.1.  This is not to say that 
particular syntaxes may not help mitigate them. 
The use of patterns offers the opportunity to work at a higher level of abstraction.  Whilst 
there has been some interest in pattern research, there is no evidence of widespread 
systematic use of ontology patterns.  This point is discussed in chapter 5.  The textual 
approach of Lord (2015; 2013) which builds on the availability of software engineering tools 
                                                 
33 In his study the MOS keywords were translated into Brazilian Portuguese.  He maintains that the same 
ambiguities and “undesired interpretations” exist in the translated version as with the English keywords. 
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would appear to encourage the use of patterns.  However, the DL still needs to be represented 
in some syntax, e.g. MOS, and the problems of comprehension and reasoning remain. 
Another approach is the graphical representation of ontologies.  Here there are broadly two 
categories.  Most visualization tools are designed to enable navigation through an ontology.  
A few support comprehension and reasoning.  One such, developed by do Amaral (2013), 
has been compared with MOS.  It is interesting that one of the advantages of the visualization 
was to remove the confusion over the precise meaning of only.  It may be that it is not 
visualization of itself which is valuable, but rather that it avoids some areas of confusion.  
There may be other, non-visual, ways of achieving this. 
CNLs and visualizations are likely to have a continuing role in the development of 
ontologies.  It is also likely that, where conciseness and precision are required, a more formal 
DL syntax will be required.  The widespread acceptance of MOS suggests that this more 
formal syntax will employ some English words, rather than a purely mathematical notation.  
Indeed, the widespread acceptance of MOS suggests that any improvements are likely to be 
evolutionary.  This highlights the need to use cognitive and linguistic theories to better 
understand the difficulties experienced with MOS, and to mitigate those difficulties.  This 
will be the theme of later chapters. 
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3. Theories of reasoning 
For, if some of the moderns have thought to enlarge its [logic’s] domain by 
introducing psychological discussions on the mental faculties, such as imagination 
and wit, …: this attempt, on the part of these authors, only shows their ignorance of 
the peculiar nature of logical science. 
Immanuel Kant, ‘Critique of Pure Reason’, Preface to second edition, 1787 
Logic is the mirror of thought, and not vice versa. 
Jean Piaget, ‘The Psychology of Intelligence’, 1947 
 
Psychologists have been investigating human reasoning for a considerable time.  Bucciarelli 
and Johnson-Laird (1999) cite Störring (1908) as reporting early psychological research on 
syllogisms.  However, modern investigations into human reasoning are generally regarded 
as beginning with the British cognitive psychologist Wason.  A classic experiment of his is 
described in Wason (1968).  In the experiment the participant is presented with four cards 
laid face down on a table and told that each card has a letter on one side and a number on 
the other.  The participant is also told that there is a putative rule expressed as a conditional 
statement: “if there is a vowel on one side of the card, then there is an even number on the 
other side” (Wason, 1968, p. 273).  The visible sides of the cards show a vowel, a consonant, 
an even number and an odd number.  The participant is required to turn over just those cards 
necessary to test out the rule.  This task has come to be known as the ‘Wason selection task’.  
The correct response is, of course, to turn over two cards displaying the vowel and the odd 
number.  In fact, the most common choices are the cards displaying the vowel and the even 
number.  Wason was surprised by this result, in part because it seemed to contradict the 
contemporary psychological theory concerning intellectual development.   
Much has been written about this, and other similar experiments.  It has set the tone for 
subsequent research into reasoning, both in terms of content and in terms of methodology.  
In terms of content, research has looked at the traditional logical forms such as the 
conditional, which underlies the Wason selection task, the disjunction, conjunction and the 
syllogism.  In terms of methodology, there has been a concern with identifying the mistakes 
which people make, and using consistent mistakes to support or refute particular theories.   
Johnson-Laird (2010, page 194) points out that early theories of reasoning assumed “an 
unconscious logical calculus” which later was assumed to contain “formal rules of 
inference”.  The expectation was that people reason using formal rules of logic, in some way 
similar to the processes of a trained logician.  This is variously referred to as the sentential, 
rule-based (Stenning & Yule, 1997)  or mental logic (Oaksford & Chater, 2001) school.  The 
phrase rule-based will be used in this dissertation, to emphasize the difference from the 
model-based approach described later.  Rips (1983) is representative of the rule-based 
approach.  He suggests that people use rules such as modus ponens, and that there is an 
availability associated with each such rule.  By ‘availability’, Rips (1983) means the ease 
with which the rule can be retrieved from memory.  He associates an availability parameter, 
between 0 and 1, with each rule to represent the ease of retrieval.  The greater the availability 
of the rules being used, the greater the probability of arriving at the correct conclusion.  Rips 
used a computer program to simulate his proposed scheme, and this is a feature which recurs 
in reasoning research. 
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An alternative school, in particular associated with Johnson-Laird, suggests that in general 
people do not reason with formal rules, but instead build mental models34 of any given 
situation.  They then test out putative inferences for consistency with the proposed models.  
If no inconsistency can be found, then the inference is accepted.  Ehrlich and Johnson-Laird 
(1982) describes an early attempt to use mental models to explain experimental results.  The 
models they describe relate to the layout of objects in two-dimensional space.  However, 
mental models can be used to represent more abstract situations.  Bucciarelli and Johnson-
Laird (1999), for example, interpret relative difficulties with syllogisms in terms of mental 
model theory.   
The distinction between the rules-based and model-based theories of reasoning can be 
regarded as analogous to the distinction in logic between syntactical and semantic reasoning.  
A mental model can be regarded as an interpretation of the corresponding syntactical system.  
Neither the rules-based nor the mental models approaches are able to represent probabilities.  
However, Oaksford and Chater (2001) point out that there are statements which are 
commonly made, but commonly understood to be not 100% true.  For example, the statement 
‘birds fly’ is not true for penguins, and neither for very young birds.  Thus ‘Probability (birds 
fly) = 0.9’, say, better captures our understanding of the statement.  Oaksford and Chater 
(2001) propose a probabilistic interpretation of human reasoning which provides a 
mathematical framework to understand people’s reasoning performance.  Unlike the rules-
based and mental model theories, the probabilistic approach does not in general attempt to 
provide an explanation of how people reason.  However, Oaksford and Chater (2001) 
describe a probability heuristic model which interprets the syllogism quantifiers 
probabilistically and proposes a set of heuristics to enable probabilistic reasoning. 
Another approach is to view every reasoning step as being about a relation between elements.  
The number of elements involved can then be regarded as a measure of the complexity of 
the reasoning step.  This is known as the relational complexity of the reasoning step (Halford 
et al., 1998).  This viewpoint can be regarded as complementary to the other schools.  
Zielinski et al. (2010) have attempted an integration of the relational complexity and mental 
model approaches in the case of the syllogism. 
The next three sections discuss the three theoretical frameworks which are used to interpret 
results and form hypotheses in the studies described in this dissertation: rule-based; mental 
models; and relational complexity.  At the end of his paper, Wason (1968) discusses whether 
the difficulty reported is caused by the structure of the rule used or by the verbal 
representation of the rule.  This theme is taken up in section 3.5 which discusses some of the 
issues which arise with language.  These issues can influence how some of the reported 
experiments on reasoning should be interpreted and have a bearing on the studies described 
in this dissertation.  Finally, section 3.6 makes some general comments. 
Before proceeding, a comment needs to be made on terminology.  In the computer science 
literature, the word reasoner refers to software which undertakes formal reasoning.  This is 
the sense in which it was used in chapter 2.  In the psychological literature, however, the 
word refers to an individual who is undertaking a reasoning task.  Sometimes the phrase 
naïve reasoner is used to emphasize that an individual, e.g. a study participant, has had no 
training in logic.  In this dissertation, the single word reasoner will always refer to computer 
                                                 
34 Throughout this dissertation, the phrase mental model will be used with the specific meaning described here, 
rather than any more general meaning with which it might be associated in everyday speech. 
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software.  An individual undertaking a reasoning task will be referred to as a human 
reasoner. 
3.1. Rule-based 
To anyone with any training in logic, be it the verbal formalisms of Aristotle or the more 
mathematical formulation developed since the 19th century, it may seem natural to suppose 
that human reasoning is based on some kind of formal system.  Certainly, as already noted, 
the first approaches to modelling human reasoning were rule-based.   
Rips (1983) has developed a model of propositional reasoning, the ANDS model, which he 
incorporated into a computer program.  The model employs 11 logical rules.  For example, 
one rule is modus ponens: if p then q; p; therefore q.  Another is the use of one of De 
Morgan’s laws to transform not (p and q) into not p or not q.  The rules are used in forward 
and backward modes, i.e. working forward from an assumption and backward from a goal.  
Some of the rules exist in both modes.  Proofs are constructed in a ‘working memory’ with 
a defined memory limitation.  Heuristics are used to determine how to deploy rules.   
The availability of each rule has a probability associated with it.  Thus it is possible to 
compute the probability of constructing a particular chain of reasoning, from assumption to 
goal.  To calculate these probabilities, Rips undertook an experiment in which participants 
were given a number of reasoning tasks, each of which could be regarded as requiring a 
sequence of rules.  Specifically, participants were asked to confirm whether a putative 
conclusion followed from a set of statements.  Based on the results of this experiment, and 
using a least-squares criterion35, Rips was able to estimate the probabilities for each of his 
rules.  He reports a correlation of 0.933 between the observed and predicted accuracies. 
Rips does not claim his system is complete, in the sense of containing all the rules which 
human reasoners use.  It does, though, demonstrate the feasibility of the approach. Although 
it does not prove that this is the way in which humans actually reason, Rips claims that the 
system was motivated by insight gained from previous experiments in which participants 
thought aloud about particular reasoning tasks. 
Braine (1978) provides another example of this rule-based approach applied to propositional 
reasoning.  He argues that our reasoning with natural language does not correspond to 
standard logic.  For example, if p then q has a directionality, from p to q, in natural language 
which is absent from standard logic.  In everyday discourse we are not concerned with what 
happens when p is not true.  As a result, in natural language one would not normally associate 
a truth value with the statement when p is false, as one does in standard logic.  He develops 
a natural propositional logic based on the rules he claims we ordinarily use, but which is 
equivalent to standard propositional logic. 
Braine and O’Brien (1991) have revised Braine’s (1978) theory of propositional reasoning 
and undertaken a detailed analysis of how this revised theory can explain reasoning with 
conditional statements.  The theory proposes “lexical entries” for the logical operators and, 
or and if.  These lexical entries contain inference schemas which differ in some respects from 
what would be expected from standard logic.  Moreover, there is nothing analogous to the 
truth table approach of standard logic.  The lexical entry for if contains a schema for modus 
ponens, i.e. p; if p then q; therefore q.  This explains why people generally apply modus 
ponens correctly.  However, there is no inference schema for modus tollens, i.e. not q; if p 
                                                 
35 Presumed to mean that the availability parameters were chosen so as to minimize the sum of the squares of 
the differences between the observed and calculated proportion of correct responses for each question. 
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then q; therefore not p.  This has to be achieved by reductio ad absurdum, i.e. by assuming 
p, deducing q from modus ponens, and finding a contradiction between this deduction and 
the original assumption of not q.  This explains the greater difficulty experienced with modus 
tollens. 
Additionally, Braine and O’Brien’s (1991) logic rejects the so-called “principle of 
explosion” of standard logic, whereby anything can be proven from a contradiction.  Rather, 
the only conclusion from a contradiction is that one of the assumptions is wrong.  They claim 
that their revised model better explains a variety of reported data. 
3.2. Mental models 
The theory of mental models has been developed over a number of years by a number of 
researchers, in particular Philip Johnson-Laird and Ruth Byrne.  There have been a great 
number of publications on the subject.  The publications discussed in this section are chosen 
to provide an overview.  In particular, they cover the various logical structures investigated: 
disjunction and conjunction; the conditional and biconditional; negation; and the syllogism.  
Johnson-Laird (2005) provides a review of the subject, whilst Johnson-Laird (2004) puts the 
theory in its historical context, tracing it back to the work of the American logician C.S. 
Peirce, through Wittgenstein’s (1922) picture theory of meaning, and Craik’s (1967) view 
that cognition is based on forming models of the world.  Of particular significance is 
Johnson-Laird (2004) reference to Peirce’s categorisation of the properties of signs into: 
iconic, i.e. possessing structural similarity; indexical, i.e. entailing some sort of physical 
connection; and symbolic, i.e. making use of an implicit or explicit representational 
convention.  Johnson-Laird (2004) argues that mental models cannot be purely iconic, since 
some sort of symbolic representation is required, e.g. to represent negation and disjunction. 
The essential principle of the mental model theory of reasoning is that, in order to reason, 
we create a model or models of a given situation and then check any putative conclusion 
against those models.  Any putative conclusion needs to be checked for consistency with all 
the models.  Mental model theorists argue that with a greater number of models there is a 
danger of one or more being forgotten, or not even created.  This could lead to the acceptance 
of an invalid conclusion, i.e. one which is consistent with some but not all the necessary 
models. 
3.2.1. Conjunction and disjunction 
An example of the simplest possible situation, i.e. with only one model, is given by 
conjunction: there is a circle and there is a triangle.  Using C and T to represent circle and 
triangle, this can be represented by: 
C T 
Exclusive disjunction: there is a circle or there is a triangle, but not both; requires two 
mental models: 
C 
 T 
Inclusive disjunction is: there is a circle or there is a triangle, or both;  requires three models: 
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C T 
C 
 T 
The first of the three lines above describes the situation in which there is both a circle and 
triangle, the second line the situation in which there is only a circle, and the third line in 
which there is only a triangle. 
On this basis we would expect people particularly to experience a difference in difficulty 
between the two extremes of these three situations, i.e. between conjunction and inclusive 
disjunction. Khemlani et al. (2012a) did find that human reasoners made more errors in 
interpreting inclusive disjunction than conjunction.  In an experiment, the former yielded 
68% correct responses compared with 86% correct for the latter. 
3.2.2. The conditional and biconditional 
The conditional, if there is a circle, then there is a triangle illustrates another feature of the 
theory.  Initially, there may appear to be only one model, identical to that for conjunction: 
C T 
This is sufficient for a certain form of reasoning, i.e. modus ponens.  Johnson-Laird et al. 
(1992) have shown experimentally that people do reason more accurately with a conditional, 
when the problem would require the application of modus ponens, than with an exclusive 
conjunction.  Given that the former requires one mental model and the latter two, they regard 
this as evidence that people are using mental models with which to reason. 
However in certain situations, specifically where a logician would apply modus tollens, three 
models need to be constructed to represent the conditional.  These models correspond to the 
three valid rows of the truth table for implication, i.e. excluding only the row corresponding 
to a true antecedent and a false consequent.  Using the symbol ‘¬’ to represent negation, the 
models are: 
 C T 
 ¬C T 
¬C ¬T 
These models are more detailed than those for the conjunction and disjunction, in that they 
explicitly show the negated statements, i.e. in this case the absence of a circle or a triangle.  
These are referred to as explicit models.  
The biconditional, if and only if there is a circle, then there is a triangle, requires only two 
models, again corresponding to the two valid rows in the truth table: 
 C T 
 ¬C ¬T 
Johnson-Laird et al. (1992) showed that modus tollens with a biconditional was significantly 
easier than with a conditional.  They attribute this to the fewer number of models required 
for the biconditional than for the conditional. 
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In fact, a key aspect of mental model theory is the claim that frequently human reasoners do 
not form fully explicit models but neglect the negated, i.e. false models.  Johnson-Laird 
(1999, page 116) formulates this as the principle of truth: 
“Individuals minimize the load on working memory by tending to construct mental 
models that represent explicitly only what is true, and not what is false.” 
Not only does this reduce the number of models required in working memory but avoids 
negative statements which may require more cognitive work than affirmative ones (Pinker, 
2014, chapter 5).  In certain situations the principle of truth reduces the number of models 
but still leads to the correct conclusion.  In other situations it can lead to false conclusions.   
Johnson-Laird et al. (1992) observe that for propositional logic, the fully explicit model 
corresponds to the disjunctive normal form (DNF) of the expression, where each line 
corresponds to a disjunct. 
3.2.3. Negation 
It was noted in the previous subsection that conjunction required one mental model whilst 
inclusive disjunction required three.  When these operators are negated the situation is 
reversed36.  It is not the case that there is a circle and a triangle corresponds to three mental 
models: 
¬C ¬T 
¬C T 
C ¬T 
Whilst it is not the case that there is a circle or a triangle or both corresponds to one mental 
model: 
¬C ¬T 
Thus we would expect reasoning with negated conjunction to be harder than reasoning with 
negated inclusive disjunction.  Khemlani et al. (2012a) did indeed find this to be the case.  
In the same experiment as already mentioned in subsection 3.3.1, they found that negated 
conjunction was interpreted correctly by 18% of the participants whilst negated inclusive 
disjunction was interpreted correctly by 89%.  In fact, 45% of the participants interpreted 
negated conjunction as equivalent to “not-A and not-B”, i.e. they created only the first of the 
three mental models shown above.   
Khemlani et al. (2012a) also report on negation of the conditional, where they found that 
59% of responses equated a negation of if A then B as if A then not B.  In a later study they 
elaborate their ideas (Khemlani et al. 2012b), pointing out that negation involves creating a 
set of models complementary to the set describing the negated assertion.  This is illustrated 
by comparing the models for negated conjunction and negated inclusive disjunction in this 
subsection with the models for conjunction and inclusive disjunction in subsection 3.2.1.  
They suggest that people tend to “assign a small scope to negation in order to minimize the 
number of models of possibilities that they have to consider” (Khemlani et al., 2012b, page 
1).  This makes sense in the case of negated conjunction where, in the example above, a 
                                                 
36 This reversal is evident from the application of De Morgan’s Laws: 
not (circle and triangle)  ≡ not circle or not triangle 
not (circle or triangle)  ≡ not circle and not triangle 
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small scope negation would presumably imply negating there is a circle and there is a 
triangle, rather than the whole statement.  However, in the case of the conditional, both the 
assertion (if A then B) and the small scope interpretation of its negation (if A then not B) 
require three mental models for their full interpretation, whereas the true negation (A and 
not B) requires only one. 
An alternative view might be that the difficulty of creating the correct mental model for the 
conditional leads to a syntactic strategy, which in turn leads to the error of changing the 
scope of the negation from the whole statement to the consequent.  This might be seen as 
analogous to the confusion between the OWL statements P some (not X) and not (P some  
X) reported by Rector et al. (2004) and discussed in section 2.4. 
3.2.4. The syllogisms 
The syllogisms were first formulated by Aristotle.  Because of their importance in 
psychological research into reasoning, an overview is provided here.  Briefly, they consist 
of two premises and a conclusion.  Each of these three statements is in one of four forms: 
All X are Y 
Some X are Y 
No X are Y 
Some X are not Y 
Each syllogism has three terms, e.g.: A, B, C. One of the premises contains the terms A and 
B.  The other premises contains the terms B and C.  The conclusion contains A and C.  In a 
valid syllogism the elimination of the B term allows the conclusion to state a relationship 
between A and C in one of the four forms.  Thus a simple valid syllogism is: 
 All A are B 
 All B are C 
 Therefore, all A are C 
There are four ways of ordering the terms in the two premises, referred to as the four figures.  
These are shown in table 3-1. 
Table 3-1 Four figures of syllogism 
1st premise 2nd premise position of common term (B) 
A-B B-C end of 1st premise, beginning of 2nd premise 
B-C C-B beginning of 1st premise, end of 2nd premise 
A-B C-B end of both premises 
B-A B-C beginning of both premises 
 
Thus, with four possibilities for each of the two premises and four figures, there are 64 (43) 
possible syllogisms.  Of these, 27 syllogisms have valid conclusions, i.e. one can write a 
relationship between A and C using one of the four statements above.  The other 37 
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syllogisms have no valid conclusion37.  More detail is provided in Khemlani and Johnson-
Laird (2012). 
The syllogisms have been studied by a number of psychologists, including the mental model 
theorists.  They encompass an enormous range of difficulty; Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991, 
chapter 6, page 106) comment that “some of these 27 [i.e. the syllogisms with valid 
conclusions] are so easy that a nine year old child can spontaneously draw a correct 
conclusion, whereas others are so hard that barely any adults perform better than chance with 
them”.   
3.2.5. Mental models for the syllogism 
The mental model representation of syllogism premises is more complex than that for 
propositional logic, and the notation different.  Newstead (1995) uses as an example Some 
A are B.  One mental model can be represented as: 
 a b 
 a b 
 a 
  b 
There are two immediate differences from the notation for propositional logic.  Firstly, the 
lowercase letters a and b are representative of individuals in the classes A and B, whereas 
for propositional logic the elements of the mental model represent specific individuals.  
Secondly, all four lines are part of the same mental model.  The model states that there are 
individuals which are both a and b, and that there can be individuals which are a and not b 
or b and not a.  It is not clear how the necessity of the first option is implied, possibly by the 
repetition of the line ‘a b’. 
However, Newstead (1995) also gives a second model for the same premise: 
 [a] b 
 [a] b 
The square brackets indicate that a is exhaustively represented, i.e. there is no possibility of 
there being an a which is not a b.  This is, in fact, the model for the premise All A are B 
which is included as a possibility in the original premise Some A are B.  A fuller version of 
this model would require a line with only b, to indicate the possibility that some B may not 
be A. 
Johnson-Laird and Bara (1984) suggest that a likely strategy when dealing with syllogisms 
is to construct a mental model for the first premise and then integrate the information from 
the second premise.  They explain procedures by which this could be achieved. 
Integration of the mental models from two premises can lead to more than one mental model 
for the syllogism.  Johnson-Laird and Bara (1984) give as an example the syllogism: 
  
                                                 
37 To be precise, there are no valid conclusions using the four statement forms provided by Aristotle.  Stenning 
and Yule (1997) point out that, if we permit conclusions of the form some not X are not Y, then some of these 
other 37 syllogisms have valid conclusions. 
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All of the A are B 
some of the B are C 
This leads to two mental models.  In the terminology of Johnson-Laird and Bara (1984), 
which is different from that of Newstead (1995), the two models can be represented: 
     (1)          (2) 
a = b = c        a = b 
a = b   0c     a = b   0c 
      0b           0b  
Here the = indicates that an individual is in two classes and 0 indicates an individual which 
may or may not exist.  The first model says that there is an individual which is in all three 
classes, an individual in classes A and B but possibly not C, and possibly an individual in 
class B which is in neither of the other two classes.  The second model does not include the 
possibility of a model in all three classes, but does include the possibility that an individual 
in B may also be in C. 
Any conclusion to the syllogism must be valid in both mental models.  The first model 
permits the conclusions some of the A are C and some of the C are A.  However, the second 
model rules out both these, and in fact the syllogism has no valid conclusion. 
Johnson-Laird and Bara (1984) present a review of the then current psychological theories 
of syllogistic inference.  They report experiments which lead them to propose that the 
variation in performance between the syllogisms can chiefly be explained in terms of the 
figure of the syllogism and the number of mental models required to represent it.   
Bucciarelli and Johnson-Laird (1999) developed a computer program to simulate reasoning 
about syllogisms using mental models.  They then conducted experiments in which 
participants were presented with a number of syllogisms and asked to reason about those 
syllogisms.  In the first experiment they were given pencil and paper, their use of which was 
videoed.  The camera was focused on where the participants were writing or drawing, so that 
they themselves were anonymous.  In the second experiment they were additionally asked 
to think aloud.  In two other experiments they were provided with cut-out shapes which 
represented the terms of the syllogisms, e.g. chefs, musicians and painters, and asked to use 
these shapes in their reasoning tasks.  They claim that when their observations were 
compared with the behaviour of the computer program, similar operations were being used, 
thus confirming their mental model theory of syllogistic reasoning.  The human reasoners 
did use more varied search strategies.  However, they did not always create all the necessary 
models. 
3.2.6. Mental models and Euler diagrams 
Euler diagrams, or Euler circles, are a logical formalism closely related to mental models.  
They are a means of representing sets by closed areas, usually circles.  Inclusion of one set 
within another is shown by one circle being totally contained within another.  Overlap of 
sets is shown by overlap of the circles.  Euler diagrams are related to Venn diagrams.  
However, Venn diagrams show all the potential areas of overlap between sets, indicating by 
shading where there is no permitted overlap.  As a result, Venn diagrams can be more 
complex than Euler diagrams.  Euler diagrams have been used to reason about syllogisms.  
Figure 3-1 illustrates the Euler diagram representation of each of the four forms of statement 
in a syllogism. 
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Graphical representations such as Euler diagrams are logically equivalent to mental models.  
However, Euler diagrams represent classes, whereas mental models represent exemplars of 
classes.  Johnson-Laird and Bara (1984) argue that the processing of Euler circles is too 
complex to constitute a model of human reasoning38.  In particular, a large number of 
possibilities arises when the Euler circle representations of two premises are combined.  
They claim that the mental model representation, based on tokens to represent elements of a 
class, does not suffer from this drawback. 
 
All A are B 
 
Some A are B 
 
No A are B 
 
Some A are not B 
Figure 3-1 The four syllogistic forms represented as Euler diagrams 
From: (Euler, 1843, pp. 260–261)  
N.B.  some A are B and some A are not B are geometrically identical.  They are 
differentiated by the location of the class names. 
 
Evidence for the efficacy of reasoning with diagrams comes from Sato and Mineshima 
(2016).  They looked at the effect that providing Euler diagram representations had on 
syllogistic reasoning.  They compared participants who had only a linguistic representation 
of the reasoning problem with those who had both a linguistic and diagrammatic 
representation.  Some questions were based on standard first-order quantifiers, whilst other 
questions included the second-order quantifier, most.  In both cases, speed and accuracy were 
significantly better for the group with diagrams than for the group without diagrams.  An 
interesting aspect of this work was that it was conducted in Japanese; to this author’s 
knowledge, most reasoning research has been conducted in European languages, in 
particular English. 
 
3.2.7. Evidence from cognitive linguistics 
Lakoff (1987) takes a similar view to the mental model theorists, but starting from a 
linguistic standpoint.  His thesis is that categorization is at the heart of human reasoning, but 
that human categorization does not fit the classical view of categorization.  The classical 
view is that we categorize entities by reference to a set of characteristics.  However, when 
we examine the use of language, we find that the categorization is more complex.  For 
                                                 
38 The problem arises in part because, with the exception of no A are B, each of the four forms of premise 
requires to be represented in several different ways.  For example, the statement some X are Y requires four 
representations: one for the case that the classes overlap but that each class has members not in the other; one 
for the case that the classes are exactly equal; and two for the possibilities that one class is a proper subset of 
the other (Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984, p. 9).  In reasoning each case needs to be considered individually. 
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example, we commonly used radial structures where there is a central case and variations on 
that case which most native speakers would recognise but which cannot be predicted.  An 
example he gives is mother, which gives rise to birth mother, genetic mother, adoptive 
mother, foster mother etc.  Consequently, human categorization does not align with the 
simple and well-defined set theoretic model which underlies logic.  This undermines theories 
of reasoning based on an axiomatic approach akin to that used in mathematics.  This 
axiomatic approach is based on the construction of axioms which can be manipulated 
syntactically, removed from any consideration of the original interpretation of these axioms; 
so that only at the end of the process is the conclusion interpreted in the real-life context.  
Whilst in no way critical of this approach in mathematics, where he acknowledges its 
considerable success, he claims that it is inconsistent with natural language and that it is 
natural language which we normally use for reasoning.  His conclusion is that “we reason 
about things in terms that are meaningful” (Lakoff, 1987, Chapter 14, page 226).  Lakoff’s 
view on reasoning is different from that of the mental model theorists; for example, he 
ascribes a significant role to metaphor.  However, neither does it support an approach based 
entirely on the rules of logic. 
3.3. Relational complexity 
The theory of relational complexity, as its name implies, is concerned with quantifying the 
complexity associated with reasoning about relations.  It begins by defining the complexity 
of any particular relation, as explained in subsection 3.3.1 and also considers the complexity 
of an inference, as explained in subsection 3.3.2.  Relational complexity theory and mental 
model theory have been compared in the particular case of the syllogisms; this is explained 
in section 3.3.3.  In fact, both these two theories are based on consideration of working 
memory limitations, and subsection 3.3.4 discusses the connection between relational 
complexity and working memory. 
3.3.1. The complexity of a relation 
Relational complexity theory defines the complexity of a particular relation as the number 
of elements associated with that relation.  The theory has its roots in the study of children’s 
intellectual development and the observation that relations of increasing complexity can be 
understood with increasing age.  Table 3-2, taken from Halford et al. (2007), illustrates 
relations of complexity one to four, and the median age of attainment. 
Table 3-2 Example of relations of arity one to four; from: Halford et al. (2007) 
Relational complexity Example Median age of 
attainment (yrs) 
unary (1) class membership, e.g. cat (Marcus) 1 
binary (2) larger (elephant, mouse) 1.5 
ternary (3) addition (2, 3, 5) 5 
quaternary (4) proportionality (2, 3, 6, 9) 11 
 
Like the rules-based and mental model theories, relational complexity theory takes account 
of the limited capacity of working memory.  This sets an upper limit on the complexity of 
any relation that can be completely comprehended at any one time.  Halford et al. (2005), 
working with adults, found that there was no significant difference in accuracy or time 
between problems of relational complexity two and three.  However, problems of relational 
complexity four were answered significantly less accurately and in significantly longer time 
than problems of relational complexity three.  Problems of relational complexity five were 
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answered no better than chance, suggesting that for most people a relational complexity of 
four imposes an upper bound on what can be handled.  After that, strategies such as 
‘conceptual chunking’ and ‘segmentation’ are used.  The former consists of combining 
tokens together, e.g. letters to form a word.  The latter consists of breaking a task into serial 
steps.  
3.3.2. The complexity of an inference 
A key point is that we are frequently concerned with the complexity of a particular reasoning 
step involving relations, rather than with the complexity of a single relation.  Halford et al. 
(1998) give the following example.  The statements John is taller than Mary and Mary is 
taller than Sue both represent binary relations.  However, when we make a transitive 
inference to deduce that John is taller than Sue, then this involves three elements and the 
relational complexity of the inference is said to be three.  Halford and Andrews (2004) 
illustrate the ternary nature of transitive inference by comparing with concatenation.  They 
argue that the transitive inference a > b; b > c ⇒ a > c is ternary because it requires all three 
elements to be considered simultaneously.  However, using a > b and b > c to form the 
concatenation a, b, c is binary because at each of the two stages used in the concatenation, 
only two elements need to be considered.  After the first stage the result is externalised, and 
the human reasoner proceeds to the second only needing to consider the b > c relation. 
3.3.3. Relational complexity and mental models 
Zielinski et al. (2010) have compared how well the relational complexity and mental model 
theories explain human reasoners’ performance on all 64 syllogisms, based on data from 
their own experiments.  To compute the relational complexity metric of each syllogism they 
counted the number of classes that needed to be considered to arrive at the correct 
conclusion.  In doing this they take account of any potential for chunking to reduce the 
complexity39.  As an initial example they give the easiest syllogisms40: 
All X are Y 
All Y are Z 
⇒All X are Z 
Zielinski et al. (2010) illustrate their argument graphically, as reproduced in figure 3-2.  The 
first premise, shown in figure 3-2(a), tells us that there must41 be an X which is a Y .  Hence 
the class XY is shown patterned to illustrate that it must be populated.  It may be the case that 
there is a Y which is not an X.  Hence the class ¬X Y is also shown.  However, this class is 
not patterned because it may not necessarily be populated.  The second premise, shown in 
figure 3-2(b) is similar.  The class YZ is shown patterned because it must be populated, whilst 
the class ¬YZ may be populated. 
Figure 3-2(c) shows the effect of combining the premises.  There are now three classes to 
consider: XYZ which must be populated and ¬XYZ and ¬X¬YZ which may be populated.  
Thus we expect a relational complexity of three.  However, Zielinski et al. (2010, page 394) 
argue that “the relation between ¬X Y Z and ¬X ¬Y Z does not need to be processed”.  Hence 
these two classes can be chunked to form, ¬X (Y, ¬Y) Z.  This gives an effective relational 
complexity of two, as illustrated in figure 3-2(d). 
                                                 
39 In a limited number of syllogisms they also take account of certain heuristics which may be used to reduce 
the complexity. 
40 In fact, this was the only syllogism which all their participants answered correctly. 
41 Note the comment from subsection 2.2.1 that in Aristotelian syllogisms, unlike in modern logic, the universal 
quantifier implies existence. 
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Similar arguments can be used to arrive at the relational complexity of each of the other 63 
syllogisms. 
For comparison Zielinski et al. (2010) use the number of mental models for each syllogism 
proposed by mental model theorists, in particular citing Bucciarelli and Johnson-Laird 
(1999) and Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991).   
Overall both theories performed similarly, in each case explaining approximately 80% of the 
variance in accuracy.  This is not surprising.  As Zielinski et al. (2010, page 418) point out 
“relational complexity theory is essentially a theory of mental models”.  The difference is 
that “it conceptualises models in a different way than have previous mental model theories 
of reasoning”. 
3.3.4. Relational complexity and working memory 
Halford et al. (2010) review relational knowledge and include a discussion of the relationship 
to working memory.  They regard working memory as “the workspace where relational 
representations are constructed” (Halford et al., 2010, page 1).  Indeed, relational complexity 
theory can be seen as a formulaic way of thinking about the limitations posed by a finite 
working memory.  As such it can only be an approximate description of these limitations. 
As one example of this, relational complexity theory makes no distinction between an n-ary 
relation in which the ordering of elements is not significant and one in which the ordering is 
significant.  Yet we would expect the former to pose less difficulty than the latter.  Consider 
the following two sequences of relations, where we assume that in the relation descendant 
(X, Y), X is the descendant of Y: 
sibling(B, A); sibling(C, D); sibling(E, C); sibling(A, E) 
descendant(B, A); descendant(C, D); descendant(E, C); descendant(A, E) 
In the first case, consider whether sibling(B, D), and in the second case whether 
descendant(B, D); the answer is yes in both cases.  It may be that the second will be harder 
to answer, since at every stage of the reasoning we need to take account of directionality.  
Similarly, in the context of DL object properties, we might expect symmetric object 
properties (e.g. is_sibling_of) to pose less difficulty than object properties with directionality 
(e.g. is_father_of).   
Another potential limitation of relational complexity theory is that it takes the particular 
relation as a given.  In the example of subsection 3.3.2 an inference of relational complexity 
three is constructed from two premises, each using the relation is taller than.  Where two 
different relations are used in an inferential step, this may cause additional load on working 
memory.  Similarly, where a human reasoner is obliged to switch rapidly between thinking 
about different relations, this may cause additional difficulties.  These are situations which 
could occur when reasoning about DL object properties. 
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Figure 3-2  Illustrating the derivation of RC=2 for the syllogism ‘all X are Y; all Y are Z ⇒ 
all X are Z’.  The patterned areas indicates the classes which must be populated. From 
Zielinski et al. (2010) 
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3.4. Language – implicatures and ambiguities 
As already noted, Wason (1968) posed the question whether the verbal representation of a 
rule influences the difficulty people experience.  Grice (1975) has made the point that 
language may convey ideas which are not logically implied by the words used, but which 
nonetheless are understood by the hearer.  The phrase Gricean implicature42 has come to be 
used for ideas which are conveyed but not logically implied.  Of particular relevance here 
are scalar implicatures (Carston, 1998).  The underlying idea is that when we make a weaker 
statement than we might make, there is an implicature that the stronger statement is not true.  
‘Some of the students work hard’ does not contradict the possibility that they all work hard.  
However, most people hearing this sentence would assume the existence of some less 
industrious students.  Otherwise the speaker would have said ‘all of the students work hard’.  
As a result, apparent mistakes in reasoning may not always be at the reasoning stage, but at 
the preliminary stage of interpretation.  Braine (1978) makes the point that, in reasoning 
according to standard logic, it is necessary first to extract the “minimum commitments” from 
the premises, whereas in everyday discourse we make use of implicatures. 
Newstead (1995) investigated the extent to which the implicature that some implies some 
not, and its converse, affect performance on syllogisms.  This was based on a survey of 
previously published results and on experimental work of his own.  He found that advising 
participants about the logical significance of some, i.e. that it does not imply some not, makes 
a significant difference to the effect of the implicature, compared with when no such advice 
is given.  He also found that, when the logical meaning of some was made clear, these kind 
of Gricean errors were still common in “simple, interpretational tasks” but less common in 
tasks which required more reasoning.  He interprets this in terms of mental model theory.  
He is careful to add that, whilst this particular Gricean implicature may not be important in 
affecting syllogism performance, other aspects of Gricean theory may well be relevant. 
Another source of confusion is between and and or.  ‘The cars are available in red and white’ 
and ‘the cars are available in red or white’ would be accepted by most listeners as reasonable 
representations of the same fact: that you can have a car in whichever of the two colours you 
like.  However, the two sentences ‘the Polish flag is red and white’ and ‘the Polish flag is 
red or white’ have quite different meanings.  The first correctly states that the flag contains 
both red and white areas.  The second, if it means anything at all, seems to imply that the 
speaker is not sure of the colour of the flag but believes it to be either red or white.  There is 
the added confusion that, to the logician, or is interpreted as inclusive or; exclusive or has to 
be explicitly stated.  In everyday language, depending on context, or may be interpreted 
exclusively43.  These varying interpretations of and and or are not just facts of everyday 
discourse, but pervade areas where precision might be expected.  Mendonça et al. (1998) 
analysed the occurrence of and and or in medical terminology44.  They found that, for and, 
51% of the occurrences represented conjunctions, 46% represented inclusive disjunctions, 
and 3% represented exclusive disjunctions.  The occurrences of or were split almost equally 
between inclusive and exclusive disjunctions, with 0.3% representing conjunction.  Braine 
(1978) noted the differences between the interpretations in natural language and standard 
                                                 
42 The word implicature was coined by Grice.  It is intended to convey the idea of an assumption which a 
reasonable person would make but which is not justified in logic. 
43 We do sometimes, particularly for emphasis, precede the or with either.  However, this is not essential. 
44 It should be noted that this was based on a version of the medical terminology system (SNOMED) prior to 
its conversion to a logic-based representation. 
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logic of and and or.  He took account of those differences in developing his system of natural 
logic discussed in section 3.2. 
Even where two statements are semantically identical, human reasoners may perform 
differently depending on the verbal representation.  Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1989) 
exemplify this in a comparison of all and only.  These two quantifiers are interchangeable.  
All X are Y is equivalent to only Y are X.  Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1989) found that 
performance with syllogisms using all was better in general than using only, although there 
were differences depending on the figure of the syllogism. 
Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1989) also compared all and only in the context of simple 
inferencing.  For example, they compared the two versions of modus ponens: 
All the artists are beekeepers 
Lisa is an artist 
Therefore Lisa is a beekeeper 
and 
Only the beekeepers are artists 
Lisa is an artist 
Therefore Lisa is a beekeeper 
Participants performed less well with only than with all, although not significantly so.  
Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1989) also experimented with modus tollens, i.e. they replaced 
the second premise with Lisa is not a beekeeper, giving rise to the valid conclusion Lisa is 
not an artist.  Here there was significantly better performance with only than with all.  They 
discuss their results in terms of the mental model theory.  However, whatever theoretical 
interpretation one chooses to place on these results, logically equivalent but verbally 
different statements can emphasize different aspects of the relationship and lead to different 
levels of performance. 
The existence of implicatures, of ambiguities in language, and of different apparent 
emphases in equivalent statements, are important for the cognitive psychologists interpreting 
the results of reasoning experiments.  They also need to be considered by the computer 
scientist whenever designing a notation which contains elements from normal human 
language. 
3.5 Discussion 
The study of human reasoning remains an active area of psychological research.  One topic 
of the debate is how to interpret the experimental data; this is discussed in subsection 3.5.1.  
Another topic, which is less often considered but nevertheless raised by some researchers, is 
the relationship between conscious and unconscious reasoning; this is the theme of 
subsection 3.5.2.  It may not be possible to develop one over-arching theory of human 
reasoning.  It may not even be possible to create experimental situations which absolutely 
differentiate between rival theories.  Additionally, different reasoning processes may be used 
by different people, or by the same person at different times.  Lack of such a unifying theory 
is the theme of subsection 3.5.3. 
3.5.1 Interpreting the data 
Research into human reasoning has by now accumulated a considerable quantity of 
experimental data.  However, this data is open to a variety of interpretations. 
Much of the argument hinges on the mistakes which people apparently make in reasoning.  
It is possible to make a case that many of these so-called mistakes are not truly mistakes in 
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reasoning but arise because the participant’s reasoning processes and assumptions are 
different from those of the logician.  At the same time, those processes and assumptions may 
be completely valid for the individual. 
Stenning and van Lambalgen (2008, chapter 5) cite studies with people from illiterate 
cultures who had difficulty answering simple reasoning problems, posed in everyday 
language.  As they note, the issue seemed to be a failure to understand the ‘discourse genre’.  
In particular, they were unfamiliar with the idea that the question should be answered purely 
on the basis of the information supplied.  They either used their own experience to answer 
the question in a way which made sense in their context but was logically incorrect; or they 
felt unable to answer the question because of a lack of personal experience.  This may not 
seem relevant to the studies cited here45, or described in later chapters.  However, even with 
highly literate subjects where the participants are told to take into account only the 
information provided, one cannot be sure that prior knowledge is not being made use of.  
This may be happening consciously or unconsciously.  In either case, this could lead to 
incorrect answers, or to correct answers but arrived at by short-circuiting the reasoning 
process.   
Related to this are the findings of Wason and Shapiro (1971) that people perform worse on 
abstract tasks than realistic ones.  They compared an abstract and thematic version of the 
Wason selection task.  The abstract version used letters and numbers on opposite sides of 
the cards, as in the original selection task experiment.  The thematic version used the rule: 
every time I go to Manchester I travel by car.  Each card contained a town (Manchester or 
Leeds) on one side and a mode of transport (Car or Train) on the other.  Performance was 
significantly worse on the abstract than on the thematic task. 
Citing Wilkins (1929), Wason and Shapiro (1971, p. 69) note “it is well known that concrete 
material is better remembered than abstract material, and that in syllogistic reasoning 
familiar terms inhibit fallacious inferences”.  There are several issues here, which will be 
considered again in the context of DLs.  Firstly, as Wilkins (1929) notes, the use of realistic 
names may aid memorisation, e.g. of the rule.  Secondly, as he also notes, realistic names 
may prevent fallacious inferences.  They may also, of course, encourage correct ones.  Rips 
(2001a)46 supports this by showing that when faced with a logically incorrect but plausible 
conclusion, many people will state that it is logically correct.  Rips suggests that this effect 
may be particularly strong when the inference is difficult.  However, the effect is not likely 
to have been a factor in the Wason and Shapiro study.  There seems no reason to suppose a 
greater preference for using a car rather than a train when travelling to Manchester, than 
when travelling to Leeds47.  Finally, it may simply be the case that people can reason more 
easily with concrete problems than with abstract ones.  Perhaps the concrete problem is 
easier to visualize than the abstract and this helps reasoning. 
                                                 
45 In point of fact, Johnson-Laird and Bara (1984) do report rejecting one participant during an experiment 
“because she could not make any more inferences since she did not know the particular individuals referred to 
in the premises”.  The author is not aware of any other similar event being reported in such laboratory 
experiments.  Indeed, this may have been an excuse to withdraw from a situation which the participant found 
stressful. 
46 Note that the “two kinds or reasoning” of the title of this paper is quite separate from other distinctions 
referred to in this dissertation, e.g. between rules-based and mental model based.  The “two kinds of reasoning” 
refers instead to the distinction between reasoning deductively and reasoning inductively.  By the latter, Rips 
means supporting a conclusion based on its plausibility. 
47 Presumably the implicit origin of the hypothetical journey was London, since the experiments were 
conducted with students at University College London. 
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Even where the genre of discourse is totally understood and no contextual knowledge can 
influence reasoning, there may still be problems of language.  Bucciarelli and Johnson-Laird 
(1999), in the work studying syllogisms discussed in subsection 3.3.4, observed the use of 
an implicature.  They report that a participant, given the statement some of the A are not C 
wrongly concluded that some of the A are C.  This is an example of the scalar implicature, 
discussed in section 3.5.  In the context of everyday language it is reasonable to suppose that 
if all of the A had not been C, then the statement would have said so.  In the context of logic, 
this assumption cannot be made.  Ford (1995) and Johnson-Laird and Bara (1984) have 
observed exactly the same implicature. 
3.5.2 Conscious and unconscious reasoning 
Another factor which may influence reasoning processes is the extent to which they are 
unconscious, sometimes referred to as System 1 processes, or conscious, referred to as 
System 2 processes.  Evans (2003, page 454) notes that “System 1 processes are rapid, 
parallel and automatic in nature; only their final product is posted in consciousness”.  He 
uses the difference between System 1 and System 2 to explain the different results achieved 
with the content based and abstract versions of the Wason selection task.  Indeed, Evans 
cites neurophysiological research which indicates that different parts of the brain are used 
when solving these two kinds of problems.  System 1 is also seen as enabling the reasoning 
by plausibility which leads to the errors reported by Rips (2001a) and discussed above.  This 
is not the same as the distinction between the mental model and rules-based theories.  Evans 
(2003, page 457) explicitly notes that “the dual-process theory [i.e. of System 1 and System 
2] does not take sides on the issue of whether this competence is achieved by the 
manipulation of mental models or mental rules”.  Johnson-Laird and Bara (1984, page 29) 
state of mental models that they “may take the form of vivid images or they may be largely 
outside conscious awareness”.  Johnson-Laird et al. (1989) agree that mental models may be 
within or outside consciousness, and maintain that “most people claim to be unaware of how 
they reason”.  They explicitly state, of the theory of mental models, that it is the structure of 
the model which is important, “not the subjective experience”.  Braine (1978) states of his 
system of natural language reasoning that the “schemata”48 are not accessible to 
introspection, but only their products.  This implies that his rules-based system should be 
categorised as System 1.   
Sloman (1996) also considers the difference between unconscious and conscious reasoning.  
He describes reasoning in which the human reasoner is “conscious only of the result of the 
computation, not the process” as “associative” reasoning (Sloman, 1996, p. 6).  He sees this 
associative reasoning as being based on considerations of similarity. 
Oaksford and Chater (2001) suggest that their probabilistic approach, as discussed in section 
3.1 is applicable to System 1 reasoning.  They comment that probabilistic System 1 
reasoning might be used to generate conclusions to be tested with System 2 reasoning. 
Braine and O’Brien (1991) make an interesting observation about consciousness.  Citing 
Ericsson and Simon (1984) they claim that working memory is accessible to consciousness, 
i.e. in the terminology used here working memory processes are System 2 process.  An 
implication is that any working memory limitations, e.g. as proposed by the relational 
                                                 
48 An inference rule schema is a formula which contains variables, e.g. p and q, which becomes an inference 
rule on substituting values for the variables. 
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complexity theory, would not apply to unconscious processes.  Presumably such process 
would be subject to other, but perhaps more generous, constraints. 
From a practical viewpoint, the extent to which reasoning is conscious or unconscious need 
not be of great concern.  The question for this dissertation is how people reason, and in 
particular how they reason with DLs.  The conscious or unconscious nature of the reasoning 
is, however, relevant from a methodological viewpoint.  In particular, when people are asked 
about their reasoning processes, they may not be reporting the whole truth.   
3.5.3 No one theory of reasoning 
It can be the case that experimental results support more than one theory.  For example, Ford 
(1995), in a study of the syllogism, argues that there is a tendency to create the conclusion 
to a syllogism with a form49 used in one of the premises, even when this is incorrect.  Thus 
performance tends to be better when the correct conclusion is of the same form as one of the 
premises. It happens that all the syllogisms requiring three mental models are syllogisms in 
which the conclusion is of a different form from either of the premises.  All the two model 
syllogisms use a form in the conclusion which is present in a premise.  This is also true for 
the one model syllogisms50.  Thus, at least for the syllogism, it is difficult on the basis of the 
data to discriminate between the mental model theory and a theory which proposes a bias 
towards reuse of the form of one of the premises. 
The search for one theory of reasoning may well not be satisfiable.  This is illustrated by 
Ford (1995) who gave experiment participants reasoning tasks based on syllogisms.  After 
the experiment, they were asked to go through the questions again, explaining with the help 
of pencil and paper how they arrived at their conclusions.  As a result, Ford (1995) concluded 
that human reasoners could be split into two groups: verbal reasoners and spatial, i.e. 
graphical, reasoners51.  Significantly, the relative difficulty of some of the syllogisms varied 
between the two groups.  This difference in difficulty could be explained by considering the 
different strategies used by the verbal and spatial reasoners, i.e. syllogisms which are 
difficult using a verbal strategy are not necessarily difficult using a graphical strategy, and 
vice versa. 
When interviewing the verbal reasoners, she notes that a few rules can render many of the 
apparently difficult syllogisms much easier.  For example, the syllogism: 
Some X are Y 
All X are Z 
becomes more obvious when the first premise is replaced by its equivalent some Y are X.  
The second premise then permits the substitution of Z for X in the first premise, leading to 
the conclusion some Y are Z.   
When interviewing the spatial reasoners, Ford (1995) notes the construction of figures akin 
to Euler diagrams.  As already pointed out in subsection 3.3.5, this is different from the 
process proposed by mental model theorists, which makes use of exemplars.  It may be, of 
                                                 
49 By form is meant one of:  all X are Y, no X are Y, some X are Y, some X are not Y; as discussed in subsection 
3.3.4. 
50 There is one possible exception to this.  One syllogism reported by Johnson-Laird and Bara (1984) as a one-
model syllogism has a conclusion of different form from either of the premises.  This is a syllogism on which 
human reasoners perform badly and which was, in fact, later reclassified as a three model syllogism by 
Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991). 
51 In fact, the view that human reasoners use either visual or verbal techniques goes back much further.  
Johnson-Laird (2004) cites Störring (1908) as having formed the same view from a study of syllogistic 
reasoning. 
 48 
 
course, that when provided with pencil and paper people reason differently than in the 
absence of such an aid.   
In a detailed theoretical and experimental study of the syllogism, Stenning and Yule (1997) 
argue that, at least for the case of the syllogism, the experimental evidence does not permit 
discrimination between the rules-based, mental model and graphical approaches.  They do 
admit that these approaches represent “different implementations”, but “of the same abstract 
processes” (Stenning & Yule, 1997, p. 143).  They suggest that part of the learning process 
is searching for a representation system to use in reasoning.  They argue against looking for 
one right system of mental representation but suggest that the representation system used 
depends upon the person, their level of expertise and on the particular task.   
In summary, the evidence available to us does not permit the construction of one overarching 
theory of reasoning, and indeed the variation in how people reason makes such a theory 
impossible.  Rather it seems that different people use different approaches.  It may even be 
that an individual will use different approaches for different types of problems, or even 
experiment with different approaches to the same type of problem. 
From the practical viewpoint of this dissertation, the lack of a unique theory of reasoning 
need not be of concern.  The thesis put forward here is that the various theories of reasoning 
can be used in different contexts to provide insights; insights which help us understand the 
difficulties experienced with DLs, and also to mitigate those difficulties. 
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4. Methodology 
We have to remember that what we observe is not nature herself, but nature exposed 
to our method of questioning. 
Werner Heisenberg,  
‘Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science’, 1958 
This chapter provides an overview of the methodology used in the subsequent four chapters; 
a methodology which was designed to answer the research questions posed in Chapter 1. 
In their most general form these were stated as: 
In what way can the difficulties experienced in using Description Logics be understood in 
terms of underlying theories, e.g., theories of reasoning, already developed within the 
cognitive psychology community? 
In what way could such theories contribute to improving the usability of Description Logics? 
Before answering the first of these it was necessary to understand the ways in which DLs 
are being used.  The next chapter describes a survey intended to gain a better understanding 
of how ontologies are being created and edited.  Of particular relevance to the first research 
objective, the survey investigated what features of DLs were commonly used.  This helped 
to ensure the ecological validity of the studies described in subsequent chapters.   
Chapters 6 and 7 then describe two studies designed to answer the first of these research 
questions.  In each study participants were given reasoning tasks and on the basis of their 
responses, and response times, information was gained about the relative difficulty of the 
various DL features.  The theories of reasoning described in Chapter 3 were used to help 
explain these difficulties.  Chapter 8 then addressed the second research question.  Motivated 
by the observed difficulties, and by their explanation in terms of the theories of reasoning, 
changes to MOS were proposed, and the effects of those changes investigated. 
In this chapter, section 4.1 discusses eithical considerations, for both the survey and the 
studies.  Section 4.2 then provides some general background to the survey.  The rest of this 
chapter is concerned with the three studies reported in Chapters 6 to 8.  Section 4.3 describes 
the general format of the study questions.  Section 4.4 describes the tools and techniques 
used for collecting and analysing the data.  The next two sections discuss the techniques used 
to avoid two particular sources of bias; section 4.5 is concerned with avoiding bias due to 
participants’ prior knowledge of the question subject matter and section 4.6 is concerned 
with avoiding bias due to question order.  Section 4.7 discusses statistical significance and 
section 4.8 discusses qualitative techniques for gaining insights into the reasoning process.  
Section 4.9 discusses threats to the validity of conclusions drawn from the work reported in 
the subsequent chapters.  Finally, section 4.10 reviews the themes of the chapter and makes 
a general comment about the nature of the work reported. 
4.1. Ethical considerations 
The nature of this work is such that no sensitive personal information was required either 
from the survey respondents or the study participants.  Nevertheless, there were some ethical 
issues to be addressed.  Subsection 4.1.1 discusses the treatment of confidentiality issues 
arising from the survey and subsection 4.1.2 discusses some broader ethical issues arising 
from the studies. 
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4.1.1. The survey – confidentiality issues 
Most of the personal information sought from the survey respondents could be regarded as 
public domain, e.g. the sector in which the respondent worked.  In any case, there were no 
mandatory questions; participants were free to omit any question.  All reporting of the data 
was anonymous.  In particular, published quotes from the respondents were not attributed.  
Respondents were asked to provide their email addresses; again, this question was non-
mandatory.  Respondents were also asked if they were willing to be contacted after the 
survey. 
4.1.2. The studies – confidentiality and other ethical issues 
As with the survey, all reporting was anonymised.  In general, reported data comprised 
statistical rather than individual data.  An exception to this was the reporting of participant 
comments.  Here care was taken to avoid providing any information, e.g. gender, which 
might enable identification of the participant.   
Participants were not subject to any intentional stress during the study.  They were not 
required to complete the study in any particular time period.  They were encouraged at the 
beginning not to spend too long over any question.  In a few cases participants were reminded 
of this during the study when they seemed to be spending an excessive time on a question.  
This was from the practical viewpoint of avoiding excessively long study times, rather than 
any intention to induce stress. 
Participants were free to withdraw from the study at any time.  In total, one participant did 
do this.  The stated reason for this was that the participant did not feel in possession of 
sufficient background knowledge to be able to answer the questions.  However, the 
participant did not show any signs of stress during the study or in withdrawing from the 
study. 
Each study was approved by the Open University Human Research Ethics Committee.  The 
relevant references are: HREC/2013/1551/Warren/1; HREC/2014/1767/Warren/1; 
HREC/2015/2075/Warren/1. 
4.2. The survey  
Research into the usage of ontologies takes a number of forms.  A common approach is to 
analyse ontologies available on the Web.  This approach was adopted early in the history of 
the Web by Tempich and Volz (2003), who were interested in creating benchmark ontologies 
and for this they needed an understanding of the kinds of  ontologies being used.  More 
recently, Power and Third (2010) reported on the usage of OWL language features, Khan 
and Blomqvist (2010) were interested in the frequency of  occurrence of particular content 
patterns, and Glimm et al. (2012) were interested in which OWL features were being used 
by the Linked Data community. 
Another approach is to interview users.  Vigo et al. (2014a) were interested in ontology tool 
design and interviewed 15 ontology authors in order to arrive at recommendations for tool 
improvement.  A related approach is to observe users as they work.  Vigo et al. (2015) 
followed up their previous study with a study of user behaviour based on a combination of 
eye-tracking data and user logs obtained by instrumenting Protégé. 
Analysis of existing ontologies provides detailed insight into the kinds of ontologies being 
used in a way which can be automated to consider large numbers of ontologies.  On the other 
hand, it provides limited insight into authoring processes and authors’ thinking.  User 
interviews and user observation do provide this kind of richer insight, which complements 
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what can be learned by analysing ontologies.  However, user interviews and observation are 
necessarily labour-intensive, although Vigo et al. (2015) have automated the process of user 
log analysis. 
The survey approach, used in the work described in Chapter 5, enables a far greater number 
of ontology users to be reached than is possible with interviews.  This provides information 
about user processes and user thinking, although the lack of interaction with the users means 
that the data will not be so rich. 
A problem with both interviews and surveys is to achieve an unbiased sampling.  The 
likelihood is that the samples used will be influenced by the researchers’ access to ontology 
users.  In the survey described later, respondents were chiefly approached via mailing lists.  
These were mostly general mailing lists for those interested in ontology use across a wide 
range of application areas.  Life sciences are a major application area and a mailing list for 
life scientists interested in semantic technologies was also used.  The result was a wide range 
of respondents, although there may have been some bias towards life scientists.  
4.3. The study questions 
The research questions stated above refer to the difficulties of using DLs.  Such difficulties 
can take various forms.  Here the focus is on the difficulties people have in reasoning with 
DLs, e.g. when attempting to understand how a justification leads to an entailment.  An 
alternative focus might have been on modelling with DLs.  The focus on reasoning has been 
adopted partly because of the importance of understanding how a justification leads to an 
entailment in the ontology debugging process.  Moreover, during the modelling process it is 
necessary to be able to reason with DLs, to understand the consequences of the axioms being 
created.  However, the modelling process offers additional challenges, and is a valuable 
complementary area of study; for an example of such a study see Scheuermann et al. (2013).  
In the studies, accuracy and response time are used as a proxy for difficulty.  These are 
objective measures of the difficulty experienced, and are generally used in psychological 
research.  An additional possibility would have been to have asked participants to rate the 
difficulty of each question once completed, e.g. on the scale: ‘easy’, ‘moderate’, ‘difficult’.  
This would have provided a subjective measure as a complement to the two objective 
measures.  
The questions in each study followed the same pattern.  A set of DL statements were 
provided plus a putative inference.  The participant was required to confirm or refute the 
validity of the inference by clicking on a button labelled ‘valid’ or ‘not valid’.  In general, in 
each study the questions were divided approximately equally between valid and non-valid 
inferences.   
The structure of the questions follows a pattern common in reasoning research, as described 
in chapter 3.  They are similar to the questions used by Rips (1983) who asked participants 
to indicate whether a conclusion was “necessarily true” or “not necessarily true”.  Other 
studies (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984) require the participants to create their own 
conclusions from a set of premises.  This type of question is particularly used for studying 
syllogisms, where there are a limited number of valid conclusions52 and each conclusion is 
in one of four forms.  However, in each of the three studies described later there were a 
                                                 
52 Of the 27 syllogisms with valid conclusions the great majority have only one valid conclusion in one of the 
four Aristotelian forms.  However, there are a few with more than one. 
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variety of logical structures being investigated and this would not have lent itself to the use 
of open-ended questions. 
4.4. Data collection and analysis 
4.4.1. The data 
A feature of the Rips (1983) study, and of a number of other early studies, was that it was 
conducted with pencil and paper, i.e. participants were required to indicate the correct 
answer on question sheets.  This restricts the quantitative data to the accuracy of the answers.  
In fact, much of the discussion in the reasoning literature is based on accuracy, in part 
because the debate between the various schools turns on the errors which people make.  From 
the statistical viewpoint the data is relatively limited since the responses are all binary 
(correct / incorrect) and sampling is assumed to be from a binomial distribution.  Some 
studies, e.g. Johnson-Laird and Bara’s (1984) study of syllogisms, use computer technology 
to record the response time for each question, thereby supplementing the accuracy data. 
In situations where the questions are relatively easy, the accuracy data may be of little value 
and the timing data is the chief source of information.  An example is given by Blake et al. 
(2012), who were interested in whether the orientation of an Euler diagram affected 
comprehension.  The overall error rate was 3% and the authors noted that “there is little 
useful information that can be derived from this error data”.  The timing data, however, 
provided a significant amount of diversity. 
Johnson-Laird and Bara (1984) used a measure which combined accuracy and timing.  They 
were working with questions based on the 27 valid syllogisms.  For each participant they put 
the participant’s correct responses into the top category, the responses for which the 
participant had indicated a conclusion which was incorrect into the middle category, and the 
responses for which the participant had indicated ‘no valid conclusion’ into the bottom 
category53.  Within each of these categories they ranked each of the responses by time.  This 
produced an overall ranking of difficulty54. 
Where there are an appreciable number of incorrect responses one approach is to analyse the 
accuracy and timing data separately but to limit all statistical analysis of response time purely 
to the correct responses.  The rationale for this is that the time taken to incorrectly respond 
is not a meaningful measure of the difficulty of the question.  However, this may not 
necessarily be the case; participants are likely to take some considerable time over the more 
difficult questions even when they get these questions wrong.  One disadvantage of not using 
timing data from the incorrect responses is the reduction in sample size.  Moreover, this 
strategy may introduce a bias.  If we remove the incorrect responses, as the questions become 
more difficult not only do the samples become smaller but in general they concentrate more 
on the better-performing participants, thus biasing timing comparisons between questions of 
different levels of difficulty.  For these reasons, in the studies reported in Chapters 6 to 8, 
analysis of response time data has included the timings from the incorrect responses. 
4.4.2. Data analysis 
In analysing time data it is common to use techniques such as the t-test and analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) which assume an approximately normal distribution.  The data should 
                                                 
53 I.e. they regarded ‘no valid conclusion’ as a more serious error than an incorrect conclusion. 
54 They used this ranking to demonstrate that the difficulty of the 27 valid syllogisms is dependent on number 
of models, and for the one and three model syllogisms, on ‘figure’, i.e. the order in which the terms are 
presented in the syllogism, see Table 3.1 of Section 3.3.4 of Chapter 3.   
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be checked for normality prior to using such techniques, e.g. by using a normal probability 
plot55.  If the data are not normal, it may be possible to transform the data such that they are 
normal and techniques such as the t-test and ANOVA can then be applied to the transformed 
data.  An alternative is to use a non-parametric test.  However, Hopkins et al. (2009) note 
that a transformation to reduce skewness followed by a parametric test provides greater 
statistical power at small sample sizes than does a non-parametric test.  Osborne (2005) 
provides an overview of how data can be transformed so that its distribution is closer to the 
normal distribution.  An example of this approach is given by Blake et al. (2012) who found 
it necessary to apply a log transformation to their timing data.  In fact, the log transformation 
is one of a number of transformations on Tukey’s ladder of powers56 (Scott, 2012).  The 
technique is to move up or down this ‘ladder’ until the data best approximate normality.  
Data can be tested for normality either by graphical inspection or the Shapiro-Wilk test 
(Shapiro & Wilk, 1965).  More detail is provided in Chapters 6 to 8, but in general the log 
transformation was found most satisfactory in transforming the time data to an 
approximately normal distribution. 
For the accuracy data a binomial distribution was assumed and Fisher’s Exact Test and 
logistic regression (Peng et al., 2002) were used. 
Note also that all tests are two-sided, unless it is explicitly stated otherwise. 
4.4.3. Practical details 
For the first two studies, described in chapters 6 and 7, a web-based tool was used to provide 
the questions and capture the responses.  More details are provided in the appropriate 
chapters.  The screen-recording tool Camtasia57 was used to record the sessions and hence 
capture the timing information.  This approach was used in laboratory experiments.  In the 
second study, it was also used in remote sessions, using Skype58 for screen-sharing.  
Specifically, the participant shared his or her screen with the experimenter and accessed the 
web-based tool which collected the responses.  The experimenter ran Camtasia on his 
machine and recorded the session. 
The approach has a number of disadvantages.  Collection of the timing data after the 
experiment is a lengthy process.  Moreover, the various web survey tools available are 
limited in their ability to randomize question order.  The need for randomization is discussed 
in section 4.5 below.  For these reasons the third study, described in chapter 3, used the 
MediaLab tool from Empirisoft59.  This software, which was run on the experimenter’s 
laptop computer, collects the responses and the timing data in a form which can be exported 
to a spreadsheet.  It also enables the order of the sections within the study and of the questions 
within each section to be randomized. 
Statistical analysis was performed using the R software environment60 (R Core Team, 2014) 
run within RStudio61. 
                                                 
55 In a normal probability plot, normal data appears as a straight line. 
56 These include: … -x-2, -x-1, -x-0.5, log x, x0.5, x, x2 …The negative sign before the transformations with 
negative index is to preserve the order of the variable, i.e. to ensure that the relations ‘<’ and ‘>’ are preserved 
by the transformation. 
57 https://www.techsmith.com/camtasia.html 
58 http://www.skype.com/en/ 
59 http://www.empirisoft.com/ 
60 https://www.r-project.org/ 
61 https://www.rstudio.com/ 
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4.5. Avoiding the use of prior knowledge 
It is clearly essential in all reasoning experiments to ensure that the participants are actually 
reasoning about the questions, or at least attempting to reason, and not using prior knowledge 
about a subject area.  There are various approaches to this, which can be regarded as being 
on a spectrum depending on their degree of abstraction. 
In psychological research, an example of the completely abstract approach is provided by 
the original selection task described in Wason (1968), where letters and numbers were used.  
In DL research, the completely abstract approach is exemplified by Horridge et al. (2011), 
who gave participants a set of axioms and a putative conclusion to confirm or refute.  The 
axioms and the conclusions made use of classes and properties; these were referred to as C1, 
C2, … and prop1, prop2, … 
A variant on the abstract approach is illustrated by Nguyen et al. (2012, 2013), who used 
‘nonsense’ statements.  An example of a statement used by Nguyen et al. (2012) is 
“Everything that has a worship leader is a fomorian”.  As can be seen from this sentence, the 
approach combines made-up words, e.g. “fomorian” and real words.  Some of the real words 
are employed with their actual meanings, e.g. in the phrase “that has”.  Others are used 
meaninglessly, e.g. the noun phrase “worship leader”62.  The result is a set of grammatical 
sentences employing a combination of phrases which have meaning (“Everything that has a 
… is a”) combined with meaningless words and phrases (“worship leader”, “fomorian”) such 
that the sentence itself is meaningless.  This is useful where one wants questions to be in 
natural language, rather than a logical symbolism.  The resultant statements do have the 
general flavour of nonsense language, akin to some of the writing of Edward Lear.  Some 
participants may find this disorienting. 
Zielinski et al. (2010) took an abstract approach in their study of syllogisms, using the letters 
X, Y and Z.  However, they began by giving participants two practice questions.  The first of 
these used occupations; whilst the second used the letters A, B, C to acquaint participants 
with the abstract approach.  Johnson-Laird and Bara (1984), in their study of syllogisms, 
take an approach which does not permit the use of prior knowledge but which has a realistic 
flavour.  They constructed questions in terms of occupations (e.g. judges), interests (e.g. 
ornithologists) and preoccupations (e.g. vegetarians).  Bucciarelli and Johnson-Laird (1999), 
also studying syllogisms, take a similar approach.  As already described in Chapter 3, in one 
experiment they provided participants with pictures to help them reason, choosing 
occupations and interests which were pictorially distinguishable, e.g. cooks, musicians and 
swimmers. 
In some experiments it is, of course, required to pose realistic questions.  Such was the case 
with the thematic questions of Wason and Shapiro (1971) discussed in chapter 3.  When 
realistic questions are used, great care needs to be taken to ensure that there are no natural 
associations which might bias the reasoning process.  As described in Chapter 3, Wason and 
Shapiro (1971) used questions about travel involving two towns and two modes of transport, 
and for this there needed to be no natural association between either of the towns and either 
of the modes of transport. 
                                                 
62 It could be argued that “worship leader” does possess a meaning.  However, the phrase is so unusual and 
shares no context with the other words used, so that it is unlikely to have any effect on the participant’s 
reasoning processes. 
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The advantage of the totally abstract approach, e.g the use of C1, C2, prop1, prop2 by 
Horridge et al. (2011), is that one can have complete confidence that no prior knowledge is 
being brought to bear.  However, this approach may make it unnaturally difficult to 
remember the significance of the various terms used.  Chapter 3 has already noted Wason 
and Shapiro’s (1971) observation, in turn based on Wilkins (1929), that “concrete material 
is better remembered than abstract material”.  In reasoning research, an argument could be 
made that the approach taken should depend on whether one regards the memorisation as 
part of the reasoning, and hence part of what is being studied, or as an extraneous activity 
the effect of which one wishes to minimize. 
For the studies reported here the goal is to understand and mitigate the difficulties 
experienced in using DLs, and as such the DL statements used should be as close as possible 
to those met in real-life.  In real-life, names used in ontologies are generally chosen to be 
meaningful.  Ideally, for the studies, names should be meaningful, familiar to all participants 
and yet not provide clues as to the correct response.  In practice there are difficulties in 
choosing names, particularly to satisfy the last of these criteria, and a hybrid approach has 
been adopted in the three studies reported here.  All property names are meaningful, e.g. 
has_child, as are some class names, e.g. MALE and FEMALE.  Abstract names were used 
where it was felt that meaningfulness was less important, i.e. for individual names and in 
some cases for class names.  Even here, where necessary, names are chosen to be mnemonic.  
In particular, in questions in the second and third studies where hierarchical relations need 
to be represented, top level classes are represented by single letters (e.g. A, B), second level 
classes by appending numbers (e.g., A_1, A_2), and third level classes by appending letters 
distinct from those used for the top-level classes (e.g. A_1_X, A_1_Y). 
It is likely that, when working with real-life ontologies, people do draw on prior knowledge.  
They may, for example, reason from plausibility as discussed in Chapter 3.  They may also 
make use of concepts not present in the questions but which can be constructed from the 
available concepts.  For example, after completion of study 3, a participant mentioned that, 
in thinking about a question which used nested instantiations of the has_child property, the 
concept grandfather had been used, although it was not present in the question. 
A related but different issue arises for the non-valid questions.  In setting these questions it 
is necessary to create non-valid conclusions.  Some potential conclusions will be more 
obviously non-valid than others.  The conclusions should appear sufficiently plausible to 
necessitate appreciable analysis of the premises.  Moreover, when comparing non-valid 
questions, e.g. with different levels of complexity in their premises, the conclusions need to 
be of comparable plausibility.  In practice this may cause difficulties.  One solution is to only 
perform analysis on the valid questions, using the non-valid purely as foils.  This was the 
approach taken by Nguyen et al. (2012).  This has the disadvantage of reducing the data 
available for analysis and for this reason the work described in later chapters makes as much 
use as possible of the data from non-valid questions.   
4.6. Avoiding bias due to question ordering 
It is reasonable to assume that the order of questions might affect both the accuracy of 
response and response time.  On the one hand, we might expect that performance will 
improve as participants get used to the type of question.  On the other hand, there could be 
a fatigue or boredom effect leading to worsening performance.  In either case, such effects 
will distort comparisons between questions and hence bias the results. 
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Each of the studies had: an introductory section, where participants were asked to provide 
basic information about themselves; three or four sections with the questions, as described 
in Section 4.3; and a final section in which participants were invited to provide feedback.  
Thus the order of the questions within the study will depend on the order of the question 
sections and the order of the questions within the question sections. 
In the first study, described in Chapter 6, there were three question sections and hence six 
possible permutations.  There were 12 participants and hence each permutation was used 
twice.  This compensates for the large-scale effect, e.g. a question is close to the beginning 
of the study for at most one-third of the participants.  However, there was no compensation 
for the effect of ordering of questions within the sections.  As this study was largely 
exploratory, this was regarded as acceptable. 
In the second study, described in Chapter 7, there were four question sections and hence 24 
possible permutations.  Response time data was collected from 24 participants63, and each 
participant was presented with a different section order.  In this case, to compensate against 
a bias due to question order within sections, for each section half the participants saw the 
questions in one order, half in the reverse order. 
As noted in section 4.3, the first two studies were implemented using a web-based tool.  
Consequently, the permutation of section and question order was a lengthy, manual process.  
However, study 3 used a tool which enabled automatic randomization of question section 
and question order within sections, and this enabled a controlled investigation of the effect 
of question position.  The investigation revealed an effect due to the position of a question 
overall and also its position within its section.  More detail is provided in Chapter 8. 
4.7. Statistical significance 
In the three studies reported here, sample sizes were inevitably quite small.  Organizing and 
holding study sessions is necessarily a time-consuming process and will always limit study 
size.  However, for these studies the greatest limitation was access to participants.  It was 
not necessary that the participants be experts in ontology modelling or in logic, since the 
necessary details were explained to participants prior to the study.  However, they did need 
to have sufficient background in computer science to be able to absorb those details.  Very 
many of the participants came from the research community at the Open University, 
augmented by contacts within the relevant research communities; and, in the case of study 
3, members of a research group at another university and an industrial research group.  In 
practice, difficulties of obtaining appropriate participants did impose a limitation on study 
size.   
Sample size, effect size and statistical significance are linked.  For any given size of effect, 
the greater the sample size, the greater the likelihood of a small p-value.  Thus, any given p-
value is not a function of the size of the effect alone, but of the size of the effect and the 
sample size.  In the work reported in this dissertation, p < 0.05 is regarded as implying 
significance.  Small effects are only likely to give rise to significant differences when we 
have a sufficiently large sample size.  Ideally, we need a sample size sufficient to make it 
likely that any effect large enough to be of interest to us will be significant.  In practice, this 
is not always achievable at the level of individual questions, and as a result the majority of 
statistical analyses in subsequent chapters are based on aggregated questions.   
                                                 
63 As explained in Chapter 7, accuracy data was collected from additional participants. 
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Related to this is the question of repeated statistical testing.  Ioannadis (2005) is concerned 
about the validity of much reported scientific work.  Part of this concern is with repeated 
statistical testing with a relatively low significance threshold.  He provides a detailed 
analysis of the danger of this practice.  The essence of his argument is that if you regard p < 
0.05 as significant, then on average one time in twenty you will report a false positive, i.e. 
you will have a type I error.  In some situations you may have very few, or even no, actual 
positives, so that given enough statistical tests most, or even all, the reported positive 
findings will be false. 
When multiple comparisons are made, e.g. repeated t-tests, one approach to compensating 
for this problem is to make use of the Bonferroni correction.  In the simple Bonferroni 
correction, if the generally-used threshold is α (here 0.05), and there are n tests, then each 
test uses the threshold α/n.  McDonald (2014) provides a brief overview of multiple 
comparisons, whilst Shaffer (1995) discusses multiple comparisons in more detail.  Both 
discuss the Bonferroni correction and refinements to it.   
One particular situation which potentially leads to repeated significance testing occurs after 
an ANOVA, when it is required to determine which pairwise differences are significant.  In 
the case of a one factor ANOVA with n levels there will be n(n-1)/2 pairwise comparisons. 
To compensate for the increased likelihood of false positives, Tukey’s Honest Significant 
Difference (HSD) test (Tukey, 1949) can be used to adjust for the number of pairwise 
comparisons being used.  This is provided as an optional feature with the ANOVA function 
in the statistical language, R, used for the work described in this dissertation. 
Both McDonald (2014) and Shaffer (1995) stress the importance of deciding which tests 
constitute a ‘family’, i.e. which tests should be regarded together as a set of multiple 
comparisons.  Shaffer (1995) provides a real-life example where an unnecessarily large 
definition of the family excessively reduced the power of the tests. 
In the work reported here, where independent hypotheses are tested using individual pairwise 
comparisons, then no correction is applied.  Where an ANOVA is used, then any subsequent 
pairwise comparisons are made using a Tukey HSD analysis.   
More generally, it is important to bear in mind the order of magnitude of the p-value.  In 
some of the tests reported, the p-values are very small indeed, and this clearly diminishes 
the force of the argument put forward by Ioannadis (2005).  At the same time, much of the 
work reported here is inevitably exploratory and should be seen in this light.  In particular, 
where results are close to significance this indicates the need for further study. 
Finally, a comment needs to be made about reporting significance levels.  As already noted, 
throughout this dissertation p < 0.05 is taken as implying significance.  Other values of p are 
regarded as being not significant.  In line with recommended practices of the American 
Psychological Association (2010), p values are normally reported to three decimal places, 
except that p values less than 0.001 are reported as ‘p < 0.001’.  In certain cases where 
comparisons between p values are being made, small p values are quoted to a greater 
precision. 
4.8. Understanding the reasoning processes 
The analysis of accuracy and response time data provides a considerable insight into the 
reasoning processes of the participants.  In psychological research, a number of attempts 
have been made to complement this type of data with more qualitative information. 
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One approach is the use of ‘thinking aloud’, i.e. participants are asked to speak their thoughts 
out loud as they perform a task.  The researcher may note the key points as they are spoken, 
or the participants’ comments may be recorded for subsequent analysis.  A potential problem 
with this approach is that the act of speaking out their thoughts may alter the participants’ 
thought processes.  Ericsson and Simon (1998) suggest that this is only likely to be the case 
if the speech is directed at another individual.  Hence, if the participant is merely talking to 
him or herself, then there may be little disturbance to thought processes.  During the initial 
sessions in the first study, described in Chapter 6, participants were asked to think aloud.  
This was subsequently dropped; in part because participants forgot as they proceeded into 
the study.  Thinking aloud may also affect response time data.  Reminding participants to 
think aloud would be likely to even more affect such data, besides increasing working 
memory demands. 
Another approach used in reasoning research is to provide pencil and paper for participants 
to use in arriving at an answer.  Participants’ writing and drawings are subsequently 
analysed.  As described in Chapter 3, this approach was used by Bucciarelli and Johnson-
Laird (1999).  Again, the drawback from the point of view of the work described here is the 
impact this might have on the response time data. 
In fact, Bucciarelli and Johnson-Laird (1999) also video-recorded the hands of the 
participants as they used pencil and paper. This provides insight into the dynamics of their 
behaviour.  Horridge et al. (2011) used eye-tracking data to give insight into how participants 
thought about a reasoning task.  This has the advantage that it provides information about 
the dynamics of user behaviour without affecting the response time data. 
Another approach, which was adopted in this work, is the use of online feedback and post-
study interviews.  The interviews were conducted immediately after each study, but there is 
still the possibility that participants may have forgotten the details of their thought processes.  
There is also the danger that participants may indulge in post-hoc rationalization.  
Nevertheless, data from post-study intervals offers a useful complement to the quantitative 
accuracy and timing data.  Easterbrook et al. (2008), in a survey of empirical methods for 
software engineering research, make the point that all methods have flaws, and that 
combining techniques may compensate for these flaws. 
4.9. Threats to validity 
Purchase (Chapter 6, 2012) describes validity, or accuracy, as “the extent to which the 
experiment correctly addresses the specified research questions”.  She further characterises 
validity as: internal validity, which is concerned with “the design of the experiment”, and 
external validity, which is concerned with “the generalization of the results”.  Another aspect 
of validity (Blake et al., 2014) is construct validity, which “examines whether the 
independent and dependent variables yield an accurate measure to test our hypotheses”.  
Each of these three aspects is considered briefly here and in more specific detail in each of 
the following four chapters. 
4.9.1. Construct validity 
For the survey in Chapter 5, the major threats to construct validity are the interpretation of 
the questions by the respondents and the interpretation of the responses by the researcher.  
To minimise the former, the questions were checked by two reviewers.  To minimise the 
latter, as far as possible the responses were selected from a list, rather than being free format. 
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For the studies, in Chapters 6 to 8, the major threats to construct validity are the accurate 
recording of response and response time.  In all three studies, the responses were recorded 
automatically.  The technique for recording response times varied between the first two 
studies and the last; this is described in the appropriate chapters. 
4.9.2. Internal validity 
For the survey, the major threat to internal validity lies in the design of the questions.  In 
particular, the range of possible answers needs to be comprehensive, in order to capture all 
the possibilities. 
For the studies, the major problem is the effect of learning or fatigue, as the participant moves 
through the study.  Each of the studies was divided into sections, hence these effects can be 
regarded as inter-section and intra-section.  This is discussed in detail later. 
4.9.3. External validity 
For both the survey and the studies, threats to external validity come from two sources.  
Fistly, it is necessary to create appropriate questions and thereby gain relevant data.  
Secondly, it is necessary to ensure a representative sample of survey respondents or study 
participants.  Again, the extent to which this was achieved is discussed in more detail later. 
4.10. Discussion 
As far as practically possible the work described here has attempted to compensate for 
sources of bias.  The survey was distributed to a very wide audience, and responses were 
received from a wide range of disciplines, as reported in Chapter 5.  The studies were 
designed to avoid bias due to prior knowledge and compensate for bias due to question order.  
Rigorous statistical testing was used in the analysis of the quantitative data, and this data 
was also complemented by qualitative data gained from online feedback and post-study 
interviews.  However, the studies reported here should be seen as exploratory.  Chapter 2 
has described a limited amount of previous research into DL comprehension.  Very little of 
this has been informed by insights from cognition or language studies.  The work reported 
here has taken a broad view of how those insights might be applied.  Certain of the results 
are clear-cut.  However, it is in the nature of an exploratory study that some results will be 
more tentative.   
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5. The user experience 
That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt. 
Immanuel Kant, ‘Critique of Pure Reason’, Introduction, 1781 
This chapter discusses the experience of using ontologies based on a survey of ontology 
users and a follow-up survey relating specifically to ontology patterns.  In particular, it 
concentrates on the use of DLs as a background to the work to be reported in the next three 
chapters.  More detail of the initial survey findings, including relating to other aspects of 
ontology use, are reported in Warren (2013).  The survey identified commonly used DL 
features which were then included in the study described in Chapter 6, helping to ensure 
ecological validity for that study.  The survey also identified that there was appreciable use 
of ontology patterns and a follow-up survey was undertaken to obtain more detail on this, 
e.g. the typical sizes of ontology patterns.  The follow-up ontology pattern survey is reported 
in Warren (2014).  Warren et al. (2014) provide an overview bringing together both surveys, 
with additional analysis.  
Section 5.1 provides some information about the organisation of the surveys and about the 
respondents.  Sections 5.2 to 5.7 report on findings from the first survey.  Section 5.2 reports 
on the commonly used ontologies and section 5.3 on the commonly used ontology tools.  
Section 5.4 discusses the usage of ontology languages, including the various OWL profiles, 
whilst section 5.5 discusses the usage of specific DL language features.  Section 5.6 
describes some comments made by respondents about their experiences with ontology 
languages.  Section 5.7 discusses ontology visualization, which can be viewed either as an 
alternative or a complement to representations using an ontology language.  Section 5.8, 
which draws on both the original survey and the follow-on patterns survey, provides 
information about the use of ontology patterns and pattern libraries.  This is important, in 
part because some ontology patterns are designed to overcome limitations in the ontology 
language.  Ontology patterns are also important from the viewpoint of this dissertation 
because three ontology patterns, identified as commonly used by the work of Khan and 
Blomqvist (2010), form the basis of the questions used in the first study.  This further helped 
to achieve ecological validity for that study.  Section 5.9 discusses possible threats to 
validity.  Finally, section 5.10 draws some conclusions. 
5.1. The surveys and survey respondents 
The original survey was conducted during the first three months of 2013 using the Survey 
Expression65 tool.  Responses were obtained using a number of contacts and relevant mailing 
lists.  The latter included: the ontolog-forum66; the U.K. Ontology Network67; the Semantic 
Web for Life Sciences group and the Description Logic group, both on LinkedIn; lists 
maintained by the Open Knowledge Foundation68, and the internal mailing list within the 
author’s university department.  Note that this does not necessarily constitute a random 
sampling of application areas.  In particular, the only application-specific mailing list used 
was for the life sciences and this may have resulted in some bias towards the life sciences. 
                                                 
65 www.surveyexpression.com 
66 This forum now uses Google Groups at https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/ontolog-forum. 
Historical archives are available at http://ontolog.cim3.net/.  
67https://conferences.ncl.ac.uk/ukon2016/, for mailing list see also: 
https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/ontology-uk/join  
68 okfn-{en,Scotland,nl}@lists.okfn.org 
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The follow-on patterns survey was conducted during the second half of 2013, also using the 
Survey Expression tool and using a similar set of mailing lists.  In addition, certain 
respondents to the first survey who indicated usage of ontology patterns were specifically 
asked to complete the second survey. 
Subsection 5.1.1 describes the original survey questions and the respondents.  Subsection 
5.1.2 similarly describes the patterns survey and the respondents. 
5.1.1. Ontology user survey 
The questionnaire contained six sections: 
• You and your work – information about the respondent and the work area. 
• Your ontologies – information about the respondent’s ontologies and how the respondent 
uses ontologies. 
• Tools and visualization – which ontology tools are used, including visualization tools. 
• Ontology languages – which ontology languages are used, and for those using DL 
languages, which language features are used; also for those using OWL, which OWL 
profiles are used. 
• Ontology patterns – whether taken from a library or created by the respondent or 
respondent’s colleagues. 
• Conclusions – an opportunity for the respondents to make any final comments on their 
experience using ontologies. 
There were 118 responses in all, although in general respondents did not answer all 
questions.  All 118 respondents described their primary application area, giving the 
following breakdown: biomedical (31%); business (9%); engineering (19%); physical 
sciences (7%); social sciences (5%); and other (30%).  The ‘other’ category included 12% 
(i.e. 12% of the original 118) with responses which could be classified as ‘computing’, 
indicating that this would have been a useful category to include in the questionnaire.  A 
small number cited ‘cultural heritage’ and ‘linguistics’, indicating that, e.g. humanities, 
might also have been a useful category.  This would have constituted 4% of the responses.  
Other responses included publishing, agricultural production and environment.  Some of the 
respondents used ‘other’ to include a combination of categories or to specify particular 
subdisciplines within the predefined categories. 
116 respondents described their sector, giving the following breakdown: academic (45%); 
from research institutes (25%); industrial (17%) and other (13%).  115 respondents provided 
information about the length of time they had worked with ontologies.  54% had over five 
years’ experience and only 5% had less than one year.  Figure 5-1 shows the response to this 
question, showing also the breakdown into application areas.  As already noted, the 
distribution of application areas does not necessarily represent a random sampling of all 
ontology users. 
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Figure 5-1 Breakdown of respondents by number of years working with ontologies 
5.1.2. Ontology patterns survey 
The questionnaire contained an introductory section describing the objectives of the survey, 
followed by four question sections: 
• You and your work – information about the respondent and the work area. 
• Pattern use – information about the patterns, e.g. the size of patterns being used and from 
where they are obtained. 
• Creating patterns – information about how the need for a pattern is identified, how 
patterns are created, and how they are stored. 
• Conclusions – an opportunity for respondents to make any final comments about their 
pattern use. 
There were 13 respondents to this survey.  As with the original survey, respondents were 
asked to indicate their application area.  The same categories were used as before, with the 
addition of computing and humanities.  There were five respondents from computing, three 
from engineering, two each from physical sciences and biomedical, and one from 
humanities.  There were no respondents from business and social sciences. 
Respondents were also asked to describe their sector, using the same categories as before.  
There were six responses from academia, five from research institutes and two from industry. 
5.2. Ontology user survey: ontologies 
Respondents were asked to specify their most frequently used ontologies, in order of 
frequency of use, up to a maximum of five.  Of the 69 respondents who answered this 
question, 32 listed five ontologies and only 7 listed just one.  Figure 5-2 shows the most 
popular five ontologies, showing the percentage of respondents who cited each ontology.  
Ten people indicated that they used their own ontologies, putting ‘own’ in sixth place, as 
shown.  Note that in this figure, as multiple responses were permitted, the total of the 
percentages exceeds 100%; this applies to many other figures in this chapter.    No 
respondent placed FOAF in their most frequently used category; the majority of respondents 
citing FOAF placed it in their second most frequently used category.  All the other categories 
in Figure 5-2 were cited by some respondents as their most frequently used ontology.   
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Besides the ontologies shown in the figure there were a number relating to biology, medicine 
and chemistry, and also some generic ontologies.  Amongst the latter were the W3C 
provenance ontology; the RDF data cube vocabulary; schema.org; upper level ontologies, 
e.g. DOLCE; and lexical databases, e.g. WordNet. 
 
Figure 5-2 Usage of ontologies; percentage of 69 respondents 
From the standpoint of the work described in later chapters, the relevant question is to what 
extent these ontologies make use of DLs.  The most commonly used, Dublin Core, is defined 
in the RDF Schema Language (RDFS).  FOAF and SKOS use an extended form of RDFS, 
see Allemang and Hendler (2011, Chapters 9 and 10)69.  DBpedia is composed of RDF triples 
extracted from structured Wikipedia data (Bizer et al., 2009).  The Gene Ontology (GO) is 
defined in a purpose-built language, but conversion into OWL DL is possible. 
To generalize, the commonly used ontologies are not created in a general-purpose DL 
language, although conversion to OWL may be possible.  Moreover, they are quite limited 
in the language constructs used.  However, as the next section demonstrates, there is 
currently an appreciable usage of OWL editors. 
5.3. Ontology user survey: ontology editors 
Respondents were asked which ontology editors they used, from a choice of twelve plus an 
‘other’ option.  There were 65 respondents and multiple responses were permitted.  Figure 
5-3 shows all the tools for which there was more than one response.  All the tools shown 
were among the predefined categories, except for OBO-Edit70 and Neurolex, which are both 
editors for biomedical ontologies.  Note that users of Protégé 3 were obliged to indicate 
whether they used the OWL or frame-based versions.  They could, of course, indicate usage 
of both. 
The dominance of DL, and specifically OWL, editors is striking.  Considering the editors in 
decreasing order of usage, i.e. from the left in Figure 5-3, Protégé 4 is an OWL editor, as is 
                                                 
69 The W3C comments that the FOAF ontology is “essentially compatible with OWL RL” except that it makes 
use of inverse functional datatype properties.  See: https://www.w3.org/wiki/Good_Ontologies  
70 http://oboedit.org/ 
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TopBraid Composer71 and Neon72.  On the other hand,  Cmap73, from the Florida Institute 
for Human and Machine Cognition (IHMC), is an editor for concept maps.  Concept maps 
were originally developed to represent children’s conceptual understanding but now have a 
wider range of knowledge management applications (Sánchez et al., 2010).  Turning to the 
editors at the far right of the figure, SWOOP74 is an OWL editor (Kalyanpur et al., 2006); 
Semantic MediaWiki is a wiki which enables the creation of informal semantic relations 
(Krötzsch et al., 2006)75; and OBO-Edit supports the Open Biomedical Ontologies (OBO) 
format, but also supports OWL. 
 
Figure 5-3 Usage of ontology editors; percentage of 65 respondents 
Thus five of the nine most commonly used ontology editors are primarily OWL editors, 
including the four most commonly used, whilst one of the remaining four (OBO-Edit) 
supports OWL.  Of course, the prevalence of OWL editors does not imply that people are 
using OWL features to any great extent.  The editors may be being used for purely RDFS 
functionality, e.g. subsumption.  The prevalence of OWL editors may reflect the fact that in 
recent years this is where most development has been concentrated, as a result of the 
standardisation of OWL by the W3C.  To understand the extent to which the more 
sophisticated features of OWL are being used we need to understand which OWL profiles 
and which specific DL features are being used.  These are the subjects of the next two 
sections. 
5.4. Ontology user survey: ontology languages 
Of the 65 respondents to a question about which languages they used, 58 indicated OWL, 
56 RDF and 45 RDFS.  The other two predefined options, OIL and DAML+OIL received 
no responses.  11 respondents indicated ‘other’ which included the OBO format, query 
languages, plus other more specialist languages. 
                                                 
71 http://www.topquadrant.com/tools/modeling-topbraid-composer-standard-edition/ 
72 http://neon-toolkit.org/wiki/Main_Page.html 
73 http://cmap.ihmc.us/ 
74 https://github.com/ronwalf/swoop 
75 Two of the four respondents who indicated use of Semanic MediaWiki were using it with Neurolex 
(http://neurolex.org/wiki/Main_Page), a lexicon for neuroscientific information (Larson & Martone, 2013). 
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When asked which OWL profiles were used there were 133 responses from 54 respondents.  
Figure 5-4 shows the distribution of responses.  The three profiles on the left are the first 
generation OWL profiles, the remainder are from the second generation of OWL.  The 
relatively high number of responses for OWL Full and OWL 2 Full is surprising, given that 
these languages are not decidable.  This may have resulted from a confusion about 
terminology or may represent people who did not consciously restrict the features they used, 
rather than actually using features beyond OWL DL or OWL 2 DL.  On the other hand, these 
responses may represent applications which do not use reasoning, and hence are not 
concerned about the lack of decidability.  Note also that the breakdown by application 
domain shows no obvious bias of a particular application domain towards a particular 
language profile. 
 
Figure 5-4 Usage of OWL profiles; percentage of 54 respondents 
There were approximately 2.5 responses per respondent, indicating considerable usage of 
multiple profiles.  This relatively high ratio may in part have been caused by people 
migrating from the first to second generation of OWL.  Indeed, of the 32 respondents who 
indicated usage of more than one profile, there were 18 respondents using profiles from both 
generations.  However, many of these 18 were using more than one profile from one or both 
generations; and in any case this still left 14 respondents using more than one profile entirely 
from one generation76. 
5.5. Ontology user survey: DL language features 
Respondents using languages based on DLs were asked which language features they used 
from a list of 23 features.  These features were identified from the relevant W3C sources, 
and the features available in Protégé.  In hindsight, there a few omissions, in particular usage 
of class and object properties; although datatype properties were included.  There were 47 
respondents to this question.  Table 5-1 shows the percentage of respondents citing each 
                                                 
76 In fact, since the 18 respondents with responses in both generations represent exactly one-third of the total 
respondents, if multiple usage were caused entirely by migration to the second generation, this would lead to 
a ratio of 1.33 responses per respondent, well below the actual figure of 2.5.  Note, though, that there were two 
who indicated all eight profiles, at least one of whom was a researcher in the area of the semantic web.  No 
other respondent indicated more than five profiles. 
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language feature.  The features are numbered from most commonly used (1: object property 
domain) to least commonly used (23: irreflexive object properties). 
Table 5-1 Usage of DL features; percentage of 47 respondents 
no. feature %age  no. feature %age 
1 object property domain 79%  13 hasValue restrictions 60% 
2 object property range 77%  14 cardinality restrictions 51% 
3 disjoint classes 74%  15 symmetric object properties 51% 
4 datatype properties 72%  16 functional datatype properties 51% 
5 intersection of classes 70%  17 datatype subproperties 49% 
6 transitive object properties 68%  18 complement of a class 47% 
7 object subproperties 68%  19 qualified cardinality restrictions 43% 
8 union of classes 66%  20 inverse functional object properties 36% 
9 existential restrictions 66%  21 reflexive object properties 30% 
10 inverse object properties 64%  22 asymmetric object properties 26% 
11 functional object properties 64%  23 irreflexive object properties 17% 
12 universal restrictions 60%     
 
Of the OWL property characteristics, there are four which over 50% of the respondents used: 
transitive object properties (68%); functional object properties (64%); symmetric object 
properties (51%); functional datatype properties (51%).  The remaining four property 
characteristics constitute the four least commonly used features: inverse functional object 
properties (36%); reflexive object properties (30%); asymmetric object properties (26%); 
and irreflexive object properties (17%).  Note that the last two of these, the asymmetric and 
irreflexive characteristics, were not present in the first generation of OWL.  The work of the 
next three chapters has looked at human reasoning with transitive, functional, symmetric and 
inverse functional object properties, but has ignored the three least commonly used 
characteristics: reflexivity, asymmetry, and irreflexivity.  
It is striking that even the less commonly used features were being used by an appreciable 
number of respondents.  Even the least commonly used feature (irreflexive object properties) 
was used by around one in six of the question respondents.  As a caveat it should be pointed 
out that respondents to this question only constituted 40% of the total respondents.  
Presumably these were the respondents with the more sophisticated knowledge of DL, who 
fully understood the question and were more likely to make use of a broad range of DL 
features.  Hence it is possible that these percentages overestimate the usage of at least the 
less commonly used features.  It should also be borne in mind that these percentages 
represent the proportion of respondents who use a particular feature, but give no indication 
of the extent to which that feature is used. 
It might be thought that it is the same few people who are using all the less commonly used 
features.  That this is not the case can be seen from Figure 5-4.  Here the language features 
are numbered as in Table 5-1, from most commonly to least commonly used.  The dashed 
line shows the percentage of question respondents indicating a particular feature, i.e. this is 
simply a graphical representation of the data shown in Table 5-1.  The continuous line shows 
the percentage of respondents who used the particular feature or one of the subsequent ones 
(i.e. higher-numbered ones, or less commonly used ones).  By definition this line must 
indicate 100% for language feature 1, since all question respondents use at least one 
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feature77.  Also, by definition the two lines must coincide for the least commonly used 
feature, i.e. feature number 23. 
It is striking that the continuous line takes high values for so much of the figure.  The ‘knee’ 
does not occur until feature 17, where the value is 81%, indicating that 81% of the question 
respondents use at least one of the seven least commonly used features, i.e. features 17-23.  
If the less commonly used features were being used by the same small group of respondents, 
then the two lines would come close together, or even coincide, earlier as we move towards 
the right of the figure.  In summary, it is not that only a small number of respondents use the 
less commonly used features but rather that very many respondents use at least one of these 
less commonly used features. 
 
Figure 5-4 Use of DL language features; percentage of 47 respondents 
5.6. Ontology user survey: ontology languages – respondents’ comments  
Respondents were asked for suggestions for additional ontology language features.  One 
respondent wanted support for “acceptable” punning78 and for the qualification pattern, as 
used in PROV-O79.  Presumably what the respondent wanted was for these features to be 
embedded into the language.  The same respondent commented on the difficulty of design 
decisions relating to classes vs. individuals and classes vs. properties.   Another respondent 
asked for “easier ways to integrate and reuse vocabularies”.  Other requests for additional 
functionality related to modalities, time, arithmetic functionality and more sophisticated 
                                                 
77 I.e. not specifying any language feature was taken as not responding to the question.  In retrospect, it would 
have been useful to enable respondents to indicate that they do use DLs, but not any of the specified features.  
Additionally, it would have been useful to have had an option to enable all respondents to indicate any features 
used additional to the listed features.  The most obvious omission from the list in question 17 is class 
subsumption. 
78 ‘Punning’ refers to the use of the same name to describe both a class and an individual.  This is not permitted 
in OWL 1 DL but is permitted in OWL 2 DL.  The use of the same name has no significance to the reasoner, 
only to the person undertaking the modelling.  See https://www.w3.org/TR/owl2-new-features/, specifically 
section 2.4.1: https://www.w3.org/TR/owl2-new-features/#F12:_Punning  The example given there is that of 
using Eagle to represent the class of all eagles and also an individual in the class of all animal and plant species. 
79 The qualification pattern uses a class to qualify an object property, i.e to associate additional information 
with an instantiation of the property, thereby overcoming the limitation of RDF to binary relations.  It is similar 
to an N-Ary relation; for a discussion of both, see Dodds and Davis (2012).  The PROV-O ontology is used “to 
represent and interchange provenance information”.  For a description of PROV-O, see 
https://www.w3.org/TR/prov-o/; for a discussion of the use of the qualification pattern in PROV-O, see 
specifically: https://www.w3.org/TR/prov-o/#description-qualified-terms. 
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property chain axioms.  Additional functionality comes with a penalty, of course; two 
respondents noted that additional functionality can lead to problems of scalability. 
Other comments related more generally to the use of DLs.  One respondent wanted 
lightweight approaches to overcome the difficulty of characterising all information in a 
strongly semantic fashion; an example cited was the interpretation of ‘temperature’ as a 
physical phenomenon or a measurement depending on the system.  This is related to another 
respondent’s comment: “The rigor of the languages exceeds the rigor of the typical user by 
a wide margin”.  On the other hand, the rigour is required to permit meaningful reasoning; 
possibly some respondents did not make use of reasoning.  Two respondents commented on 
the open world assumption; one noted the difficulty of grasping open world reasoning for 
those used to closed world reasoning; the other asked for partial support for closed world 
reasoning.  Possible ways to satisfy this requirement might be syntax to embed the closure 
axiom (Horridge, 2011, section 4.13.1) into the language, or the ability to declare an entity 
to be distinct, without using, e.g. the DisjointWith or DifferentFrom statements.  Another 
respondent noted the lack of discussion, in the survey, of “the issues of overlapping 
ontologies”, quoting the OBO Foundry80 ontologies as a collaborative set “that are open and 
can share terms”. 
One respondent stepped back from the specifics of ontology languages to make a general 
comment about ontology modelling and a call for better tools: “meta models … may not suit 
what you’re doing … The complexity of it all is way beyond what we can hope to hold in 
our minds at any given time, but I have yet to use a tool that makes this complexity easily 
understood, or even easily workable with”.   
5.7. Ontology user survey: ontology visualization 
The importance of ontology visualization is witnessed by the fact that a wide range of 
visualization tools has existed for some time, e.g. see Katifori et al. (2007).  The number of 
visualization plug-ins available for the Protégé editor indicates that visualization is seen as 
an important support for the ontology development process.  Indeed, the representation of 
ontologies visually is an alternative, or a complement, to their representation in terms of 
language.   
In the survey, respondents were asked which visualization tools they used, from a choice of 
ten tools, plus an ‘other’ option.  47 respondents replied to the question, with multiple 
responses permitted.  Figure 5-5 shows the visualization tools for which there was more than 
one response.  TopBraid and OBO-Edit were amongst the ‘other’ option.  The key point to 
note here is that these are chiefly tools for viewing the overall structure of an ontology, or 
part of an ontology.  Some of the tools do permit properties to be displayed.  However, whilst 
the display of overall structure supports reasoning about subsumption, none of these tools 
support reasoning about properties.  Visual support for general DL reasoning is being 
developed, see the description of concept diagrams in Howse et al. (2011) and Stapleton et 
al. (2013).  However, no generally available tools yet exist to offer visual support for 
reasoning. 
                                                 
80 http://www.obofoundry.org/  
 70 
 
 
Figure 5-5 Usage of visualization tools; percentage of 47 respondents 
Figure 5-6 shows the response to a question about how useful respondents find visualization. 
The dominant categories were ‘useful to a small extent’ and ‘quite useful’ - just over 60% 
of the responses were in these two categories.  The categories ‘very useful’ and ‘essential’ 
accounted for around 34% of the respondents.  This was from a sample of 56 respondents to 
the question, i.e. less than half the overall survey respondents.  It is likely that many of those 
who did not respond to this question do not use ontology visualization tools, possibly 
because they do not find visualization useful, biasing the sample towards those who do find 
it useful. 
 
Figure 5-6 usefulness of visualization; percentage of 56 respondents 
In response to a general question about the strengths and weaknesses of ontology 
development tools there were a few references to visualization.  One respondent commented 
that “visualization is, especially for end-user, really hard and not task-specific”.  Another 
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wanted “proper visual editing features”; presumably so that changes could be made in the 
visualization. 
In summary, ontology visualization was found useful to at least a small extent by 95% of the 
respondents, whilst many found it essential.  However, given the tools available, its use was 
to understand the structure of the ontology rather than to support reasoning. 
5.8. Ontology patterns 
There are a variety of different types of ontology patterns.  However, in the context of this 
work two are relevant: logical patterns, which are essentially language extensions; and 
content patterns, which are essentially mini-ontologies.  Both types are explained in more 
detail in subsection 5.8.1.  Content patterns are extensively used in ontologies (Khan & 
Blomqvist, 2010).  To help achieve ecological validity, three of the most commonly 
occurring content patterns were used as the basis for the questions in the first study, as 
described in Chapter 6. 
One concern was to know to what extent people were using pattern libraries.  Subsection 
5.8.1 describes the two main pattern libraries which have been developed, and also describes 
briefly how patterns can be categorised.  Section 5.8.2, drawing on data from the ontology 
user survey, then describes how respondents were sourcing their patterns.  Section 5.8.3, 
drawing on data from the ontology patterns survey, provides some information on the kinds 
of patterns being used. 
5.8.1. Pattern libraries 
The two main pattern libraries are the Ontology Design Patterns (ODPs) Public Catalogue81, 
which was developed mainly by researchers at the University of Manchester, and the 
Ontology Design Patterns.org82 portal, which was developed as part of the NeOn project83.  
The former contains a small number of generic patterns.  The latter contains rather more 
patterns, some generic and some domain-specific. 
The Ontology Design Patterns.org portal provides a classification into: structural, content, 
reasoning, presentation and lexico-syntactic patterns, and then a further subdivision of the 
structural, correspondence and presentation patterns.  Falbo et al. (2013) discuss the 
classification of patterns, describing the classification at Ontology Design Patterns.org and 
relating this classification to the three phases of ontology development, i.e. the conceptual 
modelling, design and implementation phases.  From the standpoint of our interest in DLs, 
the two most relevant categories are: 
• logical patterns (a subcategory of structural patterns) As already observed, these can be 
regarded as language extensions.  They do not contain class or property names, with the 
possible exception of generic entities such owl:Thing (⊤).  A logical pattern is analogous 
to a macro.  It may contain prototypical classes, to be instantiated when the pattern is 
used.  An example is the ‘N-Ary Relation’ Pattern, designed to overcome the limitation 
of OWL to binary properties, and which is present in both the Ontology Design Patterns 
(ODPs) Public Catalogue and the Ontology Design Patterns.org portal.  Another 
example, from the Ontology Design Patterns.org portal is the ‘negative property 
                                                 
81 http://www.gong.manchester.ac.uk/odp/html/index.html 
82 http://ontologydesignpatterns.org 
83 http://www.neon-project.org/nw/Welcome_to_the_NeOn_Project 
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assertions’ pattern, which enables the assertion that two given individuals cannot be 
connected by a given property84. 
• content patterns  These are mini-ontologies, i.e. they can define classes, properties and 
individuals.  Many of the content patterns in the library are generic.  Some are specific 
to the application domains investigated in the NeOn project.  Examples of content 
patterns, taken from Ontology Design Patterns.org, are the ‘part of’ pattern and the 
‘ClimacticZone’ pattern.  The former enables modelling of part-whole relations, and 
contains the mutually inverse object properties, hasPart and isPartOf.  The latter is 
specific to the fishery domain, and includes classes ClimacticZone and AquaticResource, 
and properties hasResource and hasClimacticZone.  Three of the content patterns from 
Ontology Design Patterns.org were used in the study described in Chapter 6. 
In the ontology users’ survey, and in the follow-up ontology patterns survey (Warren, 2014) 
there was no attempt to define or categorize ontology patterns. 
5.8.2. Ontology user survey: pattern sources 
In the ontology user survey (Warren, 2013), respondents were asked from where they 
obtained ontology patterns, with multiple responses permitted.  There were 35 respondents 
and the percentage of respondents in each category is shown in Figure 5-7.  Note that the 
figure moves from formal sources at the left, i.e. pattern libraries, to informal sources, i.e. 
own mental models, at the right.  The latter were described in the question as patterns which 
were “not written down”.  Note that the phrase ‘mental models’ used here is to be interpreted 
more generally than the specific usage in Chapter 3 and in later chapters.  The final category, 
‘other’, included two references to OBO, one to a small pattern library, and one to the W3C. 
 
Figure 5-7 Sources of patterns; percentage of 35 respondents 
It is noticeable that the biomedical respondents were much more prevalent at the right-hand 
half of the figure.  From the biomedical respondents there was one response for each of the 
libraries, from the same respondent, and no responses for the Protégé wizard.  The 
                                                 
84 A constructor for achieving this directly is available in OWL 2.  This pattern is useful for less rich modelling 
languages such as OWL 1.  
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biomedical respondents were chiefly using their own patterns, including from OBO, rather 
than generic patterns. 
The dominant paradigm of informal reuse of patterns was also apparent in response to a 
question about how patterns were being used.  The possible responses were: “Import 
patterns, e.g. as OWL files”; “Use patterns as examples and recreate them (possibly 
modified) in your own ontologies”; and “Other”.  Of the 32 respondents to this question, 
28% imported patterns and 75% recreated patterns85. 
Overall, the picture which emerges regarding pattern creation and usage is a relatively 
informal one, with many patterns being personal to the ontology developer, or borrowed 
from colleagues, some not even written down, and with only a relatively small amount of 
downloading from pattern libraries. 
5.8.3. Ontology patterns survey: pattern types 
In the follow-up ontology patterns survey (Warren, 2014), respondents were asked about the 
size of their patterns, i.e. the number of classes, properties and individuals, and also how 
specific their patterns were.  For the latter, respondents were able to indicate one of four 
categories.  In order of increasing specificity, these were: 
• generic 
• suited to a broad discipline, e.g. anatomy 
• suited to a specific discipline, e.g. human anatomy 
• specific to my work 
Respondents were able to specify up to five pattern types, although in fact no respondent 
specified more than four.  Note that these were pattern types, not individual patterns.  One 
respondent claimed to be using over thirty patterns of each of three pattern types.  Another 
respondent claimed to be using over ten patterns of a particular type86.  All other respondents 
used no more than ten patterns of a particular type 
Overall, ‘generic’ and ‘broad discipline’ patterns were quite small, with at most ten classes 
and at most five properties; although one respondent did report using a ‘broad discipline’ 
pattern with over one hundred individuals.  Some of the ‘specific-discipline’ and ‘work-
specific’ patterns were also quite small, i.e. with no more than ten classes or properties, 
although one respondent reported use of a ’specific discipline’ pattern with tens of classes 
and tens of properties and another reported use of ‘work-specific’ patterns with over a 
hundred classes and tens of properties.  On the basis of Spearman’s rank correlation, there 
was a significant correlation between specificity and number of classes (ρ = 0.58, p = 0.015), 
but not between specificity and number of individuals (ρ = 0.47, p = 0.055) or between 
specificity and number of properties (ρ = 0.38, p = 0.136). 
It seems highly likely that the larger pattern types represent concept patterns, in general 
specific to respondents’ disciplines or work areas, and are effectively mini-ontologies.  Many 
of the smaller pattern types may also represent content patterns, used to represent commonly 
occurring structures within ontologies.  However, it is possible that some of the smaller 
pattern types are logical patterns with prototypical classes and properties which are defined 
                                                 
85 There were five responses in the ‘other’ category, including “Fully integrated in the tool”.  Some responses 
in this category may have arisen because of ambiguity in the question. 
86 Some respondents may have been confused by the question, possibly interpreting ‘pattern’ as ‘pattern 
instantiation’. 
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when the pattern is instantiated, e.g. the N-Ary relation pattern mentioned in subsection 
5.8.1. 
5.9. Threats to validity 
Section 4.8 described the three types of threats to validity and briefly interpreted them in the 
context of the survey.  This section examines these threats in more detail. 
5.9.1. Construct validity 
Subsection 4.8.1 noted that the questions were reviewed prior to the survey being issued, to 
remove any ambiguity.  It may be that some respondents had difficulty with some of the 
questions.  For example, it has already been noted (see footnote to section 5.8.3) that, in the 
patterns survey, there may have been confusion between ‘pattern’ and ‘pattern’ instantiation.  
However, in general the responses appeared reasonable and indicative that the questions 
were properly understood.  The use of multiple-choice responses left little scope to 
misinterpret the responses.  Where free form responses were supplied, there was very rarely 
any ambiguity. 
5.9.2. Internal validity 
With hindsight, some of the questions could have been better designed.  Section 5.1.1 has 
already noted that ‘computing’ would have been a useful category to include in the question 
about applications.  Its absence is probably due to the author subconsciously including it 
within the category ‘engineering’.  Similarly, the question relating to DL features should 
have included class subsumption; property subsumption was included.   
5.9.3. External validity 
Subsection 4.8.3 noted that threats to external validity come from the nature of the questions 
and the profile of the respondents. 
The questions represented a wide range of issues relating to ontology use.  This section has 
only reported on that part of the surveys relevant to DLs and the studies reported in the next 
three chapters.  With hindsight, more could have been done to obtain data useful for the 
design of those studies.  In particular, the question on language features discussed in Section 
5.5, could have included an option for those who did not use any of the features listed.  
Furthermore, the fact that the question referred to DLs might have put some respondents off, 
e.g. those who used only the basic RDFS features; the question could have been phrased 
more generally.  It would also have been useful to ask participants to gauge how much they 
used each feature, e.g. on a scale from ‘very rarely’ to ‘very often’.  More significantly, a 
question or questions to query respondents on their difficulties in using DLs would have 
been useful; although this kind of information might be better obtained from interviews or 
focus groups.  It is important to avoid too lengthy questionnaires; the danger is that 
respondents will give up before the end.  One strategy to mitigate the effect of this might be 
to order the questions in decreasing importance to the researcher. 
The profile of respondents was quite broad.  They included computer scientists, e.g. from 
the author’s university, but they also included domain experts reached via the mailing lists.  
Because the only domain-specific mailing lists used were concerned with biological 
applications, there is likely to have been some bias towards experts in the biological domain.  
Moreover, those who are on these mailing lists and respond to such surveys are likely to be 
the more committed users of ontologies.  Hence the responses are unlikely to be 
representative of the more casual users. 
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5.10. Conclusions 
The ontology users’ survey and the follow-up ontology patterns survey were designed to 
gain an overview of how ontologies are being created, edited and used.  This chapter has 
concentrated on those results which throw most light on how DLs are being used to create 
ontologies.  OWL appears to be the dominant ontology language.  Whilst many users may 
only be using a small subset of the OWL features, there are an appreciable number who do 
use the more unusual features.  Amongst the property characteristics, the transitive and 
functional, and to a less extent the symmetric characteristics are the most commonly used, 
whilst the inverse functional, reflexive, asymmetric and irreflexive are the least four 
commonly used features overall.  The use of the inverse object property feature, i.e. 
describing two object properties as inverses, is also relatively common. 
Ontology visualization is relatively widely used, with varying degrees of enthusiasm.  
However, the tools currently being used, although some do allow the display of object 
properties, do not support reasoning about object properties.  Ontology patterns were used 
by some respondents, frequently rather informally.  However, there are two pattern libraries 
on the Web and these do enjoy some usage.  Generic patterns from one of these libraries 
provides the background for the questions in the first study, see Chapter 6. 
Finally, respondents made a range of general comments.  These included suggestions for 
language extensions but also a comment on the difficulty created by the rigour of the 
languages and a comment on the need for better tools to help make sense of the complexity.  
Finally, to end the chapter on a positive note, one respondent commented of ontologies “I 
couldn’t build what I build without them.” 
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6. The cognitive difficulties of some common DL constructs 
To err is the price for thinking. 
Émile Chartier (‘Alain’), 
‘Sketches of Man’, 1927 
This chapter describes a preliminary study into the difficulties experienced with some 
common DL features.  The features were chosen carefully to achieve ecological validity, i.e. 
to use commonly occurring language features in commonly occurring contexts.  Section 6.1 
describes how this choice was made.  Section 6.2 then describes how the study was 
organised.  In the analysis of the response time data, statistical tests were used which required 
that the data be approximately normal87.  Section 6.3 discusses the statistics of the response 
time data and the use of the log transformation to render it approximately normal.  The study 
contained three question sections, and sections 6.4 to 6.6 describe each of these sections.   
One of the research questions in Chapter 1 asked how the difficulties people experience with 
DLs could be interpreted in terms of theories of reasoning.  As far as possible section 6.4 to 
6.6 explain participant performance in terms of the theories of reasoning described in 
Chapter 3.  Section 6.7 describes feedback from participants which provides some further 
insight into their difficulties.  Section 6.8 analyses the relationship between performance and 
the self-declared level of knowledge of the participants.  Section 6.9 analyses the effect of 
question position on performance.   
Section 6.10 discusses, for questions with valid putative conclusions, the effect of the 
number of reasoning steps on accuracy and response time.  Section 6.11 discusses the effect 
on response time of three interrelated factors: validity of the putative conclusion; the nature 
of the participant’s response; and the accuracy of that response.  Finally, section 6.12 draws 
some conclusions.  The study’s main findings are also described in Warren et al. (2014). 
6.1. Identifying commonly used DL features 
Four sources were used to establish the most commonly used DL features: the survey 
described in Chapter 5; an analysis of functor88 usage made by Power and Third  (2010); an 
analysis of axiom patterns made by Power (2010); and an analysis of content pattern usage 
made by Khan and Blomqvist (2010). 
Power and Third (2010) provide a list of the most commonly used OWL functors based on 
an analysis of ontologies in the TONES ontology repository89.  Table 6-1 shows the result 
of their analysis.  Note that, as in Power and Third (2010), the table is ordered by the number 
of ontologies using the functor at least once and also shows the number of occurrences of 
the functors.  The ordering is to guard against overestimating the importance of functors 
which are used considerably in a few large ontologies.  Examples of these are the 
ObjectPropertyAssertion and DataPropertyAssertion functors which would be considerably 
higher in the table were the actual number of occurrences to be used90. 
                                                 
87 Specifically, the t-test, ANOVA and regression analysis. 
88 The term functor is used by Power and Third (2010) to represent statements in OWL.  This stems from the 
use of prefix notation such that the statements appear analogous to mathematical functions with arguments.  
ClassAssertion, for example, is a functor with two arguments, the class and the individual being asserted to be 
in the class.  ObjectPropertyAssertion is a functor with three arguments, the property and the two individuals 
related by the property. 
89 http://rpc295.cs.man.ac.uk:8080/repository/ 
90 At first sight, it might appear anomalous that ObjectPropertyRange and ObjectPropertyDomain occur in so 
many more ontologies than ObjectPropertyAssertion.  Possibly many of the ontologies were T-Box ontologies, 
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Table 6-1 Frequencies of OWL functors, from Power and Third (2010) 
Functor No. ontologies 
using functor 
at least once 
% age No. axioms 
using 
functor 
% age 
SubClassOf 190 94% 468,812 74.0% 
EquivalentClasses 94 46% 6,082 1.0% 
ObjectPropertyRange 92 45% 2,275 0.4% 
ObjectPropertyDomain 91 45% 2,176 0.3% 
DisjointClasses 88 43% 94,390 14.9% 
SubObjectPropertyOf 75 37% 2,511 0.4% 
InverseObjectProperty 63 31% 1,330 0.2% 
TransitiveObjectProperty 59 29% 221 0.0% 
FunctionalObjectProperty 56 28% 1,129 0.2% 
DataPropertyRange 52 26% 2,067 0.3% 
ClassAssertion 49 24% 12,798 2.0% 
DataPropertyDomain 47 23% 2,019 0.3% 
FunctionalDataProperty 37 18% 931 0.1% 
ObjectPropertyAssertion 22 11% 19,524 3.1% 
DataPropertyAssertion 14 7% 17,488 2.8% 
SubDataPropertyOf 6 3% 12 0.0% 
TOTAL 203 100% 633,791 100% 
 
There are strong similarities between Table 6-1 and the first half of Table 5-1 in the previous 
chapter; although it should be borne in mind when comparing the two tables that Table 5-1 
shows the proportion of respondents who use a certain feature and provides no information 
about the extent to which the feature is used.  Moreover, the survey described in Chapter 5 
did not include some of the functors shown in Table 6-191.  Conversely, Table 6-1 does not 
include certain features prominent in the survey, specifically intersection, union, and the 
existential and universal restrictions.  It is not clear why these features were excluded; 
possibly they were not regarded as functors.  However, Power and Third (2010) also 
provided a list of ‘functor argument patterns’, i.e. commonly occurring patterns of functor 
arguments, which showed that the existential restriction did occur in about 25% of the 
patterns whilst the universal restriction occurred in around 0.8%.  Intersection occurred in 
0.3% of the patterns; whilst union occurred to a negligible degree92. 
Both sources point to the high usage of object property domain and range statements, disjoint 
classes, object subproperties and inverse object properties.  Table 6-1 contains only two 
object property characteristics: transitivity and functionality.  Table 5-1 shows that these two 
were the most commonly reported in the user survey.  
In another study, Power (2010) analysed 48 ontologies from the TONES repository to 
determine which axiom patterns frequently occurred.  Table 6-2, taken from Power (2010), 
shows the commonly occurring axiom patterns.  With the exception of the last, these are not 
patterns in the sense of Chapter 5.  They are language features, as shown by the description 
                                                 
i.e. pure ontologies intended to be used in conjunction with a knowledgebase which would contain 
ObjectPropertyAssertions. 
91 Specifically: SubClassOf, EquivalentClasses, SubObjectProperty, DataPropertyRange, ClassAssertion, 
DataPropertyDomain, ObjectPropertyAssertion, DataPropertyAssertion.  In these respects the survey was not 
comprehensive.  
92 If it occurred at all, it was in the 1.8% of patterns classified as ‘other patterns’.   
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column added by this author in Table 6-2, but not present in Power (2010).  They all occur 
in one or both of the set of features identified by the survey, in Table 5-1, or by Power and 
Third (2010) in Table 6-1.  The final pattern in Table 6-2 can be regarded as a logical pattern, 
in the sense described in Chapter 5.   
Examining the features present in Table 6-2 supports the work of Power and Third (2010) in 
identifying the importance of class subsumption, disjointness, object and data property 
assertion, and class assertion.  Besides this, Table 6-2 confirms that the existential restriction 
is commonly used.  Intersection appears to be present to an appreciable amount via the 
disjointness pattern.  However, this is likely to have been achieved by using the DisjointClass 
statement, which Power and Third (2010) had already identified as occurring in 14.9% of 
the axioms, see Table 6-1.  Intersection will have occurred explicitly in the final statement 
(intersection of atomic and anonymous class), which is consistent with the limited use found 
by Power and Third (2010).   
Neither the universal restriction nor union were present in any of Power’s (2010) commonly 
occurring patterns.  This is consistent with Power and Third’s (2010) finding very limited 
usage of the universal restriction and no usage of union.  These results contrast with the 
survey in Chapter 5, where there was appreciable usage of intersection and union, and of 
both the existential and universal quantifiers.  Again, the observation needs to be made that 
the survey was looking at the extent of respondents who used a certain feature, not the extent 
to which that feature was used. 
Table 6-2 Axiom pattern frequencies, taken from Power (2010) 
Pattern Description Frequency % age 
C ⊑ C subsumption 18,961 42.3% 
C ⊓ C ⊑ ⊥ disjointness 8,225 18.3% 
C ⊑ ∃ P.C existential restriction 6,211 13.9% 
[I, I] ∈ P object property assertion 4,383 9.8% 
[I, L] ∈ D data property assertion 1,851 4.1% 
I ∈ C class assertion 1,786 4.0% 
C ≡ C ⊓ ∃ P.C intersection of atomic and anonymous classes 500 1.1% 
Other 2,869 6.4% 
TOTAL 44,786 100% 
N.B. (i) C, P, D, I and L refer to atomic classes, object properties, datatype properties 
individuals and literals.  The occurrence of a symbol more than once in a given 
pattern does not imply that it refers to the same entity.  E.g. the two occurrences of 
C in the first pattern could refer to different classes. (ii) Description column added 
by author. 
 
There were clearly only a limited number of questions which could be asked in this and the 
subsequent studies, and hence only a limited number of DL features which could be 
examined.  In order to limit these features, it was decided to exclude data properties.  The 
rationale for this is that data properties are not likely to pose any logical properties additional 
to those posed by the analogous object properties.  All the language features associated with 
data properties in Tables 5-1, 6-1 and 6-293 also occurred in their object property form and 
in that form were included in the set of features investigated in the study. 
                                                 
93 Namely, data subproperties, functional data properties, data property range, data property domain, and data 
property assertion. 
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The list of features used in the study is shown in Table 6-3.  With the exception of features 
relating to data properties, this includes all the language features in Tables 6-1 and 6-2 plus 
all those in Table 5-1 except cardinality and the last four in Table 5-1: inverse functional 
object properties, reflexive object properties, asymmetric objective properties, and 
irreflexive object properties.  As discussed in more detail shortly, Khan and Blomqvist 
(2010) have identified the 20 most commonly used content patterns.  Table 6-3 includes all 
the features found in those patterns, with the exception of features relating specifically to 
data properties, as already discussed, and cardinality restrictions.  Cardinality restrictions 
were excluded on the grounds that the inclusion of the universal and existential restrictions 
tested understanding of the general concept of a restriction in DLs, whilst cardinality 
restrictions merely added considerations of arithmetic. 
Power and Third (2010) do not mention complement of a class.  Nor does it occur in the 
common axiom patterns found by Power (2010).  However, it was employed by 47% of the 
respondents to the survey question about DL feature usage.  Consequently, complement is 
used in this and the two subsequent studies.  In addition it has been known for some time 
that negation is difficult for human reasoners (Wason, 1959) and, since complement is the 
analogue in DL of negation in PL, it seems useful to evaluate performance with complement.  
Moreover, it may be the case that a less frequently used feature causes a disproportionate 
amount of difficulty and it seems useful to test out a feature which, although not common, 
could be a source of difficulty.  Similarly, union occurs neither in Power and Third’s (2010) 
list nor Power’s (2010) list, although it was employed by 66% of the respondents to the 
survey question.  It was included in the study in part to enable a comparison with 
intersection. 
Table 6-3 Commonly used DL features used in study 1 
 language feature Manchester OWL Syntax 
 
 
 
Class features 
subsumption SubClassOf 
class equivalence EquivalentTo 
disjoint classes DisjointWith 
class assertion Type 
conjunction and 
disjunction or 
complement not 
 
 
Property 
features 
property range Range 
property domain Domain 
property hierarchy SubPropertyOf 
inverse object properties InverseOf 
transitive object property Characteristics: Transitive 
functional object property Characteristics: Functional 
symmetric object property Characteristics: Symmetric 
Restrictions existential restriction some 
universal restriction only 
 
Besides ensuring that the studies test out the most frequently used language features, another 
aspect of ecological validity is using those features in a realistic context, i.e. combining them 
in the ways in which they are commonly combined in real applications.  One way to do this 
is to make use of commonly occurring content patterns.  Evidence for the usage of content 
patterns comes from Khan and Blomqvist (2010).  They searched 682 online ontologies to 
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determine the frequency of occurrence of the 76 content patterns in the 
OntologyDesignPatterns.org library (see subsection 5.8.1), and list the twenty most 
frequently detected94.   
The five most frequently detected patterns were, in decreasing order of usage: constituency, 
participation, componency, coparticipation, and types of entities.  The first two of these were 
ruled out for use in the study because of their simplicity.  The remaining three were used in 
the study, and are illustrated later.  Coparticipation and types of entities were extended to 
enable all the features of Table 6-3 to be used in at least one pattern in the study. 
6.2. The study 
The study was administered using the SurveyExpression95 tool, which displayed the 
questions and recorded the responses, and was conducted under laboratory conditions.  
Camtasia96 was run on the PC to record screen activity and the recordings were subsequently 
analysed to obtain timing data.  The study consisted of five sections.  In the first section 
participants were asked to provide information about themselves, e.g. they were asked to 
indicate their knowledge of logic.  The next three sections contained the questions, each 
section being based on one of the content patterns mentioned in Section 6.1.  Each section 
began with a page displaying the content pattern.  The following pages then contained the 
questions.  Each question page contained a set of axioms and a putative conclusion.  
Participants were required to indicate whether the conclusion was a logical consequence of 
the pattern and the axioms listed in the question.  Each question page also repeated the 
pattern, so there was no need for the pattern to be memorized by participants.  In all there 
were 21 questions, 13 with valid conclusions and 8 where the conclusions were not valid.  
In the final section of the study participants were invited to give feedback.  This is discussed 
in section 6.6.  Throughout the study participants were free to move at their own pace.  Note 
in particular that merely indicating an answer did not move the study on to the next page.  
To do that participants were required to click on ‘Next’.  Participants were therefore free to 
change a response before moving on. 
The patterns, axioms and putative conclusions were expressed in MOS97.  Participants were 
provided with a handout, which explained the syntax and semantics of exactly that part of 
MOS required for the questions.  They were asked to read the handout before commencing 
the study and kept the handout for reference whilst completing the study.  As with the 
patterns, there was no requirement to memorize the syntax or semantics of the language.  
Participants were also asked not to use pen and paper. 
All the participants had some background in computer science, and were from the 
Knowledge Media Institute or the Centre for Research in Computing, both at the Open 
University.  There were 12 participants, three of whom were female.  To reduce any effect 
of question order, each of the six permutations of section order was used twice.  The order 
of questions within each section was not varied.  Section 6.9 considers the effect of question 
position on participant performance. 
                                                 
94 ‘detected’ because the search process was not 100% comprehensive. 
95 www.surveyexpression.com 
96 https://www.techsmith.com/camtasia.html 
97 As explained in section 2.3, the syntax was slightly simplified by removing colons from the end of keywords, 
e.g. ‘Class:’ was simplified to ‘Class’.  Also, ‘Types’ was replaced with ‘Type’.  
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6.3. Response time data 
In the analysis of response time data reported later in this chapter, use has been made of 
statistical tests which require that the data be at least approximately normal.  However, as 
can be seen from Figure 6-1, the response time data for the study showed a positive skew.  
Moreover, a Shapiro-Wilk test for normality gave a p-value of 1.2 x 10-15, indicating that the 
data deviated considerably from the normal.  The data was transformed using appropriate 
transformations from Tukey’s ladder of powers, as explained in section 4.3, working from 
the identity transformation to the left along the ladder of powers, to correct for the positive 
skew.  In each case the Shapiro-Wilk test was applied.  Table 6-4 shows the p-values 
obtained for each transformation.  As can be seen, the log transformation provides the best 
transformation to the normal98.  Figure 6-2 shows the density distribution of the transformed 
response time data. 
 
Figure 6-1 Density distribution for response time; area under histogram normalized to 1 
  
                                                 
98 Note that when the log transformation is applied, the base of the log will make no difference to the degree 
of normality of the resultant data.  However, all log transformations of time in this and subsequent chapters are 
to base 10 to aid interpretation of data plots such as in Figure 6-2. 
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Table 6-4 Shapiro-Wilk test applied to response time data 
Transformation p-value 
time (i.e. identity transformation) 1.2 x 10-15 
square root (time) 6.2 x 10-8 
log (time)  0.50 
1 / square root (time) 3.1 x 10-6 
 
 
Figure 6-2 Density distribution for log10 (response time); 
area under histogram normalized to 1 
 
Frequently, the requirement is to compare questions, and hence it is the normality of data 
from individual questions which is important, rather than the normality of the data overall.  
One approach is to identify a transformation which minimizes the maximum deviation from 
normal across each of the 21 questions.  Table 6-5 shows the minimum Shapiro-Wilk p-
value obtained across all the questions for an appropriate range of transformations.  This 
suggests that the reciprocal of the square root of time might be slightly preferable to the log 
transformation.   
However, Figure 6-3 shows the results of applying Shapiro-Wilk tests to each question, for 
both the reciprocal square root and log transformation.  From the figure it can be seen that 
there are ten questions for which the log transformation gives a better approximation to 
normality, compared with seven questions for which the reciprocal square root is better.  For 
the other four questions there is little appreciable difference between the two 
transformations.  In fact, it can be seen that, with one exception, the p-values obtained with 
the Shapiro-Wilk test after log transformation are greater than 0.032 (10-1.5); the exception 
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is the value of 0.00753 shown in Table 6-5.  With three exceptions, the Shapiro-Wilk p-
values after the log transformation are greater than 0.1.  Hence, the log transformation was 
used on time data prior to statistical testing.  This also maintains consistency with the 
approach in the other two studies where, as will be seen in the next two chapters, the log 
transformation gave the best approximation to normality. 
Table 6-5 Minimum p-value for Shapiro-Wilk test applied to response time data across all 
questions 
Transformation p-value 
time (i.e. identity transformation) 0.00006 
square root (time) 0.00097 
log (time) 0.00753 
1 / square root (time) 0.00966 
1 / time 0.00030 
 
     
 
Figure 6-3 Shapiro-Wilk p-values for each of 21 questions, after log transformation (circle) 
and reciprocal square root transformation (x).  Shown on a log10 scale.   
N.B. 10-0.5 ≈ 0.32; 10-1.5 ≈ 0.032 
6.4. The componency pattern 
There were ten questions based on the componency pattern.  Table 6-6 shows the pattern 
and Table 6-7 shows the questions, i.e. the axioms and putative conclusions.  Table 6-7 
shows whether the conclusion is valid or non-valid, the number of correct responses and the 
mean and standard deviation of the response time for each question.  For the valid questions, 
the table also shows the number of reasoning steps required; Appendix A provides a 
justification for the number of reasoning steps associated with each valid question in this 
study.  The questions all involve reasoning about object properties, i.e. relations, and involve 
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transitivity, inverse properties, property subsumption, as well as the universal restriction and 
class assertion. 
Table 6-6 Componency pattern 
Class Object   SubClassOf has_component only Object 
    SubClassOf is_component_of only Object 
Property has_part  Characteristics Transitive 
Property is_part_of  Characteristics Transitive 
InverseOf   has_part 
Property has_component SubPropertyOf has_part 
Property is_component_of SubPropertyOf is_part_of 
    InverseOf has_component 
 
Table 6-7 Questions associated with the componency pattern 
No. Question validity no. 
steps 
%age 
correct 
mean time (s.d.) - secs 
overall correct incorrect 
1 A is_part_of B; C is_part_of B  
⇒ A is_part_of C 
not-
valid 
n/a 100%* 62.3 
(53.0) 
62.3 
(53.0) 
n/a 
2 A is_part_of B; B is_part_of C  
⇒ A is_part_of C 
valid 1 100%* 20.3  
(9.7) 
20.3  
(9.7) 
n/a 
3 B is_part_of C; A is_part_of B  
⇒ A is_part_of C 
valid 1 100%* 30.7 
(34.0) 
30.7 
(34.0) 
n/a 
4 A has_component B 
B has_component C 
⇒ A has_component C 
not-
valid 
n/a 33% 62.8 
(36.2) 
77.5 
(55.9) 
55.4 
(23.0) 
5 A has_component B 
B has_component C 
⇒ A has_part C 
valid 3 83%* 29.0 
(15.8) 
29.7 
(17.0) 
25.5 
(10.6) 
6 A has_component B 
B is_part_of C 
⇒ A has_part C 
not 
valid 
n/a 83%* 57.9 
(31.0) 
49.1 
(16.9) 
102.0 
(58.0) 
7 A has_component B 
C is_part_of B 
⇒ A has_part C 
valid 3 100%* 37.4 
(37.7) 
37.4 
(37.7) 
n/a 
8 A Type Object 
A has_component B 
C Type not Object  
⇒ B DifferentFrom C 
valid 2 100%* 49.9 
(18.4) 
49.9 
(18.4) 
n/a 
9 A Type Object; A has_part B 
C Type not Object  
⇒ B DifferentFrom C 
not 
valid 
n/a 83%* 47.5 
(25.4) 
48.4 
(24.2) 
43.0 
(42.4) 
10 A has_component B 
C is_component_of B 
⇒ C is_part_of A 
valid 4 100%* 54.2 
(30.5) 
54.2 
(30.5) 
n/a 
* answered significantly better than chance (p < 0.05) 
In general, these questions were answered very well.  Six of the questions were answered 
correctly by all participants.  Given the sample size, 100% correct responses for a question 
is significantly better than chance (p < 0.001, Fisher’s Exact Test, one-sided).  Another three 
questions were answered correctly by 83% of the participants, which is also significantly 
better than chance (p = 0.019, one-sided test).  This shows that respondents were able to 
cope well with reasoning about transitivity, inverse properties and property subsumption.  
Moreover, in question 8 they were able to combine class assertion with reasoning about a 
universal restriction. 
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The exception to this high level of accuracy is question 4, where only 33% of the participants 
responded correctly, i.e. worse than chance although not significantly so (p = 0.194, one-
sided test).  It appears that the participants who answered incorrectly have erroneously 
assumed that has_component is transitive.  There are a number of reasons why this might 
be: 
1. The layout of the question, A … B; B … C, encourages the elimination of the shared 
term, B, to arrive at A … C. 
2. On reaching question 4, the participants have completed three questions involving 
the use of is_part_of, which is transitive, and are therefore in the habit of assuming 
transitivity99. 
3. They are aware that has_component is a subproperty of has_part, which is transitive 
and may have falsely assumed that transitivity is ‘inherited’. 
4. Participants may take account of their everyday understanding of what it means to 
be a component and assume transitivity, e.g. as in ‘the engine is a component of the 
car and the piston is a component of the engine, hence the piston is a component of 
the car’100. 
Whilst it is not possible to know to what extent these, or possibly other, factors influenced 
the participants, the third suggests a potential confusion regarding property subsumption.  As 
explained in subsection 2.3.3, in general subproperties do not inherit characteristics from 
their superproperties.  This was made clear in the handout, which gave transitivity as an 
example of a characteristic which is not inherited.  This fact may have been forgotten by 
study participants under the cognitive stress of answering the question.  In particular, the 
assumption of inheritance of characteristics is a natural error for those used to object oriented 
programming. 
The fourth factor indicates the need for careful choice of names, in patterns and in ontology 
design generally.  It is perfectly possible for an entity name to have associated semantics 
which are not intended to be assumed in the context of the ontology.  In the case of the 
componency pattern it might have been better to have used has_direct_component or 
has_immediate_component to avoid the assumption of transitivity. 
Finally, a comment needs to be made regarding questions 2 and 3.  These questions are 
identical, except for the order of the two axioms.  Both questions received 100% correct 
responses.  However, the mean time for question 3 is appreciably longer than question 2.  
This might suggest that participants found the order of question 3 harder than question 2, 
perhaps having to reverse the order of axioms before reaching the conclusion.  Whilst this 
may have been a common strategy, there is in fact no significant difference between the 
times to respond on the two questions (t(11) = 0.91319, p = 0.381, paired two-sided test).  In 
fact, the relatively large difference in the two mean times arises almost completely from the 
existence of one response time of 132 seconds for question 3.  When this datapoint is 
                                                 
99 In retrospect the order of the questions could have been arranged to avoid this, or the order of the questions 
in each section could have been randomized to compensate for any inter-question interaction.  The issue of the 
effect of question position is consider later in this chapter and in later chapters. 
100 The handout did state that where meaningful names were used they should not affect any conclusions to be 
drawn.  However, such caveats can be easily forgotten when answering actual questions. 
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removed, the mean time for question 3 becomes 21.5 seconds, i.e. very little greater than for 
question 2, which was 20.3 seconds101. 
6.5. The modified coparticipation pattern 
There were six questions based on a modification of the coparticipation pattern.  The 
modified pattern is shown in Table 6-8.  Table 6-9 shows the questions and data regarding 
the questions. 
Table 6-8 Modified coparticipation pattern 
Class Event   EquivalentTo has_participant some Object 
    DisjointWith Object 
Class Object   DisjointWith Event 
Class Player   SubClassOf Object 
Class Game   SubClassOf has_participant some Player 
Property coparticipates with Domain Object, Range Object 
    Characteristics Symmetric, Transitive 
Property has_participant Domain Event, Range Object 
    InverseOf is_participant_in 
N.B. the statements in italics were added to the original pattern. 
Table 6-9 Questions associated with modified coparticipation pattern 
No. Question validity no. 
steps 
%age 
correct 
mean time (s.d.) - secs 
overall correct incorrect 
1 A coparticipates_with B  
⇒ A Type not Event 
valid 2 92%* 54.9 
(35.5) 
55.5 
(37.2) 
48.0 
(n/a) 
2 A is_participant_in B 
C coparticipates_with D  
⇒ A DifferentFrom C 
not valid n/a 92%* 68.8 
(49.3) 
66.4 
(50.9) 
96.0 
(n/a) 
3 A is_participant_in B 
C is_participant_in B 
⇒ A is participant in C 
not valid n/a 100%* 43.6 
(31.4) 
43.6 
(31.4) 
n/a 
4 A has_participant B 
C is_participant_in D 
⇒ B DifferentFrom D 
valid 4102 92%* 44.6 
(20.9) 
44.3 
(21.8) 
48.0 
(n/a) 
5 B coparticipates_with A 
B coparticipates_with C 
⇒ C coparticipates with A 
valid 2 100%* 34.8 
(15.9) 
34.8 
(15.9) 
n/a 
6 A Type Game  
⇒ A Type Event 
valid 3 67% 47.6 
(25.6) 
39.0 
(23.5) 
64.8 
(23.0) 
* answered significantly better than chance (p < 0.05) 
As with the questions in the previous section, these questions were also answered in general 
very well.  Two were answered correctly by all participants, which is significantly better 
than chance (p < 0.001, one-sided test) and three were answered correctly by 92% of the 
participants, which is also significantly better than chance (p = 0.003, one-sided test).  As 
with the previous questions, participants were able to reason well about class subsumption, 
transitivity and inverse properties.  Added to these features, they could also reason well about 
symmetry and disjointness. 
                                                 
101 Note that a clue to this behaviour is given by the relatively large standard deviation for question 3.  This can 
be indicative of one or more outlying datapoints.  In this case, when the outlier is removed, the standard 
deviation for the remaining eleven points is 12.4 seconds. 
102 This number was erroneously give as 3 in Warren et al. (2014). 
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The one exception was question 6, which was not answered significantly better than chance 
(p = 0.194, one-sided test).  A distinguishing feature of this question is the use of the 
existential restriction.  It is not possible to state definitively whether the problem arises 
because of the complexity of the question or whether there is an inherent difficulty with the 
existential restriction.  As Table 6-9 shows, the number of steps (3) is not greater than for 
several questions in the study which were answered appreciably more accurately.  Moreover, 
in question 8 of the previous section, all participants answered correctly a question involving 
the universal restriction.  This might suggest that the existential restriction is harder to reason 
with than the universal restriction, although other differences between the questions could 
be responsible for the difference in accuracy.  In any case, as discussed in section 2.2, the 
use of restrictions to define classes will be unfamiliar to those accustomed to conventional 
logic and the closed world convention.  On the other hand, the questions involving only 
object properties will involve reasoning processes quite familiar from logic and 
mathematics, and even everyday life.  One remedy for this is more emphasis on, and practice 
with, restrictions during training.   
6.6. The types of entities pattern 
There were five questions based on a modification of the types of entities pattern.  Table 6-
10 shows the modified pattern.  Table 6-11 shows the questions and data regarding the 
questions.  Performance on these questions was in general worse than on the questions 
described in the preceding two sections.  Only two questions were answered significantly 
better than chance: question 4 (p = 0.003, one-sided test) and question 1 (p = 0.019, one-
sided test).  Question 5 was answered better than chance, but not significantly so (p = 0.073, 
one-sided test).  Question 3 was answered exactly at chance.  Question 2 was answered worse 
than chance, but not significantly so (p = 0.073, one-sided test).  Questions 2, 3 and 5 are 
considered in the next three subsections. 
Table 6-10 Modified types of entities pattern 
Class Entity   EquivalentTo Event or Abstract or Quality or Object 
Class Event   SubClassOf Entity 
    DisjointWith Abstract, Quality, Object 
Class Abstract   SubClassOf Entity 
    DisjointWith Event, Quality, Object 
Class Quality   SubClassOf Entity 
    DisjointWith Event, Abstract, Object 
Class Object   SubClassOf Entity 
    DisjointWith Event, Abstract, Quality 
Class Nonconceptual  EquivalentTo Event or Object 
Class Nontemporal  EquivalentTo Abstract or Quality or Object 
Property represents  Characteristic Functional 
N.B. the statements in italics were added to the original pattern. 
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Table 6-11 Questions associated with modified types of entities pattern 
No. Question validity no. 
steps 
%age 
correct 
mean time (s.d.) - secs 
overall correct incorrect 
1 A represents B; C represents D  
⇒ A DifferentFrom C 
not valid n/a 83%* 91.5 
(61.7) 
80.3 
(57.0) 
147.5 
(71.4) 
2 A Type Entity 
A Type not (Event and Quality) 
⇒ A Type (Abstract or Object) 
not valid n/a 25% 75.1 
(48.1) 
64.7 
(29.7) 
78.6  
(53.9) 
3 A represents B; C represents D 
B Type Object; D Type Event 
⇒ A DifferentFrom C 
valid 2 50% 75.8 
(31.0) 
82.8 
(20.5) 
68.7  
(39.6) 
4 A Type Entity 
A Type not (Event or Quality) 
⇒ A Type Abstract or Object 
valid 2 92%* 44.0 
(19.1) 
42.4 
(19.1) 
62.0  
(n/a) 
5 A Type (Nonconceptual and 
Nontemporal) 
⇒ A Type Object 
valid 3 75% 63.1 
(32.4) 
65.1 
(37.6) 
57.0  
(7.9) 
* answered significantly better than chance (p < 0.05) 
6.6.1. Negated conjunction – question 2 
Question 2 should be contrasted with the more accurately answered question 4; the 
difference being that question 2 uses conjunction in the second premise; question 4 uses 
disjunction.  The difference in accuracy is significant (Fisher’s Exact Test, p = 0.003).  
Question 2 also took significantly longer than question 4 (t(11) =  2.7898, p = 0.018, paired 
test).   
One way to reason about question 2 is to note that, since Event and Quality are disjoint, 
Event and Quality must be Nothing (⊥) and hence not (Event and Quality) is Thing (⊤).  
Hence the second premise is tautological and provides no information.  The first 
premise alone cannot limit A to the union of Abstract and Object. 
It is interesting to compare the difference in performance between questions 2 and 4 with the 
difference Khemlani et al. (2012a) found between negated conjunction and negated 
disjunction.  As noted in Chapter 3, subsection 3.3.1, they found that 18% of their 
participants were able to reason accurately about negated conjunction, compared with 89% 
for negated disjunction.  They interpreted this in terms of mental model theory, in particular 
a failure to create all three mental models associated with negated conjunction.  They suggest 
that, expressed in the context of question 2, people represent not (Event and Quality) as one 
mental model: not Event and not Quality. 
Another contributory factor in both cases may be the ambiguity of the word and, as also 
discussed in Chapter 3.  Knowing that Entity consists of four subclasses, and misinterpreting 
and, they might simply delete Event and Quality to arrive at the union of Abstract and Object.   
Note that both these failure mechanisms lead to a mental model for question 2 which is 
identical to that for question 4, for which the correct response is ‘valid’.  One way of reducing 
this difficulty is to make students learning DLs aware of De Morgan’s Laws103. 
6.6.2. Functional object property – question 3 
The correct reasoning for question 3 is that, since Object and Event are disjoint, B and D 
must be different.  The functionality of represents then ensures that A and C are different.   
                                                 
103 not (X and Y) ≡ not X or not Y and not (X or Y) ≡ not X and not Y 
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There are a number of possible reasons why the accuracy of response on this question is low, 
in particular compared with questions relating to transitivity in the other sections of the 
study.  It may be that participants were influenced by their inherent understanding of the 
words being used.  The transitive property names used in the previous two patterns in 
sections 6.4 and 6.5, e.g. has_part, may appear inherently transitive.  Whereas represents 
may not appear inherently functional; it is perfectly possible for something to represent more 
than one entity, e.g. the colour blue can represent the sky and the sea, besides a mental state.  
Note that the property represents was not present in the original types of entities pattern but 
was added in order to enable a question about functionality.  However, the use of meaningful 
names is likely to be ecologically more valid than abstract names; this is generally the 
practice in ontologies, with the exception of some in the life sciences.  As in section 6.4, this 
highlights the importance of careful choice of names in real-life ontologies; represents_only 
might have been a better choice of name.  Related to this, there is also a possible confusion 
between functionality and inverse functionality.  Note that this does not happen with 
transitivity; the inverse of a transitive function is also transitive104.  One remedy for this 
confusion is suggested in Chapter 8.105 
Another source of difficulty with this question may arise from its inherent complexity.  
Because one reasoning step requires the manipulation of four entities, the question has a 
relational complexity of four.  The study reported in Chapter 7 investigated performance 
with a functional property in a less complex situation, making possible a comparison with a 
similarly complex question employing a transitive property. 
6.6.3. Conjunction and disjunction – question 5 
Question 5 was answered better than chance, but not significantly so.  In fact, two 
participants answered incorrectly whilst one participant did not provide an answer106.  The 
classes Nonconceptual and Nontemporal are the unions of two and three subclasses 
respectively.  All of these subclasses are mutually disjoint, hence the conjunction of 
Nonconceptual and Nontemporal must be the one subclass they have in common, i.e. Object.  
It is possible that participants who had difficulty with this question were confused by the 
ambiguity of and, as with the question discussed in subsection 6.6.1, and interpreted the 
operator as union rather than intersection. 
Another difficulty might have been holding the four subclasses in working memory and 
remembering which ones were subclasses of each of the two superclasses.  Effectively the 
participant is looking for the overlap between the two superclasses.  This might be regarded 
as holding two mental models, one with two subclasses, the other with three, in working 
memory at the same time.  This can be avoided by a syntactic approach in which each of the 
subclasses from one superclass (e.g. Event and Object from Nonconceptual) is in turn 
                                                 
104 Let T be a transitive property and assume that x T-1 y and y T-1 z.  Then x T-1 y ⇒ y T x and y T-1 z ⇒ z T 
y.  Then y T x; z T y ⇒ z T x ⇒ x T-1 z.  I.e. x T-1 y and y T-1 z imply x T-1 z and hence T-1 is transitive. 
105 A fundamental question is the extent to which, in real-life situations, ontology users draw on their inherent 
understanding of the characteristics of properties, rather than making use of characteristics stated in the 
ontology.  It is possible that this happens to a large extent.  The declaration of property characteristics may be 
required chiefly for the benefit of software reasoners.  In this case, using abstract names in studies such as these 
would deviate completely from normal usage.  In any case, the choice of property names in real-life ontologies 
should definitely avoid any inappropriate suggestion of property characteristics.  On the other hand, the choice 
of a name which conveys a required characteristic might support user reasoning.  However, the latter strategy 
can raise problems if the characteristics of a property are changed. 
106 Participants were permitted to skip a question if they felt unable to answer it.  The skipped question was 
treated as an incorrect answer.  In fact, question 5 in Table 6.8 was the only question skipped.  The software 
used for the third study, described in Chapter 8, did not permit questions to be skipped. 
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conjunctively combined with each subclass from the other superclass (Abstract, Quality and 
Object from Nontemporal).  Each conjunction will either result in Nothing (⊥) or, in one 
case, Object.  Thus the most subclasses that need to be held in working memory are three, 
the two subclasses currently being conjunctively combined and, possibly, Object107.  This 
approach requires an, at least intuitive, understanding that conjunction distributes over 
disjunction. 
6.7. Participant feedback 
After completing the questions, participants were able to provide written feedback about 
what they found difficult and what they found easy, and to make general comments.  Some 
participants also made comments verbally.  The most common theme was the use of 
intuition, in particular relating to names.  Here there were conflicting views.  One participant 
(p1) commented that “using named individuals instead of capital letters would have been 
easier”, whilst another (p2) held the opinion that it was “easy to reason with anonymous 
things”, since this safeguarded against the danger of using intuition rather than relying on 
formal axioms.  These contrasting views were also present when considering class and 
property names.  One participant (p3) commented that because class and property names 
were familiar it was necessary to check whether the meaning in the OWL expression was 
similar to the normal English usage; another (p4) stated that “the axioms were realistic so 
one could rely to some extent on common sense”.  Of course, as has already been pointed 
out in Chapter 5, in real-world situations it is likely that ontology users do make use of their 
intuitions, based on the names used for entities.  It is the software, not the human, reasoners 
which work only with the axiom systems.  On a related, but different, theme participant p1 
also commented favourably on the lack of use of formal logic symbols, which is a feature of 
MOS. 
Four participants commented on the value of diagrams.  Here there were no conflicting views 
but a consensus that diagrams are useful, e.g. participant p3 stated: “perhaps I would have 
done better if I’d drawn diagrams on paper” and another participant (p5) commented: “a 
pictorial representation of the relationships would have been easier to use”.  One participant 
(p6) expressed a related view that colour-coding for OWL entity types and font weights and 
styles for keywords would be useful. 
There were some interesting comments about OWL features, including the difficulty of using 
the existential and universal quantifiers (participant p1); confusion between and and or 
(participant p3); and the effect of users’ legacy, e.g. that of a database background 
(participant p7).  These all echo observations made in previous sections. 
6.8. Participant performance 
At the beginning of the study participants were asked to rank themselves on their knowledge 
of formal logic and on their knowledge of OWL or another DL formalism.  Subsection 6.8.1 
reports on how these rankings correlated with participant performance.  Participants were 
also asked about their usage of DL. Subsection 6.8.2 discusses an analysis of the relationship 
between DL usage and participant performance. 
                                                 
107 Although, if the subclasses are dealt with in the order shown in the two Equivalent statements in the pattern, 
then Object only occurs as the result of the conjunction at the very end of the process. 
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6.8.1. Knowledge of logic and DL 
Participants were asked to rank themselves on their knowledge of formal logic and their 
knowledge of OWL or another DL formalism, in both cases using the same categories: 
• No knowledge at all 
• A little knowledge 
• Some knowledge 
• Expert knowledge 
Table 6-12 shows for each of the two questions, a breakdown by category giving: the number 
of participants in each category, the mean percentage of correctly answered questions, plus 
mean and standard deviation times to complete the study.  Note that in both cases there were 
no participants in the ‘no knowledge at all’ category.  Note also that the time here includes 
the time reading the on-screen study preamble plus the preamble for each section, i.e. it is 
greater than the sum of the times for each question.  As can be seen, there was increasing 
performance, in terms of increasing percentage correct and reducing mean time, with 
increasing knowledge both of logic and of DL.  It should be noted, though, that in the case 
of knowledge of logic, there was a very uneven distribution of participants, with the majority 
being in the ‘some knowledge’ category. 
Table 6-12 Participant performance by knowledge of logic, and by knowledge of OWL or 
another DL formalism 
 Knowledge of logic  Knowledge of OWL or other DL formalism 
 no. 
participants 
percentage 
correct 
mean (s.d.) 
time - secs 
 no. 
participants 
percentage 
correct 
mean (s.d.) 
time - secs 
A little 
knowledge 
2 64% 1935 (968)  3 78% 2289 (384) 
some 
knowledge 
8 87% 1762 (796)  5 81% 1771 (922) 
expert 
knowledge 
2 88% 1107 (346)  4 90% 1113 (254) 
 
There was a significant Spearman’s rank correlation between knowledge of formal logic and 
accuracy of response (ρ = 0.53, p = 0.038, one-sided test)108 and between knowledge of OWL 
or DL and accuracy (ρ = 0.54, p = 0.036, one-sided test).  This should not be taken to imply 
that, in general, knowledge of formal logic and knowledge of DL equally influence accuracy 
for these questions.  For this particular set of participants, knowledge of formal logic and 
knowledge of DL were significantly correlated (ρ = 0.58, p = 0.024, one-side test).  In fact, 
seven of the twelve participants rated their knowledge of the two topics equally, and for the 
other five participants there was never more than a difference of one place on the scale.  
Hence from this particular set of participants it is not possible to separate out the effects of 
knowledge of logic and knowledge of DL.   
There was a significant Spearman’s rank correlation between knowledge of DL and total 
time to answer the questions (ρ = -0.65, p = 0.011, one-sided test).  However, the Spearman’s 
rank correlation between knowledge of formal logic and total time was not significant (ρ = 
                                                 
108 In this and subsequent usages of Spearman’s rank correlation in this chapter, the p-value could not be 
calculated exactly because of ties.  It is assumed that this does not materially affect the results. 
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-0.29, p = 0.178).  Here, the small number of participants in two of the categories makes 
reliable analysis difficult109. 
6.8.2. Usage of DL 
Participants who used OWL or another DL formalism were asked whether they were: 
• learning about the language 
• using the language in their work 
• researching the language 
There was also an ‘other’ option.  One of the participants did not answer the question; the 
participant was assumed to make no use of DL.  Another participant used the ‘other’ option 
to indicate no use of DL.  No participants were learning about the language.  Six participants 
used DL and four were researching DL.  Table 6-13 shows a breakdown by category giving: 
the number of participants in each category, the percentage of correctly answered questions, 
plus mean and standard deviation times to complete the study. 
Table 6-13 Participant performance by usage of DL 
  no. participants percentage correct mean (s.d.) time - secs 
no use 2 76% 2500 (168) 
use in work 6 83% 1638 (877) 
researching 4 88% 1364 (438) 
 
One might expect the performance of those participants who do not use DLs to be worse 
than for the other participants.  This is indeed the case, although the sample of those not 
using DLs is very small.  A logistic analysis of deviance revealed no significant difference 
in percentage correct across the three categories (p = 0.229).  Similarly, an ANOVA revealed 
no significant difference in time across the three categories (F(2,9) = 1.908, p = 0.204).  
These results are not surprising.  Given that almost all the participants came from a research 
environment, there is probably little real difference in background between those who 
indicated they used the language in their work and those who indicated they were researching 
the language.  Moreover, the number of participants who had no experience of using DLs 
was too small to achieve a statistically significant result. 
6.9. Effect of question position 
As noted in section 6.2, each permutation of the study section order was used twice.  This 
compensates for any effect of inter-section learning which would occur if the sections of the 
study were in a fixed order.  In the latter case we might expect performance to be better on 
the second and third sections, after participants had gained experience.  It also has an effect, 
to an extent, of randomizing the position of individual questions in the study.  For example, 
the first question in section 6.4 (based on the componency pattern) will be in 1st position if 
that section is used first and 12th position if the section is used last; whilst if the section is 
used second the question will be in the 6th or 7th position, depending on which section is used 
first.  When comparing the performance on each question, this will at least partially 
compensate for any effect of question position. 
                                                 
109 In particular, the mean time of 1935 seconds for ‘a little knowledge’ of logic is the mean of 2619 seconds 
and 1250 seconds.  The former is the longest of all the participants and the latter is one of the lower times.  An 
indication of the wide discrepancy between these two values can be seen from the large standard deviation 
shown for the ‘a little knowledge’ of logic category in Table 6.12. 
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In principle, change in performance during the study might be positive or negative.  The 
former because of gaining experience, the latter because of fatigue or boredom.  In fact, a 
logistic regression of accuracy against position showed no significant effect (p = 0.889).  
Similarly, a regression of the log110 of question response time against position showed no 
significant effect (F(1, 250) = 0.5143, p = 0.474). 
The effect of position within a section was also investigated, for each of the three sections.  
In each case a logistic regression showed no significant dependence of accuracy on position 
within the section (p > at least 0.1).  Regression of log time against position within section 
showed a more varied picture.  For the questions described in section 6.4, based on the 
componency pattern, there was a significant effect (F(1,118) = 4.954, p = 0.028), such that 
response times became longer moving through the section.  There was no significant effect 
for the questions described in section 6.5, based on the modified coparticipation pattern (F(1, 
70) = 2.713, p = 0.104), nor for the questions described in section 6.6, based on the modified 
types of entities pattern (F(1, 58 = 3.925; p = 0.052).  Section 6.4 is an anomaly, not only in 
that there is a significant effect, but also in that the effect is to increase the response time 
with passage through the section.  It may also be relevant that this section had the most 
questions.  For each of the other sections, and overall, the regression analysis, although not 
significant, indicated a reduction in time.  Since the questions were not randomized within 
each section, the effect of the order of questions may be being confounded with the effect of 
differences between the questions. 
The effect of question position is investigated in a controlled way for study 3, described in 
Chapter 8.  This is made possible because question position in that study was completely 
randomized.  At this point, for study 1 we can say that there was no significant effect on 
accuracy caused by question position, neither overall nor within individual sections.  For 
time the situation is confused and it is not possible to come to even a tentative conclusion. 
6.10. Effect of number of reasoning steps 
It seems likely that the number of reasoning steps to reach a valid conclusion will influence 
the probability of reaching that conclusion and the time taken to reach it.  Indeed, Johnson-
Laird et al. (1989) cite Oshershon (1975) as reporting a correlation between the number of 
steps and participants’ accuracy.  Section 6.10.1 investigates, for this study, what effect 
number of reasoning steps had on accuracy, whilst section 6.10.2 investigates the effect on 
reasoning time. 
6.10.1. Accuracy and number of reasoning steps 
It was hypothesized that the number of reasoning steps might have some effect on accuracy 
of response for the valid questions.  Table 6-14 shows the mean percentage of correct 
responses for the valid questions, categorized by the required number of reasoning steps.  A 
logistic analysis of deviance showed a significant dependence on number of steps (p = 
0.020).  However, a logistic regression did not give a significant result (p = 0.469), i.e. there 
was no indication of a trend.  Table 6-14 shows that there was anomalously high accuracy 
on the questions with four steps, of which there were only two.  A logistic regression with 
those two questions removed showed a significant decrease in accuracy with number of steps 
(p = 0.038).  This suggests that accuracy of response does decrease with number of steps.  
To investigate this phenomenon in more detail would require comparison between questions 
with varying numbers of steps of equal complexity. 
                                                 
110 As discussed in section 6.3, all statistical tests involving time which assume normality use log time. 
 95 
 
Table 6-14 Percentage of correct responses to valid questions, categorized by number of 
reasoning steps 
 number of reasoning steps overall 
 1 2 3 4 
no. questions 2 5 4 2 13 
percentage correct 100% 87% 81% 96% 88% 
 
6.10.2. Response time and number of reasoning steps 
For those questions with valid conclusions which were correctly answered, it was 
hypothesized that the response time might be dependent on the number of reasoning steps 
required to arrive at the correct conclusion.  Table 6.15 shows the mean time and standard 
deviation for correct valid responses divided into categories by number of steps.  The table 
also shows the number of data points, i.e. the number of correct responses in each category. 
Table 6-15 Mean time and standard deviation for correct valid responses, by no. of steps 
 number of reasoning steps overall 
 1 2 3 4 
number of data points 24 52 39 23 138 
mean time – secs 25.5 49.8 42.6 54.2 43.4 
standard deviation - secs 25.0 26.7 30.3 30.5 29.2 
 
Inspection of the mean times suggests, perhaps surprisingly, that whilst there is an 
appreciable difference between questions requiring one step and those requiring more, there 
is little difference amongst the latter.  This is confirmed by an ANOVA of log time against 
number of steps, and subsequent Tukey HSD analysis.  The ANOVA showed a significant 
dependence on number of steps (F(3, 134) = 10.11, p < 0.001).  The Tukey HSD analysis 
showed a significant difference between the time for one step and for each of the other three 
categories (p < 0.001 for a comparison with two and four steps; p = 0.001 for three steps), 
whilst there was no significant pairwise difference between the other three categories (p > at 
least 0.1). 
In summary, the dominant features of the data are the difference between the questions which 
require only one reasoning step and those requiring more than one step, and the lack of 
difference between the latter, more complex, questions.  This suggests that most of the time 
is not spent in executing the reasoning steps, but in ancillary activities.  A certain amount of 
time, averaging around 25 seconds for these particular questions, is required for all 
questions.  Then, for questions requiring more than one step, a very approximately similar 
amount of time is additionally required. 
6.11. Response time – effect of validity, response and accuracy 
Three factors which might be thought to influence response time are: 
• whether the putative conclusion is valid or non-valid; 
• the nature of the participant’s response, i.e. valid or non-valid; 
• the accuracy of that response. 
These three factors are interdependent.  Pick any two and the third will be determined.  
ANOVAs of log time against each of the three pairs of factors were conducted.  Since these 
ANOVAs were unbalanced, the results potentially differ depending on the order of factors 
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in the analysis111.  Hence two ANOVAs were conducted with each pair of factors, with the 
two different orders, making six ANOVAs in all. 
The results of the ANOVAs are shown in Table 6-16.  Note that, whilst the top-level F and 
p-values depend on the order of factors, the interaction effect is independent of their order 
(Shaw & Mitchell-Olds, 1993).  Note also that all the top-level effects are significant, except 
for response when it follows validity.  The interaction between accuracy and validity is also 
not significant; the other two interactions are significant.  The two non-significant effects 
are shown in italics in the table.  In summary, when we take any pair from the three factors, 
then both members of the pair are significant.  In the one situation where this is not the case 
at the top-level, i.e. the factor response when it follows validity in the analysis, then the 
former factor has a significant interaction effect on the latter. 
Table 6-16 Dependence of log time on validity, response and accuracy: result of ANOVAs 
top-level effects interaction effect 
first factor second factor 
validity F(1, 248) = 17.833 
p < 0.0001112 
response F(1, 248) = 0.281  
p = 0.597 
 
F(1, 248) = 9.031 
p = 0.003 response F(1, 248) = 9.746 
p = 0.002 
validity F(1, 248) = 8.368  
p = 0.004 
 
validity F(1, 248) = 17.833 
p < 0.001 
accuracy F(1, 248) =   
8.803, p = 0.003 
 
F(1, 248) = 0.508 
p = 0.477 accuracy F(1, 248) = 13.409 
p < 0.001 
validity F(1, 248) = 
13.228, p < 0.001 
 
response F(1, 248) =   9.746 
p = 0.002 
accuracy F(1, 248) = 11.981 
p < 0.001 
 
F(1, 248) = 5.418 
p = 0.021 accuracy F(1, 248) = 13.409, p 
< 0.001 
response F(1, 248) =   8.318 
p = 0.004 
N.B. (1) Each row represents the result of a two-factor ANOVA.  Columns 1 and 2 
(i.e. the leftmost columns) show the first factor and the resultant data.  Columns 3 
and 4 show the second factor and resultant data.  Column 5 shows the interaction 
effect, which does not depend on the order of factors.  (2) Non-significant effects 
shown in italics 
Table 6-17 shows the mean times for each of the four possible situations.  In this case the 
two independent factors, validity and accuracy have been used.  Any two of the three factors 
could have been used; the resultant values would be the same but arranged differently.  A 
Tukey HSD was carried out after each of the ANOVAs to enable a pairwise comparison 
between each of the four quadrants.  The results of the Tukey HSDs are identical for each of 
the ANOVAs.  This is to be expected, given that the same six pairwise comparisons between 
the four quadrants are being made. 
                                                 
111 In fact, there are a number of different approaches to multi-factor ANOVA.  In one approach any difference 
in top-level effect due to order of factors is avoided by repeating the ANOVA with each factor in first position.  
The approach used here is the default ‘R’ method, which does give results depending on order.  See Shaw and 
Mitchell-Olds (1993) for a discussion of unbalanced ANOVA. 
112 These F and p-values for validity are repeated in the table, under validity * accuracy.  This occurs because 
the values associated with validity will be the same when it is used as the first factor, regardless of which of 
the other two factors is the second factor in the ANOVA.  The same phenomenon occurs for the other two 
factors. 
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Table 6-17 shows that the correct responses to the questions with valid putative conclusions 
are, in general, the most quickly answered.  On the basis of the Tukey HSD, these responses 
are significantly faster than the incorrect responses to the questions with non-valid 
conclusions (p < 0.001) and significantly faster than correct responses to the non-valid 
questions (p = 0.002), but not significantly faster than the incorrect responses to the valid 
conclusions (p = 0.055)113.  Pairwise comparisons between the other three categories of 
responses shows no significant differences (p > at least 0.3). 
Table 6-17 Mean times (standard deviation, number of data points) for responses - secs114 
 correct 
response 
incorrect 
response 
correct and 
incorrect 
valid putative conclusion 43.4 (29.2, 138) 58.4 (27.5, 18) 45.1 (29.3, 156) 
non-valid putative conclusions 59.5 (42.4, 72) 76.3 (48.8, 24) 63.7 (44.4, 96) 
valid and non-valid putative conclusions 48.9 (35.1, 210) 68.6 (41.6, 42) 52.2 (36.9, 252) 
 
In general, correct responses are significantly faster than incorrect responses.  This is 
confirmed by a t-test comparison between the times for the correct and incorrect questions 
(t(62.177) = 3.7946, p < 0.001).  This may be because the incorrect responses will be biased 
towards the harder questions, which are likely to take longer. 
More interestingly, shown by the Tukey HSD, the correct responses to the non-valid 
questions took significantly longer than the correct responses to the valid questions.  This 
may give some insight into how participants answer these questions.  It is consistent with an 
approach in which participants attempt to prove the putative conclusion and, if they are 
unable to do so eventually give up and either decide the correct response is non-valid or seek 
to construct a counter-example.  An alternative approach, of first seeking to construct a 
counter-example would be likely to lead, for the correct responses, to the non-valid 
conclusions being faster than the valid conclusions.  
Even here, care must be exercised in interpreting the result.  The valid and non-valid 
questions were not balanced for difficulty.  It may be that the valid questions were easier and 
hence took less time to answer correctly than the non-valid questions.  Indeed, overall the 
percentage of valid questions answered correctly was 88%, whilst for non-valid questions 
the percentage was 75%.  Thus the valid questions appear easier than the non-valid, and this 
may have had an effect in reducing the response time for valid questions. 
A better comparison of response times between valid and non-valid questions would be 
between questions of similar structure which were correctly answered by all participants.  
For example, in Table 6-7 question 1 is the only non-valid question correctly answered by 
all participants.  Questions 2 and 3 are similarly structured valid questions, also correctly 
                                                 
113 Note that the incorrect responses to the valid questions formed the smallest of the four categories, with 18 
data points. 
114 Note that this table is consistent with the independence of the two factors.  Since the ANOVA used log time, 
we should expect a multiplicative effect.  For example, taking the correct responses to the valid questions (top 
left) as base, the multiplicative effect of moving in two dimensions to the incorrect response to the non-valid 
questions should be approximately equal to the product of each of the effects of movements in one dimension.  
This can be confirmed when the ratios of the mean times are computed: 
1. incorrect responses to valid questions / correct responses to valid questions = 58.4/43.4 = 1.35 
2. correct responses to non-valid questions / correct responses to valid questions = 59.5/43.4 = 1.37 
3. incorrect responses to non-valid questions / correct responses to valid questions = 76.3/43.4 = 1.76 
Then 1.35 x 1.37 = 1.85, i.e. around 5% greater than the figure computed in (3) above. 
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answered by all participants.  The mean times for the two valid questions are both 
appreciably less than for the non-valid question.  A paired t-test between question 1 and 2 
shows that question 1 response times differed significantly from question 2 response times 
(t(11) = 5.8163, p < 0.001, paired test).  Similarly question 1 response times differed 
significantly from question 3 response times (t(11) = 4.1465, p = 0.002, paired test).  
Questions 3 and 5 of Table 6-9 offer another opportunity to compare non-valid and valid 
questions.  Again, both questions were correctly answered by all participants and they are 
relatively similar in structure.  In this case, although the mean time for the non-valid question 
(question 3) is greater than for the valid question (question 5), the difference is not significant 
on a paired t-test (t(11) = 0.72254, p = 0.485)115. 
In summary, whilst by no means conclusive, there is evidence to support the hypothesis that 
participants start by attempting to prove the conclusion, rather than attempting to show that 
it need not follow from the premises.  A more conclusive study would require carefully 
designed questions, on the one hand representative of a range of reasoning tasks and on the 
other hand paired to ensure that, as far as possible, the valid and non-valid questions were of 
equal difficulty. 
Finally, when considering participants’ responses to the questions with non-valid 
conclusions, it should be noted that in only one case is it possible to prove the negation of 
the conclusion.  This is question 3 in Table 6-9116.  For the other questions with non-valid 
conclusions, the most one can do is to prove that the negation of the conclusion is consistent 
with the axioms, e.g. by creating a counter-example.   
6.12. Discussion 
This chapter has described a preliminary study, investigating participants’ difficulties with 
common DL constructs in the context of commonly-used content patterns.  Five difficulties 
have been highlighted, reviewed in subsection 6.12.1.  Besides these difficulties, some other 
factors influencing participants’ performance have been investigated.  These are reviewed 
in subsection 6.12.2.  Finally, subsection 6.12.3 discusses threats to the validity of the study. 
6.12.1. The difficulties 
One difficulty may have been partly caused by the assumption that if a property is transitive, 
then this will also be true of its subproperty.  This may in part be a result of some participants 
having a background in object-oriented design and programming.  However, it may also be 
more fundamental, relating to the normal usage of the prefix ‘sub’ in English.  A subspecies, 
for example, is a specialization of species.  Any animal in a subspecies will possess the 
characteristics of the species, plus certain other characteristics specific to the subspecies.   
In general, the entities in a subclass possess the characteristics of entities in the superordinate 
class, since they are themselves members of that superordinate class117.  Whereas the 
instantiations of a subproperty do not in general possess the characteristics of the 
superproperty.  In retrospect, the choice of the keyword SubPropertyOf, whilst perfectly 
                                                 
115 The mean time for question 3 is influenced by two outliers, as is indicated by the relatively large standard 
deviation.  Removal of just the largest outlier (121 seconds) reduces the mean time for question 3 to 36.5 
seconds. 
116 The reasoning here is that is_participant_in, being the inverse of has_participant, must have domain Object 
and range Event.  Hence, from the second axiom, C must be in Object.  However, for the conclusion to hold, 
C must be in the range of is_participant_in, i.e. Event.  Since Object and Event are disjoint, C cannot be in 
both, and the conclusion cannot hold. 
117 For example, restrictions are inherited.  If A, A1 and B are classes, with A1 a subclass of A, and P is some 
object property, then A SubClassOf P {some | only} B implies A1 SubClassOf P {some | only} B. 
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logical, may be misleading because of the prefix sub.    It may be that the hierarchical concept 
of subproperties is confusing and unnecessary.  If S is a subproperty of P, then this means 
precisely that a S b implies a P b118.  An alternative way of specifying this might be to use a 
keyword which avoids the implicature of hierarchy, e.g. S Implies P119.  Looked at this way, 
a subproperty hierarchy is no more than a chain of inferences.  Indeed, in everyday English, 
whilst we talk about subclasses and subsets, we rarely talk about subproperties; e.g. ‘being 
a sister is a subproperty of being a sibling’ sounds much less natural than ‘being a sister 
implies being a sibling’.  In practice, more attention needs to be given in training to the 
relation between property characteristics and subproperty characteristics. 
The use of the existential restriction to define a class caused a difficulty.  The use of 
restrictions to define classes is central to DLs but quite unfamiliar to those coming from a 
database background.  A great deal of emphasis, and indeed repetition of examples, is needed 
during training.  Diagrammatic representation of DLs might also help, as in the work of 
Stapleton et al. (2014).  The existential restriction, and also the universal restriction, are 
further investigated in the two subsequent studies. 
The use of a functional object property also caused a difficulty.  The context of the question 
was relatively complex, and it is not possible on the basis of this study to determine to what 
extent the problem is inherent to functionality and to what extent it was caused by question 
complexity.  This is examined in the next study, whilst the final study also investigates 
inverse functionality. 
The interaction of conjunction and disjunction, also caused some participants a difficulty, 
although not to the same extent as the previously discussed problems.  The ambiguity of and 
may have contributed here, as may have the complexity of the question.  The use of the 
keywords and and or is discussed in more detail in Chapter 8. 
The greatest difficulty was experienced with negated conjunction, where the accuracy was 
less than chance, albeit not significantly so, and significantly less than for negated 
disjunction.  This agrees with the findings of Khemlani et al. (2012a), who were working 
with study participants not trained in logic.  They attributed the problem to not creating the 
necessary set of mental models.  This may well be the case.  The ambiguity of and may have 
been a factor, perhaps contributing to the failure to create all the necessary mental models. 
6.12.2. Other factors 
Participants’ previous knowledge of logic and DL, as declared by the participants 
themselves, did affect performance.  Knowledge of DL was both significantly positively 
correlated with response accuracy and negatively correlated with response time, whilst 
knowledge of logic was significantly positively correlated with accuracy but not 
significantly correlated with response time.  However, the very uneven distribution of 
participants in the categories for knowledge of logic, and the high correlation for these 
participants between knowledge of logic and knowledge of DL, means that these results must 
be treated with caution.  The nature of the sample of participants did not permit any 
conclusions as to the effect of experience of DL usage on performance. 
                                                 
118 See Motik et al. (2012) which states “if an individual x is connected by OPE1 [the subproperty] to an 
individual y, then x is also connected by OPE2 [the superproperty]”.  They do state that “Object subproperty 
axioms are analogous to subclass axioms” without specifying the extent of the analogy. 
119 Indeed Motik et al. (2012) use the word ‘implies’ in an English expansion of a subproperty statement: 
 “SubObjectPropertyOf( a:hasDog a:hasPet )   Having a dog implies having a pet.” 
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The position of a question might be expected to have an effect on the accuracy with which 
it is answered and on the response time.  In fact, overall position of a question within the 
study had no significant effect on either accuracy or response time.  Similarly, the effect of 
position within each section had no significant effect on accuracy.  The effect of question 
position within each section had an effect which varied between the sections and was only 
significant for one section.  However, these results also need to be interpreted with caution 
as the position of the questions was not fully randomized.   
For the valid questions, an increasing number of reasoning steps appears to lead to reduced 
accuracy of response; although a more controlled experiment is required to verify this.  An 
analysis of time for the correct responses to valid questions showed that questions which 
only required one reasoning step were answered significantly faster than those requiring 
more than one step.  On the other hand, there was no significant difference in response time 
between questions requiring two, three and four steps.  The number of questions was 
relatively small.  However, this does suggest that an appreciable amount of time is spent in 
a (perhaps trial and error) process of arriving at the reasoning strategy. 
Finally, response time is significantly dependent on the three interdependent factors: 
accuracy, validity of putative conclusion, and nature of response.  Mean response time is 
significantly less for the correct questions than for the incorrect ones.  This could be because 
the incorrect responses are biased towards the harder questions.  Mean response time for 
correct valid responses is significantly less than for correct non-valid responses.  This 
suggests that, in general, participants are attempting to prove the putative conclusion and 
providing a response of non-valid if they are unable to do so in a reasonable time. 
6.12.3. Threats to validity 
As discussed in Section 4.8, threats to validity are divided into three categories, each of 
which is discussed here. 
Threats to construct validity 
Subsection 4.8.1 has already noted that the responses were recorded automatically.  The 
measurement of response time was potentially more error prone, since it was done manually. 
Screen activity was recorded by Camtasia and then reviewed by the experimenter.  The 
timepoints were taken from the time data displayed by Camtasia at the bottom of the screen. 
In principle, this enabled timepoints to be measured to the nearest second, i.e. ±0.5 second, 
and hence response times to be calculated ± 1 second.  In practice, there might have been 
some difficulty in recording the precise timepoint, giving an error of ±1 second.  This would 
lead to a potential error of ±2 seconds in the calculation of response times.  This should be 
compared with a minimum response of 9 seconds; most response times were much greater 
than this. 
Threats to internal validity 
Subsection 4.8.2 noted that the major threats to internal validity for each of the studies were 
inter-and intra-section effects caused by, e.g. learning or fatigue.  The permutation of section 
order described in Section 6.2 was designed to compensate for any inter-section effect and 
for any overall effect of position in the study.  However, the position of questions in each 
section was fixed and thus there was no compensation for any intra-section effect.  Inspection 
of Tables 6-7, 6-9 and 6-11 shows no obvious effect on accuracy of position within section.  
However, in Tables 6-7 and 6-9, the first question had the second longest mean response 
time, whilst in Table 6-11 the first question had the longest mean time.  Indeed, inspection 
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of Tables 6-9 and 6-11 suggests that there may be a tendency for response time to decrease 
as the participant moves through a section.  In study 2, an attempt was made to compensate 
for this, as discussed in Section 7.1. 
Threats to external validity 
Subsection 4.8.3 noted that the generalisability of the study may be limited by two factors: 
the nature of the questions and the profile of the participants.  As described in Section 6.1, 
the questions were designed to be ecologicaly valid, i.e. to employ the kind of constructs 
actually used, and in a realistic context.  In this way, it was intended to identify difficulties 
which had a real effect on DL users.   
All the participants had some background in computer science, as noted in Section 6.2.  This 
is also illustrated in Table 6-12, which shows that all the participants had at least a little 
knowledge of logic and a little knowledge of OWL or another DL formalisms, and the great 
majority of participants had some knowledge of both logic and DL.  Consequently, the 
participants were not representative of the kind of domain experts who might have a limited 
background in computing.  To an extent, the second study compensates for this, as will be 
described in the next chapter.
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7. Further investigations – controlled comparisons 
In seeking to ascertain the ‘laws of association of ideas’, which are psychological 
‘laws of thought’, the psychologist may find the fallacies into which the average 
human mind is prone to fall an even more instructive study than the rigidly correct 
intellectual processes of the soundest scientific thinker. 
D. G. Ritchie, ‘The Relation of Logic to Psychology’, 1896 
The previous chapter identified a number of particular difficulties which people experience 
in understanding and reasoning with DLs.  This chapter investigates in more detail three of 
those areas of difficulty: functional object properties; negated conjunction; and existential 
and universal restrictions.   
The study described in the previous chapter presented DL features in the context of 
commonly used ontology patterns, in the interest of ecological validity.  The study described 
in this chapter has been designed to enable comparison between DL features, e.g. between 
functionality and transitivity in object properties.  Nonetheless, the DL features investigated 
are those commonly used by ontology developers, as identified by the survey of Chapter 5 
and the work cited in Chapter 6. 
The first section of this chapter describes the organisation of the study.  Section 7.2 then 
describes the statistics of the response time data and justifies the use of the log 
transformation, as in Chapter 6.  The following four sections describe each of the four 
sections of the study.  Section 7.3 is concerned with further investigation into the difficulty 
with functional object properties.  Section 7-4 looks again at negated disjunction and 
conjunction.  Sections 7.5 and 7.6 are concerned with restrictions.  The former looks at the 
interaction between negation and restriction; the latter at nested restrictions.  Section 7.7 
reports on participant feedback, providing further insight into the difficulties experienced.  
Section 7.8 describes the effect on performance of the self-declared level of knowledge of 
the participants.  Section 7.9 looks at the effect of question position on accuracy and response 
time.  Section 7.10 investigates the effect on response time of three interrelated factors: 
validity of the putative conclusion; the nature of the participant’s response; and the accuracy 
of that response.  Finally, Section 7.11 draws some conclusions.  The study’s main findings 
are also described in Warren et al. (2015). 
7.1. Organisation of the study 
Two sets of participants were used, under different conditions.  For the first set, the study 
was administered under laboratory conditions, using the same approach as for the first study, 
described in Chapter 6.  Then, after the laboratory study was complete, an online study was 
administered to enable additional participants to take part and thus obtain further data.  The 
analyses of response time described in later sections make use of the data from the laboratory 
study.  The analyses of accuracy make use of the data from the laboratory study, enhanced 
where possible with data from the online study. 
7.1.1. The laboratory study 
The SurveyExpression tool was used to display the questions and record the responses.  
Camtasia was run on the PC to record screen activity and the recordings were analysed to 
obtain timing data.  As with the first study, participants were drawn from the Knowledge 
Media Institute and the Centre for Research in Computing at the Open University.  In 
addition, there were participants from other universities and research institutes who were 
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identified through their membership of the UK Ontology Network120, plus participants from 
industry121.  All the participants had experience of working with ontologies.  Almost all the 
participants were primarily computer scientists; a few had a background in biology and could 
be regarded as bioinformaticians.  Most of the sessions took place using the author’s 
computer and with the author and participant physically co-located.  In a few cases the 
sessions were held remotely.  The participant accessed the SurveyExpression pages on the 
participant’s own computer and a Skype link was set up with the author’s computer.  This 
enabled Camtasia to be run on the author’s computer so that a recording could be made for 
later analysis to obtain the timing data.  
As there were four question sections, the intention was to obtain 24 participants so that each 
permutation of section order would be represented once.  For technical and other reasons, on 
four occasions there was a failure to obtain a screen recording of the whole session.  
Consequently, only accuracy data was available for four of the participants.  As a result, 
there were 24 participants for whom accuracy and timing data were available and another 4 
for whom only accuracy data were available.  Thus all the analysis of timing data for the 
laboratory study was based on 24 participants, whilst the analysis of accuracy data was based 
on 28 participants from the laboratory study enhanced by additional participants from the 
online study as described below. 
The permutation of section order was intended to compensate for inter-sectional effects and 
to partially randomize the position of questions in the study.  In addition, two mutually 
reverse orderings of questions within each section were also used, to mitigate intra-sectional 
effects and further randomize the overall position of questions in the study. 
As with study 1, there was a preliminary section where participants were invited to provide 
information about themselves, e.g. their knowledge of logic, and a final section where 
participants could provide feedback.  A five-page handout, similar to the handout used in 
study 1, contained all the necessary information about the syntax and semantics of the subset 
of MOS used in the study.  The handout was provided to participants to read before 
beginning the study and was available for reference during the study. 
7.1.2. The online study 
As discussed in Chapter 8, it is difficult to obtain statistical significance, even for quite large 
effects, with the relatively modest participant sizes available.  This is particularly the case 
for the accuracy data.  Consequently, the online study was undertaken to obtain more 
accuracy data.  With a few exceptions, described in the appropriate sections below, the study 
used exactly the same questions as the laboratory study.  The online study was launched after 
the latter was completed so that no participants in the laboratory study were able to view the 
questions before taking part.   
Because it was felt that remote online participants might not be prepared to spend as long on 
the study as laboratory participants, the online study was divided into each of the four 
sections, which could be undertaken separately.  As a result, not all the sections were 
completed.  Only data from completed sections was used and consequently the number of 
additional data points varied from 12 for the questions discussed in Section 7.4 to 37 for the 
questions discussed in Section 7.3. 
                                                 
120 https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/ontology-uk 
121 Specifically, several from BT (http://www.btplc.com/) Research Labs at Ipswich, U.K., and one from 
iSOCO (http://www.isoco.com/en/) in Madrid, Spain. 
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As noted in the previous subsection, in the laboratory study a certain degree of randomization 
was achieved by permuting the order of the sections and presenting the questions within each 
section in two different orders.  In the online study, the surveygizmo122 web tool was used, 
which enabled randomization of the question order. 
At the beginning of each of the study sections, participants were invited to download the 
handout, which was exactly as used for the laboratory study.   
Whilst the online study was a useful way of increasing the sample size for the accuracy data, 
the data might not be of the same quality as the laboratory data.  In particular, although 
participants were requested not to use pen and paper, there was no control on this.  The fact 
that there were a number of partially completed responses, i.e. that some participants had 
given up, might imply that the completed responses were biased towards those participants 
with more facility in this kind of reasoning.  Although the analysis is chiefly concerned with 
comparisons between questions, the self-selecting nature of the participants might still 
introduce a bias. 
7.1.3. The questions 
There were ten questions in the section relating to object properties, described in Section 
7.3.  All the other sections contained eight questions, making a total of 34.  As with the 
previous study, each question consisted of a set of axioms and a putative conclusion.  
Participants were required to state whether the conclusion was valid or non-valid.  For all 
the questions with non-valid putative conclusions used in this study, it is not possible to 
prove the converse, i.e. the conclusion is consistent with the axioms.  For the questions in 
Section 7.4, consistency does require that certain classes be empty.   
7.2. Response time data 
A Shapiro-Wilk test on the response time data available from the online study gave a p-value 
of less than 2.2 x 10-16, whilst a plot of the data revealed a positive skew.  Consequently, the 
data was transformed using transformations from Tukey’s ladder of powers.  The resultant 
Shapiro-Wilk p-values are shown in Table 7-1.  This suggests that, to use tests such as 
ANOVA which require approximate normality, a log transformation would be appropriate. 
Table 7-1 Shapiro-Wilk test applied to response time data 
Transformation p-value 
time (i.e. identity transformation) < 2.2 x 10-16 
square root (time) 2.8 x 10-14 
log (time)  0.11 
1 / square root (time) < 2.2 x 10-16 
 
However, as was noted in section 6.3, since comparisons are generally between questions, it 
is important that response time data for each question be approximately normal.  Table 7-2 
shows the minimum p-value across all questions for each of the relevant transformations.  
This minimum p-value is greatest for the log transformation.  Moreover, although the value 
shown (0.0077) is relatively small, there was only one other value below 0.05 across the 34 
questions.  In fact, the log transformation resulted in the other 32 Shapiro-Wilk p-values 
                                                 
122 https://www.surveygizmo.co.uk/ 
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being greater than 0.1.  Consequently, the log transformation has been applied to response 
time data prior to all statistical tests in this chapter. 
Table 7-2 Minimum p-value for Shapiro-Wilk test applied to response time data across all 
questions 
Transformation p-value 
time (i.e. identity transformation) 2.5 x 10-7 
square root (time) 2.5 x 10-5 
log (time) 0.0077 
1 / square root (time) 0.00019 
 
7.3. Functional object properties 
In the first study, participants experienced difficulty with a question involving a functional 
object property.  As explained in subsection 6.6.2, the question had a relational complexity 
of four and it was not clear whether the difficulty arose entirely from the question’s 
complexity or whether participants were experiencing an inherent difficulty with 
functionality.  Functionality might, for example, be inherently more difficult than 
transitivity, which was shown in Chapters 5 and 6 to be another commonly used object 
property characteristic. 
The question in the first study required a reasoning step of the form: 
a F b; c F d; b DifferentFrom d ⇒ a DifferentFrom c (1) 
Here, F is a functional object property and a, b, c, d are individuals.  The step has RC 4 
because it requires the concurrent attention to four individuals. 
Another inference involving functionality is: 
a F b; a F c ⇒ b SameAs c     (2) 
This has RC 3 because it only requires the concurrent attention to three individuals.  If there 
is no inherent difference in difficulty between functionality and transitivity, then we might 
expect this reasoning step to display the same difficulty as the following one, where T 
represents a transitive object property: 
 a T b; b T c ⇒ a T c      (3) 
This also has RC 3 because it requires the concurrent attention to three individuals. 
These two RC 3 inferences are the basis of the comparison between functionality and 
transitivity in this study.  Because these two inferences are, individually, relatively easy, it 
was thought that human reasoners might perform so well on them both as to make 
discrimination difficult.  Therefore, an inference was used which involves functionality and 
requires two applications of the RC 3 reasoning step: 
 a F b; a F c; b F d; c F e ⇒ d SameAs e   (4) 
The first two axioms imply that b is the same as c and the third and fourth axioms imply that 
d is the same as e.  Note that between the two RC 3 reasoning steps, there is an additional 
step in which c is substituted for b in b F d, or b is substituted for c in c F e.  In either case, 
this means the inclusion of a reasoning step which only requires concurrent manipulation of 
two individuals (the individual being substituted and the individual being replaced) and 
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hence has RC 2.  Thus the inference consists of three steps, with RC 3, 2 and 3.  This 
inference is shown in question 3 of Table 7-3 below.  The table shows all the eight question 
used in this section of the study, whether the putative conclusion is valid and, for the 
questions with valid putative conclusions, the relational complexity of each step in the 
reasoning.  Note that, for brevity, T represents a transitive object property, and F represents 
a functional object property.  In the actual questions, greater_than_or_equal_to was used 
for the former, has_nearest_neighbour for the latter.  However, as with the previous study, 
it was made clear, e.g. in the handout, that the choice of names used should not affect any 
conclusions to be drawn.  Note also that, as with subsequent tables in this and the following 
chapter, the table does not show the necessary declarative statements which were included 
in the questions.  Moreover, in places the tables use a semicolon to delimit the axioms.  In 
the actual questions, each axiom was on a separate line. 
Table 7-3 Questions employing transitive and functional object properties 
No. axioms putative 
conclusion 
valid /  
non-valid 
RC 
1 a T b; b T c; c SameAs d; d T e a T e valid 3,2,3 
2 d T b non-valid n/a 
3 a F b; a F c; b F d; c F e d SameAs e valid 3,2,3 
4 a SameAs e non-valid n/a 
5 a F b; a F c; d F b; e F f; c DifferentFrom f d DifferentFrom e valid 3,2,4 
6 a DifferentFrom d non-valid n/a 
7 a F b; c F d; b Differentfrom d; e F a; f F g;  
c SameAs g 
e DifferentFrom f valid 4,2,4 
8 a DifferentFrom f non-valid n/a 
 
Question 1 of Table 7-3 was designed to mirror question 3, this time using transitivity.  The 
first two axioms imply that a T c, constituting a reasoning step of RC 3, similar to inference 
(3) above.  The next axiom, c SameAs d is deliberately included to mirror the reasoning step 
of RC 2 in question 3.  The axiom leads to d being substituted for c in a T c, giving a T d.  
The final axiom then gives a T e.  Thus we arrive at a chain of reasoning steps, with the same 
relational complexity (3, 2, 3) as question 3.  This enables a controlled comparison between 
functionality and transitivity.   
Questions 2 and 4 have the same axioms as questions 1 and 3, but non-valid putative 
conclusions.  Since there is no valid reasoning chain associated with these questions, there 
are no associated RC values. 
The remaining questions investigate the effect of increasing complexity on reasoning with 
functionality.  Question 5 starts with the same two axioms as question 3, leading to b being 
the same as c, in a reasoning step of relational complexity 3, isomorphic to inference (2) 
above.  This, together with the last axiom (c DifferentFrom f) means that b DifferentFrom f; 
this is arrived at in a reasoning step of relational complexity 2 by substituting b for c in the 
last axiom.  This gives d F b; e F f; b DifferentFrom f, which in turn leads to d DifferentFrom 
e in a reasoning step of RC 4, isomorphic to the inference (1) above.  Thus, question 5 
comprises three reasoning steps of RC 3, 2, 4. 
In a similar way, question 7 uses two reasoning steps of RC 4, both isomorphic to inference 
(1) above, and a middle step, substituting g for c, of RC 2.  This gives a chain of RC 4, 2, 4.  
Thus questions 5 and 7, along with question 3 already discussed, employ functional object 
properties to create questions of increasing complexity, enabling an investigation of the 
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effect of such increasing complexity.  Finally, questions 6 and 8 have the same axioms as 
questions 5 and 7 but with non-valid putative conclusions. 
For each of the questions with a non-valid putative conclusion, the axioms and the 
conclusion are consistent, i.e. it is not possible to prove the converse of the conclusion, given 
the particular characteristic associated with the object property.  For example, in question 2 
if we assume that T corresponds to has_sibling then we can see that the axioms and the 
conclusion can all be true.  The failure of the axioms to infer the conclusion can be seen by 
the construction of a counter-example.  For example, if we take T to be has_descendant, this 
satisfies the transitivity requirement.  However, it is clear from the second and third axioms 
that b T d, i.e. b has_descendant d.  Consequently, we cannot also have the conclusion, d 
has_descendant b.123 
To summarise the objectives of this section, there are two research hypotheses: 
H7.1 Reasoning about functionality is inherently more difficult than reasoning 
about transitivity, after controlling for relational complexity. 
H7.2 Reasoning about functionality becomes increasingly difficult with increasing 
relational complexity. 
Here, ‘difficulty’ is measured by percentage of correct responses and time to respond.  
The following two subsections provide more information on the laboratory and online 
studies, whilst the rest of the section discusses the hypotheses.  
7.3.1. Functional object properties – the laboratory study 
For this section, the questions were presented in two mutually reverse orders.  Table 7.4 
shows the orders used, identifying the questions by the numbering used in Table 7-3.  In 
each ordering, all four different axioms were used for the first four questions, and then 
repeated for the second four, but in such a way that there are never more than two valid or 
two non-valid questions together.  Moreover, each pair of questions with identical axioms 
are separated by three other questions.  Of the 24 participants for whom response time 
information was available, 12 saw the questions in one order, 12 in the other order.  Of the 
additional four participants for whom only accuracy information was available, three saw 
the questions in order 1 and one saw the questions in order 2.  This strategy of dividing the 
participants between two mutually reverse orderings was also used in the other three 
sections, with participants assigned to order 1 and order 2 consistently in each section. 
  
                                                 
123 To generalize, if we take T to be symmetric, as well as transitive, e.g. has_sibling, we can prove the 
conclusion in question 2.  If we take T to be antisymmetric, e.g. has_descendant, we can prove the converse of 
the conclusion.  With only the assumption of transitivity, the conclusion is simply consistent with the axioms. 
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Table 7-4 Functional object properties - question ordering 
order 1  order 2 
question no. valid / non-valid  question no. valid / non-valid 
2 non-valid  7 valid 
3 valid  6 non-valid 
5 valid  4 non-valid 
8 non-valid  1 valid 
1 valid  8 non-valid 
4 non-valid  5 valid 
6 non-valid  3 valid 
7 valid  2 non-valid 
 
The results of the laboratory study are shown in Table 7.5.  Note that, with the exception of 
the two questions relating to transitivity, for each pair of questions with the same axioms, 
the non-valid questions were answered more accurately than the valid questions.  Moreover, 
this difference in accuracy increases with increasing complexity.  This may be indicative of 
a bias towards responding with ‘non valid’ when confronted with a difficult question.  Note 
also that question 5 was not answered significantly better than chance (p = 0.172, one-sided 
test).  Question 7 was answered worse than chance, although not significantly so (p = 0.286, 
one-sided test).  All other questions were answered significantly better than chance (p < 0.05, 
one-sided test).  Thus the two questions with valid putative conclusions and involving 
functionality with RC 4 were not answered significantly better than chance. 
Table 7-6 shows the data separately for the two orderings.  The two questions which were 
answered first were questions 2 and 7.  In the case of question 7, there is an appreciable 
difference between the mean response times for the two orderings, suggesting that when it 
was posed first it incurred a considerable time penalty.  This is not the case for question 2, 
possibly because it is an appreciably easier question.  In fact, the mean time for question 2 
when it was the first question is slightly less than when it occurred last.  There also seems to 
be an appreciable penalty for question 6 when it occurred in the second position.  Again, 
there seems no such penalty for the easier question 3 which also occurred second. 
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Table 7-5 Questions employing transitive and functional object properties 
No. axioms putative 
conclusion 
valid 
/ 
non-
valid 
RC %age 
corr 
N=28 
mean time (s.d.) – secs 
N = 24 
overall corr incorr 
1 a T b; b T c;  
c SameAs d; d T e 
a T e valid 3,2,3 96%* 34  
(14) 
34  
(14) 
40  
(n/a) 
2 d T b non-
valid 
n/a 86%* 48  
(34) 
42  
(14) 
87  
(95) 
3 a F b; a F c;  
b F d; c F e 
d SameAs e valid 3,2,3 75%* 52  
(36) 
56  
(39) 
36  
(9) 
4 a SameAs e non-
valid 
n/a 96%* 61  
(46) 
62  
(47) 
35  
(n/a) 
5 a F b; a F c; d F b;  
e F f; c DifferentFrom f 
d DifferentFrom e valid 3,2,4 61% 84  
(67) 
90  
(66) 
73  
(70) 
6 a DifferentFrom d non-
valid 
n/a 79%* 92  
(66) 
86  
(62) 
111 
(80) 
7 a F b; c F d;  
b Differentfrom d;  
e F a; f F g;  
c SameAs g 
e DifferentFrom f valid 4,2,4 43% 109 
(79) 
96  
(55) 
119 
(96) 
8 a DifferentFrom f non-
valid 
n/a 71%* 96  
(47) 
93 
(50) 
101 
(43) 
N.B.  (i) In this and subsequent similar tables in this chapter, the overall mean time 
for each question may not correspond to the weighted sum of the times for the correct 
and incorrect responses, using the percentage correct given, since the latter is 
calculated on the basis of a larger sample. 
(ii) * answered significantly better than chance (p < 0.05) 
Table 7-6 Object property questions - performance broken down by ordering 
No. valid / 
non-
valid 
position %age correct mean time (s.d.) - secs 
order 
1 
order 
2 
order 1 
N = 15 
order 2 
N = 13 
order 1 
N = 12 
order 2 
N = 12 
1 valid 5 4 100% 92% 28 (11) 40 (14) 
2 non-valid 1 8 87% 85% 47 (16) 49 (47) 
3 valid 2 7 67% 85% 49 (33) 54 (39) 
4 non-valid 6 3 100% 92% 42 (26) 79 (56) 
5 valid 3 6 47% 77% 80 (79) 88 (55) 
6 non-valid 7 2 73% 85% 73 (65) 111 (64) 
7 valid 8 1 40% 46% 86 (69) 132 (85) 
8 non-valid 4 5 73% 69% 91 (47) 101 (48) 
 
7.3.2. Functional object properties – the online study 
There were 37 completed responses to this section obtained from the online study.  The 
questions were identical to those used for the laboratory study except for a slight change to 
questions 1 and 2, i.e. the two questions which employ transitivity.  The revised questions 
are shown in Table 7-7.  In question 1 in the laboratory study the two transitive reasoning 
steps were such that the shared term was at the end of the first axiom and the beginning of 
the second (i.e. a T b; b T c).  In question 1 in the online study, the shared term is at the 
beginning of the first axiom and the end of the second (a T b; c T a).  Question 2 in Table 
7.6 uses the same axioms as question 1, but with an invalid putative conclusion.   
It was hypothesized that this revised order might seem less natural and be more difficult for 
participants.  Specifically: 
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H7.3 Reasoning about transitivity with the shared term at the end of the first axiom 
and beginning of the second axiom will lead to more accurate responses than when 
the shared term is at the beginning of the first axiom and end of the second axiom. 
Comparisons of the two versions of questions 1 and 2 enable this hypothesis to be tested.  
However, a caveat should be made regarding the different invalid putative conclusions in 
the two versions of question 2.  No systematic process was available for creating invalid 
conclusions of equal ‘difficulty’ and the effect of the different order of axioms may be 
confounded with differing difficulties associated with the putative conclusions. 
Table 7-7 Revised questions 1 and 2 for online study 
No. axioms putative 
conclusion 
valid /  
non-valid 
RC 
1 a T b; c T a; b SameAs d; e T c e T d valid 3,2,3 
2 a T c non-valid n/a 
 
Table 7.8 shows the percentage of correct responses for the online study and the two studies 
combined.   
Table 7-8 Percentage of responses correct for laboratory study, online study, and combined 
studies 
No. valid / non-
valid 
object 
property 
characteristic 
RC percentage correct 
online study 
N = 37 
combined studies  
N = 65 
1 valid transitive 3,2,3 95%* 95%* 
2 non-valid transitive n/a 95%* 91%* 
3 valid functional 3,2,3 78%* 77%* 
4 non-valid functional n/a 95%* 95%* 
5 valid functional 3,2,4 57% 58% 
6 non-valid functional n/a 86%* 83%* 
7 valid functional 4,2,4 73%* 60% 
8 non-valid functional n/a 54% 62%* 
TOTAL 79% 78% 
* question answered significantly better than chance (p < 0.05) 
 
7.3.3. Ordering of axioms in transitive inference – H7.3 
It is useful to start by considering hypothesis H7.3, since this clarifies the difference between 
the laboratory and the online study.  It is clear from inspection that there is no significant 
difference between the accuracy of responses to question 1 in the two forms.  For question 
2, the difference is contrary to the expected direction, but is in any case not significant (p = 
0.390, Fisher’s Exact Test, two-sided).124   
In summary, there is no support for hypothesis H7.3.  The ordering of the axioms in the 
transitive inference in question 1 makes no significant difference to accuracy or response 
time. 
                                                 
124 In fact, with the exception of question 7, there is no significant difference between the proportion of correct 
responses in the laboratory and the online situations (p > 0.1 in all cases).  For question 7, the difference is 
significant (p = 0.021, Fisher’s Exact Test, two-sided).  There was also no significant difference between the 
two studies when the data was aggregated across all questions (p = 0.397, Fisher’s Exact Test, two-sided). 
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Because of this lack of significant difference between questions 1 and 2 in the two studies, 
hypotheses H7.1 and H7.2 will be analysed using the combined accuracy data from both 
studies. 
7.3.4. Functionality and transitivity – hypothesis H7.1 
Comparison of questions 1 and 3 enables hypothesis H7.1 to be investigated.  The difference 
in percentage correct responses between the two questions is significant (p = 0.004, Fisher’s 
Exact Test, two-sided).  Moreover, the difference in time between the two questions is 
significant (t(23) = 3.0843, p = 0.005, paired test).  These results are consistent with 
hypothesis H7.1, i.e. reasoning about functionality is harder than reasoning about 
transitivity, after controlling for complexity.   
Comparisons between questions with non-valid putative conclusions are less clear-cut to 
interpret.  In particular, we do not have a defined set of reasoning steps, with known 
complexity, which participants need to follow.  As suggested in Chapter 6, many participants 
are likely to arrive at a non-valid response by failing to prove validity.  Other participants 
may construct a counter-example.  The difficulty of constructing such counter-examples may 
or may not vary appreciably across the questions and may or may not be correlated with the 
difficulty of answering the analogous questions with valid putative conclusions.   
Inspection of Table 7-8 shows that question 4, the non-valid question employing 
functionality, was actually answered more accurately than question 2, which employed 
transitivity, counter to hypothesis H7.1.  However, this difference was not significant (p = 
0.492, Fisher’s Exact Test, two-sided).  The mean response time for question 4 was greater 
than for question 2.  However, this difference was also not significant (t(23) = 1.262, p = 
0.220, paired test).   
In summary, as regards hypothesis H7.1, the laboratory study confirmed that reasoning about 
functionality is more difficult than reasoning about transitivity when required to reach a valid 
conclusion.  However, when required to refute a non-valid conclusion, there was no evidence 
of any difference in difficulty between functionality and transitivity. 
7.3.5. Increasing complexity – hypothesis H7.2 
Comparison of questions 3, 5 and 7, all with valid putative conclusions and of increasing 
relational complexity, enable hypothesis H7.2 to be investigated.  A logistic analysis of 
deviance reveals a significant variation in proportion of correct responses across the 
questions (p = 0.044).  A subsequent Tukey HSD analysis showed no significant pairwise 
differences (question 3 versus 5: p = 0.067; question 5 versus 7: p = 0.983; question 3 versus 
7: p = 0.099).  A logistic analysis of deviance for questions 4, 6 and 8, with non-valid putative 
conclusions also shows a significant variation (p < 0.001).  A subsequent Tukey HSD 
analysis showed no significant difference between questions 4 and 6 (p = 0.082), a 
significant difference between questions 6 and 8 (p = 0.019) and a significant difference 
between questions 4 and 8 (p < 0.001). 
Care needs to be exercised in interpreting the response time data. As already noted, question 
7 was the first question to be answered by half the participants.  Table 7.6 suggests that this 
had an appreciable effect on mean response time.  As a result, it is not valid to analyse the 
times for question 3, 5 and 7, e.g. using ANOVA, on the full set of 24 data points.  One 
alternative is to perform an ANOVA on data from the 12 participants who saw question 7 
last, i.e. in order 1.  This did not give a significant result (F(2, 33) = 1.889, p = 0.167).  
However, using the full dataset there was a significant difference in response time between 
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questions 3 and 5 (t(23) = 3.0226, p = 0.006, paired test)125.  This does indicate a significant 
difference in reasoning about functionality between a situation of RC 3 and a situation of 
RC 4. 
When comparing the mean response time for questions 4, 6 and 8, the problem arises that 
question 6 was answered second by half the participants and, from Table 7.6, appears to have 
incurred a time penalty which may distort the overall mean response time.  To avoid this 
problem, an ANOVA was performed on data from the participants who saw the questions in 
order 1.  This revealed that the response time varied significantly across the questions (F(2, 
33) = 4.8097, p = 0.015).  A subsequent Tukey HSD analysis revealed that there was a 
significant difference between questions 4 and 8 (p = 0.011) but no significant difference 
between questions 4 and 6 (p = 0.195) and between questions 6 and 8 (p = 0.394).  
In summary, the data confirms hypothesis H7.2.  Complexity significantly reduces accuracy 
and significantly increases response time. 
7.3.6. Conclusions 
Table 7-9 summarises the conclusions relating to hypotheses H7.1, H7.2 and H7.3.  
Confirming a valid inference was significantly less accurate and took significantly longer 
with functionality than with transitivity.  On the other hand, there was no significant 
difference in accuracy or response time between transitivity and functionality when refuting 
a non-valid inference.  Increasing complexity significantly reduced accuracy and increased 
response time; this effect was discernible in both valid and non-valid questions.  Finally, 
changing the order of the axioms in a transitive inference has no effect on the accuracy of 
responses. 
  
                                                 
125 Note that question 3 occurred second for half the population and seventh for the other half; question 5 
occurred third and sixth.  For both questions, the difference between the mean response times for the two 
orderings was relatively small, i.e. compared to the difference overall between the questions. 
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Table 7-9 Object properties – summary of hypotheses 
  accuracy response time 
H7.1 – functionality vs. 
transitivity 
valid 
conclusions 
functionality 
significantly less 
accurate 
reasoning about 
functionality takes 
significantly longer 
non-valid 
conclusions 
no significant 
difference 
no significant 
difference 
 
H7.2 – effect of relational 
complexity on reasoning 
about functionality 
valid 
conclusions 
complexity 
significantly affects 
accuracy overall; no 
significant pairwise 
differences 
significant increase 
in response time 
between RC 3, 2, 3 
and RC 3, 2, 4 
non-valid 
conclusions 
complexity 
significantly affects 
accuracy overall; 
significant pairwise 
differences between 
RC3, 2, 3 / RC4, 2, 4 
and  
RC3, 2, 4 / RC4, 2, 4 
complexity 
significantly affects 
response time 
overall; significant 
pairwise difference 
between  
RC3, 2, 3 / RC4, 2, 4 
     
H7.3 – effect of order of 
axioms in transitive 
inference 
valid 
conclusions 
no significant 
difference 
no data available 
non-valid 
conclusions 
no significant 
difference 
no data available 
 
7.4. Negation, disjunction and conjunction 
The objective of this section was to further investigate the interaction between negation and 
disjunction, and the interaction between negation and conjunction; in particular to 
investigate the difficulties with negated conjunction identified in the first study.  In order to 
ground the questions in an ecologically valid context, reference was made to Rector’s (2003) 
discussion of the need to define exceptions.  Rector (2003) noted that frame systems, 
originating from Minsky (1975), had developed the idea of defining defaults, and then 
exceptions to those defaults.  This approach raised problems of computational tractability, 
and in any case was replaced with logic-base approaches.  Attempts to introduce default 
mechanisms into the logic-based systems also ran into problems of tractability.  The details 
of this discussion are not important here.  What is important is that, in this discussion, Rector 
(2003) gives examples of defining exceptions in OWL, including two making use of negated 
conjunction.  The first defines two exceptions: 
“Drug type A and not subtype B and not subtype C”   (1) 
The second example extends this to define an exception to an exception: 
“Drug type A and not (subtype B and not subtype B1) and not subtype C” (2) 
The questions used are shown in Table 7-10.  The table also indicates whether each question 
had a valid or non-valid putative conclusion, shows the RC of each valid question (see 
discussion later in this subsection) and provides a representation of the axioms and of the 
conclusion as one or more mental models.  Note that these are the questions as used for the 
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laboratory study.  The questions used in the online study varied slightly, as explained in 
subsection 7.4.2 below. 
Table 7-10 Boolean operator questions – laboratory study 
No. axioms putative 
conclusion 
valid /  
not-
valid 
RC mental 
model(s) 
1 Z EquivalentTo (TOP_CLASS and not A  
 and not B) 
TOP_CLASS DisjointUnionOf A, B, C 
Z EquivalentTo 
C 
valid 3 TC ¬a ¬b 
 
≡ 
c 2 Z EquivalentTo (TOP_CLASS and not (A or B)) 
TOP_CLASS DisjointUnionOf A, B, C 
valid 3 
  
3 Z EquivalentTo (TOP_CLASS and  
 not (A and not A_1)) 
TOP_CLASS DisjointUnionOf A, B 
A DisjointUnionOf A1, A2 
Z EquivalentTo 
(B or A_1) 
valid 3 TC ¬a 
TC a1 
 
≡ 
 
b 
a1 
4 Z EquivalentTo 
B 
not-
valid 
n/a 
5 Z EquivalentTo (TOP_CLASS  
 and (not A or A_1)) 
TOP_CLASS DisjointUnionOf A, B 
A DisjointUnionOf A_1, A_2 
Z EquivalentTo 
(B or A_1) 
valid 2 
6 Z EquivalentTo 
A_1 
not-
valid 
n/a 
7 Z EquivalentTo ((TOP_CLASS and not A) or 
 (TOP_CLASS and A_1)) 
TOP_CLASS DisjointUnionOf A, B 
A DisjointUnionOf A_1, A_2 
Z EquivalentTo 
(B or A_1) 
valid 3 
8 Z EquivalentTo 
A_2 
not-
valid 
n/a 
  
9 Z EquivalentTo (TOP_CLASS and not (A and not 
 (A_1 and not A_1_X))) 
TOP_CLASS DisjointUnionOf A, B 
A DisjointUnionOf A_1, A_2 
A_1 DisjointUnionOf A_1_X, A_1_Y 
Z EquivalentTo 
(B or A_1_Y) 
valid 4 TC ¬a 
TC a1 ¬a1x 
 
≡ 
b 
a1y 
10 Z EquivalentTo 
A_1_Y 
not-
valid 
n/a 
 
Question complexity 
The questions are divided into three groups: questions 1 and 2; questions 3 to 8; and 
questions 9 and 10.  These represent increasing order of complexity.  Here complexity can 
be measured in a variety of ways.  The simplest may be to consider the number of levels in 
the class hierarchy, which can be regarded as one plus the number of DisjointUnionOf 
axioms.  Thus, questions 1 and 2 have two levels:  
(i) TOP_CLASS; (ii) A, B, C.   
Questions 3 to 8 have three levels:  
(i) TOP_CLASS; (ii) A, B; (iii) A_1, A_2.   
Questions 9 and 10 have four levels:  
(i) TOP_CLASS; (ii) A, B; (iii) A_1, A_2; (iv) A_1_X, A_1_Y 
The same complexity categorisation can be arrived at by considering the mental models.  
This will be discussed later.   
Alternatively, a syntactic approach can be taken by counting the levels of nesting in the 
axioms.  Question 1 has no nesting, i.e. no brackets except for those which are used to contain 
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the whole expression after the EquivalentTo keyword126.  On the same basis, questions 3 to 
8 have one level of bracketing and questions 9 and 10 have two levels of bracketing.  Using 
this approach question 2 is an anomaly, having one level of bracketing and thus being in the 
same category as questions 3 to 8. 
Another approach, is to take account of the number of reasoning steps needed for each 
question, and the relational complexity of each step.  This approach requires making 
assumptions about how a participant would mentally tackle a question, which might not be 
the same way someone trained in Boolean algebra and provided with pen and paper would 
tackle the question.  Appendix B describes an analysis of the questions with valid putative 
conclusion, i.e. questions 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9.  With the exception of question 5, there is an increase 
in the number of reasoning steps as we move from the lower to medium to higher level of 
complexity as determined by the number of levels in the class hierarchy or by the number 
and complexity of the mental models.  Also with the exception of question 5, the questions 
at the lower and medium levels of mental model complexity have maximum RC 3.  Question 
5 has maximum RC 2.  The fact that question 5 is not answered appreciably more accurately 
than the questions 3 and 7 (see Table 7-15 below) suggests that it is the complexity of mental 
models which is the main determinant of difficulty.  Finally, question 9 is clearly more 
complex, not only in having more steps but in having a maximum RC 4. 
Negated disjunction 
Question 1 was motivated by statement (1) above, taken from Rector (2003).  The axioms 
for question 2 are semantically identical, but the first axiom uses a negated disjunction.  Both 
questions have the same valid putative conclusion.  It was known from the first study, and 
from Khemlani et al. (2012a), that negated disjunction is easier than negated conjunction.  
The objective of questions 1 and 2 was to determine whether participants would find it harder 
to reason about negated disjunction, as in question 2, than the fully expanded form, as in 
question 1. 
The hypothesis to be tested is: 
H7.4 Reasoning with a negated disjunction is inherently more difficult than 
reasoning with the expanded form. 
As the axioms are semantically equivalent they have the same mental model representation.  
Table 7-10 shows the mental model representation, in two forms.  The first form (TC ¬a ¬b) 
is created directly from the first axiom.  The second form (c) is equivalent to the valid 
conclusion and arises when the second axiom, i.e. the axiom employing DisjointUnionOf, is 
taken account of.  In both cases the representation only requires one mental model.  Although 
the two questions are represented by the same mental models, it could be that the form of 
one question lends itself more easily to the creation of the models.  As pointed out in Chapter 
3, subsection 3.3.2, for axioms using Boolean operators, the mental model representation 
corresponds to DNF, with each model being one of the disjuncts.  On this basis, the first 
axiom of question 1, which is in DNF, may be easier to translate into a mental model 
representation than the first axiom of question 2. 
Negated conjunction  
The remaining questions are designed to further investigate negated conjunction.  Questions 
3 to 8 are motivated by statement (2) above, from Rector (2003).  In particular, the first 
                                                 
126 These brackets are not required by the rules of syntax, nor are they required to clarify the syntax.  Their use 
was purely to help readability. 
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axiom of questions 3 and 4 is similar to statement (2), in that it includes a nested expression, 
and thus an exception to an exception.  For simplicity, because it does not include negated 
conjunction, the final part of statement 2 (“and not subtype C”) has been omitted.  In the first 
axiom of questions 5 and 6, not (A and not A_1) has been expanded to not A or A_1.  In 
questions 7 and 8 the whole axiom has been expanded to DNF.  Thus the axioms of questions 
3 to 8 are all semantically equivalent.  Questions 3, 5 and 7 have the same valid putative 
conclusion.  Questions 6, 4 and 8 have different non-valid putative conclusions. 
Since the axioms for questions 3 to 8 are semantically equivalent they have the same mental 
model representation.  As with questions 1 and 2, the representation is shown in two forms.  
The first (TC ¬a; TC a1) arises immediately from the first axiom.  The second (b; a1) results 
from taking account of the two remaining axioms, employing DisjointUnionOf.  In both 
cases there are two alternative mental models, compared with the one mental model required 
for questions 1 and 2. 
Questions 9 and 10 are more complex still, involving exceptions to exceptions to exceptions.  
The mental model representation for these two questions has two models, as with questions 
3 to 8.  However, whilst the first model shown (TC ¬a) is identical for both sets of questions, 
the second model is more complex for questions 9 and 10 (TC a1 ¬a1x) than for questions 3 
to 8 (TC a1). 
Negated conjunction and DNF 
The first axioms of questions {3, 4}, {5, 6}, and {7, 8} represent a transition from the form 
used in Rector (2003) to DNF.  Since DNF corresponds to the mental model representation, 
one might expect the order of reducing difficulty for the questions with valid conclusions to 
be 3, 5, 7, and for the questions with non-valid conclusions to be 4, 6, 8.  This leads to the 
hypothesis: 
H7.5 Reasoning with a Boolean axiom in MOS becomes more difficult the further 
that axiom is syntactically removed from its DNF. 
Increasing complexity 
On the basis of mental model theory, and on the basis of the depth of the class hierarchy, the 
questions are arranged into three levels of complexity.  This offers an opportunity to 
investigate the following hypothesis: 
H7.6 Reasoning with Boolean axioms becomes more difficult with increasing 
complexity, e.g. as measured by the complexity of the corresponding mental model. 
It would be surprising were these hypotheses not to hold in the general case, e.g. at very high 
levels of complexity.  The real question of concern is whether this effect makes itself felt at 
the levels of complexity being studied. 
Questions 1, 3 and 9 from Table 7-10 can be used to test this hypothesis.  These three 
questions are in the general form shown in Rector (2003), with increasing levels of nesting.  
In the cases of question 1 and question 3 there are semantically equivalent alternative 
questions.  However, these would confound the effect of complexity with the effect of 
different syntactic formats. 
There is no question with a non-valid putative conclusion at the lowest level of complexity.  
However, comparison of questions 4 and 10, both with non-valid putative conclusions, 
permits another comparison of the effect of complexity.  As with the questions with valid 
conclusions discussed previously, questions 4 and 10 have the same syntactic form.  
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However, as discussed in the previous section, the effect of the differing complexity of the 
axioms will be confounded with any effect of the different putative non-valid conclusions127. 
7.4.1. Negation, disjunction and conjunction – the laboratory study 
As with the questions in the previous section, for the laboratory study the questions were 
presented in two mutually reverse orders, as shown in Table 7-11.   
Table 7-11 Negation, disjunction and conjunction - question ordering 
order 1  order 2 
question no. valid / non-valid  question no. valid / non-valid 
3 valid  4 non-valid 
1 valid  2 valid 
8 non-valid  7 valid 
10 non-valid  9 valid 
5 valid  6 non-valid 
6 non-valid  5 valid 
9 valid  10 non-valid 
7 valid  8 non-valid 
2 valid  1 valid 
4 non-valid  3 valid 
 
The results of the laboratory study are shown in Table 7-12.  As a reminder, the table also 
shows whether the putative conclusion was valid or non-valid and shows the division into 
the three levels of complexity.   
 
Table 7-12 Boolean operator questions – results from laboratory study 
No. valid / 
non-valid 
%age corr 
N=28 
mean time (s.d.) – secs, N = 24 
overall corr incorr 
1 valid 82%* 39 (26) 36 (23) 56 (37) 
2 valid 86%* 43 (29) 36 (24) 78 (27) 
 
3 valid 61% 96 (56) 99 (64) 89 (37) 
4 non-valid 64% 105 (78) 112 (78) 89 (79) 
5 valid 64% 65 (38) 61 (33) 74 (48) 
6 non-valid 79%* 58 (33) 54 (32) 70 (40) 
7 valid 68%* 70 (45) 57 (31) 109 (59) 
8 non-valid 89%* 65 (26) 66 (26) 59 (32) 
 
9 valid 54% 90 (48) 91 (49) 89 (51) 
10 non-valid 68%* 94 (47) 94 (50) 95 (45) 
* answered significantly better than chance (p < 0.05) 
 
Table 7-13 shows the accuracy and timing data for the questions in the two orders of 
presentation.  Inspection of the table suggests that questions 3 and 4, when presented first 
had appreciably longer response times.  This difference was significant in both cases 
(question 3: t(22) = 3.9248, p < 0.001; question 4: t(21.928) = 7.8683, p < 0.001).  No 
ordering effect is apparent for the accuracy data.  For example, the difference between the 
                                                 
127 In retrospect, this problem could have been mitigated by making the putative conclusion for question 10 the 
same as for question 4: Z EquivalentTo B. 
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percentage of correct responses for question 4 in the two orderings (53% and 77%) was not 
significant (p = 0.254, Fisher’s Exact test, two-sided). 
 
Table 7-13 Boolean operator questions – performance by ordering 
No. valid / 
non-valid 
position %age correct mean time (s.d.) - secs 
order 
1 
order 
2 
order 1 
N = 15 
order 2 
N = 13 
order 1 
N = 12 
order 2 
N = 12 
1 valid 2 9 80% 85% 49 (31) 30 (15) 
2 valid 9 2 100% 69% 22 (11) 64 (26) 
 
3 valid 1 10 60% 62% 128 (57) 63 (31) 
4 non-valid 10 1 53% 77% 42 (17) 167 (62) 
5 valid 5 6 67% 62% 60 (33) 69 (43) 
6 non-valid 6 5 80% 77% 36 (16) 79 (32) 
7 valid 8 3 80% 54% 39 (13) 101 (44) 
8 non-valid 3 8 93% 85% 67 (29) 63 (24) 
 
9 valid 7 4 60% 46% 71 (31) 110 (56) 
10 non-valid 4 7 60% 77% 94 (44) 95 (51) 
 
7.4.2. Negation, disjunction and conjunction – the online study 
There were 12 completed responses to this section from the online study.  The questions 
used were changed in three ways from the questions used for the laboratory study.  Firstly, 
the first two questions were omitted.  It was hoped that reducing the section from 10 to 8 
questions, i.e. the same size as the other sections, might encourage completed responses.  
Secondly, questions 4 and 8 were modified to have the same non-valid putative conclusion 
as question 6, i.e. Z EquivalentTo A_1.  This better enables a comparison between questions 
4, 6 and 8.  Thirdly, the first axiom in questions 9 and 10 was modified to DNF.  The intention 
was to enable a comparison between the form used in the laboratory study and DNF.  Table 
7.14 shows the questions, with the amendments in italics.  For comparison and aggregation 
with the laboratory study, the same numbering is used, i.e. from 3 to 10, omitting questions 
1 and 2. 
Table 7.15 shows the percentage of correct responses for the online study and the two studies 
combined.  Note that, for the pairs of questions with the same axioms and valid and non-
valid putative conclusions (i.e. {3, 4}, {5, 6}, {7, 8} and {9, 10}), the question with a non-
valid conclusion was always answered more accurately than the question with a valid 
conclusion.  Based on both the laboratory study data and the aggregated data, the two 
questions which were not answered significantly better than chance (i.e. questions 3 and 9), 
were the valid questions, at the medium and high level of complexity, using the form 
motivated by Rector (2003). 
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Table 7-14 Boolean operator questions – online study 
No. axioms putative 
conclusion 
valid /  
not-
valid 
mental 
model(s) 
3 Z EquivalentTo (TOP_CLASS and not (A and not A_1)) 
TOP_CLASS DisjointUnionOf A, B 
A DisjointUnionOf A1, A2 
Z 
EquivalentTo 
(B or A_1) 
valid TC ¬a 
TC a1 
 
≡ 
 
b 
a1 
4 Z 
EquivalentTo 
A_1 
not-
valid 
5 Z EquivalentTo (TOP_CLASS and (not A or A_1)) 
TOP_CLASS DisjointUnionOf A, B 
A DisjointUnionOf A_1, A_2 
Z 
EquivalentTo 
(B or A_1) 
valid 
6 Z 
EquivalentTo 
A_1 
not-
valid 
7 Z EquivalentTo ((TOP_CLASS and not A) or 
(TOP_CLASS and A_1)) 
TOP_CLASS DisjointUnionOf A, B 
A DisjointUnionOf A_1, A_2 
Z 
EquivalentTo 
(B or A_1) 
valid 
8 Z 
EquivalentTo 
A_1 
not-
valid 
 
9 Z EquivalentTo ((TOP_CLASS and not A) or 
(TOP_CLASS and A_1 and not A_1_X)) 
TOP_CLASS DisjointUnionOf A, B 
A DisjointUnionOf A_1, A_2 
A_1 DisjointUnionOf A_1_X, A_1_Y 
Z 
EquivalentTo 
(B or A_1_Y) 
valid TC ¬a 
TC a1 ¬a1x 
 
≡ 
b 
a1y 
10 Z 
EquivalentTo 
A_1_Y 
not-
valid 
 
Table 7-15 Boolean operator questions – results of online study and two studies combined 
No. valid / 
non-valid 
percentage correct 
online study 
N = 12 
combined studies 
N = 40 
3 valid 50% 58% 
4 non-valid 58% 63% 
5 valid 58% 63% 
6 non-valid 92%* 83%* 
7 valid 50% 63% 
8 non-valid 83%* 88%* 
 
9 valid 58% 55% 
10 non-valid 75% 70%* 
* answered significantly better than chance (p < 0.05) 
 
7.4.3. Negated disjunction – hypothesis H7.4 
Comparison of questions 1 and 2 enables hypothesis H7.4 to be investigated.  Note that this 
is based entirely on the laboratory study, since these questions did not occur in the online 
study.  There was no significant difference in accuracy between the two questions (p = 1.000, 
Fisher’s Exact Test, two-sided), nor in response time (t(23) = 0.24693, p = 0.807, paired test, 
two-sided).  This analysis does not suffer from any difficulties of interpretation arising from 
question ordering, as the questions were counterbalanced.  Half the participants saw question 
1 in position 2 and question 2 in position 9; the other half saw question 1 in position 9 and 
question 2 in position 2.  In summary, reasoning with negated disjunction (question 2) 
appears no harder than reasoning with the expanded form (question 1). 
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In summary, there was no support for hypothesis H7.4.  Reasoning with negated disjunction 
is not significantly less accurate or significantly slower than reasoning with the expanded 
form. 
7.4.4. Negated conjunction and DNF – hypothesis H7.5 
Comparison of questions 3, 5 and 7 enabled an investigation of hypothesis H7.5.  All three 
questions have semantically equivalent axioms and all three have a valid putative conclusion.  
A logistic analysis of deviance revealed no significant difference across the three questions 
(p = 0.87).  This was based on the aggregated laboratory and online studies, since the 
questions were identical in both studies.   
Inspection of the mean response time for these three questions reveals that there is little 
difference between questions 5 and 7, but that the response time for question 3 is appreciably 
longer than for questions 5 and 7.  However, inspection of Table 7-13 suggests that this is 
because half the participants saw question 3 as their first question.  Consequently, an 
ANOVA was conducted using data from the 12 participants who saw question 3 in position 
10, i.e. the participants who saw the questions in order 2.  This indicated no significant 
difference across the questions (F(2,33) = 3.22, p = 0.053).   
Questions 4, 6 and 8, all with non-valid putative conclusions, offer another opportunity to 
investigate hypothesis H7.5.  Here the putative conclusions were different for each of the 
three questions in the laboratory study, and therefore a confounding factor, but the same for 
each of the questions in the online study.   Hence the online study offers a more controlled 
comparison of the effect of complexity.  On the other hand, the small sample size restricts 
the statistical power of the test.  Using the online study data, a logistic analysis of deviance 
showed no significant variation across the three questions (p = 0.126).  When data from the 
two studies was aggregated, ignoring the difference in putative conclusions, then a logistic 
analysis of deviance did show a significant variation across the questions (p = 0.020)128.  A 
subsequent Tukey HSD analysis revealed a significant difference between questions 4 and 
8 (p = 0.035) but no significant difference between questions 4 and 6 (p = 0.120) and 
questions 6 and 8 (p = 0.806).  Thus, accuracy with the DNF form was significantly better 
than with the Rector (2003) form. 
Inspection of the mean response times for questions 4, 6 and 8 shows the same difficulty as 
occurred for questions 3, 5 and 7.  Here, question 4 is the first question to be answered in 
order 2, and there is a wide difference between the mean response times for this question in 
the two orderings.  Consequently, an ANOVA was conducted using data purely from order 
1.  This indicated that time varied significantly across the questions (F(2, 33) = 5.801, p = 
0.007).  A subsequent Tukey HSD analysis revealed a significant difference between 
question 6 and question 8 (p = 0.007) but no significant difference between question 4 and 
question 8 (p = 0.055) or question 4 and 6 (p = 0.659).  This suggests that, contrary to 
hypothesis H7.5, DNF (question 8) took longer to interpret, at least than the form 
intermediate between DNF and the Rector (2003) form (question 6). 
A further comparison of the DNF with the form derived from Rector (2003) is available by 
comparing the accuracy of questions 9 and 10 in the laboratory study with questions 9 and 
                                                 
128 Aggregation of data from the two studies means that for part of the data all three questions had the same 
putative conclusions and for part of the data all three questions had different putative conclusions.  Analysing 
separately the two questions for which the putative conclusion had been changed in the online study (questions 
4 and 8), there was no significant difference between the proportion of correct responses in the laboratory and 
online study (Fisher’s Exact Test, two-sided; question 4: p = 0.736; question 8: p = 0.627). 
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10 in the online study.  Here, using Fisher’s Exact Test, there was no significant difference 
for the questions individually (question 9: p = 1.000; question 10: 0.725), nor for questions 
combined (p = 0.802).  The power of this test is necessarily limited by the small sample size 
in the online study. 
In summary, there is no evidence to support hypothesis H7.5 for the questions with valid 
conclusions.  For the questions with non-valid conclusions, there is evidence that the DNF 
was significantly more accurate than the Rector (2003) form.  On the other hand, the DNF 
took significantly longer than the form intermediate between the DNF and the Rector (2003) 
form. 
7.4.5. Increasing complexity – hypothesis H7.6 
Earlier in this section it was noted that questions 1, 3 and 9 can be used to investigate the 
effect of increasing complexity.  As question 1 did not appear in the online study, all 
comparisons are limited to data from the laboratory study.  Inspection of Table 7-12 shows 
a reduction in percentage of correct responses with increasing complexity.  However, a 
logistic analysis of deviance revealed no significant variation in accuracy across the three 
questions (p = 0.055).   
Comparison of the response times for questions 1, 3 and 9 suffers from the difficulty that 
question 3 was answered first by the order 1 participants and, to a lesser extent, that question 
1 was answered second by the same participants.  To avoid these problems, an ANOVA was 
conducted using order 2.  This indicated a significant variation with question (F(2, 33) = 
24.41, p < 0.001).  A subsequent Tukey HSD analysis indicated significant differences 
between all three questions (Q1 vs. Q3: p < 0.001; Q3 vs. Q9: p = 0.016; Q1 vs. Q9: p < 
0.001). 
Questions 4 and 10, both with non-valid putative conclusions, provide another opportunity 
to study the effect of complexity, although the different putative conclusions provide a 
confounding effect.  Because of the change to question 10 in the online study, the comparison 
was restricted to the laboratory study.  Inspection of Table 7-12 shows that there was very 
little difference in the accuracy with which these questions were answered, with the more 
complex question (question 10) being answered slightly more accurately.  A Fisher’s Exact 
Test showed no significant difference in accuracy between the two questions (p = 1.000, 
two-sided). 
Question 4 was answered first in order 2, and inspection of Table 7-13 suggests this has 
appreciably increased the mean response time for this question.  Consequently, a comparison 
was made between questions 4 and 10 solely for those participants who saw the questions in 
order 1.  This indicated a significant difference in response time between the two questions 
(t(11) = 5.5308, p < 0.001), with question 10 taking longer.   
In summary, there is partial support for hypothesis H7.6.  Complexity, at the level studied, 
significantly affects response time but has no significant effect on accuracy. 
7.4.6. Conclusions 
Table 7-16 summarises the conclusions for hypotheses H7.4, H7.5 and H7.6.  There are two 
noteworthy effects.  Firstly, syntactic differences in the way the first axiom was expressed 
do make a difference, but apparently only for the questions with non-valid conclusions.  
Secondly, an increase in complexity does significantly increase response time.   
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Table 7-16 Negation, disjunction and conjunction – summary of hypotheses 
  accuracy response time 
H7.4 – negated disjunction 
vs. expanded form 
valid 
conclusions 
No significant difference 
 
non-valid 
conclusions 
Not investigated 
 
H7.5 – reasoning with 
Boolean axioms more 
difficult the further the 
expression is from DNF 
valid 
conclusions 
No significant difference 
 
non-valid 
conclusions 
some evidence that 
DNF significantly 
more accurate than 
Rector (2003) form 
DNF took 
significantly longer 
than form 
intermediate 
between DNF and 
Rector (2003) form 
     
H7.6 – reasoning with 
Boolean axioms more 
difficult with increasing 
complexity, e.g. of mental 
model 
valid 
conclusions 
No significant 
difference 
Significant increase 
in response time at 
each increase in 
complexity. 
non-valid 
conclusions 
No significant 
difference between 
medium and high 
levels of complexity.  
Difference between 
low and medium 
levels of complexity 
not tested. 
Significant increase 
in response time 
between medium 
and high levels of 
complexity.  
Difference between 
lowest and medium 
level of complexity 
not tested. 
 
7.5. Negation and restriction 
This section is concerned with investigation of the existential and universal restrictions, 
including with the interaction between negation and these restrictions.  Table 7-17 shows the 
questions, as used in both the laboratory and the online study.  Note that all questions have 
the same putative conclusion: X DisjointTo Y.  Consider first questions 1 to 4.  They share 
the same second axiom, which uses the universal restriction to constrain the class Y.  For the 
first axiom, which constrains class X, questions 1 and 3 use the existential restriction, whilst 
questions 2 and 4 use the universal restriction.  Questions 1 and 2 have the negation 
immediately before the named class (MALE), whilst questions 3 and 4 have the negation 
immediately before the anonymous class formed from the object property has_child and an 
existential or universal restriction.  Thus, all four possible variants of type of restriction and 
position of negation are used.  The first axioms of questions 1 and 4 are semantically 
equivalent, as are the first axioms of questions 2 and 3129.  For this reason, the first axiom of 
                                                 
129 The equivalence between the first axioms are based on the following MOS identities, 
where R is an object property and C is a class: 
R some not C ≡ not R only C  
R only not C ≡ not R some C 
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questions 1 and 4 are shown in a distinctive typeface, and the first axiom of questions 2 and 
3 in normal typeface.  Questions 5 to 8 repeat the first axiom from the first four questions.  
Questions 5 to 8 then share the same second axiom, which uses the existential restriction to 
constrain the class Y.  In summary, we have three binary factors which characterize the eight 
questions: nature of restriction in first axiom; position of negation in first axiom; nature of 
restriction in second axiom. 
Table 7-17 Negation and restriction questions 
No. First axiom  
– constraining X 
Second axiom  
– constraining Y 
valid / 
non-valid 
1 X SubClassOf has_child some (not MALE)  
Y SubClassOf 
has_child only MALE 
valid 
2 X SubClassOf has_child only (not MALE) non-valid 
3 X SubClassOf not (has_child some MALE) non-valid 
4 X SubClassOf not (has_child only MALE) valid 
5 X SubClassOf has_child some (not MALE)  
Y SubClassOf 
has_child some MALE 
non-valid 
6 X SubClassOf has_child only (not MALE) valid 
7 X SubClassOf not (has_child some MALE) valid 
8 X SubClassOf not (has_child only MALE) non-valid 
N.B.  All questions have the same putative conclusion: X DisjointTo Y 
The fact that the first axioms fall into two groups of semantically equivalent axioms, 
combined with the two alternatives for the second axiom, means that the questions can be 
regarded as four pairs of semantically equivalent questions: {1, 4}, {2, 3}, {5, 8} and {6, 7}.  
Being semantically equivalent, the members of each pair will have the same mental model 
representation.  This enables a test for the following hypothesis: 
H7.7 The mental model representation of the questions determines their difficulty. 
The four sets of semantically equivalent questions are characterised by two factors.  One 
factor identifies the semantics of the first axiom, i.e. coincides with whether the first axiom 
is expressed in distinctive or normal typeface.  The other factor differentiates between the 
two alternatives for the second axiom.   
For questions 1, 2, 5 and 6, the negation immediately precedes a named class (MALE).  For 
questions 3, 4, 7 and 8, the negation precedes an anonymous class, and syntactically 
immediately precedes an object property (has_child).  This permits another characterization 
of the questions using three binary factors, differing from the previous characterization only 
in that the first factor (nature of restriction in the first axiom) has been replaced by the 
semantics of the first axiom (for which a proxy is the typeface used in Table 7-17). The 
division into questions with negation before an anonymous class and negation before an 
object property enables a test of the hypothesis: 
H7.8 A difference in reasoning difficulty exists between negation before a named 
class and negation before an anonymous class. 
Questions 2, 4, 5 and 7 have the same type of restriction in the first axiom as in the second 
axiom.  For questions 2 and 4 this is the universal restriction.  For questions 5 and 7 it is the 
                                                 
These are the analogues of the FOL identities: x ¬P(x) ≡ ¬x P(x); ¬x P(x) ≡ x ¬P(x).  
These, in turn, are analogues of De Morgan’s laws in Propositional Logic. 
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existential restriction.  One possibility is that participants might find it easier to reason when 
a question uses only one restriction type.  If they are creating a mental model, then they only 
need to retrieve from memory the model for one type of restriction.  If they are reasoning 
syntactically, then manipulations may be aided by using only one restriction type.  This leads 
to the hypothesis: 
H7.9 The use of both existential and universal restrictions will cause reasoning to be 
more difficult than the use of one type of restriction. 
Consideration of the interaction of restrictions can be taken one step further.  The questions 
can be partitioned into the following four pairs: 
• questions with universal restrictions in both axioms – questions 2 and 4; 
• questions with existential restrictions in both axioms – questions 5 and 7; 
• questions with an existential restriction in the first axiom and a universal restriction 
in the second – questions 1 and 3; 
• questions with a universal restriction in the first axiom and an existential restriction 
in the second axiom – questions 6 and 8. 
This leads to the hypothesis: 
H7.10 The pattern of first and second axiom restrictions (only … only, some … 
some, only … some, some … only) is an indicator of performance130. 
7.5.1. Negation and restriction – the laboratory study 
As with the previous sections, the questions were presented to half the participants in one 
order, and to the other participants in the reverse order.  Order 1 was as in Table 7-17, i.e. 1, 
2, …8.  Order 2 was the reverse, i.e. 8, 7, …1.  Table 7-18 shows the results from the 
laboratory study.   
Table 7-18 Negation and restriction – results from laboratory study 
No. valid / 
non-valid 
%age corr 
N=28 
mean time (s.d.) – secs, N = 24 
overall correct incorrect 
1 valid 61% 52 (39) 38 (24) 80 (50) 
2 non-valid 50% 33 (18) 32 (14) 34 (22) 
3 non-valid 68%* 45 (22) 43 (24) 49 (16) 
4 valid 75%* 43 (25) 40 (24) 57 (24) 
5 non-valid 64% 41 (30) 42 (32) 38 (27) 
6 valid 50% 44 (40) 38 (25) 52 (55) 
7 valid 79%* 43 (37) 34 (26) 79 (53) 
8 non-valid 68%* 60 (37) 61 (42) 58 (29) 
* answered significantly better than chance (p < 0.05) 
  
Table 7-19 shows the data for the questions in the two orders of presentation.  The questions 
answered first by participants, i.e. questions 1 and 8, appear to have suffered a significant 
time penalty.  For both questions, the ratio of the mean response time between those 
participants who saw the question first and those who saw the question last was 
approximately 2:1.  This time penalty has appreciably increased the overall mean response 
                                                 
130 H7.10 is a generalization of H7.9.  H7.10 compares each of the combinations of restrictions: only … only, 
some … some, only … some, some … only.  H7.9 compares the first two with the second two. 
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time for those two questions.  In fact, questions 1 and 8 have the longest overall mean 
response times of the eight questions. 
Table 7-19 Negation and restriction data – broken down by ordering 
No. valid / 
non-valid 
position %age correct mean time (s.d.) - secs 
order 
1 
order 
2 
order 1 
N = 15 
order 2 
N = 13 
order 1 
N = 12 
order 2 
N = 12 
1 valid 1 8 53% 69% 70 (44) 34 (25) 
2 non-valid 2 7 47% 54% 28 (12) 39 (22) 
3 non-valid 3 6 67% 69% 43 (17) 47 (27) 
4 valid 4 5 73% 77% 48 (28) 39 (22) 
5 non-valid 5 4 60% 69% 48 (36) 33 (22) 
6 valid 6 3 40% 62% 43 (49) 46 (30) 
7 valid 7 2 80% 77% 32 (21) 54 (46) 
8 non-valid 8 1 73% 62% 41 (28) 78 (37) 
MEANS 62% 67% 44 (33) 46 (32) 
 
7.5.2. Negation and restriction – the online study 
The questions for the online study were identical to those used in the laboratory study.  There 
were 16 completed responses.  Table 7-20 shows the percentage of correct responses for the 
online study and for the two studies combined.  Considering the aggregated data from the 
two studies, five of the questions were answered significantly better than chance. 
Table 7-20 Negation and restriction – results from online study and two studies combined 
No. valid / 
non-valid 
percentage correct 
online study 
N = 16 
combined studies 
N = 44 
1 valid 63% 61% 
2 non-valid 50% 50% 
3 non-valid 69% 68%* 
4 valid 63% 70%* 
5 non-valid 75%* 68%* 
6 valid 50% 50% 
7 valid 75%* 77%* 
8 non-valid 81%* 73%* 
* answered significantly better than chance (p < 0.05) 
  
7.5.3. Semantic equivalence and position of negation – H7.7 and H7.8 
Based on the aggregated accuracy data from both the laboratory and online study, a logistic 
analysis of deviance was conducted using three factors: the semantics of the first axiom, as 
represented by the use of a normal or distinctive typeface in Table 7-17; the type of 
restriction used in the second axiom; and whether the negation precedes a named or 
anonymous class.  Note that the first two of these determine the semantics of the question.  
The result of the analysis indicated a significant dependence of accuracy on the position of 
the negation (p = 0.003).  However, neither of the other top-level effects (semantics: p = 
0.180; second restriction: p = 0.371), nor the interaction effects (p values greater than at least 
0.1) were significant131.  Thus, accuracy was affected by the position of the negation but not 
by the semantics of the questions.  This is entirely consistent with what one would expect 
                                                 
131 The actual p-values vary slightly depending on the order of the factors used in the analysis.  However, in all 
cases the effect of negation was significant (p < 0.05) and all the other top-level and interaction effects were 
not significant (p > 0.05). 
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from inspection of Table 7-20.  Based on the aggregated data, the worst-performing question 
with negation before the anonymous class was question 3, which was answered exactly as 
accurately as the best-performing question with negation before a named class, i.e. question 
5. 
An ANOVA was conducted for time, using the same three factors.  None of the top-level 
factors were significant (semantics: F(1, 184) = 1.8749, p = 0.174; second restriction: F(1, 
184) = 0.0005, p = 0.982; position of negation: F(1, 184) = 3.2545, p = 0.073).  Nor were 
the second-level interactions significant (p at least 0.6).  However,  the third-level interaction 
effect was significant (F(1, 184) = 3.9376, p = 0.049).  One interpretation of this third-level 
interaction can be seen from the mean response times in Table 7-18: 
• When the second axiom contains only, then for the questions in normal typeface, 
negation before a class (question 2) is answered more quickly than negation before a 
property (question 3), whereas for the questions in the special typeface, negation 
before a class (question 1) is answered more slowly than negation before a property 
(question 4). 
• When the second axiom contains some, then the above inequalities are reversed.  For 
the questions in normal typeface, negation before a class (question 6) is answered 
more slowly132 than negation before a property (question 7), whereas for the 
questions in special typeface, negation before a class (question 5) is answered more 
quickly than negation before a property (question 8). 
This behaviour appears to be related to the existence of syntactic clues.  Considering the first 
bullet above, and considering questions 1 and 4, then the latter can be answered quickly by 
realising that the first axiom refers to the complement of the class in the second axiom 
(has_child only MALE).  Question 2 is answered more quickly, but also less accurately than 
question 3.  This could arise when only (not MALE) in the first axiom of question 2 is 
wrongly interpreted as not (only MALE) and hence appears to complement the class in the 
second axiom.  In the same way, referring to the second bullet, question 7 offers a syntactic 
clue which makes it easier to answer than question 6; whilst question 5 can encourage a rapid 
erroneous response if some (not MALE) is mistaken for not (some MALE). 
In summary, questions with negation before the anonymous class were answered 
significantly more accurately, but took longer than questions with the negation before the 
named class.  The semantics of the questions, and hence the corresponding mental models, 
had no effect on accuracy or response time.  It may be that at least some of the questions 
were being answered by syntactic manipulation, without recourse to mental models.  It may 
also be the case that, where mental models were being used, the questions were differentiated 
not by the difficulty of manipulating the models but by the difficulty of forming them, which 
can depend on question syntax. 
7.5.4. Combining restriction types – H7.9 
The hypothesis here is that participants may perform significantly better with questions 
which have the same type of restriction in both axioms (i.e. questions 2, 4, 5 and 7), 
compared to questions which use both types of restriction (i.e. questions 1, 3, 6 and 8).  Based 
on the aggregated data from both laboratory and online studies, 66% of the responses to the 
                                                 
132 In this one case, there is in fact only a small difference between the two mean times. 
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former set of questions were correct, compared with 63% of the responses to the latter set.  
This difference was not significant (p = 0.289, Fisher’s Exact Test, one-sided)133. 
The mean time for the responses from the four questions using only one type of restriction 
is 40.1 seconds; that for the four questions using both types of restriction is 50.2 seconds.  
However, the latter figure is distorted because both of the questions which appear first in the 
two orderings, i.e. questions 1 and 8, use different restrictions in the two axioms.  When the 
participants who saw these two questions as first questions are removed, the latter figure is 
reduced to 42.3 seconds134.  On this basis, i.e. with the data relating to questions seen first 
removed, there was no significant difference between the two sets of questions (t(149.72) = 
0.40064, p = 0.689). 
In summary, there was no support for hypothesis H7.9.  There is no evidence that using 
different types of restrictions in the two axioms makes a significant difference to accuracy, 
nor does it significantly increase the response time, compared with using the same restriction 
in both axioms. 
7.5.5. Order of restrictions and position of negation – H7.10 and H7.8 
H7.8 and H7.10 can be investigated together by using three factors: position of negation, 
nature of restriction in first axiom, and nature of restriction in second axiom.  Based on the 
aggregated data from both laboratory and online studies, a logistic analysis of deviance using 
these factors confirmed that the position of negation significantly affects accuracy, as 
discussed above (p = 0.004).  However, neither of the other top-level effects (first restriction: 
p = 0.114; second restriction: p = 0.364), nor any of the interaction effects (p values greater 
than at least 0.1)135 were significant. 
Applying an ANOVA to the time data revealed that none of the top-level effects was 
significant (first restriction: F(1, 184) = 0.103, p = 0.749; second restriction: F(1, 184) = 
0.001, p = 0.982; position of negation: F(1, 184) = 3.2545, p = 0.073).  With one exception, 
none of the interaction effects were significant (p > at least 0.1).  The exception was the 
interaction between the choice of restriction for the first and second axiom (F(1, 184) = 
3.9376, p = 0.049).  A subsequent Tukey HSD analysis showed no significant pairwise 
difference.  In particular, on the basis of the Tukey HSD analysis there is no significant 
pairwise difference in response time between any of the individual questions.  Further 
investigation of the interaction between choice of restrictions in the first and second axioms 
indicated that the effect was caused by the high values recorded for questions 1 and 8 when 
they were answered first, as discussed above. 
In summary, there was partial support for hypothesis H7.8.  Questions with negation before 
an anonymous class were answered significantly more accurately than those with negation 
before a named class.  However, note the discussion in the following subsection suggesting 
                                                 
133 This result can be contrasted with that of Johnson-Laird et al. (1989).  They were working with two-axiom 
problems akin to syllogisms, except using a variety of relations (e.g. “in the same place as”) rather than 
equivalence.  They found that, for problems which were represented by only one mental model, those problems 
using the same quantifier with the shared term in both axioms were answered significantly more correctly than 
those using a different quantifier.  The percentage of correct responses for the former was 80%, for the latter 
63%.  For questions represented by more than one mental model, there were not enough correct responses for 
the difference to be significant. 
134 Specifically, this is the mean response time for questions 3 and 6 for all participants, for question 1 for the 
participants who saw order 2, and for question 8 for participants who saw order 1. 
135 As with the previous three-factor analysis of deviance, the precise p-values varied slightly with the order of 
factors, but not such as to materially affect the results. 
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that this may be an effect of the questions rather than a generic effect.  Moreover, there was 
no significant difference in response time between the two sets of questions. 
There was no support for hypothesis H7.10.  The pattern of axiom restrictions made no 
significand difference, neither to accuracy nor response time. 
7.5.6. Conclusions 
Table 7-21 summarises the conclusions relating to hypotheses H7.7, H7.8, H7.9 and H7.10, 
based on the data available from the laboratory study for conclusions relating to response 
time, augmented with the data from the online study for conclusions relating to accuracy. 
Table 7-21 Negation and restriction – summary of hypotheses 
 accuracy response time 
H7.7 – mental model 
representation (i.e. 
semantics) determines 
difficulty 
No significant difference. No significant difference. 
   
H7.8 – negation before a 
named class vs. negation 
before an anonymous class 
affects reasoning 
performance 
Questions with negation 
before an anonymous class 
were answered 
significantly more 
accurately than those with 
negation before a named 
class. 
No significant difference 
   
H7.9 – use of different 
restrictions will create more 
difficulty than multiple uses 
of same restriction 
No significant difference. No significant difference. 
   
H7.10 – pattern of axiom 
restrictions (only … only, 
some … some, only … 
some, some … only) affects 
reasoning performance 
No significant difference. No significant difference. 
 
Table 7-21 indicates that the only factor which had any effect was the position of negation.  
Questions with negation before an anonymous class were answered significantly more 
accurately than those with negation before a named class.   
It may be that there is an inherent difficulty in negation before a named class.  Whilst the 
term ‘negation’ is being used here, in line with the use of not in MOS, the actual operation 
is complementing of a class, not negating a proposition.  This may cause some confusion in 
participants’ minds.  The use of not before an object property is also performing a 
complement.  However, it may read more naturally, being akin to the alignment of negation 
with a verb in English. 
However, closer examination of the questions provides an additional insight into 
participants’ thought processes.  Comparison between questions with valid and non-valid 
putative conclusions is difficult because of possible bias.  For example, Johnson-Laird et al. 
(1989), in experiments with multiple quantification, found a bias in favour of questions with 
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non-valid conclusions.  Therefore, questions with valid conclusions and questions with non-
valid conclusions will be considered separately. 
Consider, first, the questions with valid conclusions, which are repeated for convenience in 
Table 7-22, along with the percentage of correct responses.  Consistent with the results for 
hypothesis H7.8 shown in Table 7-21, the most correctly answered of these were questions 
4 and 7, with negation before the anonymous class.  Inspection of these two questions reveals 
that the same anonymous class occurs in both axioms.  In question 4 this was has_child only 
MALE; in question 7 has_child some MALE.  In each question, in the first axiom the class is 
complemented.  So Y is a subclass of the anonymous class and X is a subclass of its 
complement.  Thus it is immediately apparent from the syntax of the question that X and Y 
must be disjoint.  There is no need for participants to construct a detailed mental model of 
the scenario.  It may also be relevant that in both cases the mean times for the correct 
responses were appreciably less than the mean times for the incorrect responses.  It may be 
that participants who got the question right quickly spotted the syntactic clue.  The other 
questions with valid conclusions, questions 1 and 6, appear to offer no syntactic clues.  
Participants would be required either to perform some more complex syntactic manipulation 
or else form mental models to represent the questions.  They clearly found this difficult.  
However, question 1 is semantically identical to question 4 and question 6 is semantically 
identical to question 7.  Moreover, given the identities discussed earlier in this section, it is 
relatively easy to transform question 1 to question 4 and question 6 to question 7.  For 
example, for question 1, the anonymous class in the first axiom can be transformed: 
has_child some (not MALE) ≡ not (has_child only MALE) 
Emphasizing these identities in training would help users of MOS to deal with the kinds of 
constructs found in questions 1 and 7. 
Table 7-22 Negation and restrictions: valid conclusions 
No. First axiom  
– constraining X 
Second axiom  
– constraining Y 
%age 
correct136 
1 X SubClassOf has_child some (not MALE) Y SubClassOf 
has_child only MALE 
61% 
4 X SubClassOf not (has_child only MALE) 70% 
6 X SubClassOf has_child only (not MALE) Y SubClassOf 
has_child some MALE 
50% 
7 X SubClassOf not (has_child some MALE) 77% 
N.B.  All questions have the same putative conclusion: X DisjointTo Y 
Turning to the questions with non-valid conclusions, shown again in Table 7-23, the question 
which stands out is question 2, which was answered appreciably less well than the other 
three.  This is the one question in the section which requires an understanding of the trivial 
satisfiability of the universal restriction.  This feature of the universal restriction was pointed 
out in the handout.  However, it is known to confuse, e.g. see Rector et al. (2004), and under 
the pressure of responding to the question, participants may overlook it. 
  
                                                 
136 Based on the combined laboratory and online studies, N = 44. 
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Table 7-23 Negation and restrictions: non-valid conclusions 
No. First axiom  
– constraining X 
Second axiom  
– constraining Y 
%age 
correct131 
2 X SubClassOf has_child only (not MALE) Y SubClassOf 
has_child only MALE 
50% 
3 X SubClassOf not (has_child some MALE) 68% 
5 X SubClassOf has_child some (not MALE) Y SubClassOf 
has_child some MALE 
68% 
8 X SubClassOf not (has_child only MALE) 73% 
N.B.  All questions have the same putative conclusion: X DisjointTo Y 
The universal restriction can be represented in mental model form as shown in Table 7-24.  
Here P is an arbitrary object property, X an arbitrary class, and x an arbitrary member of X.  
The expression in brackets in the first disjunct (¬P ¬x) would normally be assumed in a 
mental model representation.  It is the second disjunct (P ⊥) which corresponds to the 
trivial satisfaction of the universal restriction.  In English, the word ‘only’ has the 
implicature that there is at least one individual which acts as object of the property P.  
The second disjunct may be omitted, either by simply overlooking it or as a result of 
this implicature.  As a consequence, it appears to the participant that question 2 has a 
valid conclusion, because there is no potential for overlap between classes X and Y. 
Table 7-24 Mental models for the universal restriction 
OWL expression Mental models 
P only X P x ¬(P ¬x) 
P ⊥ 
 
Apart from stressing the need to take account of the second mental model in the expansion 
of the universal restriction, understanding the identities discussed earlier would help with 
this question.  Question 3 is semantically equivalent to question 2 and yet was answered with 
an appreciably greater level of accuracy.  Identifying has_child only (not MALE) with not 
(has_child some MALE) would transform question 2 into question 3 and avoid the problems 
arising from the use of the universal restriction. 
Another possible cause of difficulty for question 2 can arise from confusing has_child only 
(not MALE), as in question 2, with not (has_child only MALE).  If a participant makes this 
mistake, then question 2 appears identical to question 4 which, as already discussed, can 
very easily be seen to have a valid conclusion.  A similar problem can arise with question 5.  
Confusing has_child some (not MALE) with not (has_child some MALE) makes question 5, 
for which the putative conclusion is non-valid, appear the same as question 7, for which 
again the valid conclusion is easily seen.  Indeed, Rector et al. (2004) have commented on 
confusion between “some not” and “not some”.  Again, stressing the two identities involving 
negation and restriction, as discussed at the beginning of this section, would help to clarify 
this confusion. 
7.6. Nested restrictions 
This section is concerned with investigating the effect of nested restrictions.  Table 7-25 
shows the questions, as used in the laboratory study.  For this section, there was no data from 
the online study137.  In the second column from the left there are either one or two axioms 
                                                 
137 An error in framing the questions in the online study meant that the results were not strictly compatible with 
the laboratory study. 
 132 
 
which constrain the class X.  Four of the questions use one axiom; the other four use two 
axioms.  In the former case, the second instantiation of the property (has_child) creates an 
anonymous class which is the object of the first instantiation of this property.  In the latter 
case, a named class (Y) is used to connect the two axioms and plays the same role as the 
anonymous class. 
Questions 1 to 4 between them use all four of the patterns some … some, some … only, only 
… some, only … only.  Questions 5 to 8 then repeat the pattern some … some, some … only, 
only … some, only … only.  Thus, each of the four patterns occurs twice, once in one axiom 
using an anonymous class to connect the property instantiations; and once in two axioms 
connected by the named class X.  As a consequence, the first axiom of question 1 is 
semantically equivalent to the first two axioms of question 5.  Similarly, the first axiom of 
questions 3, 6 and 8 is equivalent to the first two axioms of questions 5, 2 and 4.   
The third column from the left then shows the remaining two axioms which are used to 
constrain an individual a.  Questions 1 to 4 use the pattern some not whilst questions 5 to 8 
use the pattern not … some.  For all the questions, the putative conclusion was a Type (not 
X).  The structure of the questions was designed to enable the investigation of a number of 
hypotheses.  
Table 7-25 Nested restrictions questions 
No. First axiom(s)  
– constraining X 
Remaining axioms  
– constraining a 
valid / 
non-valid 
1 X SubClassOf (has_child some  
(has_child some FEMALE)) 
a has_child b; 
b Type has_child some 
(not FEMALE) 
non-valid 
2 X SubClassOf has_child some Y; 
Y EquivalentTo has_child only FEMALE 
non-valid 
3 X SubClassOf (has_child only  
(has_child some FEMALE)) 
non-valid 
4 X SubClassOf has_child only Y; 
Y EquivalentTo has_child only FEMALE 
valid 
5 X SubClassOf has_child some Y; 
Y EquivalentTo has_child some FEMALE 
a has_child b; 
b Type (not (has_child 
some FEMALE)) 
non-valid 
6 X SubClassOf (has_child some  
(has_child only FEMALE) 
non-valid 
7 X SubClassOf has_child only Y; 
Y EquivalentTo has_child some FEMALE 
valid 
8 X SubClassOf (has_child only 
(has_child only FEMALE)) 
non-valid 
N.B.  All questions have the same putative conclusion: a Type (not X) 
The previous section investigated whether reasoning performance differed when negation 
occurred before a named class or before an anonymous class (i.e. before an object property).  
This was formalised as hypothesis H7.8.  In the context of the previous section, questions 
with negation before the anonymous class were answered significantly more accurately.  
Whilst there could be inherent differences in how participants react to the two different 
situations, the differences could also arise because of the structure of the questions.  
Subsection 7.5.6 discussed how the use of syntactic ‘cues’ could be responsible for the 
increase in accuracy, for those questions with valid putative conclusions, when negation 
occurs before an anonymous class.  In this section, comparison of questions 1 to 4, where 
 133 
 
negation occurs before a named class, with questions 5 to 8, where negation occurs before 
an anonymous class, enables this issue to be further investigated. 
The previous section also investigated whether the use of the existential and universal 
restrictions in a question creates more difficulty than when only one type of restriction is 
used.  This was formalised as hypothesis H7.9.  The current section offers another 
opportunity to investigate this.  Each question uses three instances of restrictions, of which 
the first two are nested.  In questions 1 and 5 these are all of the same type (some), in the 
other questions both types of restrictions are used.   
In the previous section there were pairs of question with the same mental model, which 
allowed investigation of the hypothesis (H7.7) that the mental model determined the 
difficulty of the questions.  In this section there are no semantically equivalent questions, i.e. 
no questions which share the same mental model.  However, the axiom or axioms which 
constrain the class X do occur in semantically equivalent pairs: {1, 5}, {2, 6}, {3, 7} and {4, 
8}.  One member of each pair uses one axiom; the other member uses two axioms joined by 
the class Y.  This leads to the hypothesis: 
H7.11 Semantic equivalence between part of a question (here that part constraining 
class X) will be an indicator of performance. 
The availability of four questions using one axiom to constrain X and four questions with 
two axioms allows the investigation of the following hypothesis: 
H7.12 There will be a difference in reasoning performance between the equivalent 
use of a named class and an anonymous class. 
7.6.1. Nested restrictions – the laboratory study 
As before, the questions were represented in two reverse orders, as shown in Table 7-26.  
Table 7-27 shows the percentage correct responses and mean response time for each 
question.  As can be seen, only three of the questions were answered significantly better than 
chance. 
Table 7-26 Nested restrictions - question ordering 
order 1  order 2 
question no. valid / non-valid  question no. valid / non-valid 
1 non-valid  5 non-valid 
2 non-valid  6 non-valid 
3 non-valid  7 valid 
4 valid  8 non-valid 
8 non-valid  4 valid 
7 valid  3 non-valid 
6 non-valid  2 non-valid 
5 non-valid  1 non-valid 
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Table 7-27 Nested restrictions – results from laboratory study 
No. valid / 
non-valid 
%age corr 
N=28 
mean time (s.d.) – secs, N = 24 
overall correct incorrect 
1 non-valid 71%* 69 (45) 71 (46) 60 (44) 
2 non-valid 57% 79 (53) 101 (55) 52 (37) 
3 non-valid 71%* 63 (43) 63 (46) 65 (38) 
4 valid 57% 63 (39) 56 (27) 72 (52) 
5 non-valid 54% 88 (62) 94 (68) 78 (53) 
6 non-valid 64% 73 (45) 66 (44) 84 (46) 
7 valid 71%* 80 (36) 71 (34) 108 (29) 
8 non-valid 50% 55 (30) 50 (23) 59 (36) 
* answered significantly better than chance (p < 0.05) 
 
Table 7-28 shows the data for the two orders of presentation.  Inspection of the data suggests 
that questions answered at the beginning of the section were not answered appreciably worse 
than questions answered later.  For example, the percentage of correct responses for question 
1 differs little between when the question was answered first and when it was answered last.  
Indeed, the percentage was slightly higher in order 1 when question 1 was the first to be 
answered, compared with order 2 when it was the last.  The picture is different when we look 
at the mean response times.  The mean response time for question 5 when answered in first 
position was 2.7 times the mean response time when the question was answered last.  For 
question 1 the ratio was 2.3.  This effect may have significantly distorted the overall response 
time for these two questions.  A similar effect, although not quite as marked, may apply to 
questions 2 and 6, each of which were answered second by half the participants.   
Table 7-28 Nested restrictions – results broken down by ordering 
No. valid / 
non-valid 
position %age correct mean time (s.d.) - secs 
order 
1 
order 
2 
order 1 
N = 15 
order 2 
N = 13 
order 1 
N = 12 
order 2 
N = 12 
1 non-valid 1 8 73% 69% 96 (45) 41 (23) 
2 non-valid 2 7 67% 46% 96 (56) 62 (46) 
3 non-valid 3 6 73% 69% 71 (41) 56 (45) 
4 valid 4 5 67% 46% 55 (43) 71 (36) 
5 non-valid 8 1 47% 62% 47 (28) 128 (60) 
6 non-valid 7 2 73% 54% 51 (34) 95 (44) 
7 valid 6 3 87% 54% 62 (36) 98 (26) 
8 non-valid 5 4 53% 46% 41 (22) 68 (32) 
 
7.6.2. Effect of pattern of restrictions and position of negation – hypotheses H7.8 and 
H7.11 
To understand how the pattern of restrictions and the position of negation affected the 
proportion of correct responses, a logistic analysis of deviance was conducted using three 
factors: nature of first restriction; nature of second restriction; and position of negation.  
None of the top-level and interaction effects were significant (first restriction: p = 1.000; 
second restriction: p = 0.267; position of negation: p = 0.592; interactions: p > 0.2 in all 
cases).  This result does not support hypothesis H7.8, i.e. that the position of negation affects 
performance.  Moreover, the lack of any significant effects due to the first two restrictions, 
and their interaction, does not support hypothesis H7.11, i.e. that the semantics of the 
axiom(s) constraining the class X will be an indicator of performance.   
 135 
 
A comparison of response times suffers from the difficulty that the first, and even the second 
question, may suffer a time penalty.  To overcome this, the analysis was conducted on timing 
data taken only from those responses which participants provided during the second half of 
the section138.  Thus the timing data for questions 1 to 4 were taken from order 2, whilst the 
timing data for questions 5 to 8 were taken from order 1.  This means that all the timing data 
used was taken after the participants had accustomed themselves to the nature of the 
question, at a cost of halving the number of data points available.  On this basis, an ANOVA 
was undertaken using the same three factors as for the logistic analysis.  Again, none of the 
top-level factors were significant (first restriction: F(1, 88) = 0.8855, p = 0.349; second 
restriction: F(1, 88) = 0.2759, p = 0.601; position of negation: F(1, 88) = 0.4488, p = 0.505).  
This, in particular, does not support hypothesis H7.8 that the position of negation affects 
performance.  With one exception, all the interaction effects were not significant (p > 0.3, in 
all cases).  The exception was the interaction between the nature of the second restriction 
and the position of negation (F(1, 88) = 4.1681, p = 0.044).  A subsequent Tukey HSD 
analysis revealed no significant comparisons.  As with the accuracy data, the lack of any 
significant effects relating to the nature of the first two restrictions and their interaction does 
not support hypothesis H7.11. 
In summary, there was no support for hypothesis H7.8.  There was no significant difference, 
neither in accuracy nor response time, between questions where negation was before an 
anonymous class and questions where negation was before a named class.  Similarly, there 
was no support for hypothesis H7.11.  Partial semantic equivalence made no significant 
difference to accuracy or to response time. 
Table 7-29 provides insight into the one significant effect found, the interaction between the 
nature of the second restriction and the position of negation.  In questions 1 to 4, when 
negation occurred directly before the class FEMALE, the mean response time was less when 
some was the second restriction.  This may have to do with a rapid realisation that although 
not FEMALE and FEMALE are complementary, there is no contradiction in having children 
of both genders.  However, in questions 5 to 8, when the negation occurred before the object 
property has_child, the mean response time was less when only was the second restriction.  
In the case of question 6, the mean time for correct responses is appreciably less than for 
incorrect responses, and the low response time may have arisen in part because of the rapid 
realisation that has_child only FEMALE and not (has_child some FEMALE) are compatible 
in the case that there are no children. 
  
                                                 
138 The motivation here is that, in addition to any gradual change in response time as the participants move 
through each section, there is a very considerable reduction in response time after the first one or two questions 
in each section.  The bias from this initial effect can be avoided by using data only from questions answered in 
the second half of the study section, where alteration of response time with question position is much less.  This 
does mean that there is no compensation for any slight change in response time moving through the later 
questions, since data is no longer being taken from two mutually reverse orderings.  Moreover, the study is no 
longer within-participants, since the data for questions 1 to 4 is taken from different participants than the data 
for questions 5 to 8. 
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Table 7-29 Interaction between second restriction and position of negation – mean 
response times 
 negation before 
class - secs 
negation before 
property - secs 
TOTALS  
 - secs 
second 
restriction 
only 66.5 46.0 56.2 
some 48.5 54.7 51.6 
TOTALS 57.5 50.3 53.9 
 
7.6.3. Use of one type of restriction vs. use of different restrictions – hypothesis H7.9 
These questions provide another opportunity to investigate H7.9.  Table 7-30 shows the 
percentage of correct responses and the mean response time for each pattern of restrictions 
in the axioms constraining the class X.  Each of the columns in the table represents two 
questions, one of which involves negation before a named class, and the other of which 
involves negation before an object property.  Since the final axiom always involves some, 
then the case some … some represents questions 1 and 5 in which only one axiom type is 
used.  As before, the mean response times are based purely on the response times for the 
questions met by participants in positions 5 to 8. 
 
Table 7-30 Effect of different patterns of restrictions 
 pattern of first two restrictions 
some … some some … only only … some only … only 
%age correct 63%* 61% 71%* 54% 
mean time (s.d.) - secs 44 (25) 56 (40) 59 (40) 56 (33) 
* answered significantly better than chance (p < 0.05) 
 
Accuracy with the some … some pattern, requiring only the use of the existential restriction, 
is neither relatively high nor low.  In fact, a logistic analysis of deviance, using one factor 
with four levels representing the columns of Table 7.27, confirmed that the pattern of the 
first two restrictions made no difference to accuracy (p = 0.273).  On the other hand, the 
mean response time for the some … some pattern is appreciably less than for the other three 
patterns.  However the difference is not significant; an ANOVA indicated that there was no 
significant difference in response times across the four patterns (F(3, 92) = 0.6938, p = 
0.558).   
One feature of note in Table 7-30 is the low level of accuracy achieved by the only … only 
pattern.  This pattern is represented by questions 4 and 8; the former question was not 
answered significantly better than chance; the latter question, which requires an 
understanding of the trivial satisfaction of the universal restriction, was answered at chance.   
7.6.4. Effect of named vs. anonymous class – hypothesis H7.12 
It has already been noted that half of the questions use a named class, Y, whereas the other 
half replace this with an anonymous class.  As Table 7-25 shows, each pattern of the first 
two restrictions (some … some, some … only etc) occurs once with class Y and once with an 
anonymous class.  This provides an opportunity to investigate whether the choice of named 
versus anonymous class has any effect on performance. 
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Of the questions employing the named class, Y, 60% were answered correctly, whilst of the 
questions employing an anonymous class, 64% were answered correctly.  This difference 
was not significant (p = 0.582, Fisher’s Exact Test, two-sided).  The mean response time for 
those questions employing the named class was 77 seconds; that for the questions with the 
anonymous class was 65 seconds.  This difference was also not significant (t(189.62) = 
1.7518, p = 0.08142).  In this analysis, all the responses are being used, since the use of 
named and anonymous classes counterbalance, i.e for each position, when order 1 uses an 
anonymous class, order 2 uses a named class, and vice versa.  If only those questions which 
appeared to a participant in the second half of each section are used, the mean response time 
for those questions employing the named class is 61 seconds; that for the questions with the 
anonymous class was 47 seconds.  In this case, the difference is significant (t(93.926) = 
2.0714, p = 0.041). 
In summary, there was no support for hypothesis H7.12.  The use of a named or anonymous 
class made no significant difference to accuracy.  The mean reponse time for questions with 
the named class was appreciably longer than for questions with the anonymous class.  
However, the difference was not significant when data from all the responses were used.  
Moreover, it should be borne in mind that the two sets of questions (i.e. with named and 
anonymous classes) were different.  Hypothesis H7.12 is reconsidered in the final study. 
7.6.5. Conclusions 
Table 7-31 summarises the conclusions regarding H7.8, H7.9, H7.11 and H7.12. 
Table 7-31 Nested restrictions – summary of hypotheses 
 accuracy response time 
H7.8 – negation before a 
named class vs. negation 
before an anonymous class 
affects reasoning 
performance. 
No significant difference. No significant difference.  
However significant 
interaction between 
position of negation and 
nature of second restriction. 
   
H7.9 – use of different 
restrictions will create more 
difficulty than multiple uses 
of the same restriction 
No significant difference. 
 
 
H7.11 – partial semantic 
equivalence (here of the 
axiom(s) constraining the 
class X) will be an indicator 
of performance 
No significant difference. 
 
 
H7.12 use of named vs. 
anonymous class affects 
reasoning performance 
No significant difference. No significant difference; 
response time with named 
class significantly longer if 
we restrict analysis to those 
responses during second 
half of each section. 
 
The findings for H7.8 contradict those from the previous section.  They do, however, support 
the suggestion in subsection 7.5.6, that any difference in the previous section related to the 
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position of negation was not inherent in the particular constructs, but was caused by the 
overall structure of the questions, e.g. the ability to pick up a syntactic ‘clue’. 
The findings for H7.9 were exactly as in the previous section.  There seems to be no 
disadvantage, either in accuracy or response time, to mixing existential and universal 
restrictions.  In fact, questions 1 and 5, the two questions which used only the existential 
restriction, were answered quite differently.  Question 1 was one of the most accurately 
answered (71%) whilst question 5 was the least well answered (54%).  Turning to response 
time, question 1 was in the middle of the range, whilst question 5 had the longest mean 
response time.   
Similarly, there is no evidence to support hypothesis H7.11, that the semantics of the 
constraint on class X, determined by the pattern of the first two restrictions, would affect 
accuracy or response time. 
The lack of any evidence for these hypotheses supports the opinion that accuracy, and 
perhaps also response time, are determined by a subtle interplay of features in the question, 
rather than by the more simplistic viewpoints underlying these hypotheses. 
When all the responses were taken into account, there was similarly no support for 
hypothesis H7.12, i.e. there was no significant difference in accuracy or response time 
between the case when one axiom was used and when two axioms were joined by a named 
class, Y.  However, if analysis is restricted to those responses given by each participant 
during the second half of each section, then response time with the anonymous class is 
significantly longer than with the named class.  Moreover, the questions using one axiom 
differed in semantics from those using two axioms.  This topic is investigated more 
rigorously in the next chapter. 
The remainder of this subsection considers the questions in detail, considering first the two 
questions with valid putative conclusions and then the six questions with non-valid 
conclusions.   
Questions with valid putative conclusions 
There were two questions with valid putative conclusions: questions 4 and 7. In considering 
these and the other questions, for convenience of explanation Y will be used to denote both 
the named class Y and the analogous anonymous class.  In question 7 it is clear from the 
syntax that Y is the complement of the anonymous class defined in the final axiom, i.e. not 
(has_child some FEMALE).  This immediately implies that b cannot be in Y, and hence, 
given the use of the universal restriction in the first axiom, that a cannot be in X.  This 
contrasts with question 4, which was answered less well.  Here there is no such syntactic 
clue and participants are likely to find it difficult to construct a model of the class X and a 
model of the possibilities for a to identify that these models have no shared elements.  Whilst 
for both questions the mean time to answer correctly was less than the mean time to answer 
incorrectly, the difference was only significant for question 7 (question 7: t(16.932) = 3.11, 
p = 0.006; question 4: t(13.235) = 0.14744, p = 0.885), suggesting that participants who 
answered this question correctly picked up the syntactic clue quickly.  Note that if the final 
axiom of question 4 was transformed, using the rule for negation and restrictions, to b Type 
has_child not (only FEMALE), then this question would offer a syntactic clue, analogously 
to question 7, and would be likely to be answered more accurately.  As for certain questions 
in the previous section, if participants were aware of this rule, this would have helped their 
reasoning. 
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Questions with non-valid putative conclusions 
The remaining six questions all had non-valid conclusions.  The best answered were 
questions 1 and 3.  These questions are relatively straightforward, in that it is clear the b can 
be in Y.  The first axiom states that a member of Y has a female child and the final axiom 
states that b has a non-female child.  There is no contradiction in b being in Y, although it 
does require an awareness of the second mental model in the expansion of the existential 
restriction, as shown in Table 7-32.  In both questions, having deduced that b can be in Y, it 
is then clear, from the first axiom, that a can be in X. 
Table 7-32 Mental models for the existential restriction 
OWL expression Mental models 
P some X P x ¬(P ¬x) 
P x (P ¬x) 
 
Question 6 was also answered relatively well.  The non-validity of the conclusion can 
deduced in two ways.  It is possible for b to be in Y, since there is no contradiction in logic 
between having only female children and having no female children, if there are no children 
at all.  However, this requires an understanding that the universal restriction can be trivially 
satisfied, i.e. it requires an awareness of the second model in Table 7-24.  Although this was 
pointed out in the handout, participants might easily overlook this and revert to the more 
natural sense of only, with the implicature that a female child does exist.  However, even if 
participants conclude wrongly that b cannot be in Y, it is still possible for a to have another 
child (i.e. besides b) which itself does have a female child, and hence for a to be in X.  This 
also requires an awareness of the second mental model in the expansion of the existential 
restriction, as shown in Table 7-32.  A participant who initially takes the first model for the 
first (existential) restriction, and then fails to take note of the second model of the second 
(universal) restriction, can still answer the question correctly by backtracking to the first 
restriction and taking its second model. 
None of the remaining three questions were answered significantly better than chance.  In 
question 5 there is a strong syntactic clue that b cannot be in Y; not (has_child some 
FEMALE) is clearly the complement of has_child some FEMALE.  To answer the question 
correctly, it is essential to backtrack to the first restriction and use its second model to 
understand that a can have another child, that does have only female children, and hence a 
can be in X.  A similar argument applies to question 2.  It is relatively easy to see that b 
cannot be in Y, since b cannot have only female children and some non-female children.  
Again, to understand the non-validity of the conclusion it is essential to backtrack to the 
second model for the first restriction. 
Finally, question 8 has similarities with question 6.  It is possible for b to be in Y, and hence 
a in X, since there is no contradiction in logic between having only female children and 
having no female children, if there are no children at all.  However, unlike with question 6, 
if participants fail to understand this, backtracking to the first (universal) restriction offers 
no second chance.  It is clear that the second model in the interpretation of the universal 
restriction is not applicable here, since this would require that a has no children, and we 
know that a has_child b.  So, although question 6 can be correctly answered by making use 
of the trivial satisfaction of the universal restriction, this knowledge is not essential.  Only 
question 8 requires that knowledge for a correct answer. 
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7.7. Participant feedback 
At the end of the study, participants were asked three questions: 
• What did you find difficult about the quiz? 
• What did you find easy about the quiz? 
• Do you have any general comments about the quiz? 
There were a large number of responses, and this section discusses those which are most 
representative or seem to offer most insight.  Rather than consider the feedback under the 
headings above, comments are separated here into: methodological comments about the 
study itself; general comments about the questions; and comments specific to the study 
sections. 
7.7.1. Methodological comments 
There was some positive feedback about the organization of the study.  One participant 
commented that “guidelines and explanations help a lot in answering”.  Presumably this was 
a reference to the handout and the on-screen text at the beginning and before each section.  
On the other hand, another participant commented that there was “quite a lot of reading 
material beforehand”.  Generally, participants seemed happy to take part.  One participant 
commented that “it was quite interesting”, and one even that “it was fun”. 
There were some comments about the order of the questions.  One participant commented 
that the “order of questions in terms of difficulty did not help”.  The participant would have 
liked to have seen some simple questions presented first.  Another participant suggested “a 
few examples at the start to warm up the brain”.  On a related point, two participants’ 
comments gave evidence of learning as they proceeded through the study; one noting doubts 
on previous questions arising as the study progressed, and another participant noting that 
understanding “a hard one” makes some of the others “easier and quicker to answer”.   
There were three responses which called into question the ecological validity of the 
approach, on the grounds that in practice one would not perform the more complex 
operations mentally.  Two of these participants commented that in practice one would use 
pen and paper, whilst another would have used a theorem prover “much as I would use a 
calculator to do long division”.  One of the participants who wanted to write things down 
stated that “my working memory was being tested as much as my logic reasoning skills”.  
Indeed, the objective was to see how well people can reason about DL constructs mentally.  
Given enough time and pen and paper, it is likely that the accuracy could be appreciably 
improved, but this would have failed to differentiate the various alternative constructs and 
syntaxes.  Moreover, the goal of language developers should be to create syntaxes which are 
easily intelligible and require the minimum of reasoning with pen and paper. 
Two participants were confused by the use of the word “valid”; one of them suggested that 
the phrase “does this axiom necessarily follow” would have been clearer.  On the other hand, 
a third participant thought that “the answering mechanism of valid or not valid was quite 
easy to use”. 
Finally, some participants would have liked to have known the correct answers at the end.  
Several expressed a wish, either through the online feedback or verbally, to know their 
scores. 
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7.7.2. General comments 
A number of people commented on the difficulty of at least some of the questions.  One 
participant commented on the need to “concentrate a lot to keep a mental model of the 
statements”.  Another participant noted, perhaps not surprisingly, that “the longer the list of 
expressions, the harder I found the questions”.  One participant commented that the order of 
the axioms was not helpful; the participant often having “to start from the bottom”.  The 
issue of axiom ordering was not given particular attention in framing the questions.  Nor is 
the author aware of it being discussed elsewhere in the literature.  It potentially can affect 
comprehension and would be a useful issue to consider when automatically creating 
justifications. 
More specifically, two participants commented on the difficulty of using abstract symbols, 
rather than names, as in the section on Boolean operators.  Conversely, one participant 
commented that the property names were too long, noting that “the English meaning is not 
essential to answer the quiz”, but that “it takes more effort to read the axioms”.   
One participant commented that the syntax was not “that intuitive”, in particular drawing 
attention to the “and / or / not” rules of precedence.  In contrast, another participant 
responded to the question “what did you find easy?”, with “the basic notions of simplified 
OWL”. 
A number of participants talked about a need to draw or visualize.  One went so far as to say 
“I am a very visual person … I draw graphs a lot when considering inferences”.  The 
syntactic approach was also represented by one participant, who commented “some 
questions were easy to solve when ignoring the actual class expressions, just looking at the 
general form of the formulas”.  Presumably this participant was reasoning syntactically, 
where possible, rather than building mental models.  In a similar vein, and specific to the 
object property questions, another participant commented on the difficulty of “trying to 
juggle the relations in my head and substitute them appropriately”.   
7.7.3. Object properties 
A number of responses indicated that the questions using transitive properties were easier 
than the questions using functional properties.  These comments took two forms.  Some 
participants referred explicitly to functionality or transitivity, e.g. commenting that they 
found functionality difficult or that “the transitivity questions were a lot easier”139.  One even 
stated that “I am much more familiar with transitivity”.  On the other hand, some participants 
referred to the exemplar properties.  A number of participants identified the 
greater_than_or_equal property as being relatively easy; a number identified the 
has_nearest_neighbour property as being relatively hard.  One participant commented that 
“‘greater than or equal’ is a more familiar relationship than ‘nearest neighbour’”.  This 
suggests that some participants were drawing on their understanding of the property, not 
simply on the stated characteristics.  This was despite the clear instruction in the handout 
that the meaningful names should not affect any conclusions to be drawn.  One participant 
appeared to be confused by the property has_nearest_neighbour being functional, since in 
some real situations it is possible for an entity to have more than one nearest neighbour. 
                                                 
139 Some of these comments may, in part, reflect the fact that that the two transitivity questions were designed 
to be potentially on the same level of difficulty as the two easiest functionality questions, and would be 
expected to be easier than the other four functionality questions. 
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There was evidence that some participants were trying to visualize the object properties.  
One participant commented that it was difficult to mentally visualize the nearest neighbour 
relations.  A participant from the online study responded that the nearest neighbour questions 
were easy once a graph had been drawn as a model.  As with the laboratory study, 
participants in the online study were asked not to use pen and paper.  However, there was 
clearly no control over this.  So this participant may have drawn models on paper, or possibly 
the reference was to drawing mental models.  In any case, these two responses suggest that 
some participants were using their understanding of nearest neighbour to create a 
visualization. 
Finally, there were two comments relating to features with which the participants were not 
very familiar.  One participant noted that the DifferentFrom keyword was not something 
often used, and hence the participant “took a while to think about it”.  Another participant 
had not had much experience with individuals, noting that “the ontologies I use are mainly 
about classes”. 
7.7.4. Boolean operators 
There were conflicting views on the difficulty of this section; two participants placing it into 
the easy category and another into the difficult.  One even claimed to have given random 
answers because of the difficulty of working without pen and paper.  As already noted in 
subsection 7.7.2 above, another participant drew attention to the difficulty of the and / or / 
not rules of precedence.  These conflicting views may relate to the background of the 
participants.  Indeed, one of the participants who found this section easy commented on the 
fact that “ors, nots and ands … appear more often in non-logic programming languages”.  
Related to this, another participant “thought that knowledge of electronic gates would have 
helped – but that was long ago”. 
There were some comments on the naming conventions.  One participant liked the easy 
naming convention, e.g. A, A_1, A_1_X.  Another two commented favourably on the use of 
the same hierarchical pattern throughout.  On the other hand, two participants were confused 
by the name TOP_CLASS.  One commented that “this can be easily confused with Top”.  In 
fact, TOP_CLASS was intended to be a synonym for Top (⊤), chosen to have a more obvious 
meaning for those not familiar with the term Top. 
Although the order of precedence for not, and and or was explained in the handout, one 
participant admitted to not being clear whether (not A or A_1) was equivalent to (not (A or 
A_1)) or ((not A) or A_1).  Another participant would have liked a refresher “on how not (X 
or Y) expands”. 
7.7.5. Restrictions 
This subsection considers together the two study sections concerned with the existential and 
universal restrictions.  As with the section on Boolean operators, there were mixed 
responses.  One participant regarded both sections as being “almost impossible”.  Another 
identified the “unnamed class section” as being particularly difficult; presumably this was a 
reference to the use of restrictions to create anonymous classes.  Some participants identified 
some and only as being difficult.  Negation was also identified as difficult, specifically in the 
context of its use with restrictions. 
On the other hand, one participant thought the usage of existential and universal restrictions 
was easy, whilst another participant commented that the section on negation and restrictions, 
as described in Section 7.5, was “fairly easy”.  Referring to the same section, a different 
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participant commented that “when the sets are obviously disjoint it is very quick to recognize 
because the questions are similar”.  This is presumably a reference to picking up on the 
syntactic clues discussed in Section 7.5. 
7.7.6. Conclusions 
Some of the participants admitted to finding many, if not most, of the questions very difficult.  
There was variation in which sections were found the more easy or the more difficult, 
perhaps arising from participants’ varying backgrounds. 
Some participants were clearly using visualization.  Others seemed to be reasoning 
syntactically, and picking up on the syntactic clues already discussed.  This is consistent 
with Ford’s (1995) observation, that people can be categorized as verbal or spatial reasoners; 
although one should also take into account that the same person may reason differently when 
confronted with different types of questions. 
Transitivity was found easier than functionality, in line with the quantitative findings 
discussed in Section 7.3.4.  People appeared to be drawing on their pre-existing knowledge 
of the two relations, greater_than_or_equal_to and has_nearest_neighbour, and it may be 
that a greater familiarity with the former helped to make the transitive questions seem easier.  
It also raises the question to what extent participants in such studies can ever really ignore 
their pre-existing models of the meanings of words.  In the real world such pre-existing 
models are used all the time and can override purely formal reasoning, as Johnson-Laird 
(2002) has pointed out in his study of the various interpretations of the conditional. 
The precedence of Boolean operators was a problem for some people.  It was also clear that 
some participants would have benefited from a reminder of De Morgan’s Laws.  On the 
other hand, there is generally greater familiarity with Boolean logic than with the use of 
restrictions, and some participants appear to have profited from this familiarity. 
Finally, whilst the use of restrictions was found very difficult by some participants, including 
in conjunction with negation, some of the feedback does suggest that they were being helped 
by the syntactic clues, i.e. where an anonymous class and its complement appeared in the 
same question. 
7.8. Effect of participant prior knowledge and experience 
At the beginning of the study participants were asked to rate their knowledge of logic and 
DL, and their usage of DL.  The questions were exactly as in the previous study, with exactly 
the same response categories, see Section 6.8.  Table 7-33 shows the number of participants, 
the proportion of correct responses and the mean response time for each category of expertise 
for logic and DL.  Unlike in the previous study, there were some participants who claimed 
no knowledge of logic and some who claimed no knowledge of DL.   
Table 7-34 shows similar data for the categories describing usage of DL.  Some participants 
did not respond to the question.  The assumption is that these participants do not use DL.  
There were also some participants who responded with the ‘other’ option.  This category 
consisted chiefly of participants who have not used DLs or do not use them currently.  
Because of the ambiguity over the reasons given for the ‘other’ response, data for this 
response is excluded from the following analysis.  Excluding ‘other’, increasing expertise is 
assumed to be represented by movement down the rows of Table 7-34 i.e. from ‘no response’ 
to ‘researching’.   
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In this study, participants were also asked the question “please indicate which of the 
following most accurately represents your relationship with English”.  The possible 
responses were: 
• English is my main language, i.e. I am more comfortable using English than any 
other language. 
• English is one of my main languages, i.e. it is one of a number of languages which I 
am equally comfortable using. 
• English is not my main language, i.e. I am more comfortable using another language. 
The motivation for this question was research indicating that choices are less heuristically 
biased when made in a foreign language (Costa et al., 2014).  In fact, the cited research 
suggests that this phenomenon is limited to emotional choices.  Nevertheless, it was felt that 
under conditions of cognitive stress, when working in a foreign language, participants might 
be less prone to introduce bias and more likely to rely on pure reasoning.  On the other hand, 
lack of familiarity with English might reduce performance.  Table 7-35 shows the breakdown 
of accuracy and response time data by the three categories. 
The same questions were asked both to participants in the laboratory study and participants 
in the online study.  Because the results presented here are based on the full study, rather 
than the individual sections, the data is taken entirely from the laboratory study. 
Interpretation of these data needs to take into account that self-assessment of expertise is 
often influenced by personality and may not accurately reflect actual competence 
(Scheuermann et al., 2013). 
Table 7-33 Participant performance by knowledge of logic, and by knowledge of OWL or 
another DL formalism 
 Knowledge of logic  Knowledge of OWL or other DL 
formalism 
  accuracy  time  accuracy  time 
 N %age 
correct 
 N mean time  
(s.d.) - secs 
 N %age 
correct 
 N mean time 
(s.d.) - secs 
No 
knowledge 
2 51% 
 
1 
2484 
(NA) 
 3 72% 
 2 2545 
(429) 
A little 
knowledge 
3 80% 
 
3 
2087 
(217) 
 8 58% 
 7 2573 
(871) 
some 
knowledge 
16 65% 
 
14 
2522 
(816) 
 9 67% 
 7 2401 
(776) 
expert 
knowledge 
7 77% 
 
6 
1929 
(768) 
 8 80% 
 8 1965 
(700) 
 
Table 7-34 Participant performance by usage of OWL or another DL formalism 
  accuracy  time 
 N %age correct  N mean time (s.d.) - secs 
no response (no use) 4 63%  4 2313 (491) 
learning 1 47%  1 1556 (NA) 
use in work 12 69%  11 2623 (732) 
researching 5 84%  5 1703 (611) 
other 6 63%  3 2485 (1057) 
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Table 7-35 Participant performance by relationship with English 
   accuracy  time 
English is:   N %age correct  N mean time (s.d.) - secs 
my main language 13 67%  11 2173 (800) 
one of my main langs 8 71%  7 2378 (711) 
not my main language 7 70%  6 2513 (832) 
  
Inspection of the accuracy data suggests that relationship with English had no effect.  This 
is confirmed by a chi-square test (χ2 (2) = 1.7375, p = 0.420).  Inspection of the response 
time data suggests that participants tended to take longer, the less dominant their English 
language skills were.  However, an ANOVA revealed that this effect was not significant 
(F(2, 21) = 0.524, p = 0.600). 
Table 7-36 shows the Spearman’s rank correlation between the other three categories and 
both accuracy and response time.  In all cases the tests were one-sided, since there was an 
expectation that increasing knowledge and experience would improve accuracy and reduce 
response time. 
 
Table 7-36 Impact of participant profile on accuracy and response time – Spearman’s rank 
correlation 
 accuracy response time 
knowledge of logic ρ = 0.19; p = 0.163 ρ = -0.13; p = 0.266 
knowledge of OWL or other 
DL formalisms 
ρ = 0.41; p = 0.015 ρ = -0.29; p = 0.087 
usage of OWL or other DL 
formalisms 
ρ = 0.49; p = 0.010 ρ = -0.17; p = 0.217 
N.B. p-values not computed exactly because of ties; p-values represent one-sided test 
The first point to note is that, whilst two of the three factors correlate significantly with 
accuracy, none of the factors correlate significantly with response time.  The two factors 
which correlated significantly with accuracy, i.e. knowledge and usage of DL, were 
themselves significantly correlated (Spearman’s ρ = 0.74, p < 0.0001, one-sided test)140, so 
the effects cannot be regarded as completely independent.  The lack of any significant 
performance correlation with knowledge of logic may be because of the non-uniform 
distribution between categories; well over half the participants were in the ‘some knowledge’ 
category.  To better investigate the effect of prior knowledge, a broader range of participants 
would be needed.  In fact, study participants were biased towards computer scientists and 
may not well represent domain experts who might be occasional users of ontologies. 
7.9. Effect of question position 
Previous sections have described how the questions in each section were presented in two 
reverse orders so as to mitigate any effect of position.  It was also noted that, from inspection 
of the data in each section, there was no apparent effect of question order on accuracy.  On 
the other hand, inspection of the response time data suggested that the initial question in each 
section often suffered a time penalty, and this was sometimes also true for the second 
                                                 
140 This was based on 22 participants, comprising the 28 laboratory study participants for which accuracy data 
was available after removing the 6 participants in the ‘other’ category.  When all 28 participants were used, the 
correlation was not significant (ρ = 0.26, p = 0.087). 
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question.  This section investigates the effect of question position, first considering the effect 
on accuracy and then on response time. 
7.9.1. Question position and accuracy 
The analysis in this subsection does not make use of the full 28 data points relating to 
accuracy available from the laboratory study, but rather of the data from the 24 participants 
who also provided response time data.  This is because this dataset was balanced to include 
each of the possible 24 permutations of the four section orders, and also each section was 
seen by half the participants in one order, and by the other half in the reverse order.  This 
reduces the risk of confounding the difficulty of individual questions with the effect of 
position in the study. 
On this basis, there is no evidence that the section position made any difference to the overall 
accuracy of the section (χ2 (3) = 3.1119, p = 0.375).  Moreover, taking all the questions 
together, there is no evidence that the position of a question within a section affected 
accuracy (χ2(9) = 11.8586, p = 0.221). 
On a section-by-section basis, there is no evidence of position in section significantly 
affecting accuracy (section on properties: χ2 (7) = 5.832, p = 0.560; on Boolean operators: 
χ2 (9) = 16.2784, p = 0.061; on negation and restrictions: χ2 (7) = 2.4334, p = 0.932; and on 
nested restrictions: χ2 (7) = 6.7447, p = 0.456).   
7.9.2. Question position and response time 
Table 7-37 shows the mean time for each question by section position.  From inspection, it 
does appear that there is a tendency for reduced response time as the participant proceeds 
through the study.  An ANOVA of time versus section position revealed that there was a 
significant effect (F(3, 812) = 4.82, p = 0.002).  A subsequent Tukey’s HSD analysis 
revealed a significant difference between the first and third section positions to be 
encountered (p = 0.005) and the first and fourth section positions (p = 0.018).  By ensuring 
that each of the 24 permutations of section order is seen by one participant, the design of the 
study is intended to compensate for this effect. 
Table 7-37 Mean response time by section position 
Section position 1 2 3 4 
mean time (s.d.) - secs 73 (51) 68 (50) 60 (44) 62 (47) 
 
A regression analysis of log response time versus question position showed a significant 
decline in response time with question position (F(1, 814) = 77.76, p < 0.001).  When the 
regression analysis was repeated on a section-by-section basis, there was a significant effect 
for the sections on: Boolean operators (F(1, 238) = 64.37, p < 0.001); negation and 
restrictions (F(1, 190) = 11.32, p < 0.001); and multiple restrictions (F(1, 190) = 47.3, p < 
0.001), but not for the section on object properties (F(1, 190) = 3.606, p = 0.059).  In every 
case, the effect was a decline in mean response time with increasing position in the section.  
Figure 7-1 to Figure 7.4 show the effect for each section.  For every position there are two 
points, representing the mean time for the two questions asked at each position, i.e. in order 
1 and order 2.  Note also that, because the regression was performed on log time, the line is 
not strictly a straight line.  However, in each case it is close to being straight.  Finally, as can 
be seen from the degrees of freedom quoted above for the F-values, the regression analysis 
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was performed on the individual data from each participant, not the means displayed in the 
figures. 
 
 
Figure 7-1 Decline in mean response time with position – object properties section 
N.B. the appearance of only one point at position 3 is because of overprinting; the 
two points are very close together. 
 
 
 
Figure 7-2 Decline in mean response time with position – Boolean operators section 
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Figure 7-3 Decline in mean response time with position – negation and restrictions section 
 
 
 
Figure 7-4 Decline in mean response time with position – nested restrictions section 
All four figures suggest, to a greater or lesser extent, that there is an initial question penalty; 
in each case at least one of the initial questions appears to be appreciably above the 
regression line.  To an extent this is compensated for by the reversal of the question order.  
A better strategy would be to randomize the question order, as was done in the third study. 
7.10. Varying effects of valid and non-valid putative conclusions 
It is possible that participants have a bias towards a particular answer.  For example, it may 
be that participants answer ‘not valid’ whenever they are unable to prove validity, even when 
they cannot be sure that the answer is not valid.  Subsection 7.10.1 investigates this 
possibility. 
In the previous study, described in Chapter 6, there was some evidence that the questions 
with non-valid putative conclusions take longer to answer than the questions with valid 
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putative conclusions.  This study offers the opportunity to investigate this more thoroughly, 
and this is done in subsection 7.10.2. 
7.10.1. Validity and accuracy 
Considering all the responses from the 28 participants who provided accuracy data in the 
laboratory study, the questions with valid conclusions were answered correctly 67.6% of the 
time, whilst the questions with non-valid conclusions were answered correctly 69.4% of the 
time.  This difference is not significant (p = 0.576, Fisher’s Exact Test, two-sided). 
There were 16 questions with valid conclusions and 18 questions with non-valid conclusions.  
It might be that, on average, the two sets of questions were of differing difficulty.  However, 
there were eight pairs of questions where the two questions shared the same axioms but had 
different conclusions; one valid and one non-valid.  These questions occurred in Sections 
7.3 and 7.4.  In Table 7-5 all the questions occurred in such pairs, in Table 7-10 all but 
questions 1 and 2 occurred in such pairs. 
Taking just these 16 questions, the percentage of correct responses to the 8 questions with 
valid conclusions is 69.3%, and to the 8 questions with non-valid conclusions is 77.6%.  This 
difference is not significant (p = 0.083, Fisher’s Exact Test, two-sided).   
Two caveats need to be made.  Firstly, this analysis is limited to two of the four sections, in 
particular excluding the two sections using restrictions, where each question had different 
axioms.  Secondly, the difficulty of the questions with non-valid conclusions depends upon 
the plausibility of the putative conclusions.  The conclusions were designed to be highly 
plausible, i.e. prima facie as plausible as the valid conclusions.  It would have been possibly 
to have created much less plausible non-valid conclusions, which would have made these 
questions much easier and hence increased the apparent bias.  On the other hand, with greater 
skill on the part of the author, it might have been possible to have created more plausible 
non-valid conclusions. 
7.10.2. Validity and response time 
As with the previous study, the mean response time for the valid questions (63 seconds) was 
less than for the non-valid questions (68 seconds).  This was also the case when the 
comparison was limited to the correctly answered questions, although not when the 
comparison was limited to the incorrectly answered questions141.  A two-factor analysis 
indicated a significant dependence on both validity (F(1, 812) = 4.2682, p = 0.039) and 
accuracy (F(1, 812) = 11.9038, p < 0.001) with a significant interaction effect (F(1, 812) = 
10.2729, p = 0.001).  A subsequent Tukey HSD indicated a significant difference between 
the times for the valid correct responses and non-valid correct responses (p = 0.004) and 
between the valid correct responses and both categories of incorrect responses (p < 0.001 
valid incorrect; p = 0.013 non-valid incorrect).  The other three pairwise comparisons were 
not significant (p > at least 0.1 in all cases).  In particular, this means that whilst there is a 
significant difference between the valid and non-valid response times for the correct 
responses, there is no significant difference between the valid and non-valid responses for 
the incorrect responses142. 
                                                 
141 The mean times are: valid / correct: 55.7 secs; valid / incorrect: 80.7 secs; non-valid / correct: 67.8 secs; 
non-valid / incorrect: 68.0 secs. 
142 In interpreting these results it should be remembered that there were fewer incorrect than correct responses.  
This may influence significance.   
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However, in both these studies the questions were not balanced to enable a proper 
comparison.  The intrinsic differences in the questions might have been the reason for the 
differences observed.  As with accuracy, the eight pairs of questions identified in the 
previous subsection offer a more controlled way to investigate the relationship between 
response time and validity of question.  These 16 questions provide 384 response times from 
the 24 participants.  These represent 192 pairs of responses, each pair consisting of responses 
from the same participant and from questions with the same axioms, one with a valid putative 
conclusion, one with a non-valid putative conclusion. 
Of these 192 pairs, there were 103 pairs in which both questions had been answered 
correctly.  This enables a comparison of accurately answered questions with valid 
conclusions and accurately answered questions with non-valid conclusions.  Moreover, a 
paired t-test can be used in which the pairing is both by the question axioms and participant, 
balancing any variation in difficulty of the axioms and any variation in facility of the 
participants.  Whilst the mean response time for the 103 questions with valid conclusions 
(67.0 seconds) was less than for the 103 questions with non-valid conclusions (70.6 
seconds), this difference was not significant (t(102) = 0.71797, p = 0.474, two-sided paired 
test) 
7.10.3. Conclusions 
The first study suggested that correct responses to valid questions were significantly faster 
than correct responses to non-valid questions, suggesting that a frequent strategy was to 
begin by attempting to prove validity. 
However, a controlled comparison in this study revealed no significant difference between 
the valid and non-valid questions, neither in accuracy nor in response time.  This controlled 
comparison was necessarily limited to the questions in the two sections concerned with 
object properties and Boolean operators, which were the two sections with the highest 
proportions of correct responses.  Given the nature of the questions, it was not possible to 
conduct a similar analysis for the two sections with restrictions, which participants found 
harder. 
More extensive controlled comparisons are required to investigate further, ideally 
augmented by interviews with participants to understand how they arrive at conclusions in 
particular cases.  
7.11. Discussion 
This study set out to investigate further the difficulties detected in the previous study, and at 
the same time to extend the investigation to the interaction of negation with existential and 
universal restrictions, and also the effect of nested restrictions.  As with the previous study, 
the intention was to use the theoretical framework discussed in Chapter 3 to understand 
participant behaviour.  Subsection 7.11.1 lists the main findings, whilst subsection 7.11.2 
discusses the threats to validity. 
7.11.1. Main findings of the study 
Taking the sections of the study in turn, the main findings were as follows.   
For the section on object properties: 
• After controlling for relational complexity, reasoning about functionality takes longer 
and is less accurate than reasoning about transitivity; although the effects are limited to 
the valid questions.  Participant feedback supported this; several participants commented 
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that the transitivity questions were the easiest.  Reasoning about functionality in 
situations of RC 4 is less accurate and takes longer than reasoning about functionality in 
situations of RC 3.   
For the section on Boolean operators: 
• Different algebraic formulations of semantically equivalent axioms made no difference 
to the accuracy or response time for the questions with valid conclusions.  For the 
questions with non-valid conclusions, there was an increase in accuracy as the algebraic 
formulation approached DNF, whilst the response time was significantly greater for DNF 
than for the form intermediate between DNF and the Rector (2003) form. 
For the two sections on restrictions, taken together: 
• Where possible, participants appear to be using syntactic clues, perhaps to avoid creating 
detailed models of the situation.  This led to some questions being answered relatively 
accurately and rapidly.  One participant commented “some questions were easy to solve 
… just looking at the general form of the formulas”.  On the other hand, in other cases 
participants appear to be misled by apparent, but false, clues, e.g. by confusing some … 
not with not … some.  Where participants were using mental models to represent 
restrictions, there appeared to be a propensity to start with the most obvious of the two 
models.  This sometimes led to the second model being ignored, in particular in the case 
of the universal restriction, where the possibility of its trivial satisfaction may sometimes 
not have been taken into account.  On other occasions, backtracking led to use of the 
second model and arrival at the correct conclusion. 
In some cases, the complexity of a question’s mental model representation was an indicator 
of question difficulty.  However, in other cases questions with the same mental model but 
different syntactic structures were answered quite differently. 
Apart from specific comments like those quoted above, participant feedback shed light 
generally on how they were reasoning about the questions.  There was evidence of both 
visual and syntactic techniques being used.  There was also evidence that some participants 
were using prior understanding, e.g. associated with a property name, rather than reasoning 
purely from the axioms.  This is likely to be how many people do reason when working with 
real ontologies. 
Whilst the majority of participants had a good knowledge of logic, there was a greater 
variation in terms of knowledge and previous usage of DL.  Those participants with more 
knowledge or previous usage of DL tended to be more accurate in their responses.  Since the 
primary concern of the study was to compare questions, and the constructs used in the 
questions, the varying competences of the participants might be regarded as irrelevant.  On 
the other hand, it is likely that experienced ontologists with a good understanding of logic 
will have different problems and need different support than, e.g. domain experts. 
Question position did not appear to have any effect on accuracy.  However, there was a 
significant effect on response time, sometimes with an apparent time penalty for the first or 
second questions in a section.  The strategy of having half the questions in one order, and 
the other half in reverse order may not have been adequate to compensate for this.  As a 
consequence, in certain cases only part of the response time data was used.  This emphasizes 
the importance of randomizing the question order. 
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Finally, there was no significant difference in accuracy between the valid and non-valid 
questions; neither when all questions were considered nor when balanced pairs of valid and 
non-valid questions were analysed.  When all the questions were considered, there was a 
significant difference in response time, with the non-valid questions taking longer.  
However, a controlled comparison revealed no significant difference in response time. The 
controlled comparison did not include questions employing restrictions; further investigation 
is needed, as part of research to understand people’s reasoning strategies when faced with 
DL and other logic languages. 
7.11.2. Threats to validity 
Threats to construct validity 
The same comments apply here as were made in subsection 6.12.3.  Responses were 
recorded automatically.  However, response time was recorded manually, leading to possible 
errors of ±2 seconds; this is relatively small compared with the response times being 
measured. 
Threats to internal validity 
In study 1 the section order was varied between participants to compensate for any inter-
section effect.  However, the question order within sections was not varied.  Study 1 gave 
no indication that accuracy was dependent on question position, and this was confirmed for 
study 2 by the analysis in Section 7.9.  However, study 1 did suggest that reponse time 
depended on question position within section. 
For study 2, in the laboratory study, the questions were again permuted to compensate for 
inter-section effects.  Moreover, participants were divided into two groups and each group 
saw mutually reverse question orders within sections.  In this way, it was hoped to 
compensate for intra-section effects. 
Figures 7-1 to 7-4 indicate an approximately linear decline in response time with increasing 
question order.  However, in some cases there is also evidence that there was an appreciable 
time premium for the first question, which was not fully compensated for by the reversal of 
question order.  In order to avoid any bias due to this time premium, in some of the response 
time analyses, only part of the data was used. 
In the online study question order was less critical, since this study was only used to collect 
accuracy data.  For the oneline study, each section could be undertaken in a separate session, 
and thus the experimenter had no control over inter-section effects.  However, the order of 
questions in each section was randomized, to compensate for any possible intra-section 
effects. 
In study 3, to be described in the next chapter, both section order and question order within 
section was randomized to better compensate for any inter or intra-section effects. 
Threats to external validity 
Subsection 6.12.3 noted that the generalizability of the study 1 results might be limited by 
the nature of the questions and the profile of the participants.  As with study 1, study 2 
employed constructs which are known to be commonly used.  In study 1, those constructs 
were set within the context of commonly used patterns.  In order to make comparisons 
between different combinations of constructs, study 2 did not use such patterns, and in some 
cases this might be taken to detract from ecological validity.  However, these combinations 
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of constructs identified certain general principles, e.g. the use of syntactic clues and the 
failure to make use of the less salient mental model for the universal and existential 
restrictions. 
Subsection 6.12.3 also noted that the sample of participants in study 1 was biased towards 
computer scientists and not representative of domain experts.  In study 2, there was a slightly 
wider range of participants.  Comparison of Tables 6-12 and 7-33 shows that in study 2, 
unlike in study 2, there were some participants who claimed no knowledge of logic or DLs.    
However, the majority of participants had at least some knowledge of logic and DLs.
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8. Study 3: Modifications to Manchester OWL Syntax 
 
It is a commonplace of philosophical logic that there are, or appear to be, divergences 
in meaning between … the FORMAL devices … and … what are taken to be their 
analogs or counterparts in natural language. 
H.P. Grice, ‘Logic and Conversation’, 1975 
The studies described in the previous two chapters, have attempted to understand the 
difficulties experienced with DLs and interpret those difficulties in terms of the theories of 
reasoning developed by cognitive psychologists.  The study described in this chapter builds 
on that understanding to develop and trial additions to MOS which might mitigate these 
difficulties.  It also draws upon the concept of implicature, mentioned in Chapter 3 and first 
developed by Grice in the paper from which the above quotation is taken (Grice, 1975). 
Section 8.1 provides an overview of the study and how it was conducted.  As with the 
previous two studies, the response time data was transformed using the logarithmic 
transformation, and a justification for this is provided in section 8.2.  The study was 
organised into four parts, analogous to study 2, and sections 8.3 to 8.6 describe each of these 
parts and the main findings.  Section 8.7 reports on participant feedback and section 8.8 
analyses the effect of participant experience and prior knowledge.  Section 8.9 analyses the 
effect of question position.  Section 8.10 investigates differences in accuracy (i.e. proportion 
of correct responses) and response time between the valid and non-valid questions.  Finally, 
section 8.11 reviews the main findings.  The study’s main findings are also described in 
Warren et al. (2017). 
8.1. Organisation of the study 
The four parts of the study were concerned with: functional and inverse functional object 
properties; Boolean concept constructors, in particular negated conjunction; negation and 
restriction; and nested restrictions.  With a few exceptions explained in later sections, the 
questions were analogous to questions in study 2, to enable the comparison with the results 
of that study.  Note that all the comparisons of accuracy with study 2 made in this chapter 
are based on the study 2 data collected under laboratory conditions, i.e. not including the 
data from the online part of the study.  This was to maintain consistency with study 3. 
Each part contained eight questions with the same format as in the previous studies.  
Participants were presented with a set of axioms and a putative conclusion and asked if the 
conclusion was valid or non-valid.  There were two variants of the study, with some of the 
questions differing between the variants.  There were 30 participants, 15 for each variant, 
drawn from the Open University, another U.K. university and an industrial research 
laboratory.  Participants were allocated alternately between the two variants.  The study used 
the same simplified form of MOS as in the other two studies, except that in certain cases 
different keywords were used.  In one case, that of solely described in section 8.3, the 
keyword was additional to existing keywords.  In the other cases the keywords were 
alternatives.  As with study 2, but not study 1, all keywords in the questions were identified 
in blue, as opposed to the black type used for the identifiers.  As with the previous two 
studies, participants were provided with a handout which they could read beforehand and 
was available to them during the study; there were different handouts for each version of the 
study.  Also as with the previous studies, there was a preliminary section where participants 
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were invited to provide information about themselves, and a final section where they could 
provide feedback on the study.     
The questions were presented to the participants on a lap-top computer using the MediaLab 
application from Empirisoft143, which recorded both the response and the response time.  
Statistical analysis was conducted using the R statistical package (R Core Team, 2014). 
The analysis of the previous study in section 7.9 indicated that response time, although not 
accuracy, depended significantly on the position of the section and the position of the 
question in the section.  To avoid any bias due to this effect, the order of sections and order 
of questions within each section were randomized, using a facility available in MediaLab.   
8.2. Response time data 
As with the two previous studies, examination of the distribution of the response times 
showed a positive skew.  Figure 8-1 shows the distribution of response times over all the 
960 measurements (i.e. 30 participants each answering 32 questions). 
 
Figure 8-1 Frequency of response time; time shown in seconds 
A Shapiro-Wilk normality test gave a p-value of less than 2.2 x 10-16.  Moving along Tukey’s 
ladder of powers (Scott, 2012), the best fit to normality was achieved with a log 
transformation, which resulted in a Shapiro-Wilk p-value of 0.00726.  Figure 8-2 shows the 
distribution of the response times after a log10 transformation. 
                                                 
143 www.empirisoft.com 
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Figure 8-2 Frequency of response time; shown after log10 transformation 
As in the previous studies, response time data was tested for each question using the Shapiro-
Wilk test, resulting in a minimum p-value of 5.21 x 10-7 for the untransformed data.  The 
two variants of each question were treated separately, making a total of 64 questions.  The 
response time data was then transformed, using points from the Tukey ladder of powers, and 
in each case the Shapiro-Wilk test was repeated for each of the 64 questions.  The minimum 
of the 64 p-values was noted.  The objective was to obtain the transformation for which 
worst-case deviation from the normal (i.e. the worst case of the 64 questions) was minimized.  
This occurs when the minimum p-value from the 64 questions is greatest.  Specifically, this 
happened when the logarithmic transformation was used, giving a minimum p-value of 
0.00679.  Although this is a relatively low p-value, for the logarithmic transformation there 
were only three other p-values below 0.05, and the great majority were above 0.1.  This can 
be seen in Figure 8-3 and Figure 8-4 which show the Shapiro Wilk p-value for each question 
in each of the two variants before and after logarithmic transformation.  Consequently, time 
was transformed using the logarithmic transformation prior to all ANOVA, t-tests and 
regression analyses reported here. 
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Figure 8-3 Shapiro-Wilk p-values for variant 1 questions, on a log scale.  Circles indicate 
before logarithmic transformation, crosses after transformation. 
 
Figure 8-4 Shapiro-Wilk p-values for variant 2 questions, on a log scale.  Circles indicate 
before logarithmic transformation, crosses after transformation. 
8.3. Functional and inverse functional object properties 
Study 2 concluded that, under conditions of equal relational complexity, reasoning about 
functionality took significantly longer than reasoning about transitivity, i.e. functionality is 
inherently harder than transitivity.  It was hypothesized that one reason for this was the 
existence of confusion in participants’ minds between functionality and inverse 
functionality, i.e. confusion about whether it is the subject or the object of the relation which 
is unique.  In this study, six functional questions were created isomorphic to the six 
functional questions in study 2, i.e. questions 3 to 8 in Table 7-3.  The resultant questions 
are shown in Table 8-1.  A keyword, solely, was inserted before the object of the property to 
make clear that it is the object of the property which is unique.  solely was chosen because 
of its anticipated power to convey uniqueness.  A possibly more natural choice, only, was 
rejected because of its existing use in MOS.  Unlike the other additions to MOS proposed in 
this study, solely is not an alternative to other keywords, but is additional.  This leads to the 
hypothesis: 
H8.1 The introduction of the additional keyword solely between a functional 
property and its object will improve participant performance. 
1 
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This hypothesis is investigated in subsection 8.3.1 
The six functional questions were of varying complexity, and this enabled a further 
investigation of hypothesis H7.2, already discussed in section 7.3: 
H7.2 Reasoning about functionality becomes increasingly difficult with increasing 
relational complexity. 
Another goal was to investigate whether performance with inverse functional properties 
could be improved by the use of a keyword to make clear that it is the subject of such 
properties which is unique.  As neither of the previous studies included inverse functional 
properties, comparison of any syntactic changes could not be made between studies.  
Consequently, variant 1 of this study included two questions using an inverse functional 
proprty in our simplified version of MOS, whilst variant 2 included the same questions, 
except that the keyword solely was included before the subject to indicate its uniqueness.  
These questions are showin in Table 8-4.  This leads to the hypothesis: 
H8.2 The introduction of the additional keyword solely before the subject of an 
inverse functional property will improve participant performance. 
This hypothesis is investigated in subsection 8.3.3. 
Finally, the availability of analogous questions using functional and inverse functional object 
properties enables a comparison of the relative difficulty of the two property characteristics.  
This is formalised as the hypothesis: 
H8.3 There will be a difference in performance between reasoning with functional 
and inverse functional properties. 
This hypothesis is investigated in subsection 8.3.4. 
8.3.1. Functional object properties – hypothesis H8.1 
Table 8-1 shows the six study 3 questions using a functional object property.  For these 
questions, there was no difference between variants 1 and 2, i.e. all 30 participants were 
presented with identical questions.  As in the tables in the previous chapter, for brevity the 
tables in this chapter omit the declarative statements included in the actual questions.  They 
also use semi-colons to separate some of the statements, rather than new lines as in the actual 
questions.  The questions are grouped into three pairs, in order of increasing complexity, the 
questions in each pair having the same axioms but different putative conclusions, and 
arranged such that the odd-numbered questions are valid and the even-numbered are non-
valid.  Note that the numbering in Table 8-1 does not correspond to that in Table 7-3.  
Questions 1 to 6 in Table 8-1 are isomorphic to questions 3 to 8 in Table 7-3.  The two sets 
of questions use different names.  Specifically, the individual names a, b, c, d, e, f in the 
previous study have been mapped into r, s, t, v, w, x in this study.  This was done to reduce 
the probability of any recollection from the previous study, which had taken place 
approximately twelve months earlier, since many of the participants in the two studies were 
the same.  The property name used, has_nearest_neighbour, was the same as previously.  
For brevity, the property name is represented by F in the table.  The table also shows the 
relational complexity of the valid questions, which is equal to the relational complexity of 
the analogous questions in the previous study. 
 
 
 160 
 
Table 8-1 Functional object property questions 
 axioms (F = has_nearest_neighbour) putative 
conclusion 
validity relational 
complexity 
1 r F solely s; r F solely t;  
s F solely v; t F solely w 
v sameAs w valid 3,2,3 
2 r sameAs t not valid n/a 
3 r F solely s; r F solely t; v F solely s;  
w F solely x; t DifferentFrom x 
v DifferentFrom w valid 3,2,4 
4 r DifferentFrom v not valid n/a 
5 r F solely s; t F solely v;  
s DifferentFrom v;  
w F solely r; x F solely z; t SameAs z 
w DifferentFrom x valid 4,2,4 
6 r DifferentFrom x not valid n/a 
 
Table 8.2 shows the proportion of correct responses for each question.  For comparison, the 
analogous data for the previous study is repeated from Chapter 7.  For each of the valid 
questions, the proportion of correct responses was greater for the current study than for study 
2.  However, Fisher’s Exact Test revealed no significant difference between the proportions 
of correct responses for the two studies at the level of individual questions.  For each 
question, the mean time overall and the mean time for the correct responses were less for 
this study than for study 2.  A comparison of the response times for each question using the 
t-test revealed a significant difference for question 1 (t(51.251) = 2.0161, p = 0.049) and 
question 5 (t(44.063) = 2.2331, p = 0.031), but no other significant differences. 
 
Table 8-2 Functional object property questions – accuracy and response times 
 study 2 – without solely study 3 – with solely 
%age 
correct  
N = 28 
mean time (SD) – secs 
N = 24 
%age 
correct  
N = 30 
mean time (SD) – secs 
N = 30 
overall correct incorrect overall correct incorrec
t 
1 75% 52 (36) 56 (39) 36 (9) 83% 39 (31) 39 (32) 38 (26) 
2 96% 61 (46) 62 (47) 35 (NA) 83% 50 (29) 52 (30) 43 (24) 
3 61% 84 (67) 90 (66) 73 (70) 70% 58 (27) 52 (26) 71 (27) 
4 79% 92 (66) 86 (62) 111 (80) 83% 78 (49) 77 (48) 81 (63) 
5 43% 109 (79) 96 (55) 119 (96) 63% 73 (37) 76 (44) 67 (23) 
6 71% 96 (47) 93 (50) 101 (43) 70% 90 (46) 92 (46) 86 (48) 
 
The small sample sizes reduce the likelihood of significant differences for individual 
questions, particularly when comparing accuracy.  A more realistic analysis is based on 
aggregated questions.  Table 8-3 shows the percentage of correct responses and mean time 
to respond for all six functional questions aggregated and for the three valid and three non-
valid questions aggregated.  Using Fisher’s Exact Test there was no significant difference in 
accuracy between the two studies when all questions were taken together (p = 0.334), nor 
for the aggregated valid questions (p = 0.081), nor the non-valid questions (p = 0.703).   
A two-factor ANOVA indicated that response time varied significantly between the 
studies (F(1, 320) = 7.559, p = 0.006) and between the valid and non-valid questions (F(1, 
320) = 4.928, p = 0.027), with no significant interaction (F(1, 320) = 1.761, p = 0.185).  A 
subsequent Tukey HSD analysis revealed a significant difference in response time between 
the two studies for the valid questions (p = 0.022) but not for the non-valid (p = 0.746).  This 
conclusion is supported when t-tests are applied to determine the effect of solely on the valid 
and non-valid questions separately.  In both cases the mean response time is less when solely 
is used.  In the case of the valid questions, the difference is significant (t(144.7) = 2.8373, p 
= 0.005).  In the case of the non-valid questions, the difference is not significant (t(148.61) 
= 1.0043, p = 0.317). 
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In summary, there was partial support for hypothesis H8.1.  The introduction of solely had 
no significant effect on accuracy.  It did lead to a significant reduction in response time for 
the valid questions but had no significant effect on response time for the non-valid questions. 
 
Table 8-3 Functional object property questions 
 study 2 – without solely study 3 – with solely 
% 
corr 
mean time (SD) - secs % 
corr 
mean time (SD) - secs 
overall correct incorr overall correct incorr 
All questions  71% 83 (61) 78 (54) 93 (75) 76% 65 (41) 64 (42) 67 (38) 
valid questions 60% 81 (67) 77 (55) 89 (83) 72% 57 (35) 54 (37) 63 (27) 
non-valid questions 82% 83 (55) 78 (54) 101 (60) 79% 73 (45) 73 (45) 73 (49) 
 
8.3.2. Effect of complexity – hypothesis H7.2 
The data from questions 1 to 6 of this study enable a further investigation into the effect of 
complexity.  There are three levels, represented in increasing complexity by questions {1, 
2}, {3, 4} and {5, 6}.  A logistic analysis showed no dependence of accuracy on complexity 
(p = 0.102).  A one-way ANOVA showed that time to respond was significantly dependent 
on complexity (F(2, 177) = 20.24, p < 0.001).  A subsequent Tukey HSD analysis showed 
that the difference in time was significant when comparing questions {1, 2} with {3, 4}, and 
when comparing questions {1, 2} and {5, 6} (p < 0.001 in both cases).  The difference 
between questions {3, 4} and {5, 6} was not significant (p = 0.080).   
In summary, there was partial support for hypothesis H7.2.  Complexity did not significantly 
affect accuracy but did significantly affect response time.  This contrasts with the results 
from the analogous questions in study 2, where complexity significantly affected both 
accuracy and response time. 
8.3.3. Inverse functional object properties – hypothesis H8.2 
Table 8-4 shows the format of the questions in the two variants.  For brevity, I is used to 
represent the property is_nearest_neighbour_of used in this study.  Questions 7 and 8 were 
generated from questions 1 and 5 of Table 8-1 by restating using is_nearest_neighbour_of 
rather than its inverse has_nearest_neighbour.  Furthermore, to create question 7, r and s 
were swapped; and to create question 8, r was swapped with s, t with v, and x with z. 
Table 8-4 Inverse functional object property questions 
 axioms (I = is_nearest_neighbour_of) putative conclusion validity relational 
complexity 
variant 1 
7 r I s; t I s; v I r; w I t v SameAs w valid 3,2,3 
8 r I s; t I v; r DifferentFrom t; 
s I w; x I z; v SameAs x 
w DifferentFrom z valid 4,2,4 
variant 2 
7 solely r I s; solely t I s;  
solely v I r; solely w I t 
v SameAs w valid 3,2,3 
8 solely r I s; solely t I v;  
r DifferentFrom t; solely s I w; 
solely x I z; v SameAs x 
w DifferentFrom z valid 4,2,4 
 
Table 8-5 shows the percentage of correct responses and the mean response time for these 
questions.  For question 8 the percentage of correct responses was the same in both variants.  
Using Fisher’s Exact Test, there was no significant difference in accuracy of response 
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between the two variants, neither when the questions were aggregated (p = 0.760) nor for 
question 7 alone (p = 0.651).  A two-way ANOVA showed that there was a significant 
difference in response time between the two questions (F(1, 56) = 26.836, p <  0.001), 
reflecting their difference in complexity, but not between the two variants (F(1, 56) = 0.640, 
p = 0.427); nor was there an interaction effect (F(1,56) = 0.382, p = 0.539). 
 
Table 8-5 Inverse functional object property questions 
 variant 1 – without solely; N = 15 variant 2 – with solely; N = 15 
% 
corr 
mean time (SD) - secs % 
corr 
mean time (SD) - secs 
overall correct incorr overall correct incorr 
question 7  73% 38 (18) 33 (19) 51 (9) 87% 48 (23) 47 (25) 53 (9) 
question 8 73% 105 (92) 115(107) 78 (16) 73% 90 (43) 89 (49) 94 (27) 
both questions 73% 72 (74) 74 (86) 65 (19) 80% 69 (40) 66 (43) 80 (30) 
 
In summary, there was no support for hypothesis H8.2.  In the case of inverse functional 
properties, the use of the keyword solely has no significant effect on accuracy or response 
time.  It may be that solely is taken to refer to the whole <subject, predicate, object> triple 
without making clear the uniqueness of the subject rather than object.   
8.3.4. Difficulty of functional and inverse functional questions – hypothesis H8.3 
The relationship between questions 1 and 7, and questions 5 and 8 enable investigation of  
hypothesis H8.3.  For the functional questions in this study variants 1 and 2 were identical, 
both using solely.  Hence a reasonable comparison is between: 
A. questions 1 and 5 from study 2 and questions 7 and 8 from variant 1 of this study, 
i.e. the questions which do not use solely; 
B. questions 1 and 5 from both variants of this study and questions 7 and 8 from variant 
2, i.e. the questions which use solely. 
Table 8-6 shows the relevant data for the two cases.  In both cases a Fisher’s Exact Test 
showed no significant difference in accuracy of response between the aggregated functional 
and inverse functional questions (case (A): p = 0.241; case (B): p = 0.606).  Similarly, t-tests 
showed no significant difference in response time (case (A): t(56.167) = 1.0853, p = 0.282; 
case (B): t(64.429) = 1.9113, p = 0.060) 
Table 8-6 Functional / inverse functional vs. with / without solely 
 Case (A): without solely Case (B): with solely 
 %age corr mean time (secs) %age corr mean time (secs) 
Functional 59% 80 73% 56 
Inverse functional 73% 72 80% 69 
N.B. Case (A) compares questions 1 and 5 aggregated from study 2 with questions 7 
and 8 aggregated from variant 1 of this study.  Case (B) compares questions 1 and 5 
aggregated from both variants of this study with questions 7 and 8 aggregated from 
variant 2 of this study. 
In summary, there was no support for hypothesis H8.3.  There was no significant difference, 
neither in accuracy nor response time, between the questions with functional and the 
questions with inverse functional properties. 
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8.3.5. Discussion 
Table 8-7 summarises the conclusions for hypotheses H7.2, H8.1, H8.2 and H8.3.  The key 
finding is that introduction of solely did significantly reduce response time for the functional 
object properties, but only in the case of the  valid questions.  However, solely had no effect 
for the inverse functional object properties.  Other keywords and other choices of position 
might improve performance.  One could, for example, experiment with the use of alone after 
the subject, e.g. s alone has_nearest_neighbour r.  As was found in section 7.3, increasing 
complexity led to increased response time; although unlike in section 7.3, increasing 
complexity did not reduce accuracy significantly144.  Finally, there was no apparent 
difference in performance between functional and inverse functional object properties. 
 
Table 8-7 Object properties – summary of hypotheses 
 accuracy response time 
H7.2 – effect of relational 
complexity on reasoning 
abut functionality 
no significant difference Response time increases 
significantly when a step 
with RC 3 is replaced by a 
step with RC 4. 
H8.1 – use of solely with 
functional object properties 
no significant difference significantly reduces 
response time – valid 
questions only 
H8.2 – use of solely with 
inverse functional object 
properties 
no significant difference 
H8.3 – comparison of 
functional and inverse 
functional properties 
no significant difference 
 
8.4. Boolean concept constructors 
The eight questions in this part of the study were designed to test out whether amendments 
to MOS could reduce the difficulties experienced with Boolean concept constructors, in 
particular relating to negated conjunction.   
Study 1 noted that negated conjunction was significantly harder than negated disjunction, as 
can be seen by comparing the data in Table 6-12 for questions 2 and 4.  This effect has also 
been observed by Khemlani et al. (2012a).  At the same time, it is known that and and or in 
everyday language are used ambiguously, e.g. see Mendonça et al. (1998).  It was 
hypothesized that performance might be improved by the use of less ambiguous terminology 
for conjunction and disjunction.  This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H8.4 The use of the keyword intersection in place of and will improve performance 
for negated conjunction. 
                                                 
144 Note that the analysis in section 7.3 was based on 65 data points, i.e. over twice as many as were available 
in this study.  As discussed in section 9.5, the reduced number of data points in study 3 means that a larger 
effect will be required to achieve significance.  If the percentage of correct responses achieved at the three 
levels in study 3, aggregated over the two questions at each level, were achieved with a sample of 65 data 
points, then a logistic analysis of deviance would give a significant result (p = 0.009). 
 164 
 
In study 2 the consecutive keywords and not were used to create exceptions, following a 
format used by Rector (2003).  For this study, it was thought that except might be more 
intuitively understandable, including within nested exceptions, i.e. and not (... and not ...), 
which give rise to negated conjunction.  This is formalised as the hypothesis: 
H8.5 The use of except in place of and not will improve performance. 
In some syntaxes, OWL already use the terms intersection and union as part of prefix 
operators.  A relevant question is how such a prefix notation compares with the infix notation 
used in MOS.  To investigate this, the following hypothesis was proposed: 
H8.6 There will be a difference in performance between the prefix notation 
IntersectionOf() and UnionOf(), and the infix notation intersection and union. 
Table 8-8 shows the original questions from previous studies which were used to generate 
questions for this study and to investigate these three hypotheses.  Note that the numbering 
differs from that used for studies 1 and 2 in Chapters 6 and 7, but is that used in this chapter 
for the analogous questions for study 3.   
Questions 1 and 2 are analogous to questions 2 and 4 from study 1 in Table 6.11.  As shown 
here they differ from the questions in study 1 in that the latter used an ontology pattern, 
whilst the questions here show the essential features abstracted from the original questions.  
This makes clearer the relationship with the questions in this study.   
Questions 3 to 8 are taken from the study 2 questions shown in Table 7-10.  To create these 
questions, six questions had to be chosen out of the ten original Boolean concept constructor 
questions.  The rationale for the choice is explained in subsection 8.4.2 below.   
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Table 8-8 Boolean concept constructor questions as used in studies 1 and 2 
 axioms putative conclusion validity 
study 1 
1 Entity DisjointUnionOf Event, Abstract, 
Quality, Object; 
A Type Entity; A Type not (Event and 
Quality); 
A Type (Abstract or 
Object) 
not valid 
2 
 
Entity DisjointUnionOf Event, Abstract, 
Quality, Object; 
A Type Entity; A Type not (Event or 
Quality); 
A Type (Abstract or 
Object) 
valid 
study 2 
3 Z EquivalentTo (TOP_CLASS and not A and 
not B); 
TOP_CLASS DisjointUnionOf A, B, C 
Z EquivalentTo C valid 
4 Z EquivalentTo (TOP_CLASS and not (A or 
B)); 
TOP_CLASS DisjointUnionOf A, B, C 
Z EquivalentTo C valid 
5 Z EquivalentTo (TOP_CLASS and not (A 
and not A_1)); 
TOP_CLASS DisjointUnionOf A, B; 
A DisjointUnionOf A_1, A_2 
Z EquivalentTo (B or A_1) valid 
6 As for question 5 Z EquivalentTo B not valid 
7 Z EquivalentTo (TOP_CLASS and not (A 
and not (A_1 and not A_1_X))); 
TOP_CLASS DisjointUnionOf A, B; 
A DisjointUnionOf A_1, A_2; 
A_1 DisjointUnionOf A_1_X, A_1_Y 
Z EquivalentTo (B or 
A_1_Y) 
valid 
8 As for question 7 Z EquivalentTo A_1_Y not valid 
 
To generate the questions for this study, variant 1 was formed by replacing and with 
intersection.  This enables the investigation of H8.4.  At the same time, for consistency, or 
was replaced with union.  In questions 3 to 8 of variant 1, the consecutive keywords and not 
have been replaced with except.  This enables the investigation of hypothesis H8.5. 
To investigate hypothesis H8.6, variant 2 was formed by using IntersectionOf() for 
conjunction and UnionOf() for disjunction.  In question 3, IntersectionOf() was used with 
three arguments; in other cases two arguments were used.  In addition, to lessen the 
probability of any recollection of the previous study, the variable names were changed.  In 
the first two questions: Entity, Event, Abstract, Quality, Object were changed to UNIVERSE, 
W, X, Y, Z; and A was represented lowercase.  In the other six questions: TOP_CLASS was 
changed to UNIVERSE; A, B and C were changed to X, Y, Z; Z was changed to W; and X and 
Y were changed to A and B, thus A_1_X became X_1_A.  Table 8-9 and Table 8-10 show the 
questions for variants 1 and 2 respectively.   
Table 8-11 shows the percentage of correct responses for variants 1 and 2 of this study and 
the analogous questions from previous studies.  The table also shows the percentage of 
correct responses for questions 3 to 8 aggregated.  Table 8-12  similarly shows the mean 
response times. 
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Table 8-9 Boolean concept constructor questions – study 3: variant 1 
 V / NV axioms putative conclusion 
Derived from study 1 
1 NV UNIVERSE DisjointUnionOf W, X, Y, Z; 
a Type UNIVERSE; a Type not (W intersection Y); 
a Type (X union Z) 
2 
 
V UNIVERSE DisjointUnionOf W, X, Y, Z; 
a Type UNIVERSE; a Type not (W union Y); 
a Type (X union Z) 
Derived from study 2 
3 V W EquivalentTo ((UNIVERSE except X) except Y); 
UNIVERSE DisjointUnionOf X, Y, Z 
W EquivalentTo Z 
4 V W EquivalentTo (UNIVERSE except (X union Y)); 
UNIVERSE DisjointUnionOf X, Y, Z 
W EquivalentTo Z 
5 V W EquivalentTo (UNIVERSE except (X except X_1)); 
UNIVERSE DisjointUnionOf X, Y; 
X DisjointUnionOf X_1, X_2 
W EquivalentTo (Y 
union X_1) 
6 NV As for question 5 W EquivalentTo Y 
7 V W EquivalentTo (UNIVERSE except (X except (X_1 
except X_1_A))); 
UNIVERSE DisjointUnionOf X, Y; 
X DisjointUnionOf X_1, X_2; 
X_1 DisjointUnionOf X_1_A, X_1_B 
W EquivalentTo (Y 
union X_1_B) 
8 NV As for question 7 W EquivalentTo X_1_B 
 
 
Table 8-10 Boolean concept constructor questions – study3: variant 2 
 V / NV axioms putative conclusion 
Derived from study 1 
1 NV UNIVERSE DisjointUnionOf (W, X, Y, Z)145; 
a Type UNIVERSE; a Type not IntersectionOf (W, Y); 
a Type UnionOf (X, Z) 
2 
 
V UNIVERSE DisjointUnionOf (W, X, Y, Z); 
a Type UNIVERSE; a Type not UnionOf (W, Y); 
a Type UnionOf (X, Z)  
Derived from study 2 
3 V W EquivalentTo IntersectionOf (UNIVERSE, not X, not Y)); 
UNIVERSE DisjointUnionOf (X, Y, Z) 
W EquivalentTo Z 
4 V W EquivalentTo IntersectionOf (UNIVERSE, not 
UnionOf(X, Y)); 
UNIVERSE DisjointUnionOf (X, Y, Z) 
W EquivalentTo Z 
5 V W EquivalentTo IntersectionOf (UNIVERSE, not 
IntersectionOf (X, not X_1)); 
UNIVERSE DisjointUnionOf (X, Y); 
X DisjointUnionOf (X_1, X_2) 
W EquivalentTo 
UnionOf (Y, X_1) 
6 NV As for question 5 W EquivalentTo Y 
7 V W EquivalentTo IntersectionOf (UNIVERSE, not 
IntersectionOf (X, not (IntersectionOf (X_1, not X_1_A)))); 
UNIVERSE DisjointUnionOf X, Y; 
X DisjointUnionOf (X_1, X_2); 
X_1 DisjointUnionOf (X_1_A, X_1_B) 
W EquivalentTo 
UnionOf (Y, X_1_B) 
8 NV As for question 7 W EquivalentTo 
X_1_B 
 
                                                 
145 For variant 2, DisjointUnionOf was followed by parentheses.  This was done for consistency with 
UnionOf().  Variant 1 used the standard MOS format for DisjointUnionOf, without parentheses, see 
https://www.w3.org/TR/owl2-manchester-syntax/.   
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Table 8-11 Boolean concept constructor questions – percentage correct 
 study 1; N = 12 study 3: variant 1; N = 15 study 3: variant 2; N = 15 
1 25% 80% 67% 
2 92% 87% 100% 
 study 2; N = 28  
3 82% 100% 100% 
4 86% 100% 93% 
5 61% 53% 53% 
6 64% 100% 73% 
7 54% 60% 40% 
8 68% 80% 60% 
Q3 to 8 69% 82% 70% 
 
 
Table 8-12 Boolean concept constructor questions – mean time (standard deviation) 
 study 1; N = 12 study 3: variant 1; N = 15 study 3: variant 2; N = 15 
overall correct incorr overall correct incorr overall correct incorr 
1 75 
(48) 
65 
(30) 
79 
(54) 
53 
(41) 
48 
(25) 
73  
(88) 
47 
(16) 
44 
(15) 
53  
(17) 
2 44 
(19) 
42 
(19) 
62 
(NA) 
42 
(28) 
40 
(30) 
53  
(7) 
39 
(25) 
39 
(25) 
NA 
(NA) 
 study 2; N = 24  
3 39 
(26) 
36 
(23) 
56 
(37) 
39 
(25) 
39 
(25) 
NA 
(NA) 
47 
(30) 
47 
(30) 
NA 
(NA) 
4 43 
(29) 
36 
(24) 
78 
(27) 
35 
(26) 
35 
(26) 
NA 
(NA) 
46 
(35) 
44 
(35) 
69  
(NA) 
5 96 
(56) 
99 
(64) 
89 
(37) 
61 
(37) 
63 
(49) 
59  
(19) 
65 
(38) 
60 
(34) 
71  
(45) 
6 105 
(78) 
112 
(78) 
89 
(79) 
44 
(25) 
44 
(25) 
NA 
(NA) 
82 
(57) 
81 
(57) 
86  
(66) 
7 90 
(48) 
91 
(49) 
89 
(51) 
97 
(75) 
99 
(92) 
94  
(47) 
156 
(126) 
128 
(39) 
174 
(161) 
8 94 
(47) 
94 
(50) 
95 
(45) 
88 
(60) 
97 
(63) 
52  
(16) 
93 
(51) 
89 
(34) 
98  
(74) 
Q3 to 
Q8 
78 
(56) 
74 
(58) 
86 
(50) 
61 
(50) 
55 
(48) 
69  
(42) 
82 
(74) 
60 
(42) 
104 
(103) 
 
8.4.1. Negated conjunction and disjunction – hypotheses H8.4 and H8.6 
Question 1 was designed to test H8.4 and also H8.6.  In variant 1, and is replaced with 
intersection whilst in variant 2 the prefix form is used, IntersectionOf().  Question 2 was 
designed to determine what effect similar changes would have on negated disjunction, where 
performance in study 1 had been good.  For this question, variant 1 uses union whilst variant 
2 uses the prefix form, UnionOf().  Using a logistic analysis, the percentage of correct re-
sponses for question 1 varied significantly between the three cases, i.e. study 1 and the two 
variants of this study (p = 0.011).  A subsequent Tukey HSD showed that the difference 
between study 1 and variant 1 was significant (p = 0.020), whilst there was no significant 
difference between study 1 and variant 2 (p = 0.094), nor between the two variants (p = 
0.691).  A one-way ANOVA indicated that there was no significant difference in response 
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time between the three cases, i.e. study 1 and variants 1 and 2 of this study (F(2, 39) = 2.052, 
= 0.142). 
For question 2, a logistic analysis showed no significant variation in percentage of correct 
responses between the three cases (p = 0.229).  A one-way ANOVA also showed no 
significant difference in response time for the three situations (F(2, 39) = 0.4233, p = 0.658).  
Thus the use of union, in infix and prefix form, made no difference to the previously high 
level of performance with negated disjunction. 
In summary, there was partial support for hypothesis H8.4.  For negated conjunction the use 
of intersection, in infix form, significantly improved the accuracy but not the response time.  
The  use of IntersectionOf() made no significant difference to accuracy or response time.  
The use of union, in infix and prefix forms, made no significant difference to accuracy or 
response time with negated disjunction.   
There was no support for hypothesis H8.6.  Neither with negated conjunction nor negated 
disjunction was there a significant difference between infix and prefix forms. 
8.4.2. Except – hypothesis H8.5 
Questions 3 to 8 in variant 1 were intended to test the effect of replacing and not with except.  
As with questions 1 and 2, variant 2 was constructed to investigate whether participant 
performance would be different if the infix notation used in MOS for conjunction and 
disjunction was replaced with prefix notation.  Study 2 included ten questions relating to 
Boolean concept constructors; the questions in this study are analogous to six of them.  These 
questions were chosen to represent the three levels of complexity present in the propositional 
logic questions in study 2.  For the questions of medium complexity, this involved selecting 
two questions from the six originally used in study 2.  These are questions 5 and 6 in Table 
8-8, and correspond to questions 3 and 4 in Table 7-11.  They were chosen because the first 
axiom was similar to an expression used in Rector (2003), containing two occurrences of 
and not which each translate into except, i.e. they are the most visibly obvious statements of 
exceptions.  Questions 5 and 6 in Table 7-11 make no use of and not, whilst questions 7 and 
8 make only one use of and not.   
Compared with study 2, the percentage of correct responses was greater in variant 1 for five 
of the six questions, whilst the percentage of correct responses was greater in variant 2 only 
for three questions.  A logistic analysis using all six questions aggregated showed no 
significant variation between the three cases (p = 0.052).  Thus, neither the use of except nor 
the use of prefix notation made a significant difference to accuracy. 
A one-way ANOVA indicated that time varied significantly between the cases, (F(2, 321) = 
3.65, p = 0.027).  A subsequent Tukey HSD analysis indicated that there was a significant 
difference between study 2 and variant 1 of this study (p = 0.044), with variant 1 responses 
faster.  There was no significant difference between the two variants (p = 0.05002), nor 
between study 2 and variant 2 (p = 0.978).   
The Tukey HSD analysis showed no significant difference between the two variants; as 
already noted the p value was a little above 0.05 (0.05002).  However, a t-test did reveal a 
significant difference between the variants (t(176.22) = 2.3962, p = 0.018).  This difference 
between the Tukey HSD comparison and the t-test is to be expected.  The Tukey HSD adjusts 
the reported p value to compensate for the multiple pairwise comparisons.  Note also that 
inspection of Table 8-12 shows that the mean time for the six questions for variant 1 (61 
seconds) was appreciably less than both variant 2 (82 seconds) and study 2 (78 seconds).  
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A strong caveat is required when interpreting the comparison of study 2 and variant 1 with 
regard to time.  The rationale for choosing the two questions, questions 3 and 4 in Table 
7.11, from the six questions of medium complexity has already been explained.  However, 
these were the two questions which occupied position 1 in the two orderings of the section 
questions.  Inspection of Table 7-14, in particular the difference between the mean times in 
the two orderings, shows that this may have biased the response times, making the 
comparison with this study more favourable.  When, for the purposes of the statistical 
analysis, questions 3 and 4 are replaced by the semantically equivalent but syntactically 
different questions 5 and 6 (albeit confounding the use of except with the issue of differing 
axiom structure), then there is no significant difference in response times between study 2 
and variant 1 (t(192.67) = 0.96752, p = 0.335). 
In summary, there is no evidence to support hypothesis H8.5.  The use of except in place of 
and not did not significantly affect accuracy.  Moreover, on the basis of the evidence, it is 
not safe to conclude that except significantly reduces response time.  However, it does 
present a strong case for further investigation.  A final point to make here is that all the 
studies in this dissertation are concerned with comprehension.  It may also be the case that 
the use of except has an advantage over and not when modelling with DL, since it 
corresponds more closely to the language generally used to discuss exceptions.  This also 
needs to be investigated. 
8.4.3. Discussion 
Table 8-13 summarises the hypotheses discussed in this section.  The major finding is that 
the use of intersection, in place of and, significantly increases accuracy.  In addition, except 
appears to offer promise in reducing reasoning time; this requires further investigation. 
Table 8-13 Boolean concept constructors – summary of hypotheses 
 accuracy response time 
H8.4 – intersection in place 
of and 
infix form significantly 
improves accuracy 
no significant difference 
H8.5 – except in place of 
and not 
no significant difference requires further 
investigation 
H8.6 – infix versus prefix 
notation 
no significant difference 
 
8.5. Negation and restrictions 
Chapter 7 described the difficulties which study 2 participants experienced with the universal 
and existential restrictions, and related these difficulties in part to a failure to form both the 
required mental models.  This and the following section of study 3 investigates whether the 
replacement of only with noneOrOnly and some with including would improve performance 
with these restrictions.  noneOrOnly was intended to draw attention to the fact that, e.g. the 
class has_child noneOrOnly MALE includes those individuals who have no children at all.  
including was intended to draw attention to the fact that, e.g. the class has_child including 
MALE may contain individuals who have a female child in addition to a male one.  Thus, 
the two proposed keywords were intended to draw attention to the second mental model in 
Table 7-24 and Table 7-32.  The hypothesis to be investigated is: 
H8.7 The use of noneOrOnly in place of only and including in place of some will 
lead to improved participant performance. 
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Moreover, in study 2, two questions include the axiom X SubClassOf not (has_child some 
MALE).  not ... some is not a natural English construct; a more natural construct is not ... any.  
It was thought that the use of the latter construct might aid comprehension and reasoning.  
This leads to another hypothesis: 
H8.8 The use of any to indicate the existential restriction, when the corresponding 
object property is preceded by a negation, will improve performance. 
The original questions, as in study 2, were shown in Table 7-17.  In this section the same 
numbering scheme is used as in Chapter 7.  All questions have the same putative conclusion: 
X DisjointWith Y.  As in Table 7-17, two different typefaces are used for the first axioms to 
indicate semantic equivalence of axioms and draw attention to the fact that the questions can 
be grouped into four semantically equivalent pairs: {1, 4}; {2, 3}; {5, 8}; {6, 7}.  For this 
study these questions were modified by the replacements described above.  For six of the 
questions there was no difference between the two variants.  However, in their original form 
questions 3 and 7 contain the class description not (has_child some MALE).  In variant 1 
some was replaced with including as in the other questions.  In variant 2, any was used, i.e. 
not (has_child any MALE).  As with the analogous questions in Chapter 7, all questions have 
the same putative conclusion: X DisjointWith Y.  Table 8-14 shows the questions used in this 
study, including the two variants of questions 3 and 7. Table 8-15 shows the proportion of 
correct responses for the questions in study 2 and the current study.  For the latter, separate 
data are shown for the two variants when the questions differ.  The table also shows the data 
aggregated for all questions excluding questions 3 and 7, and aggregated for questions 3 and 
7.  Similarly, Table 8-16 shows the data for response times. 
Table 8-14 Negation and restriction questions as used in study 3. 
 first axiom second axiom validity 
1 A SubClassOf has_child including (not FEMALE) B SubClassOf 
has_child 
noneOrOnly 
FEMALE 
valid 
2 A SubClassOf has_child noneOrOnly (not FEMALE) not valid 
3 variant 1 not valid 
A SubClassOf not (has_child including FEMALE ) 
variant 2 
A SubClassOf not (has_child any FEMALE ) 
4 A SubClassOf not (has_child only FEMALE) valid 
5 A SubClassOf has_child some (not FEMALE) B SubClassOf 
has_child 
including 
FEMALE 
not valid 
6 A SubClassOf has_child only (not FEMALE) valid 
7 variant 1 valid 
A SubClassOf not (has_child including FEMALE ) 
variant 2 
A SubClassOf not (has_child any FEMALE ) 
8 A SubClassOf not (has_child only FEMALE) not valid 
N.B. the putative conclusion in each case was A DisjointWith B. 
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Table 8-15 Negation and restriction questions – percentage correct 
 study 2 
N = 28 
study 3: both 
variants; N = 30 
study 3: variant 
1; N = 15 
study 3: variant 
2; N = 15 
 only, some noneOrOnly, including not … any 
1 61% 80%   
2 50% 73%   
3 68% 70% 67% 73% 
4 75% 90%   
5 64% 70%   
6 50% 70%   
7 79% 80% 73% 87% 
8 68% 67%   
Exc Q3 and Q7 61% 75%   
Q3 and Q7 73% 75% 70% 80% 
 
 
Table 8-16 Negation and restriction questions – mean time (standard deviation) 
 study 2 
N = 24 
study 3: both variants 
N = 30 
study 3: variant 1  
N = 15 
study 3: variant 2  
N = 15 
 only, some noneOrOnly, including not … any 
 overall correct incorr overall correct incorr overall correct incorr overall correct incorr 
1 52 
(39) 
38 
(24) 
80 
(50) 
42 
(33) 
40 
(35) 
46 
(30) 
      
2 33 
(18) 
32 
(14) 
34 
(22) 
29 
(20) 
30 
(22) 
26 
(11) 
      
3 45 
(22) 
43 
(24) 
49 
(16) 
69 
(127) 
67 
(149) 
76 
(57) 
55 
(49) 
30 
(22) 
104 
(53) 
84 
(175) 
100 
(203) 
40 
(43) 
4 43 
(25) 
40 
(24) 
57 
(24) 
41 
(32) 
36 
(19) 
87 
(83) 
      
5 41 
(30) 
42 
(32) 
38 
(27) 
30 
(21) 
27 
(21) 
36 
(21) 
      
6 44 
(40) 
38 
(25) 
52 
(55) 
33 
(33) 
33 
(38) 
35 
(18) 
      
7 43 
(37) 
34 
(26) 
79 
(53) 
29 
(16) 
30 
(17) 
26 
(13) 
26 
(14) 
25 
(14) 
26 
(16) 
33 
(18) 
33 
(19) 
27 
(4) 
8 60 
(37) 
61 
(42) 
58 
(29) 
38 
(24) 
39 
(26) 
35 
(20) 
      
Exc Q3 
and 7 
45 
(33) 
42 
(29) 
52 
(39) 
35 
(28) 
34 
(28) 
39 
(29) 
      
Q3  
and 7 
44 
(30) 
38 
(25) 
62 
(37) 
49 
(92) 
47 
(103) 
56 
(50) 
40 
(38) 
28 
(17) 
70 
(57) 
58 
(125) 
64 
(139) 
36 
(34) 
 
8.5.1. noneOrOnly and including – hypothesis H8.7 
To avoid the confounding effect of the introduction of not … any in variant 2 for questions 
3 and 7, an analysis was conducted based on the six questions excluding questions 3 and 7.  
Tables 8-15 and 8-16 show the mean results for these six questions.  The use of noneOrOnly 
and including led to a significant increase in accuracy (Fisher’s Exact Test, p = 0.008) and 
reduction in response time (t(284.57) = 2.7897, p = 0.006)146.  There is an appreciable 
increase in accuracy for the two questions which were answered worst in study 2, i.e. 
questions 2 and 6.  The former requires the second model for the universal restriction, i.e. 
the realisation that the universal restriction can be trivially satisfied. 
It is possible to separate out the effects of noneOrOnly and including, although at the expense 
of reduced sample sizes.  Questions 2 and 4 use only the universal restriction.  For these 
questions, this study has a higher proportion of correct responses and a reduced mean 
                                                 
146 In fact, the conclusion is the same if we retain questions 3 and 7.  A Fisher’s Exact Test gives p = 0.015 and 
the result for the t-test is t(394.79) = 2.7744, p = 0.006. 
 172 
 
response time, compared to study 2.  However, neither of these differences was significant 
(p = 0.192, Fisher’s Exact Test, two-sided; t(104.75) = 1.2697, p = 0.207). 
Questions 5 and 7 use only the existential restriction.  However, the situation is complicated 
here by the fact that, in variant 2, question 7 uses the construction not … any.  To avoid this 
confounding effect, a comparison can be made for these two questions between study 2 and 
variant 1 of this study.  In this case the percentage of correct responses is the same in both 
cases (71%), but there is a significantly lower response time in study 3, variant 1 (t(88.697) 
= 2.0266, p = 0.046). 
In summary, there was support for hypothesis H8.7.  The use of noneOrOnly and including 
in place of only and some significantly increased accuracy and significantly reduced 
response time.  Attempting to separate out the effects of the two changes appreciably reduces 
sample size.  The only significant result when the two changes are separated, is that the 
replacement of some by including significantly reduced response time. 
8.5.2. not ... any – hypothesis H8.8 
Questions 3 and 7 provide an opportunity to investigate the effect of using not ... any in 
variant 2.  Inspection of the percentage of correct responses indicates little difference in 
accuracy between study 2 and the two variants of this study.  A logistic analysis showed no 
significant difference in percentage of correct responses between the three cases (p = 0.653).  
A one-way ANOVA for the aggregated response time data from questions 3 and 7 also 
showed no variation across the three cases (F(2, 105) = 0.602, p = 0.550).  Thus there is no 
evidence that the use of not ... any makes any significant difference to performance.   
In summary, there was no support for hypothesis H8.8.  The use of not ... any in place of not 
... some had no significant effect on accuracy or response time. 
8.5.3. Discussion 
Table 8-17 summarises the hypotheses discussed in this section.  Taken together, the use of 
noneOrOnly and including both significantly increase accuracy and reduce response time.  
More investigation is required to investigate the individual effects of noneOrOnly and 
including, but the evidence presented here indicates that including leads to a significant 
reduction in response time. 
Table 8-17 Negation and restrictions – summary of hypotheses 
 accuracy response time 
H8.7 - noneOrOnly and 
including in place of only 
and some 
significant increase in 
accuracy 
significant reduction in 
response time 
H8.8 – not ... any in place 
of not ... some 
no significant difference 
 
8.6. Nested restrictions 
Study 2 included eight questions making use of nested restrictions, as shown in Table 7-25.  
In variant 1 of this study, analogous questions to the study 2 questions were created by 
replacing only with noneOrOnly and some with including.  This provided another 
opportunity to investigate hypotheses H8.7.  Table 8-18 shows the questions used in variant 
1. 
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In study 2, four of the questions used a named class Y, whilst in the other four questions the 
corresponding class is anonymous.  This enabled an investigation of hypothesis H7.12: 
H7.12 There will be a difference in reasoning performance between the equivalent 
use of a named class and an anonymous class. 
In study 2 there was no significant difference in accuracy between the questions with two 
axioms joined with a named class and the questions with one axiom; for response time the 
analysis was more ambiguous.  However, the two sets of questions were different, thereby 
potentially biaising the results of the analysis.  In this study, variant 1 used named and 
anonymous classes as in the original study.  This enabled the controlled comparison between 
study 2 and variant 1 described in subsection 8.6.1.  However, for variant 2, questions 1 to 
4 reversed the usage, i.e. questions 1 and 3 used a named class whilst questions 2 and 4 used 
an anonymous class.  This enabled further investigation of hypothesis H7.12 with a 
controlled comparison between the use of named and anonymous classes.   
In study 2, the final axiom of questions 5 to 8 included the construct not ... some.  For this 
study, in variant 2 this was replaced by not ... any, whilst only and some were replaced with 
noneOrOnly and including, as in variant 1.  Thus, for these questions, comparison of the two 
variants allows further investigation of hypothesis H8.8.  Table 8-19 shows the questions 
used in variant 2. 
Table 8-18 Questions employing nested restrictions; study 3: variant 1. 
 first axiom(s) final axiom valid 
1 A SubClassOf (has_child including (has_child including 
MALE)) 
x has_child y; 
y Type has_child 
including (not 
MALE) 
not valid 
2 A SubClassOf has_child including B; 
B EquivalentTo has_child noneOrOnly MALE 
not valid 
3 A SubClassOf (has_child noneOrOnly (has_child including 
MALE)) 
not valid 
4 A SubClassOf has_child noneOrOnly B; 
B EquivalentTo has_child noneOrOnly MALE 
valid 
5 A SubClassOf has_child including B; 
B EquivalentTo has_child including MALE 
x has_child y; 
y Type (not 
(has_child 
including 
MALE)) 
not valid 
6 A SubClassOf (has_child including (noneOrOnly MALE)) not valid 
7 A SubClassOf has_child noneOrOnly B; 
B EquivalentTo has_child including MALE 
valid 
8 A SubClassOf (has_child noneOrOnly (has_child 
noneOrOnly MALE)) 
not valid 
N.B. the putative conclusion in each case was x Type (not A). 
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Table 8-19 Questions employing nested restrictions; study 3: variant 2. 
 first axiom(s) final axiom valid 
1 A SubClassOf has_child including B 
B EquivalentTo has_child including MALE 
x has_child y; 
y Type has_child 
including (not 
MALE) 
not valid 
2 A SubClassOf (has_child including (has_child 
noneOrOnly MALE)) 
not valid 
3 A SubClassOf has_child noneOrOnly B 
B EquivalentTo has_child including MALE 
not valid 
4 A SubClassOf (has_child noneOrOnly (has_child 
noneOrOnly MALE)) 
valid 
5 A SubClassOf has_child including B; 
B EquivalentTo has_child including MALE 
x has_child y; 
y Type (not 
(has_child any 
MALE)) 
not valid 
6 A SubClassOf (has_child including (noneOrOnly MALE)) not valid 
7 A SubClassOf has_child noneOrOnly B; 
B EquivalentTo has_child including MALE 
valid 
8 A SubClassOf (has_child noneOrOnly (has_child 
noneOrOnly MALE)) 
not valid 
N.B. the putative conclusion in each case was x Type (not A). 
 
Table 8-20 and Table 8-21 show the percentage of correct responses and the mean response 
times for each question for study 2 and each of the variants of study 3.  The table also shows 
the mean aggregated data for all the questions and for questions 5 to 8.  The aggregated data 
are not shown for variant 2, as the differing processes for generating questions 1 to 4 and 
questions 5 to 8 in variant 2 would not make this data meaningful.  
Table 8-20 Nested restrictions questions – percentage correct 
 study 2 
N = 28 
current study: var 1 
N = 15 
current study: var 2 
N = 15 
 only, some noneOrOnly, including 
1 71% 80% 60% 
2 57% 40% 67% 
3 71% 60% 53% 
4 57% 53% 47% 
 not ... any 
5 54% 40% 67% 
6 64% 73% 73% 
7 71% 53% 47% 
8 50% 60% 53% 
Mean for Q5 to 8 60% 57% 60% 
Mean for all questions 62% 58%  
 
Table 8-21 Nested restrictions questions – mean time (standard deviation) 
 study 2 
N = 24 
current study: var 1 
N = 15 
current study: var 2 
N = 15 
only, some noneOrOnly, including 
overall correct incorr overall correct incorr overall correct incorr 
1 69 (45) 71 (46) 60 (44) 47 (30) 47 (34) 44 (6) 73 (59) 71 (66) 75 (53) 
2 79 (53) 101(55) 52 (37) 65 (20) 67 (18) 64 (23) 68 (41) 74 (43) 57 (36) 
3 63 (43) 63 (46) 65 (38) 54 (31) 45 (13) 68 (45) 79 (46) 92 (44) 64 (46) 
4 63 (39) 56 (27) 72 (52) 100(87) 107 (112) 92 (53) 66 (49) 69 (41) 63 (58) 
5 88 (62) 94 (68) 78 (53) 64 (30) 72 (42) 58 (19) 74 (67) 89 (75) 42 (30) 
6 73 (45) 66 (44) 84 (46) 85 (82) 99 (93) 47 (18) 99 (90) 97 (88) 105 (108) 
7 80 (36) 71 (34) 108(29) 64 (39) 65 (39) 63 (41) 97(102) 131 (140) 67 (43) 
8 55 (30) 50 (23) 59 (36) 83 (35) 87 (36) 77 (36) 63 (37) 70 (42) 54 (30) 
Mean for 
Q5 to Q8 
74 (46) 71 (47) 78 (44) 74 (51) 83 (61) 62 (30) 83 (77) 96 (88) 64 (54) 
Mean for 
all quests 
71 (45) 71 (46) 71 (44) 70 (51) 73 (61) 66 (35)    
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8.6.1. noneOrOnly and including – hypothesis H8.7 
A Fisher’s Exact Test comparing study 2 with variant 1 of study 3, aggregated over all 
questions, showed no significant difference in accuracy (p = 0.420), i.e. the use of 
noneOrOnly and including made no difference to accuracy.  A t-test comparison of study 2 
and variant 1 response times, aggregated over all questions, also showed no significant 
difference (t(288.79) = 0.40724, p = 0.684).  This contrasts with the effect reported in 
subsection 8.4.1.  In particular, the use of including did not appreciably improve questions 
2 and 5, which require the understanding that the first including stipulates a relationship 
(has_child) with a certain individual, but does not preclude the possibility of the same 
relationship with other individuals.  Similarly, the use of the second noneOrOnly in question 
8 does not appear to have created the awareness that there might be no child at all. 
In summary, in contrast to the results presented in subsection 8.5.1, there was no support for 
hypothesis H8.7.  The replacement of only and some with noneOrOnly and including had no 
significant effect on accuracy or response time. 
8.6.2. Anonymous and named classes – hypothesis H7.12 
Questions 1 to 4 of study 3 enabled a comparison between the use of a named and an 
anonymous class in nested restrictions.  Each of questions 1 to 4 occurred in one variant with 
a named class and in the other variant with an anonymous class.  This enables a controlled 
comparison between the use of a named class (Q1 variant 2, Q2 variant 1, Q3 variant 2, Q4 
variant 1) and an anonymous class (Q1 variant 1, Q2 variant 2, Q3 variant 1, Q4 variant 2).  
Note that each participant answered two of the four questions with a named class and the 
other two with an anonymous class.  The aggregated data for these two cases is shown in 
Table 8-22.  A Fisher’s Exact Test revealed no difference in accuracy (p = 0.268) whilst a t-
test did show a significant difference in response time (t(117.99) = 2.5387, p = 0.0124). 
In summary, there was partial support for hypothesis H7.12.  There was no significant 
difference in accuracy between the use of a named and an anonymous class.  However, 
response time was significantly longer in the case of the named class than in the case of the 
anonymous class. 
 
Table 8-22 Named and anonymous classes – percentage correct and response times 
named class; N = 15 anonymous class; N = 15 
% corr mean time (standard deviation) % corr mean time (standard deviation) 
overall correct incorrect overall correct incorrect 
52% 79 (58) 85 (70) 73 (43) 63% 59 (39) 58 (36) 61 (44) 
 
8.6.3. not … any – hypothesis H8.8 
For questions 5 to 8, there was no significant difference in accuracy between the two variants 
(Fisher’s Exact Test, p = 0.853).  Nor was there any significant difference in response time 
between the variants (t(106.86) = 0.19408, p = 0.847).   
In summary, as with the results presented in subsection 8.5.2, there is no support for 
hypothesis H8.8.  The use of not … any in place of not … some had no significant effect on 
accuracy or response time. 
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8.6.4. Discussion 
Table 8-23 summarizes the hypotheses discussed in this section.  In contrast to the previous 
section, the use of noneOrOnly and including made no difference to performance, thus 
offering no support for hypothesis H8.7.  Possibly the use of nested restrictions creates extra 
cognitive load which makes it difficult to take account of the implication of these keywords, 
i.e. that there are two associated mental models.  On the other hand, the results for hypothesis 
H8.8 are consistent with the previous section, i.e. not ... any makes no difference to 
performance.  Finally, the analysis in this section found that the use of a named class took 
significantly longer than the use of an anonymous class. 
Table 8-23 Nested restrictions – summary of hypotheses 
 accuracy response time 
H7.12 – anonymous versus 
named classes 
no significant difference responses to questions 
using named class 
significantly longer 
H8.7 - noneOrOnly and 
including in place of only 
and some 
no significant difference 
H8.8 – not ... any in place 
of not ... some 
no significant difference 
 
8.7. Participant feedback 
As in the previous studies, at the end of this study participants were given the opportunity to 
respond to three questions: 
• What did you find difficult about the quiz? 
• What did you find easy about the quiz? 
• Do you have any general comments about the quiz? 
In addition, some participants made verbal comments both during and after completion of 
the questions.  This section reports on the most commonly occurring and relevant of these 
written and verbal comments.  Very many of the comments were about the general difficulty 
of the questions; others were commenting on the format of the study.  When interpreting the 
more specific comments, it should be remembered that in usability studies it is not 
necessarily the case that the option which participants favour is the one with which they 
perform best.  For example, Cockburn and McKenzie (2001), working with document 
management systems found that there was a significant preference for 3D systems over 2D 
systems, but no significant difference in task performance.  An additional caveat is that the 
comments are not necessarily representative of the overall participant experience. 
The most commonly reported problem was the difficulty of holding all the necessary 
information in memory, represented by one comment: “Most difficult is having to keep many 
different sets in mind at the same time...”.  As with the previous study, a number of 
participants expressed a wish to use pen and paper.  Also as with the previous study, there 
were diverging views on the relative difficulty of the sections.  For example, one participant 
regarded the section on functional properties as being the hardest, another participant thought 
it probably the easiest.  Four participants found the section with intersection and union 
relatively easy; one found it difficult. 
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A number of other groups of questions were singled out as being difficult.  Two participants 
explicitly identified the nested restrictions section as being difficult, whilst three participants 
identified nested expressions generally as difficult.  Two participants identified unnamed 
(i.e. anonymous) classes with property restrictions as difficult.  Two participants reported 
confusion over the use of two names for the same individual (i.e. in the object property 
section).  In addition, one participant commented on the difficulty of double negation.   
There were some comments on the effects of the MOS modifications.  One participant 
commented favourably on the notation for the existential and universal restrictions 
(noneOrOnly and including), but explicitly excluded from this not … any.  In response to 
the question “what did you find easy about the quiz?”, another participant noted the 
“noneOrOnly and including questions which did not involve individuals”, presumably a 
reference to the negation and restriction section.  Another participant specifically referred to 
noneOrOnly as being “very clear”.  However, one of the participants who found the nested 
restrictions section particularly difficult, commented on finding the noneOrOnly and 
including keywords confusing.  One participant thought not … any difficult despite being 
intuitive, because it differed from what the participant was used to.  There was one specific 
reference to the use of solely: “the solely keyword was of help on getting the difference btw 
functional/inv functional”.   
There were three comments about except.  One was unfavourable; the participant thought 
“not is more clear than except”.  Another merely identified “the disjoint union with except” 
questions as being difficult.  The third identified the "except/not/including" questions as 
being easier than the questions on inverse functional properties.  
As in the previous study, the topic of realistic versus abstract names was raised.  One 
respondent made the comment: “It would be even harder in an abstract domain, e.g. the 
questions about children would be much harder without a concept of grandchild”.  Thus the 
use of realistic names enabled the participant to make use of a concept not explicit in the 
question, in a way which would be more difficult and less intuitive if abstract names were 
used. 
8.8. Effect of participant prior knowledge and experience 
Participants were asked the same questions about themselves as in the previous study: two 
questions about their knowledge of formal logic and DLs; a third about their usage of DLs; 
and a question about their relationship to English.  Tables 8-24 to 8-27 show the four 
questions and the percentage of responses to each answer. 
Table 8-24 Knowledge of Logic – percentage breakdown of participants; N = 30 
Please rate your knowledge of formal logic on the following scale 
No knowledge at all 3% 
A little knowledge, e.g. from an introductory course in formal logic 23% 
Some knowledge, e.g. from a university course in formal logic 47% 
Expert knowledge 27% 
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Table 8-25 Knowledge of DLs – percentage breakdown of participants; N = 30 
Please rate your knowledge specifically of OWL or other Description Logic  
formalisms 
No knowledge at all 13% 
A little knowledge, e.g. from an introductory course 47% 
Some knowledge, e.g. working knowledge to create or edit ontologies 27% 
Expert knowledge 13% 
 
Table 8-26 Usage of DLs – percentage breakdown of participants; N = 30 
Please indicate whether and for what purpose you use OWL or another Description 
Logic formalism 
Do not use 40% 
I am learning about the language (either as part of a formal course or 
informally) 
10% 
I use the language in my work, e.g. to create ontologies 27% 
I am researching the language and its applications 23% 
 
Table 8-27 Relationship with English – percentage breakdown of participants; N = 30 
Please indicate which of the following most accurately describes your relationship 
with English 
English is my main language 40% 
English is one of my main languages 33% 
English is not my main language 27% 
 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients were computed for each pairwise correlation 
between the four factors.  As in the previous studies, the responses to the question about 
usage of DLs were assumed to be on an ordinal scale: ‘Do not use’: ‘I am learning…’; ‘I 
use…’; ‘I am researching’.  There was no significant correlation between the respondents’ 
relationship with English and the other three factors.  Significance here was calculated on a 
two-sided basis since there was no a priori expectation of a particular polarity of correlation.  
Table 8-28 shows the correlation coefficients and significance levels between the other three 
factors.  These were calculated on a one-sided basis, since one would expect a positive 
correlation.  There was a significant correlation between all three pairs of factors.  In fact, 
15 of the 30 participants rated their knowledge of logic and OWL / DL the same, whilst 14 
rated their knowledge of logic greater than that of OWL / DL.   
Table 8-28 Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients and significance.   
 knowledge of OWL or 
other DL formalisms 
usage of OWL or other 
DL formalisms 
knowledge of logic ρ = 0.56; p < 0.001 ρ = 0.56; p < 0.001 
knowledge of OWL or 
other DL formalisms 
 ρ = 0.67; p < 0.001 
N.B. the p-values are not computed exactly because of the presence of ties. 
There was no significant Spearman’s rank correlation between participants’ relationship 
with English and performance on the questions, neither in terms of accuracy nor response 
time (accuracy: ρ = -0.09, p = 0.638; time: ρ = -0.04, p = 0.823).  These significance levels 
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were calculated on a two-sided basis, since, as discussed in section 7.8.3, there are opposing 
theories about how performance would be affected.  Table 8-29 shows the Spearman’s rank 
correlation between each of the three other factors and accuracy and time.  The significance 
levels in this case were calculated on a one-sided basis, since the a priori expectation is that 
knowledge and usage would improve performance.  The first point to note is that, for each 
of the three factors, the magnitudes of the two correlation coefficients are broadly equivalent, 
differing at most by 0.09.  Knowledge of logic had the greatest effect on performance, 
followed by usage of DLs; for both these factors there was a significant effect on accuracy 
and response time.  Knowledge of DLs, on the other hand, did not have a significant effect 
on either accuracy or response time. 
Table 8-29 Impact of participant profile on accuracy and response time  
– Spearman’s rank correlations. 
 accuracy response time 
knowledge of logic ρ = 0.48; p = 0.004 ρ = -0.43; p = 0.009 
knowledge of OWL or other DL 
formalisms 
ρ = 0.17; p = 0.191 ρ = -0.24; p = 0.097 
usage of OWL or other DL 
formalisms 
ρ = 0.31; p = 0.047 ρ = -0.40; p = 0.015 
N.B. p-values not computed exactly because of ties 
These results contrast, in places, with those of previous studies.  For example, study 2 found 
that knowledge of DL had a significant effect on accuracy.  These differences are likely to 
reflect the different distribution of participants’ backgrounds in the studies.  Significant 
correlations are more likely to be achieved where the distribution of participants by 
background category is more uniform. 
8.9. Effect of question position 
The analysis of the previous study in section 7.9 indicated that the response time, although 
not the accuracy, depends significantly on the position of the section and the position of the 
question in the section.  The randomization of question order in this study enabled a 
controlled investigation of the effect of question order on performance.  The first subsection 
below looks at the effect of overall position in the study, and also the relationship between 
accuracy and the time taken to respond.  The second subsection separates the effect of the 
position of a question in its section and the effect of the position of the section in the study. 
8.9.1. Position in study 
Figure 8-5 shows the results of a logistic regression of accuracy against the position of a 
question in the study.  The horizontal axis represents each of the 32 positions in the study.  
The circles represent the proportion of correct responses for each position; note that the 30 
questions at each position are randomly selected from the 32 questions in the study.  The 
curve represents the logistic regression, which gave results very close to a straight line over 
the relevant region.  However, this regression was not significant (p = 0.054). 
Regression analysis did show a significant reduction in time with position (F(1, 958) = 62.85, 
p < 0.001).  Figure 8-6 shows the average response time for each position and the regression 
line.  The regression analysis was performed using all the time data, i.e. not just the averages 
shown here.  Note also that time was first transformed using the logarithmic transformation, 
as explained in section 8.2.  For this reason, the regression line shown here is not strictly 
linear.  Figure 8-6 shows an appreciable increase in response time at the beginning of each 
section; the four points at the very top of the figure represent the mean times for the first 
question in each section. 
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Figure 8-5 Proportion of questions correct versus position in study 
 
Figure 8-6 Response time (secs) versus position in study 
It was thought that the time spent on a question might be influencing the accuracy with which 
it is answered.  To investigate this, a logistic regression of proportion of correct responses 
against time was conducted.  This result was not significant (p = 0.078).  However, the mean 
time for the correct responses is 59 seconds, and for the incorrect is 66 seconds, and this 
difference is significant (t(525.6) = 3.2288, p = 0.001).  This may be a consequence of the 
harder questions taking longer and being more prone to incorrect answers. 
To separate out the effects on accuracy of position and response time, a logistic regression 
was performed of accuracy versus position and response time.  This gave no significant top-
level effects (position: p = 0.996; time: p = 0.626).  There was, however, a significant 
interaction between the two factors (p = 0.024).  Letting c represent the proportion of correct 
responses, the resultant model was147: 
logit (c) = 1.166 + 6.145e-05 * position + 1.115e-03 * time - 3.291e-04 * position * time 
The first thing to note is that the coefficients of position and time are positive, whereas in 
the single factor analysis these coefficients are both negative.  This is explained by the 
negative coefficient for the interaction effect. 
                                                 
147 logit represents the logistic function, so logit (c) = ln (c/(1-c)).  In the equations represented here, logit (c) 
is used on the left-hand side, rather than solving the equation to provide a value for c.  Since our interest here 
is in the direction of each effect, and since logit is a monotonically increasing function, the mathematics can 
be simplified by avoiding solving for c. 
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In order to study how one factor influences the effect of the other, we can rewrite this 
equation in two ways.  Firstly, to understand how response time influences the effect of 
position, the equation can be rearranged to: 
logit (c) = 1.166 + 1.115e-03 * time + position * (6.145e-05 - 3.291e-04 * time) 
Since the minimum response time recorded is 4.5 seconds, the expression in brackets will 
always be negative.  Thus, accuracy decreases with position for every value of response time, 
and moreover decreases more rapidly the greater the response time.  The relationship 
between accuracy and position may well be a fatigue effect; the fact that this effect is greater 
when the response time is greater may be because the fatigue effect is greater for questions 
which take longer, i.e. the more difficult questions. 
In order to study how position influences the effect of response time, the equation can be 
rearranged to: 
logit (c) = 1.166 + 6.145e-05 * position + time * (1.115e-03 - 3.291e-04 * position) 
Here, the expression in brackets will be positive for low values of position and then negative 
for higher values.  Equating the expression in brackets to zero gives position ≈ 3.4; i.e. 
accuracy improves with time for the first three questions and then decreases with time for 
the fourth and later questions.  There seem to be two opposing effects here.  Initially, the 
longer a participant spends on a question, the greater the likelihood of getting it correct.  
Later, the time spent on a question is perhaps more an indicator of its difficulty, and hence 
of the chance of getting it wrong. 
8.9.2. Question position in section and section position 
When we perform a logistic regression based on the position of a question in its section, 
rather than overall, the effect of position on accuracy is not significant (p = 0.827).  However, 
a logistic regression against the position of the section shows a significant negative effect (p 
= 0.041).  This suggests that there may be an overall effect of fatigue which is reducing 
accuracy.   
To understand this better, a logistic regression was undertaken of proportion of correct 
responses against both the position of the section in the study and the position of the question 
in the section.  In this case, there is a significant reduction in accuracy with position of the 
section (p = 0.022), but no significant variation with position of question in section (p = 
0.184) and no interaction effect (p = 0.123).  It is possible that there is some kind of fatigue 
effect, which is too small to be significant within a section but becomes significant on a 
section-by-section basis.  It could also be the case that within individual sections, a learning 
effect compensates for the fatigue effect. 
The relationship between response time and question position is somewhat different.  A 
regression analysis shows that the decline in response time with position in section is 
significant (F(1, 958) = 130.3, p < 0.001) as is the decline with overall position (as noted in 
section 8.9.1: F(1, 958) = 62.85, p < 0.001).  A regression analysis of time against section 
order also shows a significant decline in time (F(1, 958) = 27.65, p < 0.001)148.   
                                                 
148 A comparison of the coefficients of log10 time against the regression variate is also interesting; for position 
in section: -0.046752, for overall position: -0.008320, for position of section: -0.04638.  The appreciably 
greater magnitude of the first of these, compared with the second, is likely to be a consequence of the effect on 
response time of the first one or two positions.  As is suggested by Figure 8-6, on a section-by-section basis 
this would create a greater decline in response time than the overall regression curve shown in the figure.   
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A regression analysis of time against position of section and position in section also gives a 
significant result (F(3, 956) = 57.12, p < 0.001).  However, this analysis shows no 
significance dependence on position of section (p =0.546) but a significant negative 
dependence on position within section (p = 0.006) and also a significant negative interaction 
effect (p = 0.029).  The within-section effect indicates that participants accelerate as they 
proceed through a section; this could be a combination of a learning effect plus an effect of 
fatigue.  The lack of a significant intersection effect suggests there is no significant inter-
section learning.  The significant interaction effect indicates that rate of acceleration 
increases for the later sections.   
8.9.3. Discussion 
In summary, there appears to be a weak effect possibly due to fatigue, by which accuracy 
declines during the study.  The effect is so weak as not to be significant within individual 
sections, but is significant on a section-by-section basis.  This has implications for the design 
of such experiments.  It suggests that, whilst prudent, it is not absolutely necessary to 
randomize the position of questions within a section if only accuracy data is being used and 
only comparisons within sections are being made.  If accuracy comparisons are being made 
between sections, rather than just between questions in the same section, then it is necessary 
to randomize the order of the sections, or to use a design which presents different orderings 
to different participants.  These comments are sensitive to the overall structure of the study.  
If a study consisted of 32 questions in one section and it was desired to compare these 
questions, then randomization could be needed. 
For response time, there is a significant variation within a section, so questions do need to 
be randomized, or some appropriate design strategy is required.  On a one-variate approach, 
there is also a significant variation between sections.  On a two-variate approach this is not 
the case, but there is a strong interaction effect between section position and question 
position within the section.  On either analysis, section position needs to be randomized, as 
in this study, or some appropriate design needs to be adopted, as in the two previous studies. 
Finally, when considering accuracy, there is also a significant interaction effect between 
position of a question in the study and the time taken to respond.  On average, for the first 
three questions in the study, accuracy improves with time to respond; possibly because 
greater response time means more thought is being given.  Thereafter, accuracy declines 
with response time; possibly because greater response time is an indicator of greater 
difficulty.  From an alternative viewpoint, accuracy decreases with position more rapidly the 
greater the response time; possibly because the harder questions intensify fatigue.  
8.10. Varying effect of valid and non-valid putative conclusions 
Analysis of the previous study found no evidence that the questions with valid putative 
conclusions were answered significantly more or less accurately than the questions with non-
valid putative conclusions.  There was a significant difference in response time between 
correctly answered valid questions and correctly answered non-valid questions, with the 
latter taking longer.  However, the difference was not significant when the analysis was 
restricted to a subset of the responses, so as to achieve a balanced comparison.  This section 
re-examines these questions using data from study 3. 
8.10.1. Validity and accuracy 
There were 16 questions with valid conclusions and 16 questions with non-valid questions.  
The valid questions were answered rather more accurately than the non-valid (74% 
compared with 69%).  This contrasts with study 2, where the non-valid questions were 
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answered more accurately.  However, as in study 2, the difference was not significant (p = 
0.133, Fisher’s Exact Test, two-sided). 
As with study 2, a more controlled comparison can be made by limiting the questions to 
those pairs of valid and non-valid questions sharing the same axioms.  This is at the expense 
of eliminating a number of questions, including all the questions from the two sections with 
universal and existential restrictions.  There are five pairs of valid and non-valid questions 
with identical axioms: three pairs relating to object properties, i.e. questions 1 to 6 in Table 
8-1; and two pairs of questions relating to Boolean concept constructors, i.e. questions 5, 6 
and 7, 8 in Table 8-9 and Table 8-10.  For these questions, the proportion of correct responses 
to the non-valid questions (79%) is greater than to the valid questions (64%), and this 
difference is significant (p = 0.007, Fisher’s Exact Test, two-sided).  This compares with 
study 2 where the difference had the same polarity but was not significant. 
8.10.2. Validity and response time 
The five pairs of valid and non-valid questions investigated in the previous subsection also 
provide an opportunity to further investigate the effect of question validity on response time.  
The ten questions provide a total of 300 responses, 150 from the valid questions and 150 
from the non-valid questions.  Of these 150 pairs, with both members of each pair from the 
same participant, there are 77 pairs in which both responses are correct.  This enables a 
balanced comparison between valid and non-valid questions.  Of these 77 pairs, the mean 
response time for the valid questions is 64 seconds and for the non-valid is 70 seconds.  This 
difference is not significant (t(76) = 1.5694, p = 0.121, paired two-sided test). 
It might be argued that what determines the participant’s experience is not whether the 
question is valid or non-valid, but rather whether the participant’s response is valid or non-
valid.  This approach enables the analysis to be repeated with a larger sample.  In addition 
to the 77 pairs where a participant has answered both questions correctly, there are also 13 
pairs where a participant answered both questions incorrectly.  This makes a total of 90 pairs 
of responses to questions with identical axioms, with one response being ‘valid’ and one 
response being ‘not-valid’ from each pair.  Of these 90 pairs, the mean response time for the 
valid responses is 65 seconds and for the non-valid responses is 71 seconds.  Again, this 
difference is not significant (t(89) = 1.6387, p = 0.105, paired two-sided test). 
8.11. Discussion 
This section makes some final comments on the study.  Subsection 8.11.1 draws together 
the conclusions, whilst subsection 8.11.2 reviews the threats to validity 
8.11.1. Conclusions 
Study 3 investigated a number of additions to MOS, intended to mitigate the problems 
identified in Chapters 6 and 7, and designed in part with insights from studies in psychology 
and language.  A number of these additions met with some success: 
1. The use of solely significantly reduced response times for the valid questions.  For these 
questions there was a reduction of around 30%, from 81 seconds to 57 seconds. 
2. The replacement of and with intersection significantly improved accuracy, with an 
increase from 25% to 80%. 
3. The replacement of only with noneOrOnly and some with including significantly 
improved accuracy and reduced response time in situations with only negation and 
restriction.  When questions 3 and 7 were excluded, to avoid the confounding effect of 
the introduction of any, the increase in accuracy was from 61% to 75%, whilst the 
 184 
 
reduction in time was around 22%, from 45 seconds to 35 seconds.  However, the change 
was not effective in situations of nested restrictions. 
A decision to implement any of these changes depends on a cost-benefit analysis.  However, 
there is a prima facie argument for introducing changes (1) and (2).  In the case of (1), a 
reduction in time of 30% could be regarded as worthwhile, particularly as it was associated 
with an appreciable but non-significant increase in accuracy from 60% to 72% for the valid 
questions.  In the case of (2), this is a very appreciable increase in accuracy indeed.  The case 
of (3) requires more research, as is discussed below. 
The effect of replacing and with intersection illustrates the need to avoid ambiguous 
language.  This topic is returned to in Chapter 9. 
The effect of replacing and not with except may have the effect of reducing response time.  
However, the results are not conclusive and further investigation is required.  Such an 
investigation should also look at the extent to which the use of except aids modelling.  This 
suggests a more general research question: to what extent can comprehension be aided by 
using language which more naturally fits our thought patterns, rather than fitting those 
thought patterns into the limited vocabulary of a language composed of the operators of 
formal logic. 
The use of noneOrOnly and including appeared successful in situations where the participant 
needed only to manipulate one restriction at a time, but not so when nested restrictions were 
involved.  The complexity created by the use of nested restrictions remains a significant 
challenge.  It may be that better results could be achieved with alternative keywords.  
Krötzsch et al. (2012b), discussing the universal restriction, equate the expression 
∀parentOf.Female to the English phrases “no children other than female ones” and “no 
children that are not female”.  This suggests noneOtherThan or noneNot as alternatives to 
only.  Discussing the existential restriction, they equate ∃parentOf.Female to “individuals 
that are parents of at least one female individual”.  This suggests atLeastOne as an alternative 
to some. 
A number of strategies were not successful.  The use of solely with the inverse functional 
property did not improve performance; an alternative keyword or word order might help 
here.    Moreover, the use of any for the existential restriction when preceded by a negation 
made no difference to performance.  Similarly, the use of prefix notation for conjunction and 
disjunction made no difference to performance. 
Although not directly related to its objectives, the study also suggested that nested 
restrictions with two statements linked by a named class took longer to comprehend than 
with one statement and an anonymous class.  This may relate to the overhead of storing and 
retrieving the extra class name. 
These findings suggest further areas for research.  In particular, how to improve performance 
with inverse functional properties and with nested restrictions. 
As a final point, and returning to the discussion of subsection 2.2.2, note that the replacement 
of and with intersection, and and not with except, is purely concerned with syntax, i.e. with 
changes to MOS to avoid ambiguity.  The other changes discussed are concerned with using 
syntax to mitigate problems inherent in DLs. 
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8.11.2. Threats to validity 
Threats to construct validity 
As in the previous studies, the responses were recorded automatically; this time using the 
MediaLab application.  Moreover, MediaLab also automatically recorded the timepoints.  
This is done with a precision of 1 millisecond.  The supplier, Empirisoft, do caution against 
the use of MediaLab for certain “cognitive / perception trials” for which millisecond 
accuracy is required.  Nevertheless, the accuracy of MediaLab is far greater than that 
achieved by the use of Camtasia in the previous two studies. 
Threats to internal validity 
The previous two studies indicated that question position within section was having a 
material effect on the response time measurements.  Study 3 has overcome this effect by 
randomizing both the order of sections and of questions within sections.  Whilst this was 
really motivated by considerations of response time, the analysis in subsection 8.9.2 also 
indicates that question position does have an effect on accuracy which is not significant 
within sections, but does make itself felt over the duration of a whole study.  Thus, 
randomization of section and question position is also prudent for the collection of accuracy 
data. 
Threats to external validity 
The questions used in this study were mostly isomorphic to those used in study 2.  Like the 
study 2 questions they were representative of commonly used DL constructs but were 
removed from the commonly used contexts employed in study 1.  However, study 2 had 
used these questions to identify generic difficulties, and study 3 similarly addressed solutions 
to those generic difficulties. 
Table 8-24 shows that, as in the previous two studies the majority of participants had at least 
some knowledge of logic, i.e. greater than ‘a little knowledge’.  However, unlike in the 
previous studies, only a minority of the participants had at least some knowledge of DLs.  In 
that sense, the participants were more representative of less specialist users. 
Finally, all three studies were concerned with the understanding of DL inferences.  In 
particular, study 3 was concerned with syntactic changes to improve that understanding.  The 
studies did not address the complementary issue of modelling, and whether syntactic changes 
might improve ease of modelling.  When modelling, one needs to understand the 
consequences of the axioms being written.  Thus, the ability to reason with DL is necessary 
for modelling with DL.  However, there may be other factors which determine success in 
modelling.  These would need to be investigated in experiments which involved participants 
in modelling tasks.
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9. Discussion – theory and methodology 
There is nothing inherent in mathematical logic that makes it the study of reason. 
George Lakoff, ‘Women, Fire and Dangerous Things’, (1987) 
Chapter 14, page 223 
 
Certain aspects of classical logic do seem to be used in reason. 
ibid., Afterword, page 586 
This chapter reviews the chief themes which have run through the dissertation.  Section 9.1 
begins by discussing the use of theory, from cognitive psychology and the philosophy of 
language.  Section 9.2 then looks at ambiguity in natural language, taking as examples the 
confusion surrounding the words and and or.  Confusion in interpreting and contributes to 
some of the difficulties with MOS, and is in part related to the difference between logic and 
DL.  Section 9.3 then discusses how participants approach answering the questions, and 
compares reasoning in the laboratory with reasoning about real applications.  Section 9.4 
discusses the relationship between the formal concepts of decidability and computational 
tractability, and the difficulties experienced by human reasoners. 
The remainder of the chapter is concerned with methodology.  Section 9.5 makes some 
observations about the relationship between sample size, effect size and significance level.  
Section 9.6 then looks at the methodological lessons learned from the three studies described 
in the preceding chapters.  Finally, Section 9.7 builds on this to make recommendations 
about methodologies for future studies. 
9.1. The uses of theory 
Chapter 3 introduced three theories of reasoning: relating to the use of rules, mental models, 
and the concept of relational complexity.  In the psychological literature, all three theories 
are used to understand the difficulties people experience with reasoning.  Mental model 
theory has also been used to predict the kinds of mistakes which people make in reasoning.  
In the context of this work, these theories have been used to explain performance, as 
discussed in subsection 9.1.1, and as a yardstick for measuring difficulty, as discussed in 
subsection 9.1.2.  The theory of the implicature, developed by philosophers of language, in 
particular Grice (1975), offers an additional insight into the difficulties experienced with 
reasoning using natural language.  These theories also offer the potential to guide language 
design, which is discussed in subsection 9.1.3.  Recently, alternatives have been proposed to 
the theories of reasoning described in this dissertation; some of these alternatives are briefly 
discussed in subsection 9.1.4. 
9.1.1. Explaining performance 
In Chapters 6 and 7, mental model theory was used to explain the difficulties participants 
experienced with negated conjunction and, in certain cases, with restrictions.  No explicit 
use was made of rule-based theory, in the sense of using the rules of logic such as modus 
ponens, as in Rips (1983).  The primary reason for describing rules-based theory was to 
provide a background for mental model theory, which came after it and which can be seen 
as a reaction to it.  However, it did appear that in some situations participants were reasoning 
syntactically rather than building models.  Although not necessarily using the same set of 
rules as proposed by Rips (1983), they were using syntactic reasoning to avoid developing 
detailed models.  For example, they appeared to be recognising complementary classes on 
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the basis of syntax.  At times this helped reasoning.  At other times confusion between not… 
only and only not and between not … some and some not may have led to errors, as discussed 
at the end of subsection 7.5.6.  The use of syntactic and model-based reasoning may in part 
be a response to the particular nature of the question.  It may also be influenced by the 
preferred mode of thinking of the participant.  As already noted, Ford (1995) has observed 
that some people exhibit a preference either for syntactic or spatial reasoning.  The latter can 
be seen as akin to the construction of mental models149. 
Finally, the implicature offers another insight into the difficulties associated with using 
natural language.  In the context of MOS, the most obvious example is the use of only, with 
the implicature that, e.g. has_child only MALE, means that a male child does exist.  
Difficulties may also occur with some, e.g. has_child some MALE may have an implicature 
that there are no female children. 
9.1.2. Measuring difficulty 
Both the rules-based and model-based theories provide a measure of the difficulty of 
inferences.  Rips (1983) calculated probabilities representing the accessibility of particular 
rules, and from this the probability of successfully arriving at conclusions to specific 
inferences.  The mental model theory generally represents difficulty in terms of the number 
of mental models required for an inference.  Additionally, it was suggested in Chapter 7 that 
the complexity of the individual models was another differentiator.  Relational Complexity 
theory (Halford et al., 1998) also provides a measure of complexity.  Whilst in principle 
applicable to any type of reasoning, in the context of DLs, RC theory is most readily 
applicable to reasoning about object properties, since these describe relations.  Work 
reported in Chapter 7 demonstrated that RC is a useful measure of difficulty.  RC theory also 
enabled a controlled comparison between different types of reasoning, i.e. based on transitive 
and functional properties, which illustrated that the characteristics of the relation is also a 
factor influencing difficulty150. 
9.1.3. Language design 
Some of the new syntactic constructs described in Chapter 8 were influenced by the theories 
of reasoning and language.  noneOrOnly and including were intended to guide the participant 
in formulating both the mental models associated with the universal and existential 
restrictions, and to avoid the implicatures associated with only and some.  The use of solely 
with the functional object property was not directly inspired by any theory.  However, RC 
theory was used to identify that functional properties posed a particular difficulty.  That this 
difficulty was, at least in part, to do with the direction of uniqueness, was suggested by the 
comment of at least one participant.  On the other hand, the use of not … any and except was 
not influenced by theory, but by a desire to match the syntax of DL to natural language151.  
                                                 
149 Ford (1995) claims that spatial reasoning is different from the construction of mental models, in that in the 
former “the class itself and not the finite members of the class is represented”.  Khemlani and Johnson-Laird 
(2012) dispute this, based on the experiment protocols quoted by Ford (1995).  Any difference may have to do 
with the availability of pen and paper in the latter’s experiment.  In any case, spatial and mental model 
reasoning both create models and are clearly differentiated from syntactic reasoning. 
150 In both the transitive and functional properties compared in study 2, the ordering of the entities in the relation 
is significant.  In symmetric relations, the order is irrelevant and this would presumably facilitate reasoning.  
RC theory does not appear to take this into account.  Relations in which the ordering is irrelevant are sometimes 
termed ‘relationships’ (Codd, 1970). 
151 An alternative inspiration for language design might come from logical patterns or macros, e.g. exclusive 
or, as discussed in Horridge et al. (2006). 
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It is possible to use intuition to guide the development of a formal language and then use 
experiment to determine the value of that intuition, as was done for not … any and except.  
However, such experiments are time and labour-intensive.  Theory, when tested and 
accepted can be used to guide language design, at least reducing the need for experiment.  
Indeed, the theories outlined in this dissertation could be used generally to guide the design 
of any formal language. 
9.1.4. Alternative theories of reasoning 
The theories of reasoning used here were chosen in part because of their fundamental 
position in reasoning research.  They were the first to offer insight into reasoning and are 
still of interest in the psychological research community.  Later, probabilistic models were 
developed.  For an early discussion see Oaksford and Chater (2001), who apply the 
probabilistic approach to conditional inference, Wason’s selection task and syllogistic 
reasoning.  The use of probabilistic reasoning makes it theoretically possible to unify 
deductive with inductive reasoning, based on plausibility.  Deductive reasoning can be seen 
as reasoning about statements with an associated probability equal to one.  Inductive 
reasoning can be seen as reasoning about statements with associated probability potentially 
less than 1.  In fact, prior to Oaksford and Chater’s work (2001), Johnson-Laird (1994) had 
put forward the view that mental models can explain both types of reasoning.  In this view, 
the proportion of mental models for which a putative conclusion is consistent is a measure 
of the likelihood of its correctness in the real world, and is the basis of inductive reasoning; 
whilst consistency across all mental models, indicating a probability of one, is the basis of 
deductive reasoning. 
Rips (2001a) compares deductive and inductive reasoning.  He shows that participants will 
state that a deductively incorrect argument is correct if it is plausible.  The converse, stating 
that a deductively correct argument is incorrect if it is implausible, occurred much less 
frequently.  However, Rips (2001b) argues against the idea that one theory can apply to both 
inductive and deductive reasoning.  In particular, he rejects the view that mental models can 
explain both types of reasoning (Johnson-Laird, 1994).  More recently, Lassiter and 
Goodman (2015) claim to have refuted objections to the probabilistic approach, and in 
particular the view that two forms of reasoning are required, one for induction and one for 
deduction.   
Subsection 9.1.1 noted that, in some cases participants seemed to use syntactic reasoning, 
akin to the rule-based approach of Rips (1983), whilst in other cases they seemed to develop 
models.  Perhaps, in some cases, the syntactic approach offers a simple, quick route to a 
solution.  In other cases, this approach is difficult and participants fall back on building 
models.  Supporting this standpoint, and arguing against the view that all human reasoning 
is inductive, Rips (2001b) points out that people can appreciate some reasoning arguments 
where they must rely on the pattern of the argument.  Lakoff (1987, Chapter 17) offers an 
explanation for the schemas used in reasoning.  He argues that such schemas arise from 
bodily experience.  One of the most basic of these is what he calls the container schema, i.e. 
something is contained inside of another object, whilst a third object may be outside.  He 
suggests that this is the basis of modus ponens and of the logic of Boolean classes.  It would 
also appear to be the basis of the most simple of syllogisms: all A are B; all B are C; therefore 
all A are C.  Perhaps this is why modus ponens and this particular syllogism are easy – they 
rest on a very simple and obvious schema. 
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An altogether different direction in reasoning research is exemplified by Ragni et al. (2016), 
who were concerned with formally modelling non-monotonicity.  This is observed in human 
reasoning when additional information suppresses inferences which would otherwise have 
been made.  An example they quote comes from Byrne (1989):  
1. If she has an essay to write, then she will study late in the library. 
2. If the library stays open, she will study late in the library. 
3. She has an essay to write. 
Here, statements (1) and (3) should lead to the conclusion that “she will study late in the 
library”.  However, the presence of statement (2) resulted in 38% of study participants 
making this conclusion and 62% concluding that “she may or may not study late in the 
library”.  Ragni et al. (2016) observe that “some non-monotonic logics seem to be adequate 
to describe human commonsense reasoning”.  The work represents an interesting attempt to 
relate observed facts of human reasoning to non-classical formal logic. 
All these various theories of reasoning may offer insight to guide the design of languages 
for human-computer interaction, particularly those languages, like DLs, which are based on 
logic.  From a practical perspective, it is not important that no universal model of reasoning 
has won acceptance.  Each of the alternative theories may offer some insight in particular 
circumstances. 
9.2. Ambiguity in natural language – the examples of and and or 
Natural language offers the possibility of providing a knowledge representation format 
which conforms with human thought patterns.  However, this can be at the price of 
ambiguity.  This is exemplified by the word and.  Evidence of the ambiguity which surrounds 
the word is provided by Mendonça et al. (1998), whose analysis of medical terminology, 
already cited in Chapter 4, found that 51% of the occurrences represented conjunctions, 46% 
inclusive disjunctions, and 3% exclusive disjunctions.  Partee and Rooth (1983) consider 
this ambiguity from the standpoint of formal semantics.  The details of their analysis are 
beyond the scope of this dissertation.  However, some of their examples are instructive.  In 
the next subsection, 9.2.1, they are accompanied by this author’s own analysis, aimed at 
illustrating the difficulties which arise with the use of the word in MOS.  or also presents 
difficulties, and this is discussed in subsection 9.2.2.  Subsection 9.2.3 then discusses the 
difference between the use of and and or in logic and MOS, and makes a general observation 
about the difference between logic and DL.  Subsection 9.2.4 makes a final comment. 
9.2.1. and as conjunction and union 
Amongst other examples, Partee and Rooth (1983) give: 
1. Susan will retire and buy a farm. 
2. John and Mary are in Chicago. 
3. She was wearing a new and expensive dress. 
(1) is clearly a conjunction.  It is shorthand for the conjunction of two propositions:  
1'.  (Susan will retire) and (Susan will buy a farm). 
(2) can also be interpreted as a conjunction: 
 2'. (John is in Chicago) and (Mary is in Chicago). 
However, and here can also be regarded as representing union: 
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 2''.  {John} ⋃ {Mary} are in Chicago. 
 (3) can again be regarded as a conjunction: 
 3'. (She was wearing a new dress) and (She was wearing an expensive dress). 
 However, here and can be regarded as representing intersection: 
 3''. She was wearing a {new dress} ⋂ {expensive dress}. 
In each of these three examples, the underlying semantics of and is the conjunction of two 
propositions.  However, in (2) and (3), an interpretation in terms of class operations may be 
more natural.  Moreover, it could be argued that union, rather than intersection, is a more 
natural interpretation of and, since intersection is often achieved simply by juxtaposing 
adjectives, e.g.: 
 3'''. She was wearing a new, expensive dress. 
Thus, the use of and in MOS, to represent intersection, can be ambiguous for those who rely 
on intuition from natural langauge. 
9.2.2. or as union and uncertainty 
or also presents difficulties.  Menonça et al.’s (1998) analysis identified the ambiguity 
between inclusive and exclusive disjunction.  However, a more fundamental confusion is 
between or representing union and or representing uncertainty. 
Example (2) above used and to create a union.  The use of or to represent union, as in MOS, 
is clearly wrong in this context: 
 2A.  John or Mary is152 in Chicago. 
Here, or represents uncertainly, since 2A is a contraction of the disjunction153: 
 2A'. (John is in Chicago) or (Mary is in Chicago). 
However, Partee and Rooth (1983) give another example: 
4. The department is looking for a phonologist or a phonetician. 
The underlying semantics of or is again disjunction: 
4' (The department is looking for a phonologist) or (the department is looking 
for a phonetician) 
However, this statement is ambiguous.  It could imply uncertainty on the part of the 
originator of the sentence.  It could also imply that the department is looking for someone 
from either discipline, i.e. from the class which is the union of phonologists and 
phoneticians: 
 4'' The department is looking for {phonologist} ⋃ {phonetician}. 
                                                 
152 are has been replaced here by is, in accordance with normal usage.  Retaining the plural form would not 
create the desired semantics of union, merely render the sentence ungrammatical. 
153 Whether we regard or here as inclusive or exclusive disjunction, the effect is still to represent uncertainty.  
For inclusive disjunction this is between two possibilities (John is in Chicago or Mary is in Chicago).  For 
exclusive disjunction it is between three possibilities (John is in Chicago, or Mary is in Chicago, or they are 
both in Chicago). 
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In this example, or has the same meaning as in MOS. 
9.2.3. Logic and DL 
The preceding two sections have demonstrated that whilst and and or in natural language 
can have the meanings ascribed to them in MOS, they can also have alternative meanings: 
union in the case of and; uncertainty in the case of or.  Language, when used to express facts 
rather than, e.g. emotions, is comprised of propositions.  In this respect, natural language is 
similar to formal logic.  When we write natural language as a set of propositions, then and 
and or have the meaning of conjunction and disjunction respectively.  The ambiguity with 
and arises because the contracted forms (2) and (3) above lead to different interpretations in 
terms of sets.  The ambiguity with or arises because both (4) and its expanded form (4') have 
two potential interpretations: that either discipline will suffice or that there is uncertainty as 
to which. 
Baader and Nutt (2003) describe DLs as “a family of knowledge representation formalisms 
… equipped with a formal, logic-based semantics”.  This quote identifies that DLs are logic-
based; they are not, strictly speaking, logics.  Logics are concerned with propositions.  For 
example, Boolean operators can be used to combine propositions, and quantifiers are used 
to define propositions.  DLs are a calculus of classes.  Boolean operators, or Boolean concept 
constructors, are used to combine classes, and restrictions are used to define classes154. 
In the context of logic, and and or are unambiguous.  In the context of classes, they are 
ambiguous and do not necessarily equate to their use in MOS.  Indeed, it could be argued 
that and, when used between individuals and classes normally represents union, whilst or 
normally conveys uncertainty. 
The adoption of the keywords union and intersection in DL avoids this ambiguity.  A point 
to note is that union is used in everyday English, e.g. ‘the United Kingdom is the union of 
England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland’.  Intersection, in everyday usage, is 
confined to lines, and by extension streets and roads.  It is not used more generally.  As noted 
above, in everyday language the intersection of two sets is often represented by juxtaposing 
two adjectives (‘new, expensive dress’). 
The lack of a commonplace word for set intersection in English was presumably the 
motivation for the search for an alternative in MOS.  The choice of and presumably arises 
because, if we take P(x) and Q(x) to be predicates representing membership of classes CP 
and CQ respectively, then (P and Q)(x) represents the intersection of these two classes, CP ⋂ 
CQ.  Similarly, the choice of or arises because (P or Q)(x) represents the union of the two 
classes, CP ⋃ CQ.  This is also presumably the motivation for using conjunction, disjunction, 
and (by a similar argument) negation as synonyms for intersection, union and complement, 
as in Krötsch et al. (2012), and as used in this dissertation.  However, this is a logician’s 
usage, not a commonplace one.   
9.2.4. Comment 
The preceding analysis has demonstrated that and and or are ambiguous in everyday English; 
and that they are very commonly used with meanings quite different from those in MOS.  
                                                 
154 The distinction between Propositional Logic and Boolean concept constructors in DL is analogous to that 
between two common interpretations of Boolean algebra.  In one, Boolean algebra is interpreted as an algebra 
of propositions; in the other it is interpreted as an algebra of classes.  The two cases are frequently distinguished 
by the use of the operator symbols ˄ and ˅ for the algebra of propositions and ⋂ and ⋃ for the algebra of 
classes. 
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The aim was not to denigrate the use of natural language.  Indeed, in Chapter 7 use was made 
of except (with some evidence of success) and not … any (with no evidence of success) in 
an attempt to improve reasoning by coming closer to natural language usage.  However, 
when natural language is adopted, great care needs to be taken to avoid any ambiguous 
usage. 
9.3. Reasoning in the wild and in the laboratory 
The axioms and conclusions used in the studies were chosen to represent the kind of 
reasoning which would take place in real life situations.  Nevertheless, an experimental study 
is necessarily an artificial situation.  However close the questions are to real life reasoning, 
there remains scope for debate as to how close is the experience.  Two aspects of the 
experimental experience are considered here: how participants answer the questions, in 
particular whether they attempt to confirm or refute validity; and the use of meaningful or 
non-meaningful names. 
9.3.1. Confirming or refuting validity 
An important motivation for this work, as for that of Horridge et al. (2011) and Nguyen et 
al. (2012, 2013), is to improve the understanding of how an entailment follows from a 
particular justification.  In a real situation, people will start with the assumption of validity.  
It is not a priori clear whether this would generally also be the case in the context of an 
experimental study, where participants are expecting some questions with non-valid 
conclusions.  The quantitative data from the three studies could offer some indication as to 
how these questions are answered.  In particular, if participants start by seeking to prove 
validity, a non-valid response would arise after a failure to prove validity.  As a consequence, 
we would expect the valid responses to be given more quickly than non-valid responses.  
Note that valid responses are a combination of the correct responses to valid questions and 
incorrect responses to non-valid questions, and vice versa for non-valid responses. 
Table 9-1 Mean and standard deviation of valid and non-valid response times 
study Mean (s.d.) time - secs t-test 
Valid responses Non-valid 
responses 
all data 
1 49 (35) 59 (40) t(206.73) = 2.8986, p = 0.004 
2 60 (44) 71 (52) t(813.98) = 3.4977, p < 0.001 
3 56 (50) 66 (61) t(952.46) = 3.987, p < 0.001 
balanced 
data 
2 69 (50) 75 (57) t(115) = 1.1616, p = 0.248 
3 65 (54) 71 (44) t(89) = 1.6387, p = 0.105 
 
Table 9.1 shows that in all three studies, when all the data was used, the valid responses took 
at least ten seconds less than the non-valid responses, and in each case this difference was 
significant.  However, this analysis is open to the objection that the effect of the nature of 
the responses may be confounded with other factors.  The table also shows, for studies 2 and 
3, a balanced comparison.  Here, only the responses are used from those questions which 
occur in pairs, each pair with the same axioms and a valid and non-valid putative conclusion.  
Moreover, only pairs from each participant were used where the participant had answered 
both questions correctly or both questions incorrectly.  This has the effect of providing a 
matching set of valid and non-valid responses to the same questions, and enables a paired t-
test to be conducted, where the pairing is both on the participants and the question-pairs.  
Again, for both studies 2 and 3, the valid responses were received more quickly than the 
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non-valid.  However, with the balanced data the difference in mean response times reduced 
to 6.2 seconds for study 2 and 5.3 seconds for study 3, and in each case the difference was 
not significant. 
Thus, on the basis of the balanced data, there is no evidence of a significant difference 
between the valid and non-valid responses.  Hence there is no evidence that participants start 
by trying to prove validity, but equally, there is no evidence that participants try to disprove 
validity.  The reason for the reduction in effect size when only the balanced data is used 
requires further investigation155. 
9.3.2. Meaningful and non-meaningful names 
Studies such as those described in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 ought to correspond as closely as 
possible to the experience of a real application.  On the other hand, they need to ensure that 
no prior domain knowledge will bias the results.  Horridge et al. (2011) satisfy the latter 
requirement by using abstract names, e.g. C1, C2, prop1, prop2.  However, this deviates 
from the former requirement, in that in general ontologists use meaningful names.  The use 
of abstract names may impose difficulties not present in real applications.  In particular, it 
may make recalling entities more difficult and thereby impose an irrelevant burden on the 
participant.  As an alternative, Nguyen et al. (2012) use a combination of meaningless names 
(‘kalamanthis’, ‘tendriculos’), meaningful names (‘plant’, ‘animal’), and also names which 
are not real English words but have a semblance of being real words (‘merfolk’, ‘lizardfolk’).   
The studies described here adopted a mixed approach.  All three studies used a combination 
of meaningful and abstract names.  In particular, object properties were represented by 
meaningful names, as were some classes.  In each study the handout noted that the names 
used should not affect any conclusions to be drawn.  However, it is doubtful whether 
participants really achieve this detachment.  The difficulty, noted in subsection 7.7.3, that 
one participant had in regarding has_nearest_neighbour as functional is illustrative of this.  
The participant, mentioned section 8.7, who used the concept of ‘grandchild’, not mentioned 
in the question, offers another illustration. 
It is also doubtful whether this degree of detachment is ideal, since it is removed from actual 
experience.  A particular example of this is associated with the characteristics of object 
properties.  It is likely that the user of an ontology has a reasonable idea of whether a 
particular object property is, e.g. transitive or functional.  The Characteristics statement may 
serve to confirm any expectations, but it is primarily for the benefit of the computer, not the 
human.  As a result, the human reasoner may often be using an inherent understanding of 
the characteristics of object properties, rather than falling back on their defined 
characteristics.  Johnson-Laird et al. (1989, page 668) make the same point when they argue 
that the logical properties of a term, e.g. the transitivity and symmetry of “is in the same 
place as” emerges “without any need to use explicit statements of these properties in the 
form of meaning postulates”.    This suggests that the best environment for investigating 
difficulties and testing out new syntax is the real application which the ontologist uses.  Such 
an approach will be limited in sample size.  An alternative is to use a real application, but 
                                                 
155 It might be thought that the differing results when using all the responses and when using the balanced 
responses was due to the absence of restrictions in the balanced questions.  However, this is not the case.  In 
studies 2 and 3, when all the responses from the object property and Boolean operator sections were used, the 
difference between the mean times for the valid and non-valid responses was at least 10 seconds, and this 
difference was significant: 
study 2 – valid: 67 seconds; non-valid: 77 seconds; t(425.85) = 2.7442, p = 0.006 
study 3 – valid: 59 seconds; non-valid: 73 seconds; t(475.37) = 4.8675, p < 0.001 
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one with which the participants are not likely to be familiar.  As an example of this, in a 
different kind of study, Vigo et al. (2014b), used a potato ontology. 
9.4. Decidability and tractability 
The theoreticians of machine reasoning have played a great deal of attention to the issues of 
decidability and computational tractability.  OWL DL and OWL 2 DL were designed to 
achieve decidability.  OWL 2 EL, OWL 2 RL and OWL 2 QL were designed not just to 
achieve decidability, but also computational tractability in particular modelling use cases 
(Horridge et al., 2012).  At the same time, a great deal of development effort has been 
expended developing efficient reasoners for particular language profiles, e.g. ELK156 for 
OWL 2 EL.  Students of human reasoning, on the other hand, have paid little attention to 
these issues.   
Consider first decidability.  Decidability is assured in DLs by observing certain rules, e.g. 
see the rules for OWL DL (Bechhofer et al., 2004).  Failure to observe these rules does not 
guarantee undecidability, but rather means that decidability cannot be guaranteed.  In any 
case, all the questions in the three studies in this dissertation are decidable, i.e. the validity 
of the putative conclusion can be proved or a counter-example can be constructed.  This is 
an inevitable consequence of their being within OWL DL. 
Lack of computational tractability is a phenomenon which occurs at scale.  To take an 
example from another domain, it is perfectly possible for a human reasoner, with pen and 
paper, to solve the travelling salesman problem for a limited number of cities by comparing 
every possible route.  With a computer it is possible to solve the problem for many more 
cities than with unaided human reasoning.  The problem is the behaviour of any solution 
algorithm as the number of cities increases.  All the problems in this dissertation can be 
solved in a reasonable time.  What might happen if, for example, the number of quantifiers 
present in a question was increased very considerably is of no relevance.  In effect, working 
memory limitations are exceeded even for algorithms which might be regarded as 
computationally tractable, and long before any unreasonable time requirements become 
apparent. 
Levesque (1988) is an author who has considered the tractability of human reasoning, asking 
how it is possible for humans to perform reasoning tasks which, on the surface, make 
physically unrealisable demands on resources, e.g. time.  He makes the point that difficulties 
arise in computation when there are a number of possibilities, each of which needs to be 
considered.  Since, each time this happens there is a multiplicative effect, this can give rise 
to an exponentially increasing number of possible reasoning chains.  He suggests there are a 
number of ways this is avoided in everyday reasoning.  One example is the subsumable 
disjunction.  He suggests that a typical disjunction in everyday life is “Joe is 71 or 72 years 
old”.  Frequently we do not need to consider each case, but can subsume them into a more 
generic case, e.g. Joe is over 70.  From that one statement we can go on to make all the 
relevant deductions, e.g. that Joe is entitled to a state pension and a free bus pass.  Levesque 
(1988) contrasts this with a disjunction such as “Joe is 71 years old or Mary has the flu”, 
making the point that the latter type of statement does not occur in everyday life, although it 
might in puzzles.  Such unlikely disjunctions also occur in some of the questions human 
reasoning researchers pose to study participants, e.g. “June is in Wales, or Charles is in 
Scotland, but not both” (Johnson-Laird et al., 1992).  This is not to discredit such questions 
                                                 
156 https://www.cs.ox.ac.uk/isg/tools/ELK/ 
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as instruments for investigating human reasoning, but merely to point out that they may stray 
some way from normal everyday reasoning and that this may explain their relative difficulty. 
9.5. Sample size, effect size and significance 
The studies described in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 required access to participants with some 
knowledge of ontologies, or alternatively some background in computer science157.  
Obtaining those participants poses a greater problem than that met by psychologists who are 
interested in the general human population.  The consequent limitation in number of 
participants places a great emphasis on the need to understand the relationship between 
sample size, effect size and significance.  For any given sample size, effects below a certain 
size are not likely to be detected as significant.  Subsection 9.5.1 discusses the relationship 
for accuracy data between effect size and required sample size.  Subsection 9.5.2 presents a 
similar discussion for response time data.  Response time data exhibits the problem that, 
particularly at low sample sizes, the mean and standard deviation can be very much 
influenced by just one extreme data point.  This is discussed in subsection 9.5.3.  Subsection 
9.5.4 then draws on the preceding subsections to make some final comments. 
9.5.1. Accuracy and sample size 
For study 3, the number of participants was 30.  For the laboratory alternative of study 2, 
with which the study 3 results are compared, there were 28 participants.  To illustrate the 
limitations which such sample sizes place on the determination of a significant effect, 
consider as an example the comparison between the responses to two questions given by a 
group of 30 participants.  Assume that the accuracy for question 1 was 50%, i.e. exactly 
chance158.  This is an extreme case, but one which did occur in practice.  Table 9-2 illustrates 
how the p-value from a Fisher’s Exact Test decreases as the accuracy for question 2 
increases.  Note that even an accuracy of 70%, i.e. an increase in 20 percentage points over 
the performance for question 1, will not be significant.  In fact, there will be no significant 
effect until the accuracy of the question 2 reaches 80%, i.e. 24 correct responses out of 30; 
23 out of 30 (77%) will not suffice (p = 0.060). 
Table 9-2  Comparison between two questions, with 30 participants, assuming 50% 
accuracy for question 1 
accuracy for question 2 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
p-value 0.604 0.187 0.029 0.002 0.000006 
N.B. using Fisher’s Exact Test 
Table 9-3 illustrates the other extreme.  Here it is assumed that the participants achieve 100% 
accuracy with question 1.  In this case, question 2 would need to be at 80% accuracy or less 
in order for there to be a significant difference.   
  
                                                 
157 The requirement is for study participants who are similar to ontology users, i.e. domain experts with a 
training in the use of ontologies or computer scientists working in the field of ontologies. 
158 For the sake of simple illustrations, the assumption here is that the samples accurately represent the 
underlying populations, so that in this case a 50% accuracy would be achieved with the total population.  A 
more rigorous analysis would consider the ensemble of sample accuracies, each with their probability of 
occurrence, for any given underlying population distribution. 
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Table 9-3  Comparison between two questions, with 30 participants, assuming 100% 
accuracy for question 1 
accuracy for question 2 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
p-value 0.000006 0.0001 0.002 0.024 0.237 
N.B. using Fisher’s Exact Test 
Table 9-2 and Table 9-3 represent infrequent extremes.  A more likely example, representing 
a 20 percentage point difference, would be between 60% and 80%.  With 30 particpants, this 
difference would not be significant (p = 0.158).  In fact, 50 participants would be needed for 
the difference between 60% and 80% to be significant (p = 0.049). 
In practice, two other factors need to be taken into consideration.  Firstly, usually more than 
one question was involved in the comparison, e.g. between study 2 and study 3, and this 
increases sample size, for a given number of participants.  Secondly, in study 3 some 
questions existed as two variants, and this reduces sample size.  Each case needs to be 
analysed separately.  The key conclusions are that the sample size needs to be appropriate to 
the minimum effect size to be identified; and that the kinds of sample sizes used in these 
studies will only detect relatively large increases in accuracy. 
9.5.2. Response time and sample size 
The discussion is inevitably more complicated for response time data because the time 
distribution has two parameters.  The analysis, the detail for which is provided in Appendix 
C, can be simplified by making certain assumptions.  Firstly, as throughout the preceding 
three chapters, it is assumed that response time has a log-normal distribution, i.e. that the log 
of the response time has a normal distribution; and that the t-statistic is calculated after the 
log transformation.  Secondly, the response time data in the three preceding chapters indicate 
that the standard deviation increases with increasing mean response time, and that the ratio 
of standard deviation to mean response time is somewhat less than 1.  In fact, the ratio of 
standard deviation to mean response time for studies 1, 2 and 3 is: 0.71; 0.74; 0.91.  The 
analysis assumes that the ratio is the same for both groups being compared; in the analysis 
the value of 0.75 is taken as representative.  Thirdly, the assumption is made that the sample 
means and standard deviations are equal to those of the underlying distributions.  Under 
these assumptions, the t-statistic is purely a function of the size of each of the two samples 
and the percentage difference in mean times between the samples.  For simplicity, it is also 
assumed that the two samples being compared are the same size. Finally, the analysis looks 
at relative differences in the mean response times of the two samples.  Specifically, the 
analysis has been conducted for differences of 10%, 20%, … 100%159.  Table 9-4 shows the 
minimum size for each sample necessary to achieve significance at the 0.05 level.  This is 
based on a two-sided t-test; a one-sided test would require smaller samples. 
Table 9-4 Minimum sample size to achieve significance 
%age difference 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
min. sample size 379 105 52 32 23 17 14 12 10 9 
N.B. size shown is for each of two samples 
The table shows that, under these assumptions, even with a 40% difference in mean times, 
32 data points would be required in each sample.  If the comparison is between two versions 
                                                 
159 Because of the assumptions made, and the use of the logarithmic transformation, the sample size required 
for significance will depend only the percentage difference between the mean times, not their absolute values.  
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of one question in a within-participants design, this would require 32 particpants; a between-
participants design would require 64.  Where a particular language feature is being 
investigated, the use of more than one question will also reduce the number of participants 
needed, at the risk of having a less representative sample.  Note that this analysis is 
necessarily approximate; in particular, in its assumption of a log-normal distribution for 
time, in the assumption that the sample statistics correspond exactly to the underlying 
distribution statistics, and in the assumption that the standard deviation to mean ratio is 0.75.  
It is intended to give only an estimate of the required sample sizes.  Van Schaik and Weston 
(2016) discuss the topic of sample size in detail and provide an extensive set of references. 
9.5.3. Response time and outliers 
Response time data is subject to another difficulty of interpretation caused by sensitivity to 
extreme data points, or outliers.  An example can be drawn from section 8.5.2.  Based on 
two questions, an ANOVA was used to compare study 2, using not … some; variant 1 of 
study 3, using not … including; and variant 2, using not … any.  The analysis revealed no 
significant variation across the three cases (F(2, 105) = 0.602, p = 0.550).  However, the 
mean response times for variant 1 and variant 2 were 40 and 58 seconds, which prima facie 
appears an appreciable difference. 
For simplicity, the discussion here will use a t-test to compare the two variants of study 3.  
There were 15 participants in each variant, i.e. a total of 60 data points, 30 with not … 
including and 30 with not … any.  Despite the appreciable difference in mean response time, 
a t-test is consistent with the ANOVA in revealing that this difference is not significant 
(t(57.832) = 0.79496, p = 0.423).  However, the standard deviations of the response times in 
the samples in variant 1 and variant 2 were 38 and 125 seconds respectively.  The latter value 
is very high, in fact more than twice the sample mean.  Examination of the response time 
data in the tables in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 shows that it was very rare for the sample standard 
deviation to exceed the mean.  Such a high standard deviation will appreciably reduce the 
value of the t-statistic and hence appreciably increase the p value160.  Further examination of 
the variant 1 data reveals one response time of 710.7 seconds161.  Removal of this one data 
point reduces the response time mean for variant 2 to 36 seconds, i.e. now slightly less than 
for variant 1.  The standard deviation is now 20 seconds, and the differences between the 
two groups remains not significant (t(52.556) = 0.2977, p = 0.767), as would now be 
intuitively expected given the small difference in means. 
This example illustrates that an apparently appreciable difference in mean response times 
can be caused by one extreme data point.  The presence of such a point can often be detected 
by a disproportionately high value for the standard deviation.  This high standard deviation 
will also have the effect of reducing the t-statistic, indicating that the difference in group 
means is not significant. 
9.5.4. Comments 
The point of the discussion in subsections 9.5.1 and 9.5.2 is not to suggest that increasing 
the sample sizes in the three studies would have necessarily resulted in more significant 
results.  Increasing the sample size is likely to increase the accuracy of the sample statistics, 
                                                 
160 To an extent, the effect of this high standard deviation is mitigated by the logarithmic transformation of 
time.   
161 At the beginning of each experiment, participants were encouraged not to take too long over any question.  
On occasions this advice was repeated when a participant appeared to be considering one question for an 
excessive time.  However, in a few cases very long response times were recorded. 
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i.e. how closely they represent the statistics of the overall population.  In a particular case 
this might lead to a reduction in the difference between two sample means, so that even with 
increased sample sizes, the difference remains non-significant.  The point being made is that 
quite large data sets can be needed for even appreciable differences to be regarded as 
significant. 
An ideal approach would be to start by considering what size of difference, i.e. for accuracy 
and mean response times, would be material and decide on that basis what sample size is 
required.  In their discussion of magnitude-based inference, van Schaik and Weston (2016) 
stress the need for researchers “to choose a smallest important effect size”.  For example, 
when comparing the syntax modifications in study 3 with the original MOS in study 2, a 
starting point would be to decide what increase in accuracy or reduction in mean response 
time would justify a change to the language.  To an extent this is a subjective decision, 
although it can be informed by consideration of the practicalities involved in implementing 
any policy decision arising from the analysis. 
Care needs particularly to be taken when comparing different changes, e.g. two different 
syntactic changes to MOS.  If the comparisons are based on different sample sizes, then it 
might be concluded that one change is significant, the other not, when the difference in 
significance could be due to sample size.  Something analogous to this was noted in section 
8.3.  The observation was made there that, when considering the object property questions 
concerned with functionality, there was a significant effect of complexity on accuracy in 
study 2 but not in study 3; and that this difference might be the result of the difference in 
sample sizes between the two studies. 
The discussion in subsection 9.5.3 raises the question whether it is appropriate to remove 
extreme data points.  As it stands, the mean response time for variant 2, given in Table 8-17 
is deceptively large.  In all the studies reported in this dissertation there has been no attempt 
to remove outliers.  An alternative would be to provide the statistics, and undertake analysis, 
before and after the removal of any outliers.  For this, an objective definition of an outlier 
would be required.  In the context of the work reported here, a rule of thumb might be any 
point which causes the sample standard deviation to exceed the sample mean. 
An alternative approach to this problem would be to limit the amount of time a participant 
could spend on any one question.  However, this further complicates the statistical analysis.  
Moreover, it is particularly difficult for the kinds of studies reported here because there is 
considerable variation in response times between participants and between questions. 
9.6. Experimental methodology – lessons learned and recommendations 
This section considers the major methodological lessons from the experience of the three 
user studies, and makes some recommendations for alternative approaches.  Subsection 9.6.1 
considers methods for achieving adequate sample size and subsection 9.6.2 considers the 
problem of bias due to the order of the questions.  Finally, subsection 9.6.3 discusses the 
interpretation of response time data and suggests an alternative approach to that used here. 
9.6.1. Achieving adequate sample size 
The previous section identified the need for adequate sample sizes, bearing in mind what 
effect size is regarded as important.  The requirement for participants with some knowledge 
of ontologies or computer science makes it hard to achieve satisfactory sample sizes.  At the 
same time, the work has had the pragmatic goal of identifying problems with the commonly 
used MOS features, and recommending how to overcome those problems.  Whilst 
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psychologists may devote a single study to one aspect of reasoning, e.g. the syllogism, such 
a focussed study did not seem reasonable in this context.  The need was to consider a range 
of common MOS features and a range of possible changes to syntax.  This had the effect of 
confounding factors.  It also had the effect of reducing sample size, in particular in study 3 
where two variants were used.  In an exploratory study, this is to an extent unavoidable.  
However, more refined studies should avoid confounding factors in this way. 
One approach to achieving greater sample size is exemplified by Nguyen et al. (2012), who 
used a crowd-sourcing technique.  This means that the respondents are chiefly lay-people, 
i.e. not familiar with ontologies162, and that the axioms and conclusions need to be 
represented in an accessible way, i.e. not in a formal language.  Nguyen et al. (2012) used 
51 questions, each with a set of axioms and a valid conclusion163.  There were four questions 
which were answered significantly worse than chance.  The least accurately answered 
question had only 2 correct responses out of 49 (compared with chance: p = 2 x 10-12).  It is 
noteworthy that this question required an understanding of the trivial satisfaction of the 
universal restriction; it is not clear to what extent this was explained to participants.  Another 
two of the four questions used rather technical language, talking about lack of convertibility 
between double values and integer values and between string values and integer values.  The 
fourth question, which was answered appreciably better than the others, although still 
significantly worse than chance, required thinking about inverse properties (“toves from” 
and “toves into”); the use of different prepositions after the verb to create different property 
names may have caused difficulties here.  It may be that participants were not sufficiently 
prepared to cope with these questions.  In any case, the participants were not representative 
of the user community. 
An alternative is to use participants who may not be familiar with ontologies, but are not 
randomly selected through crowd sourcing.  One possibility would be to use the kind of 
people who might be regarded as domain experts, i.e. the kind of people who might 
conceivably be involved in building ontologies, even if they are not currently doing so.  They 
would need to be well prepared for the study.  However, for a study which was not 
exploratory but rather looking at a focussed issue, the degree of preparation could be 
relatively limited.  They would only need to be familiar with that small subset of the language 
necessary for the investigation, rather than the relatively wide spectrum of language dealt 
with in the three studies in this dissertation. 
As in studies 2 and 3, it is possible to increase the number of data points, without increasing 
the number of participants, by increasing the number of questions.  For example, in the work 
described in section 8.3.3, one could have more questions employing an inverse functional 
object property.  The drawback to this approach is that the sample may not be as 
representative of the total population as would be achieved by increasing the number of 
participants. 
Studies 1 and 2 were within-participant studies.  The comparisons were between different 
questions answered by the same participants.  However, Chapter 8, in sections 8.3 to 8.6 
describes mostly between-participant comparisons, i.e. between study 3 and both studies 1 
and 2, and between the two variants of study 3.  Between-participant studies introduce 
variability due to the participants, unlike within-participant studies where paired 
                                                 
162 Whilst many users of ontologies are not computer scientists but domain experts, the latter will have received 
some training in ontology development and will differ considerably from a random sample of lay people.  
163 Questions with non-valid conclusions were used as foils but not included in the analysis. 
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comparisons can be made.  Within-participant studies also have the advantage that, within 
the limit set by the realistic length of a study, twice as many questions can be posed, since 
each question is put to each participant.  For these reasons, a more focussed study to 
investigate the issues explored in study 3, would benefit from a within participants approach. 
A final point on sample size relates to analysis of response time.  Section 4.4.1 noted that 
both correct and incorrect responses were used for the response time analyses, to increase 
sample size.  Analyses based purely on the correct responses would have been a useful 
complement.  Whilst such analyses might have produced fewer statistically significant 
results, the use and comparison of the two approaches might have provided additional 
insight. 
9.6.2. Avoiding order bias 
Analysis from studies 1 (section 6.9) and 2 (section 7.9) showed that question position 
significantly affected response time, but not accuracy.  Analysis from study 3 (section 8.9) 
confirmed the effect of question position on time, and also indicated an effect on accuracy.  
This effect was relatively small, but was significant when comparison was made between 
sections.  These analyses indicate that compensating for order effects is prudent when 
considering accuracy and essential when considering response time.   
In the studies reported here, this was done either with an experimental design which ensures 
that participants view the questions in different orders, or else by randomization of the 
question order.  The former approach was adopted in studies 1 and 2.  In study 1 only the 
order of the sections was permuted.  In study 2 the order of the sections was permuted, and 
within each section the participants saw the questions in two reversed orders164.  This latter 
strategy was not effective in compensating for the effect of position on time.  It appeared 
that, in some sections, there was a large time penalty associated with the first, and sometimes 
also the second, question; and that this was not adequately compensated for by using two 
reversed orders.  In the subsequent data analysis, where necessary any effect of this time 
penalty was avoided by not using questions which occupied first or second place in a section.  
Study 3 used randomization to compensate for the effect of section and question order.  This 
also enabled a more rigorous analysis of the effect of question order, not confounded with 
the effect of any difference in the questions, with the results noted above.   
Generally, randomization is an easier approach than attempting to compensate for question 
order with an experimental design, and there are a number of tools available which enable 
randomization.  In the online alternative of study 2, the surveygizmo tool was used to provide 
question randomization.  In study 3, the MediaLab application provided automatic 
randomization of section order and question order within sections. 
In the absence of randomization, another approach would be to provide several ‘warm-up’ 
questions at the beginning of each section, the data from which would not be used in the 
analysis.  This would avoid any initial effects.  Presenting the remaining questions, i.e. the 
ones actually used in the analysis, in two reversed orders would then compensate for any 
longer-term effects.  Indeed, in study 2, one participant did suggest using “a few examples 
at the start to warm up the brain” (see subsection 7.7.1).  This might even be useful prior to 
randomized questions, to further eradicate any distortion of response time data associated 
with the initial questions.   
                                                 
164 This was for the laboratory study.  In the online study there was no control over the order in which 
participants approached each section, whilst the order of questions in each section was randomized. 
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In summary, avoiding bias caused by question order is an essential consideration, in 
particular where timing data is being collected.  Whatever approach is used, it needs to be 
planned before the commencement of the experiments. 
9.6.3. The interpretation of response time data 
The theories of reasoning discussed in this dissertation are concerned with understanding 
and predicting reasoning accuracy.  Less attention is given to the time taken to perform 
reasoning.  As discussed in section 4.3.1, response time has been taken as a proxy for 
difficulty.  With a few exceptions, there has been no attempt in the analysis to differentiate 
between response times for correct and incorrect responses.  The first two studies were 
concerned with identifying difficulties, and the decision not to make that differentiation 
between correct and incorrect responses was justified on the grounds that, even when a 
question is incorrectly answered, its response time is likely to be a measure of its difficulty.  
The assumption is that people spend more time on difficult questions than easy questions, 
even when they get them wrong. 
In study 3, the intention was to estimate the effect of changes to MOS syntax.  The same 
approach was taken, i.e. to use response time as a measure of difficulty, regardless of the 
accuracy of the response.  An alternative approach would be to use only the response times 
from the correct responses.  The argument for doing this would be that syntax changes which 
lead to more rapid response are only of interest if those responses are also correct.  The 
disadvantage is reduced sample size.  Chapter 8 used between-participants comparisons, i.e. 
between studies 2 and 3.  However, the approach of using only accurate responses for the 
time analysis would fit well with a within-participants study, where all participants answered 
questions with the original and changed syntax.  Analysis of the accuracy of responses would 
identify whether a particular change led to an increase in accuracy.  Analysis of response 
times could be restricted to responses to paired questions where both responses from a 
particular participant were correct.  This would determine whether, even when the original 
answer was correct and hence could not be improved upon, the syntax change had an effect 
on the time to produce the correct answer. 
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10. Conclusions and future research 
“Words are all we have.  It is no good to find fault with them.” 
“And yet I do so.  They are used as if they had some power. And how little they 
have!” 
Ivy Compton-Burnett, ‘A Heritage and Its History’, 1959 
 
The introduction to this dissertation presented two research questions, to which this chapter 
returns.  Section 10.1 begins by reviewing to what extent they have been answered.  Section 
10.2 then suggests additional work to be done to answer them more fully.  Section 10.3 
expands the original questions into a wider domain.  Section 10.4 provides some guidance 
for researchers undertaking similar studies to those reported in Chapters 6 to 8.  Section 10.5 
makes some final remarks. 
10.1. The research questions – summarising progress 
Chapter 1 posed two broad research questions: 
(1) In what way can the difficulties experienced in using Description Logics be 
understood in terms of underlying theories, e.g., theories of reasoning, already 
developed within the cognitive psychology community? 
(2) In what way could such theories contribute to improving the usability of 
Description Logics? 
The next two subsections consider each of these questions in turn, reviewing how the 
questions have been addressed;  and how improvements to MOS have been proposed and 
tested.  Although the original focus was on using results from cognitive psychology, it 
became apparent during the research that insight from the philosophy of language was also 
valuable, and this will also be discussed. 
10.1.1. The theories and their applicability to DLs 
In Chapter 1, question 1 was expanded into two more detailed questions: 
(1A) What theories are available, and what are their relevant strengths in the 
context of DLs? 
(1B) How can these theories explain how people understand DL statements? 
Section 9.1 has already reviewed the use of the theories of reasoning, and explained the 
motivation for concentrating on the rule-based and model-based theories, and the theory of 
relational complexity.  The model-based theory has been particularly useful in explaining 
the difficulties experienced with negated conjunction, where the correspondence between 
the results in subsection 6.6.1 and those presented by Khemlani et al. (2012a) is striking.  It 
has also been successful in explaining participant performance with questions involving 
universal and existential restrictions.  With nested restrictions, for example, the mental 
model theory explains the difficulty caused when the less prominent model needs to be 
adopted in the first restriction.  This leads to the need for backtracking, with consequent 
difficulties.  The concept of the implicature, from the philosophy of language, augments 
mental model theory by suggesting why one model is more prominent than another.  On the 
other hand, syntactic reasoning also appeared to be present, akin to the rule-based reasoning 
of Rips (1983).  In any case, taken together, the model-based and the syntactic approach 
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offer a better explanation of performance than the use of alternative hypotheses put forward 
in Chapter 7, e.g. that reasoning performance with restrictions depends on the number of 
types of restriction (hypothesis H7.9), and the pattern of use of restrictions (H7.10). 
Relational complexity theory proved useful as a yardstick for semantic complexity.  It was 
most obviously applicable to reasoning about object properties, but was also applied 
elsewhere, e.g. to considering Boolean concept constructors as described in section 7.4 and 
Appendix B.  Not all relations can be considered of equal difficulty.  Functional relations 
gave greater difficulty than transitive ones; perhaps because of the need to remember 
whether subject or object was unique.  However, care needs to be taken in interpreting this.  
People do not reason like computers, obtaining the characteristics of a property from a look-
up table.  They absorb the semantics of words, without even necessarily knowing the 
meaning of terms such as ‘transitive’ and ‘functional’.  It may be that the choice of object 
property names influences reasoning.  This was suggested by participants’ comments in 
subsection 7.7.3, commenting that greater_than_or_equal was easier than 
has_nearest_neighbour.  When framing the questions, the choice of names was found 
difficult and likely to have not always been ideal.  Again as noted in subsection 7.7.3, one 
participant had difficulty with has_nearest_neighbour, arguing quite reasonably that this 
was not necessarily functional.  Yet the alternative, of using abstract or nonsense names, 
deviates a long way from natural usage.  A better solution might be to work within the 
participant’s own subject domain; but this is time-consuming and raises problems of 
comparability between participants. 
10.1.2. Enhancing the usability of Description Logics 
Chapter 1 also expanded on question 2: 
How do these theories motivate: 
(2A) notational extensions; 
(2B) tool enhancements; 
(2C) enhancements to training? 
The preceding chapters have made suggestions to enhance the syntax of MOS.  Some of 
these suggestions come from consideration of the theories discussed; others are more ad-
hoc.  The use of union and intersection rather than or and and, and the use of including and 
noneOrOnly for the existential and universal restrictions are in the former category.  The use 
of except for and not, and the use of solely with functional properties are in the latter 
category; although identifying the need for additional support for functional properties was 
guided by the use of RC theory. 
Apart from notational extensions to MOS, tool support could offer help to ontologists.  The 
presentation of alternative syntactic forms could be valuable.  Subsection 7.5.6 discussed 
pairs of questions which were semantically equivalent but which were answered with 
appreciably different degrees of accuracy.  The equivalence of the questions arose from the 
equivalences: 
has_child some (not MALE)  ≡  not (has_child only MALE) (10.1) 
has_child only (not MALE)  ≡ not (has_child some MALE) (10.2) 
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Providing both equivalent forms in, e.g. a chain of deductions, might help readers to follow 
the reasoning, and also guard against the fallacies of equating some not with not … some and 
only not with not … only. 
The quotation at the start of the chapter was deliberately provocative.  Words are not all we 
have; we also have pictures, and pictures can be used to reason with.  Larkin and Simon 
(1987) note the importance of diagrams for search, recognition and inference.  As Ford 
(1995) has pointed out, some people appear to think more naturally in pictures than in words.  
Similarly, Petre and Blackwell (1999), in a study of mental imagery in programming, found 
evidence of visual, as well as textual and auditory, imagery.  Moreover, diagrams have been 
part of mathematical reasoning at least since Euclid.  Cheng (2012) discusses the use of 
diagrams in syllogistic reasoning; here the diagrams are not just used to visualize syllogisms, 
but also to reason about them.  The use of diagrams in ontology engineering is an active 
research area, e.g. Stapleton et al. (2013; 2014).  Their work concentrates on representing a 
whole ontology, or substantial parts of an ontology; the automatic creation of diagrams to 
aid individual reasoning steps would also be useful, e.g. to illustrate class membership and 
emphasize the direction of uniqueness in functional object properties. 
Finally, the three studies suggest a number of areas worth particular emphasis in DL training.  
De Morgan’s Laws are one; this should particularly mitigate the problem of negated 
conjunction.   The analogues of De Morgan’s Laws for restrictions, as exemplified by (10.1) 
and (10.2) above, are another; this should help when thinking about negation and restrictions, 
as in section 7.5.  When introducing these equivalences, the false equivalences of some not 
with not … some and only not with not … only should be pointed out.  Stress also needs to 
be placed on functional and inverse functional object properties, so that there is a clear 
awareness of the difference. 
10.2. The research questions – further work 
There remain some unresolved issues, within the scope of the research questions posed in 
Chapter 1.  Subsection 10.2.1 describes some of these issues.  Some have been studied but 
require further investigation; others were not examined in the current studies.  The approach 
used here was to create controlled experiments based on commonly used language features.  
Other approaches could be applied to the research questions, and some of these alternative 
approaches are described in subsection 10.2.2. 
10.2.1. Unresolved questions 
There are a number of other commonly used OWL features which have not been 
investigated.  Amongst these are the use of object properties defined to be inverse.  This was 
relatively prominent in the survey described in Chapter 5 and also in the analysis of Power 
and Third (2010), as summarised in Table 6.1 in section 6.1.  Some language features were 
investigated in the first study but were not prioritized for investigation in the subsequent 
studies.  The use of object subproperties is an example; an alternative keyword to 
SubPropertyOf, as suggested in subsection 6.12.1, could avoid the erroneous ‘inheritance’ 
of property characteristics.  The use of two restrictions for which the object properties are in 
a subsumption relation also comes into the category of language constructs examined in 
study 1 but not further investigated; in question 6 of section 6.5 difficulties seem to have 
been experienced with the combination of a subclass and the existential restriction. 
There are also some outstanding issues arising from study 3.  Whilst the use of including and 
noneOrOnly for the existential and universal restrictions achieved some benefit when a 
single restriction was used to define a class, this was not the case for nested restrictions.  
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More focussed research is needed to investigate this, and also to separate out the effects for 
the existential and universal restrictions.  The limited amount of data for the separate cases 
made this difficult in study 3.  Secondly, there remains the issue of how to improve 
performance with inverse functional object properties.  As was suggested in subsection 8.3.3, 
possible areas to investigate would be the use of a different keyword, e.g. alone and moving 
the keyword to follow the subject, i.e. immediately before the object property. 
10.2.2. Alternative methodologies 
The starting point for study 1, which then influenced the subsequent two studies, was the 
identification of MOS language features most commonly used in creating ontologies.  An 
alternative strategy would be to look at the kinds of justifications which arise in debugging 
ontologies.  One approach to this would be to ask ontologists, e.g. through the appropriate 
lists as used for the survey of Chapter 5, to submit justifications which have created difficulty 
for them.  Alternative approaches are to arrange focus groups with ontologists or to observe 
them as they work. 
At the end of subsection 10.1.1, there was a discussion of the necessarily artificial nature of 
the kinds of studies described in this dissertation.  The discussion was particularly related to 
object property names, but could also be widened to class and individual names.  More 
broadly, an approach which abstracts from a real-world environment offers the advantage of 
focussing on a few particular factors at the expense of observing those factors removed from 
the context in which they normally have an effect.  In the case of entity names, the strategies 
of using abstract names or ‘nonsense’ names, or even names chosen from a field unknown 
to the participants, may cause those participants to reason in a quite unnatural way.  They 
may be obliged to explicitly refer to the entity name characteristics, rather than using an 
acquired understanding.  From this viewpoint, the accepted practice of using an unknown or 
artificial domain may not be ideal.  Rather, it would be better to use names from the 
participants’ actual ontology usage.  In doing this, care has to be taken to understand what 
semantics are normally associated with particular entity names e.g. which characteristics are 
associated with particular object properties, and whether particular classes are assumed to 
be disjoint. 
Another approach to investigating how ontologists work in real-world situations is 
exemplified by Vigo et al. (2014b; 2015), who have instrumented Protégé to record and 
subsequently analyse user interactions.  Whilst this approach can provide valuable insights 
into how people use tools such as Protégé, it may give limited access to thought patterns and 
difficulties of reasoning.  Indeed, the recommendations in Vigo et al. (2015) are, quite 
reasonably, concerned with tool improvement. 
Controlled experiments, as used here, can offer precise answers in well-defined situations165.  
They also have the advantage of being relatively easy to administer.  Yet, they are to an 
extent unnatural; whilst that unnaturalness can be mitigated it can never be totally eradicated.  
Case studies (Easterbrook et al., 2008) offer insights based on observation.  Whilst these are 
harder to interpret, they complement the results of controlled experiments.  Indeed, 
Easterbrook et al. (2008, section 5.6) talk about “triangulation”, i.e. “using different sources 
                                                 
165 In comparing “the three fundamental paradigms … introspection, field studies, and controlled experiments”, 
Shneiderman (1978) believes that “all three are useful, but that controlled experiments must ultimately be the 
basis for the most profound theoretical and practical conclusions.”  North (2006), discussing specifically 
visualization research whilst making some observations which are more generally applicable, provides a 
critique of benchmark tasks.  He argues for more complex benchmark tasks and qualitative studies with open-
ended tasks. 
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of data to confirm results and build a coherent picture”.  The research questions posed at the 
beginning of this dissertation could well be revisited through the technique of the case study. 
Finally, the emphasis in this work has been on reasoning with DL statements.  In line with 
this, study 3 investigated how well the proposed keywords improved reasoning.  An 
additional question is how well any change to notation supports the creation of ontologies, 
i.e. the act of modelling using DLs.  This would require an alternative experimental approach 
in which participants were required to undertake modelling exercises. 
10.3. Expanding the research horizon 
The original research questions were framed in the context of DLs, but they could be 
translated into the context of any other computing language, particularly those languages 
which are logic-based.  This section looks at two areas in which analogous research questions 
could be posed.  Subsection 10.3.1 looks at a long-standing area, that of database interaction; 
whilst subsection 10.3.2 looks at the more recent area of linked data querying and results 
presentation. 
10.3.1. Interacting with databases 
There is a long history of research into interaction with databases.  A relatively early example 
is the work of Thomas and Gould (1975) who looked at a query system using a formal 
language and anticipated a number of the issues discussed in this dissertation.  They reported 
that participants to their study had difficulty with universal quantification and with certain 
operators, e.g. COUNT and SUM.  Conversely, they had little difficulty with conjunction 
and disjunction.  The authors ascribe this to the fact that their system is “nearly wordless”, 
using instead a tabular approach; i.e. there is no possibility of confusing and and or because 
these words are not used.  Indeed, the paper starts with a critique of the use of natural 
language, arguing against its use.  The authors also make some methodological comments.  
They note that studies such as theirs are concerned with translating test questions, whereas 
in real life users are concerned with generating their own questions; and they identify the 
need to understand how experts write queries, rather than the non-experts used in their study.   
Subsection 2.5.3 has already noted Shneiderman’s (1978) comparison of the use of natural 
and artificial language in database querying.  As already noted, he found that whilst the 
number of valid queries was approximately the same in both cases, natural language 
participants posed more questions that could not be answered from the database.  He includes 
a critique of natural language usage; amongst other issues pointing out that it may create an 
unrealistic expectation of what questions can be answered.  Indeed, he includes the issue of 
natural versus artificial language as an important research question in database interaction.  
Shneiderman (1978) also includes a discussion of the difficulties of universal quantification, 
drawing on a number of previous authors. 
More recently, Jagadish et al. (2007) discuss database usability, making comparisons 
between the differing expectations of database use and web search.  Having previously been 
involved in a variety of other aspects of database research, they describe their motivation for 
becoming interested in usability research.  This originated from observing the difficulties 
experienced by users who were professionals but not computer scientists, i.e. users 
analogous to domain experts in ontology design.  They identify the need for database systems 
to be able to explain their results; a feature analogous to providing justifications in ontology 
debugging.  In another echo of a problem experienced with ontology use, one of their 
observations was that users were having difficulty with “the mere complexity of the … 
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schema”.  Their solution was to develop schema representations “at different levels of 
detail”, so that users could zoom in on the part of the schema of interest. 
The previous paragraphs have provided inevitably a tiny snapshot from the history of 
database research.  It is striking that many of the themes have also occurred in the context of 
ontology development.  It is also striking that there is no reference to theories of reasoning 
or language, although the theme of using natural language does recur.  On a specific point, 
Jagadish et al. (2007) observe that joins are hard to reason with; this could well be a topic to 
investigate in the context of theories of reasoning.  Generally, insights from psychology and 
language could be applied to the usability of databases, both as experienced by experts and 
non-experts.  Additionally, there is much that researchers investigating the usability of 
ontologies can learn from database usability research. 
10.3.2. Interacting with linked data 
The view is sometimes expressed that the Semantic Web has not developed as originally 
envisaged, in particular that there has been limited use of OWL.  Instead we have seen the 
growth of the LOD cloud, which is chiefly based on RDFS plus a few OWL features such 
as sameAs and functional object properties.  Chapter 2 has already described Hendler’s 
(2015) distinction between ‘big O’ ontologies and ‘small o’ ontologies.  The former find 
their application in specialized fields such as biological research.  The latter are found at 
Web scale constituting the LOD cloud. 
There is considerable use of ‘big O’ ontologies, as chapter 5 has demonstrated.  The work 
reported in this dissertation is chiefly aimed at this world.  Some of the work, e.g. relating to 
functional object properties, is certainly relevant also to the LOD world.  However, in the 
LOD world, whilst there is limited complexity in the ontology design, SPARQL offers the 
possibility of complex queries.  A number of studies have investigated to what extent that 
possibility has been taken up.  Möller et al. (2010), looking at four datasets, found that most 
queries were SELECT queries and that almost all of those queries had at most three triple 
patterns, although some queries were found with up to 16 triple patterns.  They also found 
that three pattern types constituted almost all the patterns for three of the datasets and around 
86% for the other dataset.  Gallego et al. (2011) looked at two datasets and reported similar 
results.  They also found that the dominant query was SELECT.  The great majority of 
queries had only one triple pattern.  Similarly to Möller et al. (2010), Gallego et al. (2011) 
found a few pattern types constituting most of the patterns; however, there were some 
differences in the detail regarding the particular pattern types.   
One approach to making SPARQL querying easier is by providing a visual editor for queries.  
One such is OWL2Query166.  This is one of three ontology visualization tools compared 
specifically from the standpoint of information retrieval by Ramakrishnan and Vijayan 
(2014).  In fact, in their study participants obtained the required information more quickly 
using a general ontology navigation tool, OntoGraf167.  However, as the authors point out, 
OWL2Query had more features than OntoGraf, and this may make it more difficult to use, 
at least for novices. 
There have been attempts to make querying easier through the use of controlled natural 
language.  Rico et al. (2015) have developed such a query system.  They note that there are 
two problems for those using SPARQL: mastering the syntax and knowing the vocabulary 
                                                 
166 http://protegewiki.stanford.edu/wiki/OWL2Query 
167 http://protegewiki.stanford.edu/wiki/OntoGraf 
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of the queried dataset.  Their solution to both problems is a system that guides users by 
proposing possible completions of a query in a controlled natural language.  This depends 
on there being a relatively limited number of query patterns.  In fact, similarly to Möller et 
al. (2010) and Gallego et al. (2011), they claim that, for two datasets investigated a very few 
pattern types account for most queries. 
The requirement to know the vocabulary of a dataset can also be met by creating a CNL 
specific to an application.  Chang et al. (2015) describe a French CNL designed for 
translation into SPARQL, for use in the analysis of computer logs represented as RDF.  
Consequently, it includes temporal operators such as the French language equivalent of 
before, after, contains and overlaps.   
Research into SPARQL is following the same path as that trod by research into DLs.  Usage 
studies are identifying what constructs are being used; natural language and graphical 
techniques are being investigated as alternatives to writing SPARQL.  This opens up a 
number of research questions, some parallel to those investigated for DLs: 
• Why are the great majority of queries relatively simple: because this is all users need; 
because this is all users can conceive; or because more complex queries are too 
difficult for users to implement? 
• What are the relative advantages of formal language, natural language and graphical 
techniques for creating queries? 
• What are the advantages, and best ways of using, application specific query language, 
e.g. as mentioned above for time-related queries (Chang et al., 2015)? 
Answering these questions could draw upon insights from psychology and language, and 
also the work of database usability researchers.  Additionally, two features differentiate 
working with the LOD cloud from working with databases: information is likely to be 
incomplete, and may be incorrect or even inconsistent.  These features are shared with 
ontologies but are likely to be exaggerated with public LOD data.  Supporting users in 
finding and interpreting data in the LOD cloud could well be helped by an understanding of 
how people reason with incomplete, potentially incorrect and inconsistent data.  This might, 
for example, draw on some of the alternative theories of reasoning discussed in subsection 
9.1.4. 
10.4. Guidance for practitioners 
This section draws on the experience of the studies reported in Chapters 6 to 8 to provide 
some guidance to those undertaking similar studies, not necessarily in the same area of 
research, but requiring similar methodological approaches. 
10.4.1. Randomizing question order 
It is clear from study 2 that question order needs to be randomized to obtain unbiased timing 
data.  Failure to do this in study 2 meant that some data had to be discarded, reducing sample 
size and limiting the chance of achieving significant results.  Moreover, the analysis in study 
3 suggests that randomization is also prudent when only accuracy data is being collected.  
The availability of relatively cheap applications such as MediaLab, used in study 3, makes 
this randomization very easy.  Moreover, this avoids the time-consuming manual recording 
of timing data, as was done for studies 1 and 2.   
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10.4.2. Avoiding confounding factors 
Studies 2 and 3 were over-ambitious, attempting to investigate a considerable number of 
factors.  This led to confounding factors.  Separating those factors out, to the extent that it 
was possible, led to reduced sample sizes.  For example, in study 3 the use of identical 
questions for all participants, rather than two variants, would have increased the sample size 
for many of the tests.  This would have been at the expense of removing some of the possible 
areas of investigation, e.g. the use of any in place of some when preceded by a negation.  
There is a trade-off here.  In an exploratory study, it may be justifiable to have many factors.  
In this case it needs to be understood that it will difficult to achieve significant results.  
Appreciable, but non-significant effects will need to be interpreted as indicative of the need 
for further study.  For a definitive study, confounding effects need to be avoided. 
10.4.3. Designing the study for an appropriate sample size 
Subsection 9.6.1 has discussed the issue of achieving an adequate sample size.  This will 
depend on the size of effect considered important.  In some cases, the minimum effect of 
importance might be calculated by a formal cost-benefit analysis.  More usually, it will 
depend on a subjective view.  In the context of the work reported here, that might be a 
decision as to how big an increase in accuracy or reduction in reasoning time would make 
an appreciable difference to someone working with DLs.  In any case, the decision as to 
what constitutes an appreciable effect needs to be made when the study is being designed.  
Once that decision is made, then it will be possible to calculate the appropriate sample size.  
Applications are available for such calculations.  However, it may be useful to call on the 
assistance of a qualified statistician. 
10.4.4. Achieving ecological validity 
Chapter 6 discussed the need for ecological validity in terms of identifying the commonly 
used DL constructs, and placing those constructs in a commonly used context, as identified 
from a commonly used pattern.  To generalise, this is about investigating features which 
occur frequently.  However, this is not the only aspect of designing for ecological validity.  
Another aspect is making those investigations in an environment which is as close as 
possible to the working environment of the final user.  This aspect of design may be 
interpreted in different ways, depending on the nature of the study.  In the studies reported 
here, a relevant question was how much domain knowledge the participants should be able 
do draw on.  Pre-existing domain knowledge should not permit the participant to know the 
answer, avoiding any reasoning.  Depending on the goal of the study, it might include any 
knowledge which the participant would normally have available in real-life situations, e.g. 
knowledge that a particular object property has a particular characteristic, such as 
transitivity. 
10.4.5. Non-valid conclusions 
A more specific issue is the design of non-valid putative conclusions; or indeed any sort of 
answer which the participant should recognise as incorrect.  If the question is not to be too 
easy, these conclusions need to be credible.  More specifically, if two or more questions with 
non-valid conclusions are being used for comparison, e.g. to estimate the efficacy of a 
particular language change, then ideally the same non-valid conclusion should be used in 
both questions.  If the nature of the questions is such that this is not possible, then the putative 
conclusions must be designed to have equal credibility.  The latter may be extremely 
difficult.  In some situations, it may be more appropriate to use the questions with non-valid 
conclusions as foils, and base all analysis on the questions with valid conclusions. 
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10.4.6. Achieving an absolutely fair comparison 
In designing experiments, the researcher needs always to be on guard against any possible 
bias.  For example, in studies 2 and 3 many of the participants were already familiar with 
MOS.  When the two studies were being compared, this may have introduced a bias against 
the syntax changes.  Indeed, in Section 8.7 one of the study 3 participants is reported as 
finding not … any difficult because it was different from what the participant was used to.  
Ideally, both MOS and the modified MOS should have been unfamiliar to the participants.  
In practice, it would have been impossible to obtain a reasonable number of such particpants, 
within the constraint that participants were required with some knowledge of ontologies or 
computer science. 
10.4.7. Alternative strategies 
A final recommendation is to be prepared to consider alternative strategies.  In these studies, 
obtaining participants with the required background was difficult.  An alternative strategy 
would have been to have looked for participants who did not use ontologies, neither as 
ontology experts nor domain experts, but who were experts in particular domains and might 
potentially use ontologies.  This is likely to require more preparation for the participant, but 
makes possible appreciably greater numbers of participants.  It also avoids the kind of bias 
discussed in the preceding subsection. 
10.5. Final remarks 
This dissertation has put forward the thesis that insights from the psychological theories of 
reasoning, and from the philosophy of language can be of value in understanding the 
difficulties in working with computer languages, and can help mitigate those difficulties.  
Taking DLs as an example, the work described here has used those insights to explain 
reasoning performance and to suggest strategies for improving that performance.  These 
suggested strategies have comprised notational extensions, tool enhancements, and 
enhancements to training.  In a final study, certain notational extensions met with some 
success.  At the same time, a number of unresolved questions have been identified.  Whilst 
the work reported here has been limited to applying particular theories, the dissertation has 
also suggested how it might be expanded to take account of a broader range of theories.  In 
addition, there are other areas of computer interaction to which these theories might be 
applied, specifically interaction with databases and LOD.  Finally, in the course of three 
studies into reasoning with DLs, some lessons have been learned about how to conduct such 
studies.  In particular, sample sizes should be appropriate for the effect size of interest; 
experimental design should be able to isolate individual factors, rather than have a number 
of factors confounded; and question order should be randomized or systematically permuted 
between participants.  These lessons have wide applicability in human-computer interaction 
studies. 
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Glossary of acronyms 
 
ACE Attempto Controlled English (Fuchs et al. 2006) 
CNL Controlled Natural Language 
CWA Closed World Assumption 
DAML DARPA Agent Markup Language 
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
DL Description Logic 
DNF Disjunctive Normal Form 
F-Logic Frame Logic 
FOL First Order Logic 
HSD Honest Significant Difference, as in ‘Tukey HSD’ 
HTML HyperText Markup Language 
IHMC Florida Institute for Human and Machine Cognition 
LOD Linked Open Data 
MLL Manchester-Like Language, a simplified form of MOS (Kuhn, 2013) 
MOS Manchester OWL Syntax 
OBO Open Biomedical Ontologies 
ODP Ontology Design Pattern 
OIL Ontology Inference Layer 
OPPL Ontology Pre-Processor Language (Aranguren et al. 2011) 
OWA Open World Assumption 
OWL Web Ontology Language 
PL Propositional Logic 
RC Relational Complexity 
RDF Resource Description Framework 
RDFS Resource Description Framework Schema 
ROO Rabbit to OWL Ontology authoring (Denaux et al., 2010) 
SOS Sydney OWL Syntax (Cregan et al. 2007) 
SPARQL SPARQL Protocol and RDF Query Language168 
SWRL Semantic Web Rule Language 
UML Unified Modelling Language 
W3C World Wide Web Consortium 
WWW World Wide Web 
XML Extensible Markup Language 
                                                 
168 SPARQL is an example of a recursive acronym, see http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/semantic-
web/2011Oct/0041.html  
 215 
 
References 
 
Allemang, D., & Hendler, J. (2011). Semantic web for the working ontologist: effective 
modeling in RDFS and OWL. Elsevier. 
American Psychological Association. (2010). Publication Manual of the American 
Psychological Association (6th ed.). Washington, DC. 
Antoniou, G., & van Harmelen, F. (2004). A semantic web primer. MIT press. 
Aranguren, M.E., Iannone, L., & Stevens, R. (2011). Ontology Pre-Processor Language 
(OPPL): User’s Manual. Retrieved from http://oppl2.sourceforge.net/manual.pdf 
Baader, F. (2003). The description logic handbook: theory, implementation, and 
applications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Baader, F., Horrocks, I., Lutz, C., & Sattler, U. (2017). An Introduction to Description Logic. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Baader, F., & Nutt, W. (2003). Basic description logics. In Description logic handbook (pp. 
43–95). 
Bechhofer, S., van Harmelen, F., Hendler, J., Horrocks, I., McGuiness, D., Patel-Schneider, 
P., & Stein, L. (2004). OWL Web Ontology Language Reference. Retrieved August 
30, 2016, from https://www.w3.org/TR/owl-ref/ 
Berners-Lee, T., & Fischetti, M. (2000). Weaving the Web: The original design and ultimate 
destiny of the World Wide Web by its inventor. HarperInformation. 
Berners-Lee, T., Hendler, J., Lassila, O., & others. (2001). The semantic web. Scientific 
American, 284(5), 28–37. 
Bizer, C., Lehmann, J., Kobilarov, G., Auer, S., Becker, C., Cyganiak, R., & Hellmann, S. 
(2009). DBpedia-A crystallization point for the Web of Data. Web Semantics: 
Science, Services and Agents on the World Wide Web, 7(3), 154–165. 
Blake, A., Stapleton, G., Rodgers, P., Cheek, L., & Howse, J. (2012). Does the orientation 
of an Euler diagram affect user comprehension? In DMS (pp. 185–190). 
Blake, A., Stapleton, G., Rodgers, P., Cheek, L., & Howse, J. (2014). The impact of shape 
on the perception of Euler diagrams. In International Conference on Theory and 
Application of Diagrams (pp. 123–137). Springer. 
Blomqvist, E., Gangemi, A., & Presutti, V. (2009). Experiments on pattern-based ontology 
design. In Proceedings of the fifth international conference on Knowledge capture 
(pp. 41–48). 
Blomqvist, E., Presutti, V., Daga, E., & Gangemi, A. (2010). Experimenting with eXtreme 
design. Knowledge Engineering and Management by the Masses, 120–134. 
Braine, M. D. (1978). On the relation between the natural logic of reasoning and standard 
logic. Psychological Review, 85(1), 1. 
Braine, M. D., & O’Brien, D. P. (1991). A theory of if: A lexical entry, reasoning program, 
and pragmatic principles. Psychological Review, 98(2), 182. 
Bucciarelli, M., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1999). Strategies in syllogistic reasoning. Cognitive 
Science, 23(3), 247–303. 
Byrne, R. M. (1989). Suppressing valid inferences with conditionals. Cognition, 31(1), 61–
83. 
Card, S. K., Moran, T. P., & Newell, A. (1983). The psychology of human-computer 
interaction. CRC. 
Carston, R. (1998). Informativeness, relevance and scalar implicature. PRAGMATICS AND 
BEYOND NEW SERIES, 179–238. 
Chang, B. K. W., Lefevre, M., Guin, N., & Champin, P.-A. (2015). SPARE-LNC: un langage 
naturel contrôlé pour l’interrogation de traces d’interactions stockées dans une base 
RDF. In IC2015. Rennes, France. 
 216 
 
Chapman, P., Stapleton, G., Howse, J., & Oliver, I. (2011). Deriving sound inference rules 
for concept diagrams. In Visual Languages and Human-Centric Computing 
(VL/HCC), 2011 IEEE Symposium on (pp. 87–94). IEEE. 
Cheng, P. C. (2012). Visualizing syllogisms: category pattern diagrams versus Venn 
diagrams. Retrieved from http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/41053/ 
Cockburn, A., & McKenzie, B. (2001). 3D or not 3D?: evaluating the effect of the third 
dimension in a document management system. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI 
conference on Human factors in computing systems (pp. 434–441). ACM. 
Codd, E. F. (1970). A Relational Model of Data for Large Shared Data Banks. Commun. 
ACM, 13(6), 377–387. https://doi.org/10.1145/362384.362685 
Compton, M., Barnaghi, P., Bermudez, L., García-Castro, R., Corcho, O., Cox, S., … others. 
(2012). The SSN ontology of the W3C semantic sensor network incubator group. 
Web Semantics: Science, Services and Agents on the World Wide Web, 17, 25–32. 
Costa, A., Foucart, A., Arnon, I., Aparici, M., & Apesteguia, J. (2014). “Piensa” twice: on 
the foreign language effect in decision making. Cognition, 130(2), 236–254. 
Craik, K. J. W. (1967). The nature of explanation. CUP Archive. 
Cregan, A., Schwitter, R., & Meyer, T. (2007). Sydney OWL Syntax-towards a Controlled 
Natural Language Syntax for OWL 1.1. In OWLED (Vol. 258). 
Dau, F., & Eklund, P. (2008). A diagrammatic reasoning system for the description logic 
ALC. Journal of Visual Languages & Computing, 19(5), 539–573. 
Denaux, R., Dimitrova, V., Cohn, A. G., Dolbear, C., & Hart, G. (2010). Rabbit to OWL: 
ontology authoring with a CNL-based tool. In Controlled Natural Language (pp. 
246–264). Springer. 
Dimitrova, V., Denaux, R., Hart, G., Dolbear, C., Holt, I., & Cohn, A. G. (2008). Involving 
domain experts in authoring OWL ontologies. Springer. 
do Amaral, F. N. (2013). Model outlines: A visual language for DL concept descriptions. 
Semantic Web, 4(4), 429–455. 
Dodds, L., & Davis, I. (2012). Linked Data Patterns. Retrieved from 
http://patterns.dataincubator.org/book/ 
Easterbrook, S., Singer, J., Storey, M. A., & Damian, D. (2008). Selecting empirical methods 
for software engineering research. Guide to Advanced Empirical Software 
Engineering, 285–311. 
Ehrlich, K., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1982). Spatial descriptions and referential continuity. 
Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 21(3), 296–306. 
Engelbrecht, P., Hart, G., & Dolbear, C. (2010). Talking rabbit: a user evaluation of sentence 
production. In Controlled Natural Language (pp. 56–64). Springer. 
Ericsson, K. A., & Simon, H. A. (1998). How to study thinking in everyday life: Contrasting 
think-aloud protocols with descriptions and explanations of thinking. Mind, Culture, 
and Activity, 5(3), 178–186. 
Ericsson, K., & Simon, H. (1984). Protocol analysis: Verbal reports as data. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. 
Euler, L. (1843). Lettres à une princesse d’Allemagne: sur divers sujets de physique & de 
philosophie. PPUR presses polytechniques. 
Evans, J. S. B. (2003). In two minds: dual-process accounts of reasoning. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 7(10), 454–459. 
Falbo, R., Guizzardi, G., Gangemi, A., & Presutti, V. (2013). Ontology patterns: clarifying 
conceptsa and terminology. Presented at the Workshop on Ontology and Semantic 
Web Patterns - WOP2013, Sydney, Australia. Retrieved from 
http://ontologydesignpatterns.org/wiki/WOP:2013 
Ford, M. (1995). Two modes of mental representation and problem solution in syllogistic 
reasoning. Cognition, 54(1), 1–71. 
 217 
 
Fuchs, N. E., Kaljurand, K., & Schneider, G. (2006). Attempto Controlled English Meets 
the Challenges of Knowledge Representation, Reasoning, Interoperability and User 
Interfaces. In FLAIRS Conference (Vol. 12, pp. 664–669). 
Gallego, M. A., Fernández, J. D., Martínez-Prieto, M. A., & de la Fuente, P. (2011). An 
empirical study of real-world SPARQL queries. In 1st International Workshop on 
Usage Analysis and the Web of Data (USEWOD2011) at the 20th International 
World Wide Web Conference (WWW 2011), Hyderabad, India. 
Gangemi, A., & Presutti, V. (2009). Ontology design patterns. In Handbook on ontologies 
(pp. 221–243). Springer. 
Gennari, J. H., Musen, M. A., Fergerson, R. W., Grosso, W. E., Crubézy, M., Eriksson, H., 
… Tu, S. W. (2003). The evolution of Protégé: an environment for knowledge-based 
systems development. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, 58(1), 89–
123. 
Glimm, B., Hogan, A., Krötzsch, M., & Polleres, A. (2012). OWL: Yet to arrive on the Web 
of Data? arXiv Preprint arXiv:1202.0984. 
Glimm, B., Horrocks, I., Motik, B., Stoilos, G., & Wang, Z. (2014). HermiT: an OWL 2 
reasoner. Journal of Automated Reasoning, 53(3), 245–269. 
Grice, H. P. (1975). Logic and conversation. In P. Cole & J. L. Morgan, Syntax and 
Semantics, Volume 3: Speech Acts (pp. 41–58). 
Gruber, T. R. (1993). A translation approach to portable ontology specifications. Knowledge 
Acquisition, 5(2), 199–220. 
Halford, G. S, Wilson, W. H., & Phillips, S. (1998). Processing capacity defined by relational 
complexity: Implications for comparative, developmental, and cognitive psychology. 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 21(06), 803–831. 
Halford, Graeme S., & Andrews, G. (2004). : The development of deductive reasoning: How 
important is complexity? Thinking & Reasoning, 10(2), 123–145. 
Halford, Graeme S., Baker, R., McCredden, J. E., & Bain, J. D. (2005). How many variables 
can humans process? Psychological Science, 16(1), 70–76. 
Halford, Graeme S., Cowan, N., & Andrews, G. (2007). Separating cognitive capacity from 
knowledge: A new hypothesis. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11(6), 236–242. 
Halford, Graeme S., Wilson, W. H., & Phillips, S. (2010). Relational knowledge: The 
foundation of higher cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 14(11), 497–505. 
Halpin, T., & Curland, M. (2011). Enriched support for ring constraints. In On the Move to 
Meaningful Internet Systems: OTM 2011 Workshops (pp. 309–318). Springer. 
Hammar, K. (2014). Ontology Design Patterns: Improving Findability and Composition. In 
The Semantic Web: ESWC 2014 Satellite Events (pp. 3–13). Springer. 
Hart, G., Dolbear, C., & Goodwin, J. (2007). Lege Feliciter: Using Structured English to 
represent a Topographic Hydrology Ontology. In OWLED. 
Hendler, J. (2015). On beyond OWL. Presented at the OWLED 2015. Retrieved from 
http://www.slideshare.net/jahendler/on-beyond-owl-challenges-for-ontologies-on-
the-web 
Hitzler, P., Kroetzsch, M., Parsia, B., & Rudolph, S. (2012). OWL 2 Web Ontology Language  
Primer (Second Edition). Retrieved from http://www.w3.org/TR/owl2-primer/ 
Hoekstra, R. (2009). Ontology Representation : design patterns and ontologies that make 
sense (Ph.D. dissertation). Retrieved from http://dare.uva.nl/document/2/68623 
Hopkins, W., Marshall, S., Batterham, A., & Hanin, J. (2009). Progressive statistics for 
studies in sports medicine and exercise science. Medicine+ Science in Sports+ 
Exercise, 41(1), 3. 
Horridge, M., Aranguren, M. E., Mortensen, J., Musen, M., & Noy, N. F. (2012). Ontology 
Design Pattern Language Expressivity Requirements (Vol. 929). Presented at the 
WOP 2012 workshop on ontology patterns, Boston, MA. 
 218 
 
Horridge, M., Bail, S., Parsia, B., & Sattler, U. (2011). The cognitive complexity of OWL 
justifications. The Semantic Web–ISWC 2011, 241–256. 
Horridge, M., Drummond, N., Goodwin, J., Rector, A., Stevens, R., & Wang, H. H. (2006). 
The manchester owl syntax. OWL: Experiences and Directions. 
Horridge, M., & Patel-Schneider, P. (2012). OWL 2 Web Ontology Language  Manchester 
Syntax (Second Edition). Retrieved from http://www.w3.org/TR/owl2-manchester-
syntax/ 
Horridge, Matthew. (2011). A Practical Guide To Building OWL Ontologies Using Protégé 
4 and CO-ODE Tools Edition1. 3. The University of Manchester. 
Horridge, Matthew, & Patel-Schneider, P. F. (2008). Manchester syntax for OWL 1.1. OWL: 
Experiences and Directions, Washington, DC. 
Horrocks, I. (2002). DAML+OIL: A Description Logic for the Semantic Web. IEEE Data 
Eng. Bull., 25(1), 4–9. 
Horrocks, I., Patel-Schneider, P. F., Boley, H., Tabet, S., Grosof, B., Dean, M., & others. 
(2004). SWRL: A semantic web rule language combining OWL and RuleML. W3C 
Member Submission, 21, 79. 
Howse, J., Stapleton, G., Taylor, K., & Chapman, P. (2011). Visualizing ontologies: a case 
study. The Semantic Web–ISWC 2011, 257–272. 
Hussain, A., Latif, K., Rextin, A., Hayat, A., & Alam, M. (2014). Scalable visualization of 
semantic nets using power-law graphs. Applied Mathematics & Information 
Sciences, 8(1), 355–367. 
Iannone, L., Rector, A., & Stevens, R. (2009). Embedding knowledge patterns into owl. The 
Semantic Web: Research and Applications, 218–232. 
Ioannidis, J. P. (2005). Why most published research findings are false. PLoS Medicine, 
2(8), e124. 
Jagadish, H. V., Chapman, A., Elkiss, A., Jayapandian, M., Li, Y., Nandi, A., & Yu, C. 
(2007). Making database systems usable. In Proceedings of the 2007 ACM SIGMOD 
international conference on Management of data (pp. 13–24). ACM. 
Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2004). The history of mental models. In K. Manktelow & M. Chung 
(Eds.), Psychology of reasoning: Theoretical and historical perspectives (p. 179). 
Psychology Press. 
Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2010). Against logical form. Psychologica Belgica, 50(3), 193–221. 
Johnson-Laird, Philip N. (1994). Mental models and probabilistic thinking. Cognition, 50(1–
3), 189–209. 
Johnson-Laird, Philip N. (1999). Deductive reasoning. Annual Review of Psychology, 50(1), 
109–135. 
Johnson-Laird, Philip N. (2005). Mental models and thought. The Cambridge Handbook of 
Thinking and Reasoning, 185–208. 
Johnson-Laird, Philip N, & Bara, B. G. (1984). Syllogistic inference. Cognition, 16(1), 1–
61. 
Johnson-Laird, Philip N., & Byrne, R. M. (1989). Only Reasoning. Journal of Memory and 
Language, 28(3), 313–330. 
Johnson-Laird, Philip N., & Byrne, R. M. (2002). Conditionals: a theory of meaning, 
pragmatics, and inference. Psychological Review, 109(4), 646. 
Johnson-Laird, Philip N., Byrne, R. M., & Schaeken, W. (1992). Propositional reasoning by 
model. Psychological Review, 99(3), 418. 
Johnson-Laird, Philip N., Byrne, R. M., & Tabossi, P. (1989). Reasoning by model: The case 
of multiple quantification. Psychological Review, 96(4), 658. 
Johnson-Laird, Philip Nicholas, & Byrne, R. M. (1991). Deduction. Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, Inc. 
 219 
 
Jupp, S., Horridge, M., Iannone, L., Klein, J., Owen, S., Schanstra, J., … Stevens, R. (2012). 
Populous: a tool for building OWL ontologies from templates. BMC Bioinformatics, 
13(Suppl 1), S5. 
Kaljurand, K. (2007). Attempto controlled English as a Semantic Web language, Ph.D. 
thesis. Faculty of Mathematics and Computer Science, University of Tartu. 
Kaljurand, K. (2008). ACE View—an Ontology and Rule Editor based on Attempto 
Controlled English. In OWLED. 
Kalyanpur, A., Parsia, B., Sirin, E., & Cuenca-Grau, B. (2006). Repairing unsatisfiable 
concepts in OWL ontologies. Springer. 
Kalyanpur, A., Parsia, B., Sirin, E., Grau, B. C., & Hendler, J. (2006). Swoop: A web 
ontology editing browser. Web Semantics: Science, Services and Agents on the World 
Wide Web, 4(2), 144–153. 
Katifori, A., Halatsis, C., Lepouras, G., Vassilakis, C., & Giannopoulou, E. (2007). Ontology 
visualization methods—a survey. ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR), 39(4), 10. 
Kazakov, Y., Krötzsch, M., & Simancik, F. (2012). ELK Reasoner: Architecture and 
Evaluation. In ORE. 
Khan, M. T., & Blomqvist, E. (2010). Ontology design pattern detection-initial method and 
usage scenarios. In SEMAPRO 2010, The Fourth International Conference on 
Advances in Semantic Processing (pp. 19–24). 
Khemlani, S., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2012). Theories of the syllogism: A meta-analysis. 
Psychological Bulletin, 138(3), 427. 
Khemlani, S., Orenes, I., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2012a). Negating compound sentences. 
Naval Research Lab, Washington DC, Navy Center for Applied Research in 
Artificial Intelligence. Retrieved from 
http://mindmodeling.org/cogsci2012/papers/0110/paper0110.pdf 
Khemlani, S., Orenes, I., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2012b). Negation: A theory of its meaning, 
representation, and use. Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 24(5), 541–559. 
Kifer, M., & Lausen, G. (1989). F-logic: a higher-order language for reasoning about objects, 
inheritance, and scheme. In ACM SIGMOD Record (Vol. 18, pp. 134–146). ACM. 
Křemen, P., Šmíd, M., & Kouba, Z. (2011). OWLDiff: A practical tool for comparison and 
merge of OWL ontologies. In Database and Expert Systems Applications (DEXA), 
2011 22nd International Workshop on (pp. 229–233). IEEE. 
Krötzsch, M., Simancik, F., & Horrocks, I. (2012a). A description logic primer. arXiv 
Preprint arXiv:1201.4089. Retrieved from http://arxiv.org/abs/1201.4089 
Krötzsch, M., Simancik, F., & Horrocks, I. (2012b). A description logic primer. arXiv 
Preprint arXiv:1201.4089. 
Krötzsch, M., Vrandečić, D., & Völkel, M. (2006). Semantic mediawiki. In International 
semantic web conference (pp. 935–942). Springer. 
Kuhn, T. (2013). The understandability of OWL statements in controlled English. Semantic 
Web, 4(1), 101–115. 
Kuhn, T. (2014). A survey and classification of controlled natural languages. Computational 
Linguistics, 40(1), 121–170. 
Lakoff, G. (1987). Women, fire, and dangerous things. University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago. 
Larkin, J. H., & Simon, H. A. (1987). Why a diagram is (sometimes) worth ten thousand 
words. Cognitive Science, 11(1), 65–100. 
Larson, S. D., & Martone, M. (2013). NeuroLex. org: an online framework for neuroscience 
knowledge. Frontiers in Neuroinformatics, 7, 18. 
Lassiter, D., & Goodman, N. D. (2015). How many kinds of reasoning? Inference, 
probability, and natural language semantics. Cognition, 136, 123–134. 
Levesque, H. J. (1988). Logic and the complexity of reasoning. Journal of Philosophical 
Logic, 17(4), 355–389. 
 220 
 
Lord, P. (2015). Take Wing: building ontologies with Tawny-OWL. Retrieved from 
http://homepages.cs.ncl.ac.uk/phillip.lord/take-wing/take_wing.pdf 
Lord, Phillip. (2013). The Semantic Web takes Wing: Programming Ontologies with Tawny-
OWL. arXiv Preprint arXiv:1303.0213. 
Matassoni, M., Rospocher, M., Dragoni, M., & Bouquet, P. (2014). Authoring OWL 2 
ontologies with the TEX-OWL syntax. 
McDonald, J. (2014). Mutliple comparisons. In Handbook of Biological Statistics. 
Baltimore: Sparky House Publishing. Retrieved from 
http://www.biostathandbook.com/multiplecomparisons.html 
Mendonça, E. A., Cimino, J. J., Campbell, K. E., & Spackman, K. A. (1998). Reproducibility 
of interpreting“ and” and“ or” in terminology systems. In Proceedings of the AMIA 
Symposium (p. 790). American Medical Informatics Association. 
Minsky, M. (1974). A framework for representing knowledge. 
Minsky, Marvin. (1975). A framework for representing knowledge. In P. H. Winston (Ed.), 
The Psychology of Computer Vision (pp. 211–277). McGraw-Hill. 
Möller, K., Hausenblas, M., Cyganiak, R., Grimnes, G., & Handschuh, S. (2010). Learning 
from Linked Open Data Usage: Patterns & Metrics. In WebSci10: Extending the 
Frontiers of Society On-Line. Raleigh, NC, US. 
Motik, B., Cuenca-Grau, B., Horrocks, I., Wu, Z., Fokoue, A., & Lutz, C. (2012). OWL 2 
Web Ontology Language  Profiles (Second Edition). W3C. Retrieved from 
https://www.w3.org/TR/owl2-profiles/ 
Motik, P., Patel-Schneider, P., & Parsia, B. (2012). OWL 2 Web Ontology Language  
Structural Specification and Functional-Style Syntax (Second Edition). 
Nardi, D., & Brachman, R. J. (2003). An introduction to description logics. The Description 
Logic Handbook: Theory, Implementation, and Applications, 1–40. 
Newstead, S. E. (1995). Gricean implicatures and syllogistic reasoning. Journal of Memory 
and Language, 34(5), 644. 
Nguyen, Power, Piwek, & Williams. (2012). Measuring the understandability of deduction 
rules for OWL. Presented at the First international workshop on debugging 
ontologies and ontology mappings, Galway, Ireland. 
Nguyen, T. A. T., Power, R., Piwek, P., & Williams, S. (2013). Predicting the 
understandability of OWL inferences. Retrieved from http://oro.open.ac.uk/36692/ 
Nickles, M. (2014). Functional-Logic Programming for Web Knowledge Representation, 
Sharing and Querying. In Knowledge Engineering and Knowledge Management (pp. 
333–338). Springer. 
North, C. (2006). Toward measuring visualization insight. IEEE Computer Graphics and 
Applications, 26(3), 6–9. 
Oaksford, M., & Chater, N. (2001). The probabilistic approach to human reasoning. Trends 
in Cognitive Sciences, 5(8), 349–357. 
Ogbuji, C. (2008). InfixOWL: An Idiomatic Interface for OWL. In OWLED (Vol. 432). 
Osborne, J. (2005). Notes on the use of data transformations. Practical Assessment, Research 
and Evaluation, 9(1), 42–50. 
Osherson, D. (1975). Logic and models of logical thinking. In R. J. Falmagne (Ed.), 
Reasoning: Representation and process in children and adults (pp. 81–91). 
Partee, B., & Rooth, M. (1983). Generalized conjunction and type ambiguity. Formal 
Semantics: The Essential Readings, 334–356. 
Patel-Schneider, P. F., Hayes, P., Horrocks, I., & others. (2004). OWL web ontology 
language semantics and abstract syntax. W3C Recommendation, 10. 
Peirce, C. S., & Sowa, J. F. (2000). Existential Graphs: MS 514 by Charles Sanders Peirce 
with commentary by John Sowa,. Retrieved from 
http://www.jfsowa.com/peirce/ms514.htm 
 221 
 
Peng, C.-Y. J., Lee, K. L., & Ingersoll, G. M. (2002). An introduction to logistic regression 
analysis and reporting. The Journal of Educational Research, 96(1), 3–14. 
Petre, M., & Blackwell, A. F. (1999). Mental imagery in program design and visual 
programming. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, 51(1), 7–30. 
Pinker, S. (2014). The Sense of Style: The Thinking Person’s Guide to Writing in the 21st 
Century. Penguin. 
Poveda-Villalón, M., Suárez-Figueroa, M. C., & Gómez-Pérez, A. (2012). Validating 
ontologies with OOPS! In Knowledge Engineering and Knowledge Management (pp. 
267–281). Springer. 
Power, R. (2010). Complexity assumptions in ontology verbalisation. In Proceedings of the 
ACL 2010 Conference Short Papers (pp. 132–136). 
Power, R., & Third, A. (2010). Expressing OWL axioms by English sentences: dubious in 
theory, feasible in practice. In Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on 
Computational Linguistics: Posters (pp. 1006–1013). 
Purchase, H. C. (2012). Experimental human-computer interaction: a practical guide with 
visual examples. Cambridge University Press. 
R Core Team. (2014). R: A language and environment for statistical computing. R 
Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria. 2013. ISBN 3-900051-07-0. 
Ragni, M., Eichhorn, C., & Kern-Isberner, G. (2016). Simulating Human Inferences in the 
Light of New Information: A Formal Analysis. In Proceedings of the 25th 
International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI. 
Ramakrishnan, S., & Vijayan, A. (2014). A study on development of cognitive support 
features in recent ontology visualization tools. Artificial Intelligence Review, 41(4), 
595–623. 
Rector, A. (2005). Representing Specified Values in OWL: “value partitions” and “value 
sets.” Retrieved from http://www.w3.org/TR/swbp-specified-values/ 
Rector, A., Drummond, N., Horridge, M., Rogers, J., Knublauch, H., Stevens, R., … Wroe, 
C. (2004). OWL pizzas: Practical experience of teaching OWL-DL: Common errors 
& common patterns. In Engineering Knowledge in the Age of the Semantic Web (pp. 
63–81). Springer. 
Rector, A. L. (2003). Defaults, context, and knowledge: Alternatives for OWL-indexed 
knowledge bases. In Pacific Symposium on Biocomputing (pp. 226–237). 
Rico, M., Unger, C., & Cimiano, P. (2015). Sorry, I only speak natural language: a pattern-
based, data-driven and guided approach to mapping natural language to SPARQL. 
In Intelligent Exploration of Semantic Data (IESD) 2015. 
Rips, L. J. (2001b). Reasoning imperialism. Common Sense, Reasoning, and Rationality, 
215–235. 
Rips, L. J. (2001a). Two kinds of reasoning. Psychological Science, 12(2), 129–134. 
Rips, L. J. (1983). Cognitive processes in propositional reasoning. Psychological Review, 
90(1), 38. 
Ritchie, D. G. (1896). The Relation of Logic to Psychology. The Philosophical Review, 5(6), 
585–600. 
Sánchez, J., Cañas, A. J., & Novak, J. D. (2010). The universality and ubiquitousness of 
concept maps. 
Sato, Y., & Mineshima, K. (2016). Human Reasoning with Proportional Quantifiers and Its 
Support by Diagrams. In International Conference on Theory and Application of 
Diagrams (pp. 123–138). Springer. 
Scheuermann, A., Motta, E., Mulholland, P., Gangemi, A., & Presutti, V. (2013). An 
empirical perspective on representing time. In Proceedings of the seventh 
international conference on Knowledge capture (pp. 89–96). ACM. 
 222 
 
Schwitter, R., Kaljurand, K., Cregan, A., Dolbear, C., & Hart, G. (2008). A comparison of 
three controlled natural languages for OWL 1.1. In 4th OWL Experiences and 
Directions Workshop (OWLED 2008 DC), Washington. 
Scott, D. (2012). Tukey’s ladder of powers. Rice University. Retrieved from 
http://onlinestatbook.com/2/transformations/tukey.html 
Shaffer, J. P. (1995). Multiple hypothesis testing. Annual Review of Psychology, 46(1), 561–
584. 
Shams, Z., Jamnik, M., Stapleton, G., & Sato, Y. (2017). Reasoning with Concept Diagrams 
About Antipatterns in Ontologies. In International Conference on Intelligent 
Computer Mathematics (pp. 255–271). Springer. 
Shapiro, S. S., & Wilk, M. B. (1965). An analysis of variance test for normality (complete 
samples). Biometrika, 591–611. 
Shaw, R. G., & Mitchell-Olds, T. (1993). ANOVA for unbalanced data: an overview. 
Ecology, 74(6), 1638–1645. 
Shneiderman, B. (1978). Improving the human factors aspect of database interactions. ACM 
Transactions on Database Systems (TODS), 3(4), 417–439. 
Sloman, S. A. (1996). The empirical case for two systems of reasoning. Psychological 
Bulletin, 119(1), 3. 
Smart, P. R. (2008). Controlled natural languages and the semantic web. Retrieved from 
http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/265735/ 
Sowa, J. F. (2000). Knowledge representation: logical, philosophical, and computational 
foundations. Brooks/Cole. 
Stapleton, G., Howse, J., Bonnington, A., & Burton, J. (2014). A vision for diagrammatic 
ontology engineering. Retrieved from http://eprints.brighton.ac.uk/13046/ 
Stapleton, G., Howse, J., Taylor, K., Delaney, A., Burton, J., & Chapman, P. (2013). 
Towards Diagrammatic Ontology Patterns. Presented at the 4th Workshop on 
Ontology and Semantic Web Patterns, Sydney, Australia. Retrieved from 
http://ontologydesignpatterns.org/wiki/WOP:2013 
Stenning, K., & Van Lambalgen, M. (2008). Human reasoning and cognitive science. MIT 
Press. 
Stenning, K., & Yule, P. (1997). Image and language in human reasoning: A syllogistic 
illustration. Cognitive Psychology, 34, 109–159. 
Storey, M. A., Musen, M., Silva, J., Best, C., Ernst, N., Fergerson, R., & Noy, N. (2001). 
Jambalaya: Interactive visualization to enhance ontology authoring and knowledge 
acquisition in Protégé. 
Störring, G. (1908). Experimentelle  Untersuchungen  über  einfache  Schlussprozesse. 
Archiv Für Die Gesamte Psychologie, 11, 1–27. 
Strawson, P. F. (1952). Introduction to logical theory. Routledge. 
Tempich, C., & Volz, R. (2003). Towards a benchmark for Semantic Web reasoners-an 
analysis of the DAML ontology library. In EON (Vol. 87). 
Thomas, J. C., & Gould, J. D. (1975). A Psychological Study of Query by Example. In 
Proceedings of the May 19-22, 1975, National Computer Conference and Exposition 
(pp. 439–445). New York, NY, USA: ACM. 
https://doi.org/10.1145/1499949.1500035 
TopQuadrant. (2014). TopBraid Composer - Getting started guide version 4.5. Retrieved 
from http://www.topquadrant.com/docs/TBC-Getting-Started-Guide40.pdf 
Tukey, J. W. (1949). Comparing individual means in the analysis of variance. Biometrics, 
99–114. 
van Schaik, P., & Weston, M. (2016). Magnitude-based inference and its application in user 
research. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, 88, 38–50. 
 223 
 
Vigo, M, Jay, C., & Stevens, R. (2014a). Design insights for the next wave ontology 
authoring tools. Presented at the ACM SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in 
Computing Systems, CHI 2014, Toronto, Canada: ACM Press. 
Vigo, M, Jay, C., & Stevens, R. (2014b). Protege4US: harvesting ontology authoring data 
with Protege. Presented at the HSWI2014 - Human Semantic Web Interaction 
Workshop, Crete. 
Vigo, Markel, Jay, C., & Stevens, R. (2015). Constructing conceptual knowledge artefacts: 
activity patterns in the ontology authoring process. In Proceedings of the 33rd 
Annual ACM Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (pp. 3385–3394). 
ACM. 
W3C. (2001). Web Ontology Language (OWL). Retrieved from 
http://www.w3.org/2001/sw/wiki/OWL 
Warren, P. (2013). Ontology Users’ Survey - Summary of Results (KMi Tech Report No. 
kmi-13-01). Retrieved from http://kmi.open.ac.uk/publications/pdf/kmi-13-01.pdf 
Warren, P. (2014). Ontology patterns: a survey into their use (KMi Tech Report No. kmi-
14-02). Retrieved from http://kmi.open.ac.uk/publications/pdf/kmi-14-02.pdf 
Warren, P., Mulholland, P, Collins, T, & Motta, E. (2014). The usability of Description 
Logics: understanding the cognitive difficulties presented by Description Logics (pp. 
550–564). Presented at the ESWC 2014, Crete: Springer. 
Warren, P., Mulholland, P., Collins, T., & Motta, E. (2014). Using ontologies. In 
International Conference on Knowledge Engineering and Knowledge Management 
(pp. 579–590). Springer. 
Warren, P., Mulholland, P., Collins, T., & Motta, E. (2015). Making sense of description 
logics. In Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Semantic Systems 
(pp. 49–56). ACM. 
Warren, P., Mulholland, P., Collins, T., & Motta, E. (2017). Improving the 
Comprehensibility of Description Logics - Applying insights from theories of 
reasoning and language. Presented at the ESWC 2017, Portoroz, Slovenia: Springer. 
Wason, P. C. (1959). The processing of positive and negative information. Quarterly Journal 
of Experimental Psychology, 11(2), 92–107. 
Wason, P. C. (1968). Reasoning about a rule. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 20(3), 273–281. 
Wason, P. C., & Shapiro, D. (1971). Natural and contrived experience in a reasoning 
problem. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 23(1), 63–71. 
Wilkins, M. C. (1929). The effect of changed material on ability to do formal syllogistic 
reasoning. Archives of Psychology. Retrieved from 
http://psycnet.apa.org/psycinfo/1929-04403-001 
Wittgenstein, L. (1922). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Yamauchi, T. (2007). The Semantic Web and Human Inference: A Lesson from Cognitive 
Science. In K. Aberer, K.-S. Choi, N. Noy, D. Allemang, K.-I. Lee, L. Nixon, … P. 
Cudré-Mauroux (Eds.), The Semantic Web: 6th International Semantic Web 
Conference, 2nd Asian Semantic Web Conference, ISWC 2007 + ASWC 2007, 
Busan, Korea, November 11-15, 2007. Proceedings (pp. 609–622). Berlin, 
Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 
Zielinski, T. A., Goodwin, G. P., & Halford, G. S. (2010). Complexity of categorical 
syllogisms: An integration of two metrics. European Journal of Cognitive 
Psychology, 22(3), 391–421. 
 225 
 
Appendix A: study 1 - reasoning steps for valid questions 
 
This appendix describes the reasoning steps for each of the valid questions in study 1.  Where 
a derivation requires more than one step, numbers in square brackets are used to indicate the 
provenance of statements derived from previous steps.  All other statements are either from 
the pattern or the specific question. 
A1 Componency pattern 
 
Class Object   SubClassOf has_component only Object 
    SubClassOf is_component_of only Object 
Property has_part  Characteristics Transitive 
Property is_part_of  Characteristics Transitive 
InverseOf   has_part 
Property has_component SubPropertyOf has_part 
Property is_component_of SubPropertyOf is_part_of 
    InverseOf has_component 
 
Questions are numbered as in Table 6.7. 
A1.1 Question 2 
A is_part_of B 
B is_part_of C 
⇒ A is_part_of C 
 
Step no. Reasoning 
1 is_part_of Characteristics Transitive; A is_part_of B; B is_part_of C 
⇒ A is_part_of C 
  
A1.2 Question 3 
B is_part_of C 
A is_part_of B 
⇒ A is_part_of C 
 
Step no. Reasoning 
1 is_part_of Characteristics Transitive; B is_part_of C; A is_part_of B 
⇒ A is_part_of C 
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A1.3 Question 5 
A has_component B 
B has_component C 
⇒ A has_part C 
 
Step no Reasoning 
1 A has_component B; has_component SubPropertyOf has_part  
⇒ A has_part B 
2 B has_component C; has_component SubPropertyOf has_part  
⇒ B has_part C 
3 has_part Characteristics Transitive; A has_part B [1]; B has_part C [2]  
⇒ A has_part C 
 
A1.4 Question 7 
A has_component B 
C is_part_of B 
⇒ A has_part C 
 
Step no Reasoning 
1 A has_component B; has_component SubPropertyOf has_part  
⇒ A has_part B 
2 C is_part_of B; is_part_of InverseOf has_part  
⇒ B has_part C 
3 has_part Characteristics Transitive; A has_part B [1]; B has_part C [2]  
⇒ A has_part C 
 
A1.5 Question 8 
A Type Object 
A has_component B 
C Type not Object 
⇒ B DifferentFrom C 
 
Step no Reasoning 
1 Class Object SubClassOf has_component only Object 
A Type Object; A has_component B ⇒ B Type Object 
2 B Type Object [1]; C Type not Object ⇒ B DifferentFrom C  
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A1.6 Question 10 
A has_component B 
C is_component_of B 
⇒ C is_part_of A 
 
Step no Reasoning 
1 has_component SubPropertyOf has_part; A has_component B  
⇒ A has_part B 
2 is_part_of InverseOf has_part; A has_part B [1] ⇒ B is_part_of A 
3 is_component_of SubPropertyOf is_part_of; C is_component_of B  
⇒ C is_part_of B 
4 is_part_of Characteristics Transitive; B is_part_of A [2]; C is_part_of B [3] 
⇒ C is_part_of A 
 
A2 Modified coparticipation pattern 
 
Class Event   EquivalentTo has_participant some Object 
    DisjointWith Object 
Class Object   DisjointWith Event 
Class Player   SubClassOf Object 
Class Game   SubClassOf has_participant some Player 
Property coparticipates_with Domain Object, Range Object 
    Characteristics Symmetric, Transitive 
Property has_participant Domain Event, Range Object 
    InverseOf is_participant_in 
 
Questions are numbered as in Table 6.9. 
A2.1 Question 1 
A coparticipates_with B 
⇒ A Type not Event  
 
Step no Reasoning 
1 A coparticipates_with B; coparticipates_with Domain Object  
⇒ A Type Object  
2 A Type Object [1]; Object DisjointWith Event ⇒ A Type not Event  
 
  
 228 
 
A2.2 Question 4 
A has_participant B 
C is_participant_in D 
⇒ B DifferentFrom D 
 
Step no Reasoning 
1 A has_participant B; has_participant Range Object ⇒ B Type Object  
2 C is_participant_in D; is_participant_in InverseOf has_participant  
⇒ D has_participant C 
3 D has_participant C [2]; has_participant Domain Event ⇒ D Type Event 
4 B Type Object [1]; D Type Event [3]; Object DisjointWith Event  
⇒ B DifferentFrom D 
 
A2.3 Question 5 
B coparticipates_with A 
B coparticipates_with C 
⇒ C coparticipates_with A  
 
Step no Reasoning 
1 B coparticipates_with C;  
coparticipates_with Characteristics Symmetric  
⇒ C coparticipates_with B  
2 coparticipates_with Characteristics Transitive 
C coparticipates_with B [1] 
B coparticipates_with A 
⇒ C coparticipates_with A 
 
A2.4 Question 6 
A Type Game 
⇒ A Type Event 
 
Step no Reasoning 
1 A Type Game; Game SubClassOf has_participant some Player 
⇒ A Type has_participant some Player 
2 A Type has_participant some Player [1]; Player SubClassOf Object  
⇒ A Type has_participant some Object 
3 A Type has_participant some Object [2] 
Event EquivalentTo has_participant some Object 
⇒ A Type Event 
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A3 Modified types of entities pattern 
 
Class Entity   EquivalentTo Event or Abstract or Quality or Object 
Class Event   SubClassOf Entity 
    DisjointWith Abstract, Quality, Object 
Class Abstract   SubClassOf Entity 
    DisjointWith Event, Quality, Object 
Class Quality   SubClassOf Entity 
    DisjointWith Event, Abstract, Object 
Class Object   SubClassOf Entity 
    DisjointWith Event, Abstract, Quality 
Class Nonconceptual  EquivalentTo Event or Object 
Class Nontemporal  EquivalentTo Abstract or Quality or Object 
Property represents  Characteristic Functional 
 
Questions are numbered as in Table 6.11. 
A3.1 Question 3 
A represents B 
C represents D 
B Type Object 
D Type Event 
A DifferentFrom C 
 
Step no Reasoning 
1 B Type Object; D Type Event; Object DisjointWith Event 
⇒ B DifferentFrom D 
2 represents Characteristic Functional; B DifferentFrom D [1] 
A represents B; C represents D 
⇒ A DifferentFrom C 
 
A3.2 Question 4 
A Type Entity 
A Type not (Event or Quality) 
⇒ A Type Abstract or Object 
 
Step no Reasoning 
1 A Type Entity 
Entity EquivalentTo Event or Abstract or Quality or Object  
⇒ A Type (Event or Abstract or Quality or Object) 
2 A Type not (Event or Quality) 
A Type (Event or Abstract or Quality or Object) [1] 
⇒ A Type (Abstract or Quality) 
 
N.B. The treatment above reaches the conclusion in step 2 by removing Event and Quality, 
in the first line of step 2, from Event or Abstract or Quality or Object, in the second line of 
step 2.  A more formal, algebraic, approach would be to expand not (Event or Quality) to 
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become not Event and not Quality and then form the conjunction of not Event and not 
Quality and Event or Abstract or Quality or Object.  This algebraic approach would take 
several more steps. 
 
A3.3 Question 5 
A Type (Nonconceptual and Nontemporal) 
⇒ A Type Object 
 
Step no Reasoning 
1 A Type (Nonceptual and Nontemporal) 
Nonconceptual EquivalentTo Event or Object 
⇒ A Type ((Event or Object) and Nontemporal) 
2 A Type ((Event or Object) and Nontemporal) [1] 
Nontemporal EquivalentTo Abstract or Quality or Object 
⇒ A Type ((Event or Object) and (Abstract or Quality or Object) 
3 Event DisjointWith Abstract, Quality, Object 
Object DisjointWith Event, Abstract, Quality 
A Type ((Event or Object) and (Abstract or Quality or Object) [2] 
⇒ A Type Object 
 
The final step is dependent on Event being disjoint with Abstract, Quality and Object, and 
on Object being disjoint with Abstract and Quality.
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Appendix B: study 2 – reasoning steps for Boolean operator 
questions 
 
This appendix outlines the reasoning steps for each of the questions with valid conclusions 
in the section of study 2 relating to Boolean operators, see Section 7.4.  The steps described 
here are intended to represent how participants might tackle the questions, bearing in mind 
that they are working without pen and paper.  They do not correspond exactly to the 
manipulations which would be made by someone trained in Boolean logic and working with 
pen and paper.  Moreover, they do not necessarily represent a unique way of arriving at the 
correct result.  They do, however, illustrate the differing complexities of the questions. 
In what follows, the symbol ⋃ (i.e. the symbol for union, underlined) is used to represent 
disjoint union.  More usually, disjoint union is represented by ⋃ with a dot over it or within 
it; the convention used here is for typographical convenience.  The backslash (\) is used to 
denote relative complement, i.e. terms on the right-hand side of the backslash are removed 
from those on the left. 
B1 Question 1 
In question 1 we have: 
TOP_CLASS    ≡ A ⋃ B ⋃ C    (1.1) 
A ⋃ B ⋃ C \ A   ≡ B ⋃ C    (1.2) 
B ⋃ C \ B   ≡ C     (1.3) 
Thus, there are three steps.  The first is simply the expansion of TOP_CLASS.  The second 
is the most complex, requiring the manipulation of three classes and being of RC 3.  The 
third is of RC 2. 
B2 Question 2 
This question can be approached very similarly to question 1.  First, expand TOP_CLASS: 
TOP_CLASS    ≡ A ⋃ B ⋃ C    (2.1) 
Then remove the classes within the brackets: 
A ⋃ B ⋃ C \ (A ⋃ B)  ≡ A     (2.2) 
Step 2.2 is of RC 3.  Another way of representing the reasoning process would see step 2.2 
broken down into two steps, identical to steps 1.2 and 1.3 above; and still with a maximum 
RC of 3. 
B3 Question 3 
In question 3 we need to start by expanding the inner bracketed expression in the first 
statement, which in turn first requires the expansion of A.  After this A_1 needs to be 
removed: 
A    ≡ A_1 ⋃ A_2    (3.1) 
A_1 ⋃ A_2 \ A_1  ≡ A_2     (3.2) 
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TOP_CLASS then needs to be expanded, which is a two-stage process: 
TOP_CLASS   ≡ A ⋃ B    (3.3) 
A ⋃ B    ≡ A_1 ⋃ A_2 ⋃ B   (3.4) 
Then finally, A_2 (from 3.2) needs to be removed from the expression in 3.4: 
 A_1 ⋃ A_2 ⋃ B \ A_2 ≡ A_1 ⋃ B    (3.5) 
In all, this takes five steps and the maximum RC of 3 occurs at 3.5. 
B4 Question 5 
One approach here would be to start by expanding TOP_CLASS: 
TOP_CLASS   ≡ A ⋃ B    (5.1) 
Then, take account of the not (A … : 
A ⋃ B \ A   ≡ B     (5.2) 
Finally, re-inserting the A_1 gives A_1 ⋃ B 
This is simpler than for question 3, with a maximum RC of 2 at step 5.2. 
B5 Question 7 
The first step could be an expansion of TOP_CLASS: 
TOP_CLASS    ≡ A ⋃ B   (7.1) 
There are then two parallel paths corresponding to the two bracketed expressions containing 
TOP_CLASS.  The first bracketed expression gives: 
A ⋃ B \ A    ≡ B    (7.2) 
The second bracketed expression starts with the expansion of A and then requires the 
intersection with A_1: 
A ⋃ B     ≡ A_1 ⋃ A_2 ⋃ B  (7.3) 
(A_1 ⋃ A_2 ⋃ B) ⋂ A_1  ≡ A_1    (7.4) 
We then need to take the disjunction of these two bracketed expressions, as in the right-hand 
sides of 7.2 and 7.4, to give B ⋃ A_1.  The maximum RC 3 at 7.4, where three classes need 
to be manipulated. 
B6 Question 9 
Question 9 is more complex.  One strategy is to start by expanding the innermost bracket: 
A_1     ≡ A_1_X ⋃ A_1_Y   (9.1) 
(A_1_X ⋃ A_1_Y) \ A_1_X  ≡ A_1_Y    (9.2)  
Working outwards to the next bracket, expanding A in two stages and then removing A_1_Y: 
A     ≡ A_1 ⋃ A_2    (9.3) 
A_1 ⋃ A_2    ≡ A_1_X ⋃ A_1_Y ⋃ A_2  (9.4) 
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A_1_X ⋃ A_1_Y ⋃ A_2 \ A_1_Y ≡ A_1_X ⋃ A_2   (9.5) 
Then, TOP_CLASS needs to be expanded as far as is possible: 
 TOP_CLASS    ≡ A ⋃ B    (9.6) 
A ⋃ B     ≡ A_1 ⋃ A_2 ⋃ B   (9.7) 
A_1 ⋃ A_2 ⋃ B   ≡ A_1_X ⋃ A_1_Y ⋃ A_2 ⋃ B (9.8) 
Finally, the relative complement is then formed from the expanded TOP_CLASS in 9.8 and 
the expression in 9.5: 
A_1_X ⋃ A_1_Y ⋃ A_2 ⋃ B \ A_1_X ⋃ A_2 ≡ A_1_Y ⋃ B  (9.9) 
Not only does this process involve more steps than the previous questions, but the final step 
(9.9) involves the manipulation of four classes and is of RC 4. 
B7 Summary 
Questions 1, 2, 3 and 7 have maximum RC 3.  However, questions 3 and 7 do have more 
steps than questions 1 and 2.  This is consistent with the greater syntactic complexity of 
questions 3 and 7, and also their greater complexity when represented as mental models.  
Question 5, although semantically equivalent to questions 3 and 7, requires fewer steps and 
has maximum RC 2.  This comparative simplicity is not reflected in the accuracy of 
responses, consistent with the view that the complexity of the mental model is the major 
determinant of difficulty.  Finally, question 9 is more complex both in the number of steps 
required and in having maximum RC 4.  This additional complexity is reflected in reduced 
accuracy and increased response time; although only the latter effect was significant, see 
section 7.4.5.
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Appendix C: effect of sample size on response time comparison 
 
The analysis in this appendix is concerned with establishing an estimate for the number of 
samples required to achieve significance in a comparison of two groups, where the 
measurement is of a variate assumed to have a log-normal distribution with parameters μ 
and σ.  These are the mean and standard deviation of the underlying normal distribution, i.e. 
of the variate after a logarithmic transformation. 
The other assumptions made are: 
• The sample mean and standard deviation of the log-normal distribution correspond 
exactly to the mean and standard deviation of the underlying distributions.  These are 
represented by μL and σL. 
• The ratio of standard deviation to mean (σL / μL) is assumed to be 0.75 for both 
groups. 
• The number of samples in each group is the same.  This number is represented by n, 
i.e. there are 2n samples in all. 
C1 Parameters of the log-normal distribution  
The mean and standard deviation of a log-normal distribution can be represented in terms of 
the parameters μ and σ by: 
μL  = exp(μ + σ2/2)      (1) 
σL2 = exp(2μ + σ2) (exp(σ2) – 1) 
 = exp(2μ) exp(σ2) (exp(σ2) – 1)    (2) 
From (1),  
exp(μ) = μL exp(-σ2/2)      (3) 
Substituting for exp(μ) from (3) into (2) gives: 
σL2 = μL2 (exp(σ2) – 1)      (4) 
This leads to: 
σ2 = ln(1 + (σL / μL)2)      (5) 
Taking logarithms on each side of (3): 
μ = ln(μL) - σ2/2       (6) 
Substituting from (5) into (6): 
μ = ln(μL) – (ln(1 + (σL / μL)2))/2 
 = ln(μL / √(1 + (σL / μL)2))     (7) 
Equations (5) and (7) give the underlying parameters of the log-normal distribution in terms 
of the distribution’s mean and standard deviation. 
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C2 t-statistic 
In Chapters 6, 7 and 8, the t-statistic was calculated after taking the logarithmic 
transformation.  That is to say, the t-statistic was not calculated directly from the means and 
standard deviations of the response time distributions, but from the means and standard 
deviations of the distributions of the log of response time.  These correspond to μ and σ in 
the previous section, and in what follows are written μ1, σ1 and μ2, σ2 for the two groups.  On 
the assumption that the two groups have the same number of samples, n, then the t-statistic, 
with 2n-2 degrees of freedom, is given by: 
t(2n-2) = (μ1 - μ2) √n / (√(σ12 + σ22))      (8) 
Writing μL1 and μL2 for the means of response times for the two groups, again assuming that 
the sample means correspond to the population means, equation (6) gives: 
μ1 = ln(μL1) – σ12/2  and  μ2 = ln(μL2) – σ22/2  (9) 
If we assume that the ratio of standard deviation to mean is the same for both groups, 
represented by r, then using equation (5) above: 
σ12 = σ22 = ln(1 + r2)       (10) 
Using equations (9) and (10) to substitute for μ1, μ2, σ1 and σ2 in (8): 
t(2n-2) = (ln(μL1) – ln(μL2)) √n / √(2 ln(1+r2))    (11) 
To investigate relative differences, write μL1 = a μL2, so that (11) becomes: 
t(2n-2)  = ln(a) √n / √(2 ln(1+r2))     (12) 
The t-statistic is now a function only of a, the ratio between the two means, and r, the ratio 
of standard deviation to mean, which is assumed to be the same for both groups.  As 
discussed in Chapter 9, for the purposes of the example, this is taken to be 0.75. 
On this basis, for any given value of a, the t-statistic can be calculated for a range of values 
of n so as to obtain, by search, the minimum value of n to achieve significance at the 0.05 
level.  Table C-1 shows these minimum values.  This table is reproduced as Table 9-4 in 
subsection 9.5.2, where an alternative labelling in terms of percentage difference is used. 
Table C-1 Minimum group size to achieve significance 
a 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 
min. no. samples 379 105 52 32 23 17 14 12 10 9 
 
The table represents the minimum number of data points in each group.  As noted in Chapter 
9, this is based on a two-sided t-test; a one-sided test would require fewer points to achieve 
significance.  For a comparison of one question between participants, then the required 
number of participants would be twice the number shown; for a within-participants study, 
then the total number of participants would be as shown.  The number of participants 
required could be further reduced if more than one question was use for comparison. 
 
